Actions suggesting to a reasonable police officer that an individual is attempting to flee is adequately suspicious to support an investigatory stop. State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77
, 454 N.W.2d 763
rule applies once a person becomes a valid suspect even though the encounter was initially consensual; if circumstances show investigation is not complete, the suspect does not have the right to terminate it. State v. Goyer, 157 Wis. 2d 532
, 460 N.W.2d 424
(Ct. App. 1990).
When a person's activity may constitute either a civil forfeiture or crime, an investigative stop may be performed. State v. Krier, 165 Wis. 2d 673
, 478 N.W.2d 63
(Ct. App. 1991).
A "showup" where police present a single suspect to a witness for identification, often at or near a crime scene shortly after the crime occurs, is suggestive but not impermissibly suggestive per se.
State v. Garner, 207 Wis. 2d 520
, 558 N.W.2d 916
(Ct. App. 1996), 96-0168
Detaining a person at his home, then transporting him about one mile to the scene of an accident in which he was involved, was an investigative stop and a reasonable part of an ongoing accident investigation. State v. Quartana, 213 Wis. 2d 440
, 570 N.W.2d 618
(Ct. App. 1997), 97-0695
That the defendant is detained in a temporary Terry
stop does not automatically mean Miranda
warnings are not required. Whether the warnings are required depends on whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have considered himself or herself to be in custody. State v. Gruen, 218 Wis. 2d 581
, 582 N.W.2d 728
(Ct. App. 1998), 96-2588
This section authorizes officers to demand identification only when a person is suspected of committing a crime, but does not govern the lawfulness of requests for identification in other circumstances. State v. Griffith, 2000 WI 72
, 236 Wis. 2d 48
, 613 N.W.2d 72
A police officer performing a Terry
stop and requesting identification could perform a limited search for identifying papers when: 1) the information received by the officer was not confirmed by police records; 2) the intrusion on the suspect was minimal; 3) the officer observed that the suspect's pockets were bulging; and 4) the officer had experience with persons who claimed to have no identification when in fact they did. State v. Black, 2000 WI App 175
, 238 Wis. 2d 203
, 617 N.W.2d 210
Under Florida v. J.L.,
an anonymous tip giving rise to reasonable suspicion must bear indicia of reliability. That the tipster's anonymity is placed at risk indicates that the informant is genuinely concerned and not a fallacious prankster. Corroborated aspects of the tip also lend credibility; the corroborated actions of the suspect need be inherently criminal in and of themselves. State v. Williams, 2001 WI 21
, 241 Wis. 2d 631
, 623 N.W.2d 106
An anonymous tip regarding erratic driving from another driver calling from a cell phone contained sufficient indicia of reliability to justify an investigative stop when: 1) the informant was exposed to possible identification, and therefore possible arrest if the tip proved false; 2) the tip reported contemporaneous and verifiable observations regarding the driving, location, and vehicle; and 3) the officer verified many of the details in the tip. That the tip reasonably suggested intoxicated driving created an exigency strongly in favor of immediate police investigation without the necessity that the officer personally observe erratic driving. State v. Rutzinski, 2001 WI 22
, 241 Wis. 2d 729
, 623 N.W.2d 516
When a caller identifies himself or herself by name, placing his or her anonymity at risk, and the totality of the circumstances establishes a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot, the police may execute a lawful investigative stop. Whether the caller gave correct identifying information, or whether the police ultimately could have verified the information, the caller, by providing the information, risked that his or her identity would be discovered and cannot be considered anonymous. State v. Sisk, 2001 WI App 182
, 247 Wis. 2d 443
, 634 N.W.2d 877
and this section apply to confrontations between the police and citizens in public places only. For private residences and hotels, in the absence of a warrant, the police must have probable cause and exigent circumstances or consent to justify an entry. Reasonable suspicion is not a prerequisite to an officer's seeking consent to enter a private dwelling. State v. Stout, 2002 WI App 41
, 250 Wis. 2d 768
, 641 N.W.2d 474
To perform a protective search for weapons, an officer must have reasonable suspicion that a person may be armed and dangerous. A court may consider an officer's belief that his, her, or another's safety is threatened in finding reasonable suspicion, but such a belief is not a prerequisite to a valid search. There is no per se rule justifying a search any time an individual places his or her hands in his or her pockets contrary to police orders. The defendant's hand movements must be considered under the totality of the circumstances of the case. State v. Kyles, 2004 WI 15
, 269 Wis. 2d 1
, 675 N.W.2d 449
The principles of Terry
permit a state to require a suspect to disclose his or her name in the course of a Terry
stop and allow imposing criminal penalties for failing to do so. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177
, 159 L. Ed 2d 292
, 124 S. Ct. 2451
