Suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning may later waive rights and confess after Miranda warnings are given. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298 (1985).
Police's failure to inform defendant that third party had retained counsel didn't invalidate defendant's waiver of Miranda rights. Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412 (1986).
Where no evidence is present suggesting that police officers sent suspect's wife in to see him with the hope of obtaining incriminating information, no "interrogation" was undertaken even though detective was present and tape recorded conversation. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 US 520 (1987).
Police may not interrogate suspect held in custody after suspect has previously requested counsel even when interrogation relates to offense different from that for which suspect requested counsel. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 US 675 (1988).
Corporate records custodian may not resist subpoena for records on self-incrimination grounds, regardless of size of corporate entity. Braswell v. United States, 487 US 99 (1988).
Self-incrimination privilege does not support refusal to comply with juvenile court's order to produce child. Baltimore Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 US 474, 107 LEd 2d 992 (1990).
Undercover officer is not required to give Miranda warnings to suspect before surreptitious custodial interrogation. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 US 292, 110 LEd 2d 243 (1990).
When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and may not be reinstated without counsel present even though the accused previously did have an opportunity to consult an attorney. Minnich v. Mississippi, 498 US 146, 112 LEd 2d 489 (1990).
Admission of coerced confession may be found to be "harmless error". Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 US 279, 113 LEd 2d 302 (1991).
Sixth amendment right to counsel is offense specific; an accused's invocation of this right during a judicial proceeding did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda arising from the 5th amendment guarantees against self incrimination in regard to police questioning concerning a separate offense. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 US 171, 115 LEd 2d 158 (1991).
Police officer's subjective and undisclosed view of whether a person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to determining whether the person is in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings. Stansbury v. California, 511 US ___, 128 LEd 2d 293 (1994).
Officers need not cease questioning a suspect subject to custodial interrogation when the suspect makes an ambiguous reference to an attorney. Although often good practice, it is not necessary that the officer ask clarifying questions. Davis v. United States, 512 US ___, 129 LEd 2d 362 (1994).
Collateral estoppel barred state from introducing evidence of van theft as overt act in conspiracy charge where accuseds had earlier been acquitted in van theft trial. Accused's silence prior to receiving Miranda warnings was properly used to impeach accused; prosecution's reference to post-Miranda silence was harmless error. Feela v. Israel, 727 F (2d) 151 (1984).
Assertion of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in federal civil litigation: Rights and remedies. Daskal, 64 MLR 243 (1980).
Privilege against self-incrimination-truthful statements may be used in a perjury prosecution. 64 MLR 744 (1981).
The privilege against self-incrimination in civil commitment proceedings. 1980 WLR 697.
McNeil v. Wisconsin: Blurring a Bright Line on Custodial Interrogation. 1992 WLR 1643.
I,9 Remedy for wrongs. Section 9. Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
The trial court's holding that plaintiff's claim was barred because the period of limitations ran from the time the last architectural services were performed is not sustained, for to so read the statute, although susceptible of that literal meaning, would reveal a constitutionally impermissible legislative intent to negate a right statutorily recognized in 893.14. Rosenthal v. Kurtz, 62 W (2d) 1, 213 NW (2d) 741, 216 NW (2d) 252.
The constitutional guaranty, which insures a remedy for injuries to person and property does not, as contended, give plaintiffs a constitutional right to sue the state in tort, because there is no right of a citizen to hold his sovereign substantively liable therefor, and the state, being immune from suit without its consent, may define the conditions under which it will permit actions against itself. Cords v. State, 62 W (2d) 42, 214 NW (2d) 405.
In consonance with the Wisconsin constitutional mandate entitling every person to a remedy in the law for injury or wrong, the supreme court departs herein from the former traditional common-law rule and extends the line of recovery against the seducer to the woman herself, because the seducer's reprehensible and tortious conduct merits his response therefor in damages. Slawek v. Stroh, 62 W (2d) 295, 215 NW (2d) 9.
