Public utility had free speech right to inclose with bills inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 447 US 530 (1980).
Test for determining whether commercial speech is protected discussed. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 447 US 557 (1980).
Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, criminal trial must be open to public. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 US 555 (1980).
Ordinance prohibiting live dancing exhibition violated free speech clause. Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 US 61 (1981).
Statute prohibiting nude dancing in establishments licensed by state to sell liquor was valid under 21st amendment. New York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 US 714 (1981).
Statute which prohibits placing unstamped mailable matter in any box approved by US postal service does not violate free speech clause. U. S. Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Assn. 453 US 114 (1981).
Ordinance which placed substantial restrictions on billboards other than those used for onsite commercial advertising violated free speech clause. Metromedia v. San Diego, 453 US 490 (1981).
Public university which provided forum to many student groups but excluded religious student groups violated principle that state regulation of speech should be content-neutral. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981).
Ordinance regulating sale of drug paraphernalia was constitutional. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 US 489 (1982).
School board's discretion to determine contents of school libraries may not be exercised in narrowly partisan or political manner. Board of Education v. Pico, 457 US 853 (1982).
States are entitled to greater leeway in regulation of pornographic depictions of children. New York v. Ferber, 458 US 747 (1982).
Discharge of public employe did not deny free speech rights, under facts of case. Connick v. Myers, 461 US 138 (1983).
Sidewalk was "public forum"; hence, prohibition of leaflets denied free speech. U.S. v. Grace, 461 US 171 (1983).
Government's substantial interest in maintaining park in heart of capital in attractive condition sustained regulation against camping or overnight sleeping in public parks. Free speech was not denied. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence, 468 US 288 (1984).
School district didn't violate free speech clause by disciplining student for giving offensively lewd and indecent speech at school assembly. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 US 675 (1986).
School administrators may exercise control over style and content of student speech in school-sponsored activity as long as control is reasonably related to "legitimate pedagogical concerns". Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260 (1988).
State may not categorically ban targeted, direct-mail advertising by attorneys. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Assn. 486 US 466 (1988).
Brookfield ordinance prohibiting picketing of individual's residence was not facially invalid under free speech provision. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 US 474 (1988).
Protester's conviction for desecration of flag violates freedom of speech. Texas v. Johnson, 491 US 397, 105 LEd 2d 342 (1989).
First Amendment prohibits employment decisions concerning low-level public employees to be based upon political patronage. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 US 62, 111 LEd 2d 52 (1990).
Public indecency statute barring public nudity and requiring dancers to wear pasties and a G-string does not violate freedom of expression. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 US 560, 115 LEd 2d 504 (1991).
Press freedom does not confer a constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforceable under state law; possible promissory estoppel action for breaching agreement to keep source confidential was not barred. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 US 663, 115 LEd 2d 586 (1991).
County ordinance requiring permit for all parades and public assemblies which gave county administrator power to adjust permit fee to meet the police expense incident to the assembly violated 1st amendment as impermissible assessment of permittee's speech content was required to determine the expenses to be incurred in maintaining order at the assembly. Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 US 123, 120 LEd 2d 101 (1992).
Exclusion of "fighting words" from free speech protections did not justify city ordinance banning displays that communicate fighting words that convey messages of racial, gender or religious intolerance; city may not selectively ban fighting words based on the particular idea expressed by their content. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 US 377, 120 LEd 2d 305 (1992).
City ban on newsracks for commercial publications violated free speech right where city failed to establish a "reasonable fit" between its legitimate interest in safety and aesthetics and the ban. Cincinnati v. Discovery network, 507 US 410, 123 LEd (2d) 99 (1993).
Denial of the use of a school building to a church seeking to exhibit a film when a nonsectarian group would have been allowed the use of the building to show a secular film on the same topic violated the right to free speech. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches, 508 US 34, 124 LEd 2d 352 (1993).
For a government employe's speech to be protected, the speech must be on a matter of public concern and the employe's interest in expressing himself or herself on the matter must outweigh the the injury the speech could cause the employer in providing public services through its employes. Waters v. Churchill, 511 US ___, 128 LEd 2d 686 (1994). See also Burkes v. Klauser, 185 W (2d) 309, 517 NW (2d) 502 (1994).
A city's ban on almost all residential signs violated the right of free speech. City of LaDue, 512 US ___, 129 LEd 2d 22 (1994).
An Ohio statute prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature violated the right of free speech. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 US ___, 131 LEd 2d 426 (1995).
The selection of contingents that will make up a parade is entitled to free speech protection. A parade sponsor's free speech rights include the right to deny a group's participation who intends to convey a message contrary to the sponsor's. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group, 515 US ___, 132 LEd 2d 487 (1995).
A state university which funded printing of a broad range of student publications but denied funding for printing the publication of a student religious group violated free speech guarantees and was not excused by the need to comply with the establishment of religion clause of the constitution. Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 US ___, 132 LEd 2d (1995).
