Equal protection precludes a prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to exclude potential jurors solely by reason of race. A criminal defendant can raise the equal protection claim that jurors were excluded because of their race, whether or not there is racial identity between the defendant and the excluded jurors. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
, 113 L. Ed. 2d 411
(1991). See also Basten v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69
(1986) for a process for evaluating a claim that race was the sole basis for a peremptory challenge.
Gender-based peremptory strikes are barred by the equal protection clause. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. 511 U.S. 127
, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89
Exercise of challenges. 972.04(1)
The number of jurors selected shall be prescribed in s. 756.06 (2) (a)
, whichever is applicable, unless a lesser number has been stipulated and approved under s. 972.02 (2)
or the court orders that additional jurors be selected. That number, plus the number of peremptory challenges available to all the parties, shall be called initially and maintained in the jury box by calling others to replace jurors excused for cause until all jurors have been examined. The parties shall thereupon exercise in their order, the state beginning, the peremptory challenges available to them, and if any party declines to challenge, the challenge shall be made by the clerk by lot.
A party may waive in advance any or all of its peremptory challenges and the number of jurors called pursuant to sub. (1)
shall be reduced by this number.
History: 1983 a. 226
; 1995 a.. 427; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96-08
, 207 Wis. 2d xv (1997).
Judicial Council Note, 1983: Sub. (1) is amended by allowing the court to order that additional jurors be impaneled. The size of the panel is then reduced to the appropriate number by lot immediately before final submission if that has not already occurred through death or discharge of a juror. See s. 972.10 (7), stats. Abolition of the concept of "alternate" jurors is intended to promote an attentive attitude and a collegial relationship among all jurors. [Bill 320-S]
Guarantees of open public proceedings in criminal trials include voir dire examinations of potential jurors. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal. 464 U.S. 501
The court may order a view by the jury.
The trial court, sitting as the trier of fact, committed an error of law in making and relying on an unrequested, unannounced, unaccompanied and unrecorded view of an accident scene in assessing evidence produced at trial. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Shannon, 120 Wis. 2d 560
, 356 N.W.2d 175
In a trial to the court without a jury when a witness is sworn;
In a jury trial when the selection of the jury has been completed and the jury sworn.
The federal rule that jeopardy attaches when the jury is sworn is an integral part of the guarantee against double jeopardy. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28
NOTE: See also the notes to Article I, section 8 of the Wisconsin constitution.
Incriminating testimony compelled; immunity. 972.08(1)(a)(a)
Whenever any person refuses to testify or to produce books, papers or documents when required to do so before any grand jury, in a proceeding under s. 968.26
or at a preliminary examination, criminal hearing or trial for the reason that the testimony or evidence required of him or her may tend to incriminate him or her or subject him or her to a forfeiture or penalty, the person may nevertheless be compelled to testify or produce the evidence by order of the court on motion of the district attorney. No person who testifies or produces evidence in obedience to the command of the court in that case may be liable to any forfeiture or penalty for or on account of testifying or producing evidence, but no person may be exempted from prosecution and punishment for perjury or false swearing committed in so testifying.
Whenever a witness attending in any court trial or appearing before any grand jury or John Doe investigation fails or refuses without just cause to comply with an order of the court under this section to give testimony in response to a question or with respect to any matter, the court, upon such failure or refusal, or when such failure or refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order the witness's confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or until such trial, grand jury term or John Doe investigation is concluded but in no case exceeding one year. No person confined under this section shall be admitted to bail pending the determination of an appeal taken by the person from the order of confinement.