When the defendant's refusal to disclose his name was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute him, application of a criminal statute requiring disclosure of the person's name when the police officer reasonably suspected the person had committed a crime did not violate the protection against self-incrimination. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177
, 159 L. Ed 2d 292
, 124 S. Ct. 2451
Weaving within a single traffic lane does not alone give rise to the reasonable suspicion necessary to conduct an investigative stop of a vehicle. The reasonableness of a stop must be determined based on the totality of the facts and circumstances. State v. Post, 2007 WI 60
, 301 Wis. 2d 1
, 733 N.W.2d 634
The potential availability of an innocent explanation does not prohibit an investigative stop. If any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned, notwithstanding the existence of other innocent inferences that could be drawn, the officers have the right to temporarily detain the individual for the purpose of inquiry. State v. Limon, 2008 WI App 77
, 312 Wis. 2d 174
, 751 N.W.2d 877
When a person who is temporarily detained for investigation pursuant to a Terry stop is then moved to another location, courts conduct a two-part inquiry: First, was the person moved within the vicinity of the stop? Second, was the purpose in moving the person within the vicinity reasonable? Ten miles is too distant a transportation to be within the vicinity so long as the temporary detention is supported by no more than a reasonable suspicion. In order for the transporting of a defendant to a hospital that was not in the vicinity of the stop to have been lawful, it must have been supported by probable cause to arrest or by a reasonable exercise of the community caretaker function. State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46
, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 13-2107
Cell Phone Tips of Crime and `Reasonable Suspicion.' Andregg. Wis. Law. June 2005.
NOTE: See also the notes to Article I, section 11, of the Wisconsin Constitution.
Search during temporary questioning.
When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning pursuant to s. 968.24
and reasonably suspects that he or she or another is in danger of physical injury, the law enforcement officer may search such person for weapons or any instrument or article or substance readily capable of causing physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law abiding persons. If the law enforcement officer finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which the law enforcement officer reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, or which may constitute a threat to his or her safety, the law enforcement officer may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time the law enforcement officer shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest the person so questioned.
History: 1993 a. 486
An investigatory stop-and-frisk for the sole purpose of discovering a suspect's identity was lawful under the facts of the case. State v. Flynn, 92 Wis. 2d 427
, 285 N.W.2d 710
This section permits an officer to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons if an individual who recently occupied the vehicle is stopped under s. 968.24 and the officer "reasonably suspects that he or another is in danger of physical injury." State v. Moretto, 144 Wis. 2d 171
, 423 N.W.2d 841
provides only for an officer to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons that might be used to assault him or her, under the circumstances of this case, the search was properly broadened to encompass the opening of the defendant's purse, which was essentially an extension of her person where the purse was accessible by her. State v. Limon, 2008 WI App 77
, 312 Wis. 2d 174
, 751 N.W.2d 877
Terry tempered or torpedoed? The new law of stop and frisk. Lewis. WBB Aug. 1988.
NOTE: See also the notes to Article I, section 11, of the Wisconsin Constitution.
A person taken into custody under s. 938.19
and there are reasonable grounds to believe the juvenile has committed an act which if committed by an adult would be covered under subd. 1.
A person arrested for any misdemeanor not specified in subd. 2.
, any other violation of state law punishable by forfeiture or any local ordinance if there is probable cause to believe the person is concealing a weapon or a thing which may constitute evidence of the offense for which he or she is detained.
A person arrested or otherwise lawfully detained or taken into custody, if the person will be incarcerated, imprisoned, or otherwise detained in a jail or prison with one or more other persons. Subject to subd. 3.
, for the purpose of this subdivision, "detainee" does not include a juvenile who is taken into custody under s. 938.19
and held in custody under s. 938.209
"Jail" includes municipal prisons and rehabilitation facilities established under s. 59.53 (8)
by whatever name they are known, but does not include lockup facilities.
"Lockup facilities" means those facilities of a temporary place of detention at a police station that are used exclusively to hold persons under arrest until they can be brought before a court and that are not used to hold persons pending trial who have appeared in court or have been committed to imprisonment for nonpayment of fines or forfeitures.
"Strip search" means a search in which a detainee's genitals, pubic area, buttock or anus, or a female detainee's breast, is uncovered and either is exposed to view or is touched by a person conducting the search, except that if the detainee is a person defined in par. (a) 5.
