For failure to pay child support or family support, satisfaction under s. 780.10
out of the proceeds of the sale of any ship, boat or vessel attached and sold under ch. 780
Upon the request of a county, the department of natural resources shall provide the county with a list of the names and addresses of all of the owners of boats that have a valid certificate of number or registration that has been issued by the department under s. 30.52
. The department shall prepare the list annually before May 31 of each year.
A court is justified in requiring the creation of a trust to secure the payment of support money where the husband has a record of failing to obey prior court orders. Foregger v. Foregger, 48 W (2d) 512, 180 NW (2d) 578.
See note to 767.25, citing State ex rel. v. Reible, 91 W (2d) 394, 283 NW (2d) 427 (Ct. App. 1979).
Court had power to order father to look for additional or alternative employment or be held in contempt. Proper contempt procedures discussed. Marriage of Dennis, 117 W (2d) 249, 344 NW (2d) 128 (1984).
There is no authority under this section to grant credits against arrearages. To grant a credit requires modification of the judgment under s. 76.32. Under s. 767.32 (1r) a court is without discretion to grant credits against arrearages for direct payments made for child support regardless of when the order was entered. Douglas County Child Support v. Fisher, 200 W (2d) 807, 547 NW (2d) 801 (Ct. App. 1996).
Enforcement of child support; suspension of operating privilege. 767.303(1)(1)
If a person fails to pay a payment ordered for support under s. 767.077
, support under s. 767.08
, child support or family support under s. 767.23
, child support under s. 767.25
, family support under s. 767.261
, revised child or family support under s. 767.32
, child support under s. 767.458 (3)
, child support under s. 767.51
, child support under ch. 769
or child support under s. 948.22 (7)
, the payment is 90 or more days past due and the court finds that the person has the ability to pay the amount ordered, the court may suspend the person's operating privilege, as defined in s. 340.01 (40)
, until the person pays all arrearages in full or makes payment arrangements that are satisfactory to the court, except that the suspension period may not exceed 5 years. If otherwise eligible, the person is eligible for an occupational license under s. 343.10
at any time.
Whenever the court orders suspension of a person's operating privilege under sub. (1)
, the court shall notify the department of transportation, in the form and manner prescribed by the department. The notice to the department shall include the name and last-known address of the person against whom the support order was entered, certification by the court that the person has been notified of the entry of the support order and that there are arrearages in support payments that are 90 or more days past due, the place where the arrearages may be paid and that the person's operating privilege shall remain suspended until the person pays all arrearages in full or makes payment arrangements that are satisfactory to the court, except that the suspension period may not exceed 5 years.
If the person subsequently pays the full amount of the arrearages or makes payment arrangements that are satisfactory to the court, the court shall immediately notify the department of transportation of the payment, in the form and manner prescribed by the department.
This section applies to support arrearages existing on or after October 1, 1996, regardless of when the arrearages accrued or when the order or judgment requiring the payment of support was entered.
The remedy permitted under this section is in addition to any other remedies authorized by law.
History: 1995 a. 401
Enforcement; contempt proceedings.
In all cases where a party has incurred a financial obligation under s. 48.355 (2) (b) 4.
, 48.357 (5m)
, 48.363 (2)
, 938.183 (2)
, 938.355 (2) (b) 4.
, 938.357 (5m)
or 938.363 (2)
and has failed within a reasonable time or as ordered by the court to satisfy such obligation, and where the wage assignment proceeding under s. 767.265
and the account transfer under s. 767.267
are inapplicable, impractical or unfeasible, the court may on its own initiative, and shall on the application of the receiving party, issue an order requiring the payer to show cause at some reasonable time therein specified why he or she should not be punished for such misconduct as provided in ch. 785
Contempt is appropriate means to enforce child support arrears after child has reached majority. Marriage of Griffin v. Reeve, 141 W (2d) 699, 416 NW (2d) 612 (1987).