Ordering a witness who has been granted immunity to answer questions does not violate the constitutional right against self incrimination. State v. Blake, 46 Wis. 2d 386
, 175 N.W.2d 210
The prosecutor is required to move that witnesses be granted immunity before the court can act. The trial court has no discretion to act without a motion and a defendant cannot invoke the statute. Elam v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 383
, 184 N.W.2d 176
An order by a judge to compel a witness in a John Doe proceeding to testify after a refusal on the ground of self-incrimination must be done in open court. State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit Court, 65 Wis. 2d 66
, 221 N.W.2d 894
In considering whether to move for immunity for a witness, a prosecutor should consider the duty to not merely convict but to seek impartial justice and should not hesitate to move for immunity on the ground that the testimony thus elicited might exonerate the defendant. Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 22
, 233 N.W.2d 420
This section does not prevent a district attorney from entering into a nonprosecution agreement prior to filing charges in exchange for information in a criminal investigation. State v. Jones, 217 Wis. 2d 57
, 576 N.W.2d 580
(Ct. App. 1998), 97-1806
A defendant seeking review of prosecutor's immunization decision must make a substantial evidentiary showing that the government intended to distort the judicial fact-finding process. Stuart v. Gagnon, 614 F. Supp. 247
NOTE: See also the notes to Article I, section 8 of the Wisconsin constitution.
Immunity; use standard.
Immunity from criminal or forfeiture prosecution under ss. 13.35
, 17.16 (7)
, 77.61 (12)
, 111.07 (2) (b)
, 139.39 (5)
, 551.56 (3)
, 553.55 (3)
, 601.62 (5)
, 767.87 (4)
, 885.25 (2)
, 891.39 (2)
, 972.08 (1)
and 979.07 (1)
and ch. 769
, provides immunity only from the use of the compelled testimony or evidence in subsequent criminal or forfeiture proceedings, as well as immunity from the use of evidence derived from that compelled testimony or evidence.
Hostile witness in criminal cases.
Where testimony of a witness at any preliminary examination, hearing or trial in a criminal action is inconsistent with a statement previously made by the witness, the witness may be regarded as a hostile witness and examined as an adverse witness, and the party producing the witness may impeach the witness by evidence of such prior contradictory statement. When called by the defendant, a law enforcement officer who was involved in the seizure of evidence shall be regarded as a hostile witness and may be examined as an adverse witness at any hearing in which the legality of such seizure may properly be raised.
Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d R1, R6 (1973); 1993 a. 486
The defendant was not prejudiced by receipt in evidence of a hostile state witness's entire statement rather than only those portions she acknowledged at trial, for while prior inconsistent statements may not be introduced until they have been read to the witness in order that the witness may explain the contradiction, it appeared herein that the unread portion of the statement was not inconsistent with the witness' testimony at trial, but would have been objectionable as hearsay if such objection had been made. When the question is raised as to the propriety of use of a prior inconsistent statement of a witness, and request is made for hearing outside the presence of the jury, the more appropriate procedure is to excuse the jury. Bullock v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 809
, 193 N.W.2d 889
This section does not forbid the use of prior inconsistent statements of a witness as substantive evidence when no objection is made by counsel. There is no duty on the trial court to sua sponte reject the evidence or to instruct the jury that the evidence is limited to impeachment. Irby v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 311
, 210 N.W.2d 755
After the selection of a jury, the court shall determine if the jurors may take notes of the proceedings:
If the court authorizes note-taking, the court shall instruct the jurors that they may make written notes of the proceedings, except the opening statements and closing arguments, if they so desire and that the court will provide materials for that purpose if they so request. The court shall stress the confidentiality of the notes to the jurors. The jurors may refer to their notes during the proceedings and deliberation. The notes may not be the basis for or the object of any motion by any party. After the jury has rendered its verdict, the court shall ensure that the notes are promptly collected and destroyed.
If the court does not authorize note-taking, the court shall state the reasons for the determination on the record.
The court may give additional preliminary instructions to assist the jury in understanding its duty and the evidence it will hear. The preliminary instructions may include, without limitation, the elements of any offense charged, what constitutes evidence and what does not, guidance regarding the burden of proof and the credibility of witnesses, and directions not to discuss the case until deliberations begin. The additional instructions shall be disclosed to the parties before they are given and either party may object to any specific instruction or propose instructions of its own to be given prior to trial.
In a trial where the issue is mental responsibility of a defendant, the defendant may make an opening statement on such issue prior to the defendant's offer of evidence. The state may make its opening statement on such issue prior to the defendant's offer of evidence or reserve the right to make such statement until after the defendant has rested.