, "strip search" means a search in which a detainee's genitals, pubic area, buttock or anus, or a female detainee's breast, is uncovered and exposed to view but is not touched by a person conducting the search unless the touching is necessary to gain the detainee's cooperation with the search or unless the touching is necessary to assist a disabled detainee's cooperation with the search.
No person may conduct a strip search unless all of the following apply:
The person conducting the search is of the same sex as the detainee, unless the search is a body cavity search conducted under sub. (3)
The detainee will be incarcerated, imprisoned, or otherwise detained in the jail or prison where the search is conducted for not less than 12 hours. This paragraph applies only to a detainee who meets the definition in sub. (1) (a) 5.
The detainee is not exposed to the view of any person not conducting the search.
The search is not reproduced through a visual or sound recording.
A person conducting the search has obtained the prior written permission of the chief, sheriff or law enforcement administrator of the jurisdiction where the person is detained, or his or her designee, unless there is probable cause to believe that the detainee is concealing a weapon.
A person conducting the search prepares a report identifying the person detained, all persons conducting the search, the time, date and place of the search and the written authorization required by par. (d)
, and provides a copy of the report to the detainee.
No person other than a physician, physician assistant or registered nurse licensed to practice in this state may conduct a body cavity search.
A person who intentionally violates this section may be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 90 days or both.
This section does not limit the rights of any person to civil damages or injunctive relief.
Each law enforcement agency, as defined in s. 165.83 (1) (b)
, and each facility where a strip search may be conducted pursuant to this section, shall establish written policies and procedures concerning strip searches which at least meet the minimum requirements of this section and shall provide annual training regarding the policies and procedures to any employee or agent of the agency or facility who may conduct a strip search.
This section does not apply to a search of any person who:
Is serving a sentence, pursuant to a conviction, in a jail, state prison or house of correction.
Is placed in or transferred to a juvenile correctional facility, as defined in s. 938.02 (10p)
, or a secured residential care center for children and youth, as defined in s. 938.02 (15g)
A visual body cavity search is more intrusive than a strip search. It is not objectively reasonable for police to conclude that consent to a strip search includes consent to scrutiny of body cavities. State v. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61
, 251 Wis. 2d 625
, 642 N.W.2d 549
This section is a regulatory statute aimed at controlling law enforcement officers' conduct via criminal penalties. It does not mention probable cause and authorizes no motions to quash or limit the search. When there was no violation of any constitutional right but merely of the statute itself, the violation of the statute provided no basis for a suppression motion. State v. Minett, 2014 WI App 40
, 353 Wis. 2d 484
, 846 N.W.2d 831
Intrusive searches of the mouth, nose, or ears are not covered by sub. (3). However, searches of those body orifices should be conducted by medical personnel to comply with the 4th and 5th amendments. 71 Atty. Gen. 12
Search of physically disabled person. 968.256(1)
In this section, "physically disabled person" means a person who requires an assistive device for mobility, including, but not limited to, a wheelchair, brace, crutch or artificial limb.
A search of a physically disabled person shall be conducted in a careful manner. If a search of a physically disabled person requires the removal of an assistive device or involves a person lacking sensation in some portion of his or her body, the search shall be conducted with extreme care by a person who has had training in handling physically disabled persons.
History: 1979 c. 240
John Doe proceeding. 968.26(1)(1)
If a district attorney requests a judge to convene a proceeding to determine whether a crime has been committed in the court's jurisdiction, the judge shall convene a proceeding described under sub. (3)
and shall subpoena and examine any witnesses the district attorney identifies.
Except in par. (am)
, in this subsection, "district attorney" includes a prosecutor to whom the judge has referred the complaint under par. (am)
If a person who is not a district attorney complains to a judge that he or she has reason to believe that a crime has been committed within the judge's jurisdiction, the judge shall refer the complaint to the district attorney or, if the complaint may relate to the conduct of the district attorney, to another prosecutor under s. 978.045
If a district attorney receives a referral under par. (am)
, the district attorney shall, within 90 days of receiving the referral, issue charges or refuse to issue charges. If the district attorney refuses to issue charges, the district attorney shall forward to the judge in whose jurisdiction the crime has allegedly been committed all law enforcement investigative reports on the matter that are in the custody of the district attorney, his or her records and case files on the matter, and a written explanation why he or she refused to issue charges. The judge may require a law enforcement agency to provide to him or her any investigative reports that the law enforcement agency has on the matter. The judge shall convene a proceeding as described under sub. (3)
if he or she determines that a proceeding is necessary to determine if a crime has been committed. When determining if a proceeding is necessary, the judge may consider the law enforcement investigative reports, the records and case files of the district attorney, and any other written records that the judge finds relevant.
