Defendant's voluntary statements were admissible for impeachment even though they were obtained in violation of Miranda. State v. Mendoza, 96 W (2d) 106, 291 NW (2d) 478 (1980).
Where accused cut off initial interrogation but was interrogated by another officer 9 minutes later following fresh Miranda warning, confession was admissible. State v. Shaffer, 96 W (2d) 531, 292 NW (2d) 370 (Ct. App. 1980).
By testifying as to his actions on day murder was committed, defendant waived self-incrimination privilege on cross-examination as to previous actions, related to the murder, which were subject of pending prosecution. Neely v. State, 97 W (2d) 38, 292 NW (2d) 859 (1980).
Miranda warnings were unnecessary where officer entered defendant's home, in belief that defendant might have killed wife 4 days earlier, and asked "Where is your wife?". State v. Kraimer, 99 W (2d) 306, 298 NW (2d) 568 (1980).
Prosecutor's comment on failure of alibi witness to come forward with alibi story immediately did not infringe on defendant's right of silence. State v. Hoffman, 106 W (2d) 185, 316 NW (2d) 143 (Ct. App. 1982).
Defendant's silence both before and after Miranda warning may not be referred to at trial by prosecution. State v. Fencl, 109 W (2d) 224, 325 NW (2d) 703 (1982).
Videotapes of sobriety tests were properly admitted to show physical manifestation of defendant driver's intoxication. State v. Haefer, 110 W (2d) 381, 328 NW (2d) 894 (Ct. App. 1982).
John Doe subpoena requiring production of income tax returns violated self-incrimination right. B. M. v. State, 113 W (2d) 183, 335 NW (2d) 420 (Ct. App. 1983).
Statement given police, without Miranda warnings, while accused was in emergency room, that accused was driver in fatal crash, was admissible. State v. Clappes, 117 W (2d) 277, 344 NW (2d) 141 (1984).
After guilty plea, privilege against self-incrimination continues at least until sentencing. State v. McConnohie, 121 W (2d) 57, 358 NW (2d) 256 (1984).
Where defendant does not testify but presents own argument to jury, prosecutor may caution jury that defendant's statements are not evidence. State v. Johnson, 121 W (2d) 237, 358 NW (2d) 824 (Ct. App. 1984).
Where relative of accused contacted police and asked if anything could be done to help accused, subsequent confession elicited from accused by relative was inadmissible. Court lists factors to consider in determining when civilian becomes agent of police. State v. Lee, 122 W (2d) 266, 362 NW (2d) 149 (1985).
Where police knew that suspect had asked wife to contact attorney and didn't inform suspect when that attorney arrived at police station, confession obtained after attorney's arrival was inadmissible. State v. Middleton, 135 W (2d) 297, 399 NW (2d) 917 (Ct. App. 1986).
Police had no duty to inform suspect during custodial interrogation that lawyer retained by suspect's family was present. State v. Hanson, 136 W (2d) 195, 401 NW (2d) 771 (1987).
Incriminating statement by intoxicated defendant undergoing medical treatment for painful injuries was voluntary since there was no affirmative police misconduct compelling defendant to answer police questioning. State v. Clappes, 136 W (2d) 222, 401 NW (2d) 759 (1987).
"Rescue doctrine" exception to Miranda rule discussed. State v. Kunkel, 137 W (2d) 172, 404 NW (2d) 69 (Ct. App. 1987).
Probationer's answers to probation agent's questions are "compelled" and may not be used for any purpose in criminal trial. State v. Thompson, 142 W (2d) 821, 419 NW (2d) 564 (Ct. App. 1987).
Prosecution may comment on accused's pre-Miranda silence when accused elects to testify on own behalf. State v. Sorenson, 143 W (2d) 226, 421 NW (2d) 77 (1988).
"Functional equivalent" of direct custodial interrogation discussed. State v. Cunningham, 144 W (2d) 272, 423 NW (2d) 862 (1988).
Admission of involuntary or coerced confession is subject to harmless error test. State v. Childs, 146 W (2d) 116, 430 NW (2d) 353 (Ct. App. 1988).
Use of Goodchild testimony to impeach defendant's trial testimony does not violate privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Schultz, 152 W (2d) 408, 448 NW (2d) 424 (1989).
See note to 970.03, citing State v. Moats, 156 W (2d) 74, 457 NW (2d) 299 (1990).
Where psychiatrist did not comply with Miranda, constitution does not require exclusion of results of interview with defendant from competency phase of trial. State v. Lindh, 161 W (2d) 324, 468 NW (2d) 168 (1991).
Miranda does not require warning suspect that he has the right to stop answering questions. State v. Mitchell, 167 W (2d) 672, 482 NW (2d) 364 (1992).
Statement made after Miranda warnings but before contact with requested counsel is admissible for impeachment. Oregon v. Hass, 420 US 714.
Witness who refuses to testify on self-incrimination grounds after judge grants immunity may summarily be found in criminal contempt. United States v. Wilson, 421 US 309.
Use of defendant's income tax returns to prove gambling charge did not deny self-incrimination protection. Garner v. United States, 424 US 648.
