There is no authority for the proposition that an incriminating statement offered by a suspect who has not been Mirandized during the course of a custodial interrogation is admissible simply because that particular statement, viewed in complete isolation, appears "voluntary." It is of no moment to a Miranda analysis that an admission, viewed in a vacuum, appears to have been made voluntarily. State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 10-0505.
The defendant withdrew his request for an attorney by voluntarily initiating a request to resume questioning after validly invoking his right to counsel, cancelling his invocation of that right by initiating the dialogue in which he asked to continue the interrogation. That before the interrogator returned, the suspect's attorney on a prior charge arrived at the police station and asked to see the suspect did not change the court's analysis. State v. Stevens, 2012 WI 97, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 09-2057.
The constitutional prohibition against compelled self-incrimination applies only to testimonial or communicative evidence, not to physical tests. The privilege does not bar compulsion to submit to physical testing such as fingerprinting, photographing or measuring, writing or speaking for identification, assuming a stance, or making a particular gesture. State v. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 137, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 12-0064.
A defendant's statements are voluntary if they are the product of a free and unconstrained will, reflecting deliberateness of choice, as opposed to the result of a conspicuously unequal confrontation in which the pressures brought to bear on the defendant by representatives of the state exceeded the defendant's ability to resist. The determination is made in light of all of the facts surrounding the interview and decided under the totality of the circumstances, balancing the defendant's relevant personal characteristics, including the defendant's age, education and intelligence, physical and emotional condition, and prior experience with law enforcement, with the pressures imposed by the police. State v. Lemoine, 2013 WI 5, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 10-2597.
Misrepresentations by police do not necessarily make a confession involuntary; rather, they are a relevant factor in the totality of the circumstances. In this case, misstatements made by the police were not themselves a constitutional violation when the defendant was not in custody. Because the comments were technically a misrepresentation, they weighed toward a finding of involuntariness, but in the context of the whole interview, they did not suffice to make the defendant's statements involuntary. State v. Lemoine, 2013 WI 5, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 10-2597.
Statements made after Miranda warnings but before contact with requested counsel are admissible for impeachment purposes. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714.
A witness who refuses to testify on self-incrimination grounds after the judge grants immunity may summarily be found in criminal contempt. United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309.
The accused's silence during police interrogation lacked probative value for impeachment of an alibi at trial. United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171. See: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610.
The use of the defendant's income tax returns to prove a gambling charge did not deny self-incrimination protection. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648.
A voluntary interview at a police station was not "custodial interrogation." Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492.
An instruction to the jury, over defense objection, not to draw an adverse inference from the defendant's failure to testify did not violate the right against self-incrimination. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
While statements made by the defendant in circumstances violating Miranda protections are admissible for impeachment if their trustworthiness satisfies legal standards, any criminal trial use against the defendant of involuntary statements is a denial of due process. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
Testimony before a grand jury under a grant of immunity could not constitutionally be used for impeachment purposes in a later criminal trial. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
An explicit statement of waiver is not necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived Miranda rights. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
A voluntary confession obtained during a custodial interrogation following an illegal arrest was inadmissible. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
A witness compelled by a grant of immunity to testify despite a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination was property prosecuted for perjured testimony. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980).
An officer's comment that a child might find a loaded gun was not the functional equivalent of questioning in violation of Miranda rights. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
The right against self-incrimination is not violated when the defendant who testifies in his own defense is impeached by use of the defendant's prearrest silence. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
Upon the defendant's request, the judge must instruct the jury not to infer guilt from the defendant's failure to testify. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981).
An accused who requests counsel may not be interrogated without counsel unless the accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
When, for impeachment purposes, the prosecution cross-examined the defendant as to postarrest silence before the defendant received Miranda warnings, due process was not violated. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
When the prosecutor improperly commented to the jury that the defendants did not challenge certain accusations against them, the court erred in reversing the conviction on appeal without determining whether the error was harmless. U.S. v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
A probationer under an obligation to appear before a probation officer and answer questions truthfully was not entitled to Miranda warnings. A confession was, therefore, admissible. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984).