As with government employes whose employment may not be terminated for exercising 1st amendment rights, independent contractors may not have their government contracts terminated for refusing to support a political party or its candidates or for exercising free speech rights. Board of County Commissioners, v. Umbehr, 518 US ___, 135 LEd 2d 843 (1996) and O'Hare Truck Service v. Northlake, 518 US ___, 135 LEd 2d 874 (1996).
Dividing line between publications which may be denied prisoners and those which may not is a matter not of administrative grace but of constitutional right. Gaugh v. Schmidt, 369 F Supp. 877.
Town board was restrained from discharging police chief until issue of impermissible considerations of chief's political activities were resolved. Kuhlmann v. Bloomfield Tp. 521 F Supp. 1242 (1981).
Testimonial privilege of newsmen. Baxter, 55 MLR 184.
Academic freedom; some tentative guidelines. Keith, 55 MLR 379.
Protection of commercial speech. 60 MLR 138.
Zurcher: third party searches and freedom of the press. Cantrell. 62 MLR 35 (1978).
A newspaper cannot constitutionally be compelled to publish a paid advertisement designed to be an editorial response to previous newspaper reports. 64 MLR 361 (1980).
Granting access to private shopping center property for free speech purposes on the basis of a state constitutional provision does not violate owner's federal constitutional property rights or first amendment free speech rights. 64 MLR 507 (1981).
First amendment and freedom of press: A revised approach to marketplace of ideas concept. Garry. 72 MLR 187 (1989).
Researcher-subject testimonial privilege. Nejelski and Lerman, 1971 WLR 1085.
Freedom of speech, expression and action. Himes, 1971 WLR 1209.
Free speech on premises of privately owned shopping center. Felsenthal, 1973 WLR 612.
Constitutional protection of critical speech and the public figure doctrine: Retreat by reaffirmation. 1980 WLR 568.
Corporate "persons" and freedom of speech: The political impact of legal mythology. Patton and Bartlett, 1981 WLR 494.
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District: Creating Greater Protection Religious Speech Through the Illusion of Public Forum Analysis. Ehrmann. 1994 WLR 965.
The Journalist's Privelege. Kassel. Wis. Law. Feb. 1996.
LIBEL
Burden of proof and determination of damages in libel cases discussed. Dalton v. Meister, 52 W (2d) 173, 188 NW (2d) 494.
In a libel action involving a public figure or a matter of public concern the defendant is entitled to the "clear and convincing" burden of proof and also to a finding of the type of malice involved. Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 54 W (2d) 578, 196 NW (2d) 685.
In determining punitive damages in libel cases it is relevant to consider the maximum fine for a similar offense under the criminal code. Wozniak v. Local 1111 of UE, 57 W (2d) 725, 205 NW (2d) 369.
The executive committee of the medical staff of a private hospital is not a quasi-judicial body so as to render a letter to it privileged. DiMiceli v. Klieger, 58 W (2d) 359, 206 NW (2d) 184.
"Public figure" defined. Constitutional protections of news media and individual defamer discussed. Denny v. Mertz, 106 W (2d) 636, 318 NW (2d) 141 (1982).
Private citizen may become public figure regarding particular issue which is of substantial public interest and must prove actual malice to prevail in libel action. Weigel v. Capital Times Co. 145 W (2d) 71, 426 NW (2d) 43 (Ct. App. 1988).
Discussion of absolute privilege to defame in course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Rady v. Lutz, 150 W (2d) 643, 444 NW (2d) 58 (Ct. App. 1989).
Captain in fire department with considerable power and discretion in use of power is public official who must meet malice requirement; defendant firefighters have common law privilege to comment in writing on captain's fitness for office. Miller v. Minority Brotherhood, 158 W (2d) 589, 463 NW (2d) 690 (Ct. App. 1990).
State libel laws are preempted by federal labor laws to extent statements made without knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth are at issue. Old Dominion Br. No. 496, Nat. Asso., Letter Car. v. Austin, 418 US 264.
Public figure who sues media companies for libel may inquire into editorial processes of those responsible where proof of "actual malice" is required for recovery. Herbert v. Lando, 441 US 153 (1979).
"Public figure" principle in libel cases discussed. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc. 443 US 157 (1979).
Defamation law of Wisconsin. Brody, 65 MLR 505 (1982).
Limitations on damages awarded public officials in defamation suits. Kampen, 1972 WLR 574.
I,4 Right to assemble and petition. Section 4. The right of the people peaceably to assemble, to consult for the common good, and to petition the government, or any department thereof, shall never be abridged.
Narrowly drawn anti-cruising ordinance did not violate the right to assemble or travel. Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 179 W (2d) 469, 507 NW (2d) 163 (Ct. App. 1993).