Sec. 9 does not entitle state litigants to the exact remedy they desire, but merely to their day in court, hence 138.06 (7), providing that retail sellers shall refund excess interest charged before October 9, 1970, upon written individual demand is a certain remedy. Wiener v. J. C. Penney Co. 65 W (2d) 139, 222 NW (2d) 149.
893.155, Stats. (1973) is unconstitutional in denying plaintiffs a remedy for a wrong recognized. Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 W (2d) 382, 225 NW (2d) 454.
Illegal aliens have right to sue in Wisconsin for injuries negligently inflicted upon them. Arteaga v. Literski, 83 W (2d) 128, 265 NW (2d) 148 (1978).
No legal rights are conferred by this section. Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp. 95 W (2d) 173, 290 NW (2d) 176 (1980).
Pre-1981 statutory paternity proceedings, which vested exclusive authority in district attorney to commence paternity action, unconstitutionally denied child "day in court". Accordingly, child's action was not barred by any statute of limitations. In re Paternity of R.W.L. 116 W (2d) 150, 341 NW (2d) 682 (1984).
Court fashions remedy for victims of synthetic hormone, DES, which was manufactured in generic form by many drug companies. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. 116 W (2d) 166, 342 NW (2d) 37 (1984).
State is not entitled to protection under this section. State v. Halverson, 130 W (2d) 300, 387 NW (2d) 124 (Ct. App. 1986).
Register in probate's fee based on value of estate does not violate this section. Treiber v. Knoll, 135 W (2d) 58, 398 NW (2d) 756 (1987).
I,9m Victims of crime. Section 9m. [As created April 1993] This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy. This state shall ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges and protections as provided by law: timely disposition of the case; the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from the accused throughout the criminal justice process; notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a statement to the court at disposition; restitution; compensation; and information about the outcome of the case and the release of the accused. The legislature shall provide remedies for the violation of this section. Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law. [1993 J.R. 2, vote April 1993]
I,10 Treason. Section 10. Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against the same, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
I,11 Searches and seizures. Section 11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Electronic eavesdropping, done with the consent of one of the parties, does not violate the U.S. constitution. State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court, 51 W (2d) 434, 187 NW (2d) 354.
The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to criminal cases. It applies in forfeiture actions arising out of ordinance violations. Milwaukee v. Cohen, 57 W (2d) 38, 203 NW (2d) 633.
An inspection by police of a basement storage room accessible to the public and the observation of evidence found there in open view which was later seized under a search warrant does not amount to an improper invasion of defendant's privacy. Watkins v. State, 59 W (2d) 514 (1973).
Police have a right to lock a car to protect its contents after arresting the driver, but if it is already locked they cannot enter it on pretense of locking it and thus discover contraband. Where the car was borrowed, consent by the lawful user of the car was sufficient to allow a search and any containers found could be opened and examined. Soehle v. State, 60 W (2d) 72, 208 NW (2d) 341.
When officers, armed with a search warrant, knocked on a door, pushed it open when the defendant opened it 2 inches, and put him under restraint before showing the warrant, they acted legally. State v. Meier, 60 W (2d) 452, 210 NW (2d) 685.
The observation of the tools in the car by the officers did not constitute a search and the tools could be seized and were properly admissible into evidence. Anderson v. State, 66 W (2d) 233, 223 NW (2d) 879.
Pertinent to the validity of an investigative stop is whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Wendricks v. State, 72 W (2d) 717, 242 NW (2d) 187.
Where abused child, an occupant of defendant's house, was accompanied to the house by social workers to recover the child's belongings, and exhibited to the workers the instruments used to inflict punishment, subsequent search warrant was not tainted by an unconstitutional search. State v. Killory, 73 W (2d) 400, 243 NW (2d) 475.
Where evidence seized in illegal search was admitted, no reversible error resulted since other evidence uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence was sufficient to convict. Kelly v. State, 75 W (2d) 303, 249 NW (2d) 800.