Accused's silence during police interrogation lacked probative value for impeachment of alibi at trial. United States v. Hale, 422 US 171. See: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 US 610.
Voluntary interview at police station was not "custodial interrogation". Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 US 492.
Instruction given to jury over defense objection not to draw adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify did not violate self-incrimination right. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 US 333 (1978).
While statements made by defendant in circumstances violating Miranda protections are admissible for impeachment if their trustworthiness satisfies legal standards, any criminal trial use against defendant of involuntary statements is denial of due process. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385 (1978).
Testimony before grand jury under grant of immunity could not constitutionally be used for impeachment purposes in later criminal trial. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 US 450 (1979).
Explicit statement of waiver is not necessary to support finding that defendant waived Miranda rights. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 US 369 (1979).
Voluntary confession obtained during custodial interrogation following illegal arrest was inadmissible. Dunaway v. New York, 442 US 200 (1979).
Witness compelled by grant of immunity to testify despite claim of self-incrimination privilege was property prosecuted for perjured testimony. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 US 115 (1980).
Officer's comment that child might find loaded gun was not functional equivalent of questioning in violation of Miranda rights. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US 291 (1980).
Right of self-incrimination was not violated when defendant who testifies in own defense is impeached by use of defendant's prearrest silence. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 US 231 (1980).
Upon defendant's request, judge must instruct jury not to infer guilt from defendant's failure to testify. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 US 288 (1981).
Accused who requests counsel may not be interrogated without counsel unless accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981).
Where for impeachment purposes prosecution cross-examined defendant as to postarrest silence before defendant received Miranda warnings, due process was not violated. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 US 603 (1982).
Where prosecutor improperly commented to jury that defendants did not challenge certain accusations against them, court erred in reversing conviction on appeal without determining whether error was harmless. U.S. v. Hasting, 461 US 499 (1983).
Probationer under obligation to appear before probation officer and answer questions truthfully was not entitled to Miranda warnings; confession was, therefore, admissible. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 US 420 (1984).
Court adopts "inevitable discovery" exception to exclusionary rule. Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431 (1984).
Court adopts "public safety" exception to Miranda rule. Where accused, known to have had gun, did not have gun at time of arrest in supermarket, officer properly asked where the gun was before giving Miranda warnings. New York v. Quarles, 467 US 649 (1984).
Person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to Miranda warnings regardless of nature or severity of offense. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 (1984).
Suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning may later waive rights and confess after Miranda warnings are given. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298 (1985).
Police's failure to inform defendant that third party had retained counsel didn't invalidate defendant's waiver of Miranda rights. Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412 (1986).
Where no evidence is present suggesting that police officers sent suspect's wife in to see him with the hope of obtaining incriminating information, no "interrogation" was undertaken even though detective was present and tape recorded conversation. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 US 520 (1987).
Corporate records custodian may not resist subpoena for records on self-incrimination grounds, regardless of size of corporate entity. Braswell v. United States, 487 US 99 (1988).
Self-incrimination privilege does not support refusal to comply with juvenile court's order to produce child. Baltimore Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 US 474, 107 LEd 2d 992 (1990).
Undercover officer is not required to give Miranda warnings to suspect before surreptitious custodial interrogation. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 US 292, 110 LEd 2d 243 (1990).
When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and may not be reinstated without counsel present even though the accused previously did have an opportunity to consult an attorney. Minnich v. Mississippi, 498 US , 112 LEd 2d 489 (1990).
Admission of coerced confession may be found to be "harmless error". Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 US , 113 LEd 2d 302 (1991).
Sixth amendment right to counsel is offense specific; an accused's invocation of this right during a judicial proceeding did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda arising from the 5th amendment guarantees against self incrimination in regard to police questioning concerning a separate offense. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 US , 115 LEd 2d 158 (1991).
Collateral estoppel barred state from introducing evidence of van theft as overt act in conspiracy charge where accuseds had earlier been acquitted in van theft trial. Accused's silence prior to receiving Miranda warnings was properly used to impeach accused; prosecution's reference to post-Miranda silence was harmless error. Feela v. Israel, 727 F (2d) 151 (1984).
Assertion of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in federal civil litigation: Rights and remedies. Daskal, 64 MLR 243 (1980).
Privilege against self-incrimination-truthful statements may be used in a perjury prosecution. 64 MLR 744 (1981).
The privilege against self-incrimination in civil commitment proceedings. 1980 WLR 697.
I,9 Remedy for wrongs. Section 9. Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
The trial court's holding that plaintiff's claim was barred because the period of limitations ran from the time the last architectural services were performed is not sustained, for to so read the statute, although susceptible of that literal meaning, would reveal a constitutionally impermissible legislative intent to negate a right statutorily recognized in 893.14. Rosenthal v. Kurtz, 62 W (2d) 1, 213 NW (2d) 741, 216 NW (2d) 252.
The constitutional guaranty, which insures a remedy for injuries to person and property does not, as contended, give plaintiffs a constitutional right to sue the state in tort, because there is no right of a citizen to hold his sovereign substantively liable therefor, and the state, being immune from suit without its consent, may define the conditions under which it will permit actions against itself. Cords v. State, 62 W (2d) 42, 214 NW (2d) 405.