The state first offers evidence in support of the prosecution. The defendant may offer evidence after the state has rested. If the state and defendant have offered evidence upon the original case, the parties may then respectively offer rebuttal testimony only, unless the court in its discretion permits them to offer evidence upon their original case.
At the close of the state's case and at the conclusion of the entire case, the defendant may move on the record for a dismissal.
When the evidence is concluded and the testimony closed, if either party desires special instructions to be given to the jury, the instructions shall be reduced to writing, signed by the party or his or her attorney and filed with the clerk, unless the court otherwise directs. Counsel for the parties, or the defendant if he or she is without counsel, shall be allowed reasonable opportunity to examine the instructions requested and to present and argue to the court objections to the adoption or rejection of any instructions requested by counsel. The court shall advise the parties of the instructions to be given. No instruction regarding the failure to call a witness at the trial shall be made or given if the sole basis for such instruction is the fact the name of the witness appears upon a list furnished pursuant to s. 971.23
. Counsel, or the defendant if he or she is not represented by counsel, shall specify and state the particular ground on which the instruction is objected to, and it shall not be sufficient to object generally that the instruction does not state the law, or is against the law, but the objection shall specify with particularity how the instruction is insufficient or does not state the law or to what particular language there is an objection. All objections shall be on the record. The court shall provide the jury with one complete set of written instructions providing the burden of proof and the substantive law to be applied to the case to be decided.
In closing argument, the state on the issue of guilt and the defendant on the issue of mental responsibility shall commence and may conclude the argument.
If additional jurors have been selected under s. 972.04 (1)
and the number remains more than required at final submission of the cause, the court shall determine by lot which jurors shall not participate in deliberations and discharge them.
History: 1979 c. 128
; 1981 c. 358
; 1983 a. 226
; Sup. Ct. Order, 130 Wis. 2d xi (1986); 1993 a. 486
; 1995 a. 387
; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96-08
, 207 Wis. 2d xv (1997).
Judicial Council Note, 1983: Sub. (7) requires the court to reduce the size of the jury panel to the proper number immediately prior to final submission of the cause. Unneeded jurors must be determined by lot and these may not participate in deliberations. State v. Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d 291
(1982). [Bill 320-S]
Judicial Council Note, 1986: Sub. (1) (b) is amended to provide that preliminary instructions may include the elements of any offense charged, what constitutes evidence and what does not, guidance regarding the burden of proof and the credibility of witnesses, and directions not to discuss the case until deliberations begin.
The state need not introduce evidence of a confession until after defendant testifies and gives contradictory testimony. Ameen v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 175
, 186 N.W.2d 206
Sub. (5) is amended to require that the court provide the jury one written copy of its instructions regarding the burden of proof. [Re Order eff. 7-1-86]
The trial court did not err in failing to declare a mistrial because of a statement made by the prosecutor in closing argument, challenged as improper allegedly because he expressed his opinion as to defendant's guilt, when it neither could be said that the statement was based on sources of information outside the record, nor expressed the prosecutor's conviction as to what the evidence established. State v. McGee, 52 Wis. 2d 736
, 190 N.W.2d 893
No potential coercion was exerted by the trial court in its statement made to the jury requesting it to continue its deliberations for the next half hour or hour, and if not then agreed, overnight hotel arrangements would be made. Ziegler v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 703
, 223 N.W.2d 442
An objection to jury instructions will not be waived when the instructions misstate the law. Randolph v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 630
, 266 N.W.2d 334
If the defendant moves for dismissal at the close of the state's case and then presents evidence, the appellate court will consider all evidence of guilt in ruling on a motion. State v. Gebarski, 90 Wis. 2d 754
, 280 N.W.2d 672
A refusal to give a jury special instructions on identification was not an abuse of discretion. Hampton v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 450
, 285 N.W.2d 868
Control of the content and duration of closing argument is within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Stawicki, 93 Wis. 2d 63
, 286 N.W.2d 612
(Ct. App. 1979).
