995.50 Annotation
Oral communication among numerous employees and jail inmates is sufficient to constitute publicity under sub. (2) (c). The plain meaning of "a place" in sub. (2) (a) is geographical and does not include a file of medical records Hillman v. Columbia County,
164 Wis. 2d 376,
474 N.W.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1991).
995.50 Annotation
Disclosure of private information to one person or to a small group does not, as a matter of law in all cases, fail to satisfy the publicity element of an invasion of privacy claim. Whether a disclosure satisfies the publicity element of an invasion of privacy claim depends upon the particular facts of the case and the nature of plaintiff's relationship to the audience who received the information. Pachowitz v. LeDoux,
2003 WI App 120,
265 Wis. 2d 631,
666 N.W.2d 88,
02-2100.
995.50 Annotation
An action for invasion of privacy requires: 1) a public disclosure of facts regarding the plaintiff; 2) the facts disclosed were private; 3) the private matter is one that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities; and 4) the party disclosing the facts acted either unreasonably or recklessly as to whether there was a legitimate public interest in the matter or with actual knowledge that none existed. In order to find public disclosure, the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge. Olson v. Red Cedar Clinic,
2004 WI App 102,
273 Wis. 2d 728,
681 N.W.2d 306,
03-2198.
995.50 Annotation
The recording of sounds emanating from a neighbor's home using a common recording device that was placed inside the defendant's own window was not an intrusion of a nature highly offensive to a reasonable person in violation of sub. (2) (a). Poston v. Burns,
2010 WI App 73,
325 Wis. 2d 404,
784 N.W.2d 717,
09-0463.
995.50 Annotation
Sub. (2) (a) has a spatial basis β the invasion of privacy must occur in a place that a reasonable person would consider private or in a manner which is actionable for trespass. In this case, the only action that was allegedly taken by the defendant was the distribution of fliers containing information that was already available to the public. That the information may have inspired others to make phone calls, honk horns, or write letters does not mean that the defendant invaded the plaintiff's private space. Keller v. Patterson,
2012 WI App 78, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,
11-0334.
995.50 Annotation
Sub. (2) (c) addresses situations where an individual makes public statements about the private life of another person in a highly offensive way. In order to fall under sub. (2) (c), the statements must make information public that was not previously available to the public. Keller v. Patterson,
2012 WI App 78, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,
11-0334.
995.50 Annotation
The more reasonable interpretation of "use" in sub. (2) (b) is that it does not cover bidding on someone's name as a keyword search term. The holding is limited to the particular "non-visible" type of use at issue in this case. Habush v. Cannon,
2013 WI App 34, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___,
11-1769.
995.50 Annotation
The right to privacy law does not affect the duties of custodians of public records under s. 19.21. 68 Atty. Gen. 68.
995.50 Annotation
Surveillance of a school district employee from public streets and highways by the employer school district's agents to determine whether the employee was in violation of the district's residency policy did not violate this section. Munson v. Milwaukee Board of School Directors,
969 F.2d 266 (1992).
995.50 Annotation
While the Open Records Law and this statute are related laws, they are only related in that a finding under the Open Records Law that a record should be made public would necessarily mean that "the information was available to the public as a matter of public record." This is true because both statutes apply the same common-law balancing test when determining whether a record is public. When a trial court found only that the procedures delineated in the Open Records Law were not followed, those procedures had no impact on the question of whether a record is public under this section; the procedures are merely procedural, not substantive. Hutchins v. Clarke,
661 F.3d 947 (2011).
995.50 Annotation
A person's religious affiliation, standing alone, is not so private that publication would offend a reasonable person and constitute an invasion of privacy under sub. (2) (c). Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. National Catholic Reporter Publishing Co.
978 F. Supp 1195 (1997).
995.50 Annotation
The exclusivity provision of the Workers Compensation Act does not bar a claim for invasion of privacy under s. 895.50. Marino v. Arandell Corp.
1 F. Supp. 2d 947 (1998).
995.50 Annotation
In drafting this section, the legislature used New York's privacy statute as a model. The text of sub. (2) (b) duplicates nearly verbatim New York law so case law under the New York privacy statute may be particularly useful. Bogie v. Rosenberg,
705 F.3d 603 (2013).
995.50 Annotation
A claim under sub. (2) (a) must show that the alleged intrusion into privacy would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. The question of what kinds of conduct will be regarded as a highly offensive intrusion is largely a matter of social conventions and expectations. The offensiveness of the intrusion itself cannot be based on the content or substance captured by virtue of the alleged intrusion. The fact that the plaintiff was embarrassed to be filmed saying something she regretted having said and later deemed offensive did not convert the filming itself into a highly offensive intrusion. Bogie v. Rosenberg,
705 F.3d 603 (2013).
995.50 Annotation
Where a matter of legitimate public interest is concerned, no cause of action for invasion of privacy will lie. This newsworthiness or public interest exception should be construed broadly, covering not only descriptions of actual events, but also articles concerning political happenings, social trends, or any subject of public interest. Wisconsin courts have also incorporated the common law exception for incidental use into the statute. Bogie v. Rosenberg,
705 F.3d 603 (2013).
995.50 Annotation
Court documents are matters of public interest. It follows that if court documents warrant the public interest exception, Internet search providers and indexes that lead the public to those documents or that capture key terms related to them are likewise entitled to that exception. To the extent that a search provider's profit motives undermine the reliance on the public interest argument, the exception applies even when the entities sharing the information do so largely, and even primarily, to make a profit. Stayart v. Google Incorporated ,
710 F.3d 719 (2013).
995.50 Annotation
The absence of false light from the Wisconsin privacy statute. 66 MLR 99 (1982).
995.50 Annotation
The tort of misappropriation of name or likeness under Wisconsin's new privacy law. Endejan, 1978 WLR 1029.
995.50 Annotation
The Case for Reexamining Privacy Law in Wisconsin: Why Wisconsin Courts Should Adopt the Interpretation of the Tort of Intrusion upon Seclusion of Fisher v. Mount Olive Lutheran Church. Infield-Harm. 2004 WLR 1781.
995.50 Annotation
The Scope of Wisconsin's Privacy Statute. Backer. Wis. Law. Sept. 2003.
995.50 Annotation
Employer Liability for Employment References. Mac Kelly. Wis. Law. May 2008.
995.67
995.67β
Domestic abuse services; prohibited disclosures. 995.67(1)(b)
(b) "Domestic abuse services organization" means a nonprofit organization or a public agency that provides any of the following services for victims of domestic abuse:
995.67(1)(c)
(c) "Service recipient" means any person who receives or has received domestic abuse services from a domestic abuse services organization.
995.67(2)(a)(a) No employee or agent of a domestic abuse services organization who provides domestic abuse services to a service recipient may intentionally disclose to any person the location of any of the following persons without the informed, written consent of the service recipient:
995.67(2)(a)3.
3. Any minor child in the care or custody of the service recipient.
995.67(2)(a)4.
4. Any minor child who accompanies the service recipient when the service recipient receives domestic abuse services.
995.67(2)(b)
(b) Any person who violates this subsection may be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned for not more than 30 days or both.
995.67 History
History: 1991 a. 228;
2005 a. 155 s.
61; Stats. 2005 s. 995.67;
2007 a. 20.