The right to intrastate travel, including the right to move about one's neighborhood in an automobile, is fundamental, but infringements on the right are not subject to strict scrutiny. Cruising ordinances, reasonable in time, place and manner, do not violate this right. Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 W (2d) 528, 544 NW (2d) 849 (1996).
The legislature cannot prohibit an individual from entering the capitol or its grounds. 59 Atty. Gen. 8.
Section 947.06, Stats. 1969, which prohibits unlawful assemblies, is constitutional. Cassidy v. Ceci, 320 F Supp. 223.
Wisconsin, a Constitutional Right to Intrastate Travel, and Anti-Cruising Ordinances. Mode. 78 MLR 735.
I,5 Trial by jury; verdict in civil cases. Section 5. [As amended Nov. 1922] The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law. Provided, however, that the legislature may, from time to time, by statute provide that a valid verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of a specified number of the jury, not less than five-sixths thereof. [1919 J.R. 58; 1921 J.R. 17 A; 1921 c. 504; vote Nov. 1922]
Note: See also the notes to Article I, Section 7—Jury Trial and Juror Qualifications for notes relating to jury trials in criminal cases.
When a juror is struck after trial has commenced, a litigant cannot be required to proceed with 11 jurors in a civil case. The trial court must declare a mistrial or grant a nonsuit with the right to plead over. It is error to grant a nonsuit and then direct a verdict for the defendant because the plaintiff refused to continue with 11 jurors. State ex rel. Polk v. Johnson, 47 W (2d) 207, 177 NW (2d) 122.
Neither by constitution, statute, or common law is a right to trial by jury afforded in a will contest. Estate of Elvers, 48 W (2d) 17, 179 NW (2d) 881.
Where defendant, through his attorney, signed a notice of issue stating there was an issue of fact for the court, which was filed with the clerk, jury trial was effectually waived, because such conduct on the part of defendant's attorney amounted to written consent filed with the clerk as prescribed in 270.32, Stats. 1971. Theuerkauf v. Schnellbaecher, 64 W (2d) 79, 218 NW (2d) 295.
Requirement that defendant prepay jury fees in civil traffic forfeiture action is constitutional. State v. Graf, 72 W (2d) 179, 240 NW (2d) 387.
Jury fee did not violate right to trial by jury. County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 W (2d) 466, 312 NW (2d) 731 (1981).
Right to 12-member jury can only be waived personally by defendant. State v. Cooley, 105 W (2d) 642, 315 NW (2d) 369 (Ct. App. 1981).
Defendant has right to jury determination on each element of charged offense, and right can be waived only by defendant personally, on the record. State v. Villarreal, 153 W (2d) 323, 450 NW (2d) 519 (Ct. App. 1989).
The right to a jury trial does not extend to equitable actions; however defendants who are required to plead legal counterclaims in equitable actions or lose those claims are entitled to a jury trial of their claims. Green Spring Farms v. Spring Green Farms, 172 W (2d) 28, 492 NW (2d) 392 (Ct. App. 1992).
Use of collateral estoppel to prevent a civil defendant from testifying that he did not commit an act where in an earlier criminal trial the defendant was convicted by a jury of committing the act did not deny the defendant's right to a jury. Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 W (2d) 681, 495 NW (2d) 327 (1993).
Where collateral estoppel compels raising a counterclaim in an equitable action, that compulsion does not result in the waiver of the right to a jury trail. Norwest Bank v. Plourde, 185 W (2d) 377, 518 NW (2d) 265 (Ct. App. 1994).
A party has a constitutional right to a jury trial on a statutory claim when the statute codifies an action known at common law in 1848 and the action was regarded as at law in 1848. State v. Ameritech, 185 W (2d) 686, 517 NW (2d) 705 (Ct. App. 1994).
There is neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to have all parties identified to a jury, but as a procedural rule the court should in all cases apprise the jurors of the names of all the parties. Stoppleworth v. Refuse Hideaway, Inc. 200 W (2d) 512, 546 NW (2d) 870 (Ct. App. 1996).
A jury trial is not constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 US 528.
Juror intoxication is not external influence about which jurors may testify to impeach verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 US 107 (1987).
I,6 Excessive bail; cruel punishments. Section 6. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Imposition of a 3-year sentence as a repeater is not cruel and unusual even though the present offense only involved the stealing of 2 boxes of candy, which carries a maximum sentence of 6 months. Hanson v. State, 48 W (2d) 203, 179 NW (2d) 909.
It is not a cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a defendant to 25 years for armed robbery where the maximum would be 30 years, since by stipulation the court took into consideration 5 other uncharged armed robberies. Mallon v. State, 49 W (2d) 185, 181 NW (2d) 364.
Current standards of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment should not be applied in reviewing old sentences of long standing. State ex rel. Warren v. County Court, 54 W (2d) 613, 197 NW (2d) 1.
A sentence is not discriminatory and excessive because it is substantially greater than that received by a codefendant. State v. Studler, 61 W (2d) 537, 213 NW (2d) 24.