The court adopts an "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
The court adopts a "public safety" exception to the Miranda rule. When the accused, known to have had gun, did not have a gun at time of arrest in a supermarket, the officer properly asked where the gun was before giving Miranda warnings. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
A person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to Miranda warnings regardless of the nature or severity of the offense. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
A suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning may later waive his or her rights and confess after Miranda warnings are given. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
The prosecutor's use of the defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda-warnings silence as evidence of the defendant's sanity violated the due process clause. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986).
Police failure to inform the defendant that a third party had retained counsel did not invalidate the defendant's waiver of Miranda rights. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
Exclusion of testimony about the circumstances of a confession deprived the defendant of due process and other fundamental constitutional rights. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
When no evidence is present suggesting that police officers sent the suspect's wife in to see him with the hope of obtaining incriminating information, no "interrogation" was undertaken even though a detective was present and tape recorded the conversation. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987).
Police may not interrogate a suspect held in custody after the suspect has previously requested counsel, even when the interrogation relates to an offense different from that for which the suspect requested counsel. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
The custodian of corporate records may not resist a subpoena for records on self-incrimination grounds, regardless of the size of the corporate entity. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
The self-incrimination privilege does not support a refusal to comply with a juvenile court's order to produce a child. Baltimore Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 474, 107 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1990).
An undercover officer is not required to give Miranda warnings to a suspect before surreptitious custodial interrogation. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 110 L. Ed. 2d 243 (1990).
When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and may not be reinstated without counsel present even though the accused previously did have an opportunity to consult an attorney. Minnich v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 112 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1990).
Admission of a coerced confession may be found to be "harmless error." Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991).
The 6th amendment right to counsel is offense specific. An accused's invocation of the right during a judicial proceeding did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda arising from the 5th amendment guarantees against self-incrimination in regard to police questioning concerning a separate offense. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 115 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1991).
A police officer's subjective and undisclosed view of whether a person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to determining whether the person is in custody and entitled to Miranda warnings. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994).
Officers need not cease questioning a suspect subject to custodial interrogation when the suspect makes an ambiguous reference to an attorney. Although often good practice, it is not necessary that the officer ask clarifying questions. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994).
Miranda and its progeny govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. Miranda may not be overruled by act of Congress. Dickerson v. U.S. 530 U.S. 428, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000).
A witness who denies all culpability has a 5th amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 67, 149 LEd 2d 205 (2001).
A prison rehabilitation program that required inmates convicted of sexual assault to admit having committed the crime or have prison privileges reduced did not violate the right against self-incrimination although immunity was not granted and prosecution of previously uncharged crimes that might be revealed by the required admissions was possible. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2002).
It is not until statements compelled by police interrogations are used use in a criminal case that a violation of the 5th amendment self-incrimination clause occurs. When a confession was coerced, but no criminal case was ever brought there could be no violation. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 155 L. Ed. 2d 984, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003).
When the defendant's refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute him, application of a criminal statute requiring disclosure of the person's name when the police officer reasonably suspected the person had committed a crime did not violate the protection against self-incrimination. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 159 L. Ed 2d 292, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
A custodial interrogation in which no Miranda warnings are given until the interrogation has produced a confession in which the interrogating officer follows the confession with Miranda warnings and then leads the suspect to cover the same ground a second time violates Miranda and the repeated statement is inadmissible. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 177, 159 L. Ed 2d 292, 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
A failure to give a suspect Miranda warnings does not require suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements. Miranda protects against violations of the self-Incrimination clause, which is not implicated by the introduction at trial of physical evidence resulting from voluntary statements. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 600, 159 L. Ed 2d 667, 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
The 4 warnings Miranda requires are invariable, but the U.S. Supreme Court has not dictated the words in which the essential information must be conveyed. The inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his or her rights as required by Miranda. Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1009 (2010).