When a contemnor's liberty interests are at risk he or she must be given an opportunity to show the court that the failure to comply with the purge conditions was not wilful and intentional. V.J.H. v. C.A.B. 163 W (2d) 833, 472 NW (2d) 939 (Ct. App. 1991).
Trustee may be appointed.
The court may appoint a trustee, when deemed expedient, to receive any payments ordered, to invest and pay over the income for the maintenance of the spouse entitled thereto or the support and education of any of the minor children, or to pay over the principal sum in such proportions and at such times as the court directs. The trustee shall give such bond, with such sureties as the court requires, for the faithful performance of his or her trust.
History: 1971 c. 220
; 1979 c. 32
; 1979 c. 196
; Stats. 1979 s. 767.31.
Revision of certain judgments. 767.32(1)(a)(a)
After a judgment or order providing for child support under this chapter or s. 48.355 (2) (b) 4.
, 48.357 (5m)
, 48.363 (2)
, 938.183 (2)
, 938.355 (2) (b) 4.
, 938.357 (5m)
, 938.363 (2)
or 948.22 (7)
, maintenance payments under s. 767.26
or family support payments under this chapter, or for the appointment of trustees under s. 767.31
, the court may, from time to time, on the petition, motion or order to show cause of either of the parties, or upon the petition, motion or order to show cause of the department, a county department under s. 46.215
or a child support program designee under s. 59.53 (5)
if an assignment has been made under s. 46.261
, 48.57 (3m) (b) 2.
, 49.153 (3)
, 49.19 (4) (h)
or 49.45 (19)
or if either party or their minor children receive aid under s. 48.57 (3m)
or ch. 49
, and upon notice to the family court commissioner, revise and alter such judgment or order respecting the amount of such maintenance or child support and the payment thereof, and also respecting the appropriation and payment of the principal and income of the property so held in trust, and may make any judgment or order respecting any of the matters that such court might have made in the original action, except that a judgment or order that waives maintenance payments for either party shall not thereafter be revised or altered in that respect nor shall the provisions of a judgment or order with respect to final division of property be subject to revision or modification. A revision, under this section, of a judgment or order with respect to an amount of child or family support may be made only upon a finding of a substantial change in circumstances. In any action under this section to revise a judgment or order with respect to maintenance payments, a substantial change in the cost of living by either party or as measured by the federal bureau of labor statistics may be sufficient to justify a revision of judgment or order with respect to the amount of maintenance, except that a change in an obligor's cost of living is not in itself sufficient if payments are expressed as a percentage of income.
NOTE: Par. (a) is shown as affected by five acts of the 1995 legislature and as merged by the revisor under s. 13.93 (2) (c).
In any action under this section to revise a judgment or order with respect to an amount of child support, any of the following shall constitute a rebuttable presumption of a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to justify a revision of the judgment or order:
Commencement of receipt of aid to families with dependent children under s. 49.19
or participation in Wisconsin works under ss. 49.141
by either parent since the entry of the last child support order, including a revision of a child support order under this section.
Unless the amount of child support is expressed in the judgment or order as a percentage of parental income, the expiration of 33 months after the date of the entry of the last child support order, including a revision of a child support order under this section.
A difference between the amount of child support ordered by the court to be paid by the payer and the amount that the payer would have been required to pay based on the percentage standard established by the department under s. 49.22 (9)
if the court did not use the percentage standard in determining the child support payments and did not provide the information required under s. 46.10 (14) (d)
, 767.25 (1n)
or 767.51 (5d)
, whichever is appropriate.
In any action under this section to revise a judgment or order with respect to an amount of child support, any of the following may constitute a substantial change of circumstances sufficient to justify revision of the judgment or order:
Unless the amount of child support is expressed in the judgment or order as a percentage of parental income, a change in the payer's income, evidenced by information received by the department, or the county child and spousal support agency, under s. 49.22 (2m)
or by other information, from the payer's income determined by the court in its most recent judgment or order for child support, including a revision of a child support order under this section.