The drawing and testing of blood solely for diagnostic purposes and not government-instigated is not a "search or seizure" even though the testing physician testifies at negligent homicide trial. State v. Jenkins, 80 W (2d) 426, 259 NW (2d) 109.
Stop and frisk was not unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Williamson, 113 W (2d) 389, 335 NW (2d) 814 (1983).
Person who is lawfully in custody for civil offense may be required to participate in lineup for unrelated criminal offense. State v. Wilks, 121 W (2d) 93, 358 NW (2d) 273 (1984).
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage once it has been routinely collected by garbage collectors. State v. Stevens, 123 W (2d) 303, 367 NW (2d) 788 (1985).
Unlawful arrest does not deprive court of personal jurisdiction over defendant. State v. Smith, 131 W (2d) 220, 388 NW (2d) 601 (1986).
Under inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence seized under defective search warrant was admissible because later inventory search would have discovered it. State v. Kennedy, 134 W (2d) 308, 396 NW (2d) 765 (Ct. App. 1986).
Reasonableness of investigative stop depends on facts and circumstances present at time of stop. State v. Guzy, 139 W (2d) 663, 407 NW (2d) 548 (1987).
Where officer observed traffic violation but stopped vehicle merely to render assistance, inadvertently discovered criminal evidence was admissible. State v. Baudhuin, 141 W (2d) 642, 416 NW (2d) 60 (1987).
Trial court is permitted to consider suppressed evidence at sentencing where nothing suggests consideration will encourage illegal searches. State v. Rush, 147 W (2d) 225, 432 NW (2d) 688 (Ct. App. 1988).
Escapee does not have legitimate privacy expectation in premises in which escapee is hiding at time of warrantless exigent search. State v. Amos, 153 W (2d) 257, 450 NW (2d) 503 (Ct. App. 1989).
Court specifically limits its holding approving aerial surveillance to use of standard binoculars and cameras equipped with generally available standard and zoom lenses. State v. Lange, 158 W (2d) 609, 463 NW (2d) 390 (Ct. App. 1990).
Discussion of application of informer privilege to communications tending to identify informer and consideration by trial court under 905.10 (3) (c) of such privileged information in determining reasonable suspicion for investigative seizure. State v. Gordon, 159 W (2d) 335, 464 NW 91 (Ct. App. 1990).
Evidence obtained from legal search following two prior illegal searches was not suppressed where the third search was sufficiently attenuated from the prior two. State v. Anderson, 165 W (2d) 441, 477 NW (2d) 277 (1991).
Factors used to determine the extent of a home's curtilage discussed. State v. Moley, 171 W (2d) 207, 490 NW (2d) 764 (Ct. App. 1992).
Bank customers have no protectable privacy interest in bank records relating to accounts under Art. I, s. 11. State v. Swift, 173 W (2d) 870, 496 NW (2d) 713 (Ct. App. 1993).
The use of an infrared sensing device to detect heat emanating from a residence does not constitute a search within the meaning of the proscription of unlawful searches. State v. McKee, 181 W (2d) 354, 510 NW (2d) 807 (Ct. App. 1993).
Defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a porch through which the door to the living area was visible and which was entered through an unlocked screen door. Where an officer came to the defendant's residence for a legitimate purpose, observation of contraband from the porch through a window in the interior door was not a search. State v. Edgeberg, 188 W (2d) 339, 524 NW (2d) 911 (Ct. App. 1994).
The use of a police dog to sniff an automobile parked in a motel parking did not constitute a search. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the air space around a car in a motel parking lot. State v. Garcia, 195 W (2d) 68, 535 NW (2d) 124 (Ct. App. 1995).
Although a vehicle had been improperly seized, evidence obtained in a later search of the vehicle under a warrant which was not based on information gathered from the illegal seizure was not subject to suppression. State v. Gaines, 197 W (2d) 102, 539 NW (2d) 723 (Ct. App. 1995).
Arson investigations under s. 165.55 (9) and (10) are subject to search warrant requirements set forth in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 US 499 (1978). Consent to search discussed. 68 Atty. Gen. 225.