Under Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, a voluntary Miranda waiver is sufficient at the time of an initial attempted interrogation to protect a suspect's right to have counsel present, but not at the time of subsequent interrogation attempts if the suspect initially requested the presence of counsel. However, confessions obtained after a 2-week break in custody and a waiver of Miranda rights are most unlikely to be compelled, and hence are unreasonably excluded. Lawful imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a crime does not create the coercive pressures identified in Miranda and is not considered continued custody for determining whether custodial interrogation ended. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1213; 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010).
An invocation of the right to remain silent must be unambiguous and unequivocal. The defendant did not say that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk with the police. Had he made either of these simple, unambiguous statements, he would have invoked his right to cut off questioning. He did neither, so he did not invoke his right to remain silent. A suspect who has received and understood the Miranda warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the police. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 2250; 176 L. Ed. 2d 1098 (2010).
The age of a child subjected to police questioning is relevant to the custody analysis of Miranda. So long as the child's age was known to the officer at the time of police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature of that test, but a child's age will not be determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case. J. D. B. v. North Carolina, 564 U. S. ___, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011).
A prisoner is not always in custody for purposes of Miranda whenever a prisoner is isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct outside the prison. Imprisonment, questioning in private, and questioning about events in the outside world are not necessarily enough to create a custodial situation for Miranda purposes. "Custody" is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion. In determining whether a person is in custody in this sense, the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Howes v. Fields, 565 U. S. ___, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17, 132 S. Ct. 1181 (2012).
Collateral estoppel barred the state from introducing evidence of a van theft as an overt act in a conspiracy charge when the accuseds had earlier been acquitted in the van theft trial. The accused's silence prior to receiving Miranda warnings was properly used to impeach the accused. The prosecution's reference to post- Miranda silence was harmless error. Feela v. Israel, 727 F.2d 151 (1984).
Assertion of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in federal civil litigation: Rights and remedies. Daskal, 64 MLR 243 (1980).
Privilege against self-incrimination-truthful statements may be used in a perjury prosecution. 64 MLR 744 (1981).
Adding (or Reaffirming) a Temporal Element to the Miranda Warning "You Have a Right to an Attorney. Bazelon. 90 MLR 1009 (2007).
The privilege against self-incrimination in civil commitment proceedings. 1980 WLR 697.
McNeil v. Wisconsin: Blurring a Bright Line on Custodial Interrogation. 1992 WLR 1643.
I,9 Remedy for wrongs. Section 9. Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
The constitutional guaranty of a remedy for injuries to person and property does not give a constitutional right to sue the state in tort. There is no right of a citizen to hold the sovereign substantively liable for torts, and the state, being immune from suit without its consent, may define the conditions under which it will permit actions against itself. Cords v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 42, 214 N.W.2d 405.
The action for common-law seduction is extended to allow recovery against the seducer by the woman herself. Slawek v. Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9.
The constitution does not entitle state litigants to the exact remedy they desire, but merely to their day in court. Wiener v. J.C. Penney Co. 65 Wis. 2d 139, 222 N.W.2d 149.
Illegal aliens have the right to sue in Wisconsin for injuries negligently inflicted upon them. Arteaga v. Literski, 83 Wis. 2d 128, 265 N.W.2d 148 (1978).
No legal rights are conferred by this section. Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp. 95 Wis. 2d 173, 290 N.W.2d 176 (1980).
Pre-1981 statutory paternity proceedings, which vested exclusive authority in district attorney to commence paternity action, unconstitutionally denied the child a "day in court." Accordingly, the child's action was not barred by any statute of limitations. In re Paternity of R.W.L. 116 Wis. 2d 150, 341 N.W.2d 682 (1984).
When an adequate remedy or forum does not exist to resolve disputes or provide due process, the courts can fashion an adequate remedy. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
The state is not entitled to protection under this section. State v. Halverson, 130 Wis. 2d 300, 387 N.W.2d 124 (Ct. App. 1986).
A register in probate's fee based on the value of the estate does not violate this section. Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987).
A court faced with a litigant who has engaged in a pattern of frivolous litigation has the authority to implement a remedy that may include restrictions on the litigant's access to the court. Village of Tigerton v. Minniecheske, 211 Wis. 2d 777, 565 N.W.2d 586 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1933.