In consonance with the Wisconsin constitutional mandate entitling every person to a remedy in the law for injury or wrong, the supreme court departs herein from the former traditional common-law rule and extends the line of recovery against the seducer to the woman herself, because the seducer's reprehensible and tortious conduct merits his response therefor in damages. Slawek v. Stroh, 62 W (2d) 295, 215 NW (2d) 9.
Sec. 9 does not entitle state litigants to the exact remedy they desire, but merely to their day in court, hence 138.06 (7), providing that retail sellers shall refund excess interest charged before October 9, 1970, upon written individual demand is a certain remedy. Wiener v. J. C. Penney Co. 65 W (2d) 139, 222 NW (2d) 149.
893.155, Stats. (1973) is unconstitutional in denying plaintiffs a remedy for a wrong recognized. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 W (2d) 382, 225 NW (2d) 454.
Illegal aliens have right to sue in Wisconsin for injuries negligently inflicted upon them. Arteaga v. Literski, 83 W (2d) 128, 265 NW (2d) 148 (1978).
No legal rights are conferred by this section. Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp. 95 W (2d) 173, 290 NW (2d) 176 (1980).
Pre-1981 statutory paternity proceedings, which vested exclusive authority in district attorney to commence paternity action, unconstitutionally denied child "day in court". Accordingly, child's action was not barred by any statute of limitations. In re Paternity of R.W.L. 116 W (2d) 150, 341 NW (2d) 682 (1984).
Court fashions remedy for victims of synthetic hormone, DES, which was manufactured in generic form by many drug companies. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. 116 W (2d) 166, 342 NW (2d) 37 (1984).
State is not entitled to protection under this section. State v. Halverson, 130 W (2d) 300, 387 NW (2d) 124 (Ct. App. 1986).
Register in probate's fee based on value of estate does not violate this section. Treiber v. Knoll, 135 W (2d) 58, 398 NW (2d) 756 (1987).
I,10 Treason. Section 10. Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against the same, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
I,11 Searches and seizures. Section 11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
GENERAL
Electronic eavesdropping, done with the consent of one of the parties, does not violate the U.S. constitution. State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court, 51 W (2d) 434, 187 NW (2d) 354.
The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to criminal cases. It applies in forfeiture actions arising out of ordinance violations. Milwaukee v. Cohen, 57 W (2d) 38, 203 NW (2d) 633.
An inspection by police of a basement storage room accessible to the public and the observation of evidence found there in open view which was later seized under a search warrant does not amount to an improper invasion of defendant's privacy. Watkins v. State, 59 W (2d) 514 (1973).
Police have a right to lock a car to protect its contents after arresting the driver, but if it is already locked they cannot enter it on pretense of locking it and thus discover contraband. Where the car was borrowed, consent by the lawful user of the car was sufficient to allow a search and any containers found could be opened and examined. Soehle v. State, 60 W (2d) 72, 208 NW (2d) 341.
When officers, armed with a search warrant, knocked on a door, pushed it open when the defendant opened it 2 inches, and put him under restraint before showing the warrant, they acted legally. State v. Meier, 60 W (2d) 452, 210 NW (2d) 685.
The observation of the tools in the car by the officers did not constitute a search and the tools could be seized and were properly admissible into evidence. Anderson v. State, 66 W (2d) 233, 223 NW (2d) 879.
Pertinent to the validity of an investigative stop is whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Wendricks v. State, 72 W (2d) 717, 242 NW (2d) 187.
Where abused child, an occupant of defendant's house, was accompanied to the house by social workers to recover the child's belongings, and exhibited to the workers the instruments used to inflict punishment, subsequent search warrant was not tainted by an unconstitutional search. State v. Killory, 73 W (2d) 400, 243 NW (2d) 475.
Where evidence seized in illegal search was admitted, no reversible error resulted since other evidence uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence was sufficient to convict. Kelly v. State, 75 W (2d) 303, 249 NW (2d) 800.
The drawing and testing of blood solely for diagnostic purposes and not government-instigated is not a "search or seizure" even though the testing physician testifies at negligent homicide trial. State v. Jenkins, 80 W (2d) 426, 259 NW (2d) 109.
Stop and frisk was not unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Williamson, 113 W (2d) 389, 335 NW (2d) 814 (1983).
Person who is lawfully in custody for civil offense may be required to participate in lineup for unrelated criminal offense. State v. Wilks, 121 W (2d) 93, 358 NW (2d) 273 (1984).
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage once it has been routinely collected by garbage collectors. State v. Stevens, 123 W (2d) 303, 367 NW (2d) 788 (1985).
Unlawful arrest does not deprive court of personal jurisdiction over defendant. State v. Smith, 131 W (2d) 220, 388 NW (2d) 601 (1986).
Under inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence seized under defective search warrant was admissible because later inventory search would have discovered it. State v. Kennedy, 134 W (2d) 308, 396 NW (2d) 765 (Ct. App. 1986).
Reasonableness of investigative stop depends on facts and circumstances present at time of stop. State v. Guzy, 139 W (2d) 663, 407 NW (2d) 548 (1987).