Any other factor that the court determines is relevant.
In an action under sub. (1)
to revise a judgment or order with respect to child support, maintenance payments or family support payments, the court may not revise the amount of child support, maintenance payments or family support payments due, or an amount of arrearages in child support, maintenance payments or family support payments that has accrued, prior to the date that notice of the action is given to the respondent, except to correct previous errors in calculations.
In an action under sub. (1)
to revise a judgment or order with respect to child support or family support, the court may not grant credit to the payer against support due prior to the date on which the action is commenced for payments made by the payer on behalf of the child other than payments made to the clerk of court or support collection designee under s. 767.265
or as otherwise ordered by the court.
Except as provided in sub. (2m)
, if the court revises a judgment or order with respect to child support payments, it shall do so by using the percentage standard established by the department under s. 49.22 (9)
Upon request by a party, the court may modify the amount of revised child support payments determined under sub. (2)
if, after considering the factors listed in s. 767.25 (1m)
or 767.51 (5)
, as appropriate, the court finds, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, that the use of the percentage standard is unfair to the child or to any of the parties.
In an action under sub. (1)
, the court may not approve a stipulation for the revision of a judgment or order with respect to an amount of child support or family support unless the stipulation provides for payment of an amount of child support or family support that is determined in the manner required under s. 46.10 (14)
, whichever is appropriate.
A revision of a judgment or order with respect to child support, family support or maintenance payments has the effect of modifying the original judgment or order with respect to such payments to the extent of the revision from the date on which the order revising such payments is effective. The child support, family support or maintenance payments modified by the order for revision shall cease to accrue under the original judgment or order from the date on which the order revising such payments is effective.
After a final judgment requiring maintenance payments has been rendered and the payee has remarried, the court shall, on application of the payer with notice to the payee and upon proof of remarriage, vacate the order requiring such payments.
In any case in which the state is a real party in interest under s. 767.075
, the department shall review the support obligation periodically and whenever circumstances so warrant, petition the court for revision of the judgment or order with respect to the support obligation.
A summons or petition, motion or order to show cause under this section shall include notification of the availability of information under s. 767.081 (2)
History: 1971 c. 220
; 1977 c. 105
; 1977 c. 418
; 1979 c. 32
, 92 (4)
; Stats. 1979 s. 767.32; 1981 c. 20
s. 2202 (20) (m)
; 1981 c. 314
; 1983 a. 27
; 1985 a. 176
; 1987 a. 27
; 1989 a. 212
; 1991 a. 39
; 1993 a. 16
; 1995 a. 27
s. 9126 (19)
; 1995 a. 77
; s. 13.93 (2) (c).
The fact that a child needs more support at 6 than at 2 is sufficient to justify an increase in payments if the father is able to make them. Klipstein v. Klipstein, 47 W (2d) 314, 177 NW (2d) 57.
Even though the mother took the children out of the state without court approval or letting the father know where he could visit them, the court may not suspend payment of a support allowance without a hearing as to the effect on the children. Krause v. Krause, 58 W (2d) 499, 206 NW (2d) 589.
Even assuming the parties' agreement as to child support gave rise to contractual obligations, these obligations remained subject to modification by the court under this section. Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 67 W (2d) 477, 227 NW (2d) 62.
While a divorced party owes no duty of sexual fidelity to the former spouse, cohabitation by the party can be acknowledged as a change of circumstances affecting the former spouse's responsibility to provide alimony, with the manner and extent of the cohabitation and surrounding circumstances to be considered in determining whether such alimony payments should be modified. Taake v. Taake, 70 W (2d) 115, 233 NW (2d) 449.
Child support provision reducing payments proportionately as each of several minor children attains majority is not against public policy. Severson v. Severson, 71 W (2d) 382, 238 NW (2d) 116.
Trial court abused discretion in denying former husband's motion to terminate alimony, where court failed to consider former wife's increased estate as result of inheritance. Lemm v. Lemm, 72 W (2d) 457, 241 NW (2d) 593.