A special instruction need not be given because a witness has been granted immunity. Linse v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 163
, 286 N.W.2d 554
A defendant who chose to be represented by counsel had no right to address the jury personally in closing arguments. Robinson v. State, 100 Wis. 2d 152
, 301 N.W.2d 429
A defendant is entitled to an instruction on a valid theory of defense if the instruction is supported by the evidence and is relevant to the to the issue being tried. It was not error to refuse to give an instruction regarding the defendant's theory of defense relating to the legal basis for the motive of a witness who was not a defendant. State v. Dean, 105 Wis. 2d 390
, 314 N.W.2d 151
(Ct. App. 1981).
Unless the defendant consents, it is reversible error for the court to substitute an alternate juror for a regular juror after jury deliberations have begun. State v. Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d 291
, 321 N.W.2d 212
Under the separation of powers doctrine, ss. 805.13 (4), and 972.10 (5) require submission of written instructions to the jury on the substantive law but do not require automatic reversal when the trial court fails to do so. Instructions on the burden of proof and presumption of innocence are procedural, not substantive law. In Matter of E. B. 111 Wis. 2d 175
, 330 N.W.2d 584
The court must inform counsel of changes it makes to jury instructions following an instructions conference. State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722
, 467 N.W.2d 531
Under rare circumstances, a jury instruction creating a conclusive presumption regarding an element of a crime may be harmless error. State v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722
, 467 N.W.2d 531
Instructional rulings are to be made at the close of the evidence. A party is not entitled to a mid-trial advisory ruling on whether an instruction will be given. Such a ruling, if given, is nonbinding and not subject to appeal. State v. Sohn, 193 Wis. 2d 346
, 535 N.W.2d 1
(Ct. App. 1995).
The right to counsel includes the right to make a closing summary of the evidence to trier of fact. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853
Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, a criminal trial must be open to the public. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
NOTE: See also the notes to Article I, section 7 of the Wisconsin constitution.
Evidence and practice; civil rules applicable. 972.11(1)(1)
Except as provided in subs. (2)
, the rules of evidence and practice in civil actions shall be applicable in all criminal proceedings unless the context of a section or rule manifestly requires a different construction. No guardian ad litem need be appointed for a defendant in a criminal action. Chapters 885
, except ss. 804.02
, shall apply in all criminal proceedings.
In this subsection, "sexual conduct" means any conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities of the complaining witness, including but not limited to prior experience of sexual intercourse or sexual contact, use of contraceptives, living arrangement and life-style.
If the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 940.225
, or 948.095
, any evidence concerning the complaining witness's prior sexual conduct or opinions of the witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation as to prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into evidence during the course of the hearing or trial, nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the presence of the jury, except the following, subject to s. 971.31 (11)
Evidence of the complaining witness's past conduct with the defendant.
Evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury suffered.
Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault made by the complaining witness.
Notwithstanding s. 901.06
, the limitation on the admission of evidence of or reference to the prior sexual conduct of the complaining witness in par. (b)
applies regardless of the purpose of the admission or reference unless the admission is expressly permitted under par. (b) 1.
If the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 940.225
, or 948.095
, evidence of the manner of dress of the complaining witness at the time when the crime occurred is admissible only if it is relevant to a contested issue at trial and its probative value substantially outweighs all of the following:
The danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.
The considerations of undue delay, waste of time or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
The court shall determine the admissibility of evidence under subd. 1.
upon pretrial motion before it may be introduced at trial.
At a trial in any criminal prosecution, the court may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, order that the testimony of any child witness be taken in a room other than the courtroom and simultaneously televised in the courtroom by means of closed-circuit audiovisual equipment if all of the following apply:
That the presence of the defendant during the taking of the child's testimony will result in the child suffering serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.
That taking the testimony of the child in a room other than the courtroom and simultaneously televising the testimony in the courtroom by means of closed-circuit audiovisual equipment is necessary to minimize the trauma to the child of testifying in the courtroom setting and to provide a setting more amenable to securing the child witness's uninhibited, truthful testimony.