This section applies only when a prospective litigant seeks a remedy for an already existing right. It preserves the right to obtain justice on the basis of law as it in fact exists. Legislative actions define how the law does exist. Aicher v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 2000 WI 98, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849, 99-2955.
Although Article I, s. 9, itself may not create new rights, it does allow for a remedy through the existing common law. The goal of providing certainty is not necessarily achievable, and that is not necessarily a bad thing. The common law develops to adapt to the changing needs of society. Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523, 03-1528.
I,9m Victims of crime. Section 9m. [As created April 1993] This state shall treat crime victims, as defined by law, with fairness, dignity and respect for their privacy. This state shall ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges and protections as provided by law: timely disposition of the case; the opportunity to attend court proceedings unless the trial court finds sequestration is necessary to a fair trial for the defendant; reasonable protection from the accused throughout the criminal justice process; notification of court proceedings; the opportunity to confer with the prosecution; the opportunity to make a statement to the court at disposition; restitution; compensation; and information about the outcome of the case and the release of the accused. The legislature shall provide remedies for the violation of this section. Nothing in this section, or in any statute enacted pursuant to this section, shall limit any right of the accused which may be provided by law. [1993 J.R. 2, vote April 1993]
I,10 Treason. Section 10. Treason against the state shall consist only in levying war against the same, or in adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.
I,11 Searches and seizures. Section 11. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Electronic eavesdropping, done with the consent of one of the parties, does not violate the U.S. constitution. State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court, 51 Wis. 2d 434, 187 N.W.2d 354.
The prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is not limited to criminal cases. It applies in forfeiture actions arising out of ordinance violations. Milwaukee v. Cohen, 57 Wis. 2d 38, 203 N.W.2d 633.
An inspection by police of a basement storage room accessible to the public and the observation of evidence found there in open view that was later seized under a search warrant did not amount to an improper invasion of the defendant's privacy. Watkins v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 514, 208 N.W.2d 449 (1973).
Police have a right to lock a car to protect its contents after arresting the driver, but if it is already locked they cannot enter it on the pretense of locking it and thus discover contraband. When the car was borrowed, consent by the lawful user of the car was sufficient to allow a search and any containers found could be opened and examined. Soehle v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 72, 208 N.W.2d 341.
When officers, armed with a search warrant, knocked on a door, pushed it open when the defendant opened it 2 inches, and put him under restraint before showing the warrant, they acted legally. State v. Meier, 60 Wis. 2d 452, 210 N.W.2d 685.
The observation of tools in a car by police officers did not constitute a search, and the tools could be seized and were properly admissible into evidence. Anderson v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 233, 223 N.W.2d 879.
Pertinent to the validity of an investigative stop is whether the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate. Wendricks v. State, 72 Wis. 2d 717, 242 N.W.2d 187.
When an abused child, an occupant of defendant's house, was accompanied to the house by social workers to recover the child's belongings and exhibited to the workers the instruments used to inflict punishment, a subsequent search warrant was not tainted by an unconstitutional search. State v. Killory, 73 Wis. 2d 400, 243 N.W.2d 475.
When evidence seized in an illegal search was admitted, no reversible error resulted when other evidence uninfluenced by the inadmissible evidence was sufficient to convict. Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800.
The drawing and testing of blood solely for diagnostic and not government-instigated purposes was not a "search or seizure" even when the testing physician testified at a negligent homicide trial. State v. Jenkins, 80 Wis. 2d 426, 259 N.W.2d 109.
A stop and frisk was not an unreasonable search and seizure. State v. Williamson, 113 Wis. 2d 389, 335 N.W.2d 814 (1983).
A person who is lawfully in custody for a civil offense may be required to participate in a lineup for an unrelated criminal offense. State v. Wilks, 121 Wis. 2d 93, 358 N.W.2d 273 (1984).
There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage once it has been routinely collected by garbage collectors. State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 367 N.W.2d 788 (1985).
An unlawful arrest does not deprive a court of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. State v. Smith, 131 Wis. 2d 220, 388 N.W.2d 601 (1986).