Judgment's prohibition against modification of amount or term of limited maintenance violated this section. Dixon v. Dixon, 107 W (2d) 492, 319 NW (2d) 846 (1982).
See note to 767.24, citing In re Marriage of Groh v. Groh, 110 W (2d) 117, 327 NW (2d) 655 (1983).
See note to 767.26, citing Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 110 W (2d) 188, 327 NW (2d) 674 (1983).
Criteria for change of custody discussed. In re Marriage of Millikin v. Millikin, 115 W (2d) 16, 339 NW (2d) 573 (1983).
Where stipulation required maintenance payments during wife's lifetime, husband was estopped from requesting termination of payments under (3) when wife remarried. Marriage of Rintelman v. Rintelman, 118 W (2d) 587, 348 NW (2d) 498 (1984).
Court may revise judgment incorporating stipulation regarding limited maintenance if petition to revise is filed before expiration of maintenance obligation. Fobes v. Fobes, 124 W (2d) 72, 368 NW (2d) 643 (1985).
Petition for revision filed 20 days after receipt of final scheduled maintenance payment was properly dismissed as untimely. In re Marriage of Lippstreu v. Lippstreu, 125 W (2d) 415, 373 NW (2d) 53 (Ct. App. 1985).
"Millikin standard" did not apply to transfer of physical placement of child under existing joint custody arrangement. In re Marriage of Abel v. Johnson, 135 W (2d) 219, 400 NW (2d) 22 (Ct. App. 1986).
State family court may modify payor spouse's support obligation following payor's discharge in bankruptcy. In re Marriage of Eckert v. Eckert, 144 W (2d) 770, 424 NW (2d) 759 (Ct. App. 1988).
Orders assigning health care responsibility pursuant to 767.25 (4m) are subject to revision under 767.32. Marriage of Kuchenbecker v. Schultz, 151 W (2d) 868, 447 NW (2d) 80 (Ct. App. 1989).
It is within trial court's discretion to apply WAC sec. HSS 80 percentage standards to child support revision; if applied to remarried parent, gross income for purposes of base must be computed as if remarried parent is still single. Trial court retains discretion to adjust percentage calculation based on circumstances. In re Marriage of Abitz v. Abitz, 155 W (2d) 161, 455 NW (2d) 609 (1990).
Sub. (1m) applies prospectively only and arrearages accruing under support order entered before August 1, 1987, may be modified, reduced or eliminated; trial court may grant credit against arrearages for expenditures made for child in manner other than that prescribed in support order under some circumstances. In re Marriage of Schulz v. Ystad, 155 W (2d) 574, 456 NW (2d) 312 (1990).
Remarriage, though unlawful in Wisconsin and dissolved through annulment, is sufficient to terminate maintenance under (3); requirement that maintenance be terminated following remarriage is unconditional. In re Marriage of Falk v. Falk, 158 W (2d) 184, 462 NW (2d) 547 (Ct. App. 1990).
Discussion of factors required to find party estopped from seeking maintenance revision. In re Marriage of Nichols v. Nichols, 162 W (2d) 96, 469 NW (2d) 619 (1991).
Divorce judgment provisions waiving maintenance take precedence over other provisions arguably reserving or awarding maintenance. In re Marriage of Tyson v. Tyson, 162 W (2d) 551, 469 NW (2d) 913 (Ct. App. 1991).
In determining income for maintenance revision, investment income form property awarded in equal property division may be included; interest payments to payee spouse under division may not to be deducted. In Re Marriage of Hommel v. Hommel, 162 W (2d) 782, 471 NW (2d) 1 (1991).
Where, pursuant to Schultz, equitable credit for direct expenditures for support in a manner other than included in the divorce order or judgment is justified, it may be reimbursed as well as set-off against an arrearage. In re Marriage of Rummel v. Karlin, 167 W (2d) 400, 481 NW (2d) 695 (Ct. App. 1992).