When executing a search warrant for private premises, the belongings of a visitor on the premises which are plausible repositories for the objects of the search, except those worn by or in physical possession of persons whose search is not authorized by the warrant, may be searched. State v. Andrews, 201 W (2d) 383, 549 NW (2d) 210 (1996).
In-custody statements stemming from illegal arrest are not admissible merely because Miranda warnings were given. Brown v. Illinois, 422 US 590.
Bank records are not private papers protected by legitimate "expectation of privacy". United States v. Miller, 425 US 435.
Standard procedure inventory of any container impounded by police is reasonable search. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 US 364.
Standards for application of exclusionary rule to live-witness testimony discussed. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 US 268 (1978).
Newspaper office may be searched for evidence of crime even though newspaper is not suspected of crime. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 US 547 (1978).
Stopping car for no other reason than to check license and registration was unreasonable under Fourth Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US 648 (1979).
In-court identification of accused was not suppressed as fruit of unlawful arrest. United States v. Crews, 445 US 463 (1980).
Illegally seized evidence was properly admitted to impeach defendant's false trial testimony, given in response to proper cross-examination, where evidence did not squarely contradict defendant's testimony on direct examination. United States v. Havens, 446 US 620 (1980).
Arcane concepts of property law do not control ability to claim 4th amendment protections. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 US 98 (1980).
Resemblance to "drug courier profile" was insufficient basis for seizure. Reid v. Georgia, 448 US 438 (1980).
Objective facts and circumstantial evidence justified investigative stop of smuggler's vehicle. United States v. Cortez, 449 US 411 (1981).
Automobile exception does not extend to closed, opaque container located in luggage compartment. Robbins v. California, 453 US 420 (1981).
Police placement of beeper in container of precursor chemical used to manufacture illicit drug and subsequent surveillance of defendant's car by monitoring beeper transmission was not prohibited by fourth amendment. U.S. v. Knotts, 460 US 276 (1983).
Under facts of case, detention and interrogation of airline passenger fitting "drug courier profile" was unconstitutional. Florida v. Royer, 460 US 491 (1983).
Under "independent source" doctrine, evidence discovered during valid search was admissible regardless whether initial entry was illegal. Segura v. U.S. 468 US 796 (1984).
"Good faith" exception to exclusionary rule allowed admission of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on search warrant, issued by detached and neutral magistrate, later found to be unsupported by probable cause. U.S. v. Leon, 468 US 897 (1984).
"Good faith" exception to exclusionary rule discussed. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 US 981 (1984).
If "wanted flyer" has been issued on basis of articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that wanted person has committed a crime, other officers may rely on flyer to stop and question person. United States v. Hensley, 469 US 221 (1985).
In assessing whether detention is too long to be justified as investigative stop, it is appropriate to examine whether police diligently pursued means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. United State v. Sharpe, 470 US 675 (1985).
Proposed surgery under general anesthetic to recover bullet from accused robber's body was unreasonable search. Winston v. Lee, 470 US 753 (1985).
Fingerprints were not admissible where police transported suspect to station house for fingerprinting without consent, probable cause, or prior judicial authorization. Hayes v. Florida, 470 US 811 (1985).
Apprehension by use of deadly force is a seizure subject to reasonableness requirement. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 US 1 (1985).
Where officer stopped car for traffic violations and reached into car to move papers obscuring vehicle ID number, discovered evidence was admissible. New York v. Class, 475 US 106 (1986).
Reasonable expectation of privacy wasn't violated when police, acting on anonymous tip, flew over defendant's enclosed backyard and observed marijuana plants. California v. Ciraolo, 476 US 207 (1986).
Defendants have no reasonable privacy interest in trash left on curb for pick-up; therefore, warrantless search is not prohibited under federal law. California v. Greenwood, 486 US 35 (1988).
Use of roadblock to halt defendant's automobile constitutes seizure. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 US 593, 103 LEd 2d 628 (1989).