In a proceeding convened under par. (b)
, the judge shall subpoena and examine under oath the complainant and any witnesses that the judge determines to be necessary and appropriate to ascertain whether a crime has been committed and by whom committed. The judge shall consider the credibility of testimony in support of and opposed to the person's complaint.
In a proceeding convened under par. (b)
, the judge may issue a criminal complaint if the judge finds sufficient credible evidence to warrant a prosecution of the complaint. The judge shall consider, in addition to any testimony under par. (c)
, the law enforcement investigative reports, the records and case files of the district attorney, and any other written reports that the judge finds relevant.
The extent to which the judge may proceed in an examination under sub. (1)
is within the judge's discretion. The examination may be adjourned and may be secret. Any witness examined under this section may have counsel present at the examination but the counsel shall not be allowed to examine his or her client, cross-examine other witnesses, or argue before the judge. Subject to s. 971.23
, if the proceeding is secret, the record of the proceeding and the testimony taken shall not be open to inspection by anyone except the district attorney unless it is used by the prosecution at the preliminary hearing or the trial of the accused and then only to the extent that it is so used. A court, on the motion of a district attorney, may compel a person to testify or produce evidence under s. 972.08 (1)
. The person is immune from prosecution as provided in s. 972.08 (1)
, subject to the restrictions under s. 972.085
A defendant must be allowed to use testimony of witnesses at a secret John Doe proceeding to impeach the same witnesses at the trial, even if the prosecution does not use the John Doe testimony. Myers v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 248
, 208 N.W.2d 311
An immunity hearing must be in open court. State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit Court, 65 Wis. 2d 66
, 221 N.W.2d 894
A person charged as a result of a John Doe proceeding has no recognized interest in the maintenance of secrecy in that proceeding. John Doe proceedings are discussed. State v. O'Connor, 77 Wis. 2d 261
, 252 N.W.2d 671
No restriction under the 4th or 5th amendment precludes the enforcement of an order for handwriting exemplars directed by a presiding judge in a John Doe proceeding. State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161
, 254 N.W.2d 210
Due process does not require that a John Doe witness be advised of the nature of the proceeding or that the witness is a "target" of the investigation. Ryan v. State, 79 Wis. 2d 83
, 255 N.W.2d 910
This section does not violate the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. John Doe proceedings are discussed. State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808
, 266 N.W.2d 597
A balance between the public's right to know and the need for secrecy in John Doe proceedings is discussed. In re Wis. Family Counseling Services v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 670
, 291 N.W.2d 631
(Ct. App. 1980).
A John Doe judge may not issue a material witness warrant under s. 969.01 (3). State v. Brady, 118 Wis. 2d 154
, 345 N.W.2d 533
(Ct. App. 1984).
When a John Doe proceeding is not a joint executive and judicial undertaking, the procedure does not violate the separation of powers doctrine and is constitutional. State v. Unnamed Defendant, 150 Wis. 2d 352
, 441 N.W.2d 696
A John Doe judge may issue and seal a search warrant, and a district attorney may independently issue a criminal complaint, regardless of the existence of the John Doe. A John Doe cannot be used to obtain evidence against a defendant who has already been charged. State v. Cummings, 199 Wis. 2d 721
, 546 N.W.2d 406
To be entitled to a hearing, a John Doe complainant must do more than merely allege in conclusory terms that a crime has been committed. The complainant's petition must allege facts that raise a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed. State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 214 Wis. 2d 605
, 571 N.W.2d 385
A nonlawyer's questioning of a witness on the state's behalf at a John Doe hearing even if constituting the unauthorized practice of law did not require exclusion of the testimony at trial. State v. Noble, 2002 WI 64
, 253 Wis. 2d 206
, 646 N.W.2d 38
Article VII, Section 5 (3), read together with ss. 808.03 (2) and 809.51 (1) is sufficiently broad in scope to permit the court of appeals to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the actions of a judge presiding over a John Doe proceeding. When rendering judicial decisions in the context of a John Doe proceeding, the judge must create a record for possible review. On review of a petition for a writ stemming from a secret John Doe proceeding, the court of appeals may seal parts of a record in order to comply with existing secrecy orders issued by the John Doe judge. Unnamed Persons Numbers 1, 2, and 3 v. State, 2003 WI 30
, 260 Wis. 2d 653
, 660 N.W.2d 260
A John Doe judge must have the authority to disqualify counsel, and may permit argument by counsel when necessary to ensure procedural fairness. Unnamed Persons Numbers 1, 2, and 3 v. State, 2003 WI 30
, 260 Wis. 2d 653
, 660 N.W.2d 260