Lottery proceeds won after divorce may be considered a change in financial circumstances in determining whether change in maintenance is justified; maintenance award is to assure recipient spouse a standard of living comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. In re Marriage of Gerrits v. Gerrits, 167 W (2d) 429, 482 NW (2d) 134 (Ct. App. 1992).
Revision of 767.24 allowing joint custody in cases where both parties did not agree was not a "substantial change in circumstances" justifying change to joint custody. Licary v. Licary, 168 W (2d) 686, 484 NW (2d) 371 (Ct. App. 1992).
See note to 767.25 citing In Marriage of Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 169 W (2d) 516, 485 NW (2d) 294 (Ct. App. 1992).
Even though incarceration results from intentional criminal conduct, it is a change in circumstance under sub. (1). In re Marriage of Voecks v. Voecks, 171 W (2d) 184, 491 NW (2d) 107 (Ct. App. 1992).
Where a payor spouse's termination of employment is voluntary, an order may be based on the spouse's earning capacity whether or not bad faith is shown. In re Marriage of Roberts v. Roberts, 173 W (2d) 406, 496 NW (2d) 210 (Ct. App. 1992).
A payor spouse should be allowed a fair choice of livelihood even though an income reduction may result, but the spouse may be found to be shirking where the choice is not reasonable in light of the payor's support obligation. Marriage of Van Offeren v. Van Offeren, 173 W (2d) 482, 496 NW (2d) 660 (Ct. App. 1992).
Parties' extrajudicial agreement that child support payments be discontinued was enforceable via the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Harms v. Harms, 174 W (2d) 780, 498 NW (2d) 229 (1993).
The date when a maintenance order is vacated under sub. (3) is a discretionary determination based on the specific facts and equities of the case. Hansen v. Hansen, 176 W (2d) 327, 500 NW (2d) 357 (Ct. App. 1993).
In the absence of a specific agreement that maintenance payments continue after the payee's remarriage, the payor was not estopped from seeking termination upon the payee's remarriage. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 177 W (2d) 539, 502 NW (2d) 869 (Ct. App. 1993).
An agreement that the husband would complete his education when the wife completed hers and the wife's increased income upon completion of her education were both relevant to the husband's request for a change in support upon returning to graduate school full time. Kelly v. Hougham, 178 W (2d) 546, 504 NW (2d) 440 (Ct. App. 1993).
Where a broadly worded settlement agreement required the payor to meet the children's current and changing needs rather than to pay a set amount or percentage, a change in the children's needs, although a change in circumstances, did not require a modification of child support to impose percentage guidelines where the court found those needs were being met. Jacquart v. Jacquart 183 W (2d) 372, 515 NW (2d) 539 (Ct. App. 1994).
Unlike an initial award of maintenance, a party seeking to change maintenance has the burden of proof. Haeuser v. Haeuser, 200 W (2d) 750, 548 NW (2d) 750 (Ct. App. 1996).
Under sub. (1r) a court is without discretion to grant credits against arrearages for direct payments made for child support regardless of when the order was entered. Douglas County Child Support v. Fisher, 200 W (2d) 807, 547 NW (2d) 801 (Ct. App. 1996).
See also Wisconsin Administrative Code Citations published in the Wisconsin Administrative Code for a list of citations to cases citing ch. HSS 80, the percentage standards developed by the Department of Health and Social Services.
Revision of legal custody and physical placement orders.
Except for matters under s. 767.327
, the following provisions are applicable to modifications of legal custody and physical placement orders:
Within 2 years after initial order.
Except as provided under sub. (2)
, a court may not modify any of the following orders before 2 years after the initial order is entered under s. 767.24
, unless a party seeking the modification, upon petition, motion, or order to show cause shows by substantial evidence that the modification is necessary because the current custodial conditions are physically or emotionally harmful to the best interest of the child:
An order of physical placement if the modification would substantially alter the time a parent may spend with his or her child.