



# Wisconsin State Legislature

**Mark Meyer**

State Senator  
32<sup>nd</sup> Senate District

**DuWayne Johnsrud**

State Representative  
96<sup>th</sup> Assembly District

## \*\*\*\*\***MEDIA ADVISORY**\*\*\*\*\*

**Press Conference  
Senate Parlor**

**Thursday, April 26, 2001  
9:30am**

Senator Mark Meyer (D-La Crosse) and Representative DuWayne Johnsrud (R-Eastman) will talk about their bill to help one of their constituents, Lori Long of Prairie du Chien, stop her ex-husband from taking their four children to Iran, his native homeland. The strong possibility exists that he may never return, giving Ms. Long no way to bring them back.

In its decision to allow the ex-husband to travel to Iran with their children, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals said it found no law that prohibits a parent with joint legal custody from taking a child to a foreign country for up to 90 days. The court made this decision even though it acknowledged that the father might not return with the children *and* that the mother would have no legal recourse to bring them back to the United States.

Not only is Iran a country that does not have diplomatic relations with the United States, the Iranian government also does not recognize dual citizenship. If these children are taken to Iran, they would be considered Iranian citizens and the United States would not be regarded as their rightful homeland. Over the years, the U.S. Department of State has been involved in almost 100 cases where children have been wrongfully taken to Iran, and the majority of them have never been resolved. Here in Wisconsin we need to make sure that our children are protected from potential abduction by making sure both parents agree to a trip to a questionable country.

This legislation would prohibit a parent with physical placement rights from leaving the country with their children *only if* the other parent objects *and* if the country is not a party to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. Countries that are signatories to this convention have established procedures that would ensure the return of abducted children to their native land and have diplomatic relations with the United States. Countries that have not signed the convention include Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia. Note that this bill would only prevent a trip to one of these countries if the other parent objected.

Senator Meyer and Representative Johnsrud have introduced companion bills in the Senate (SB-89) and in the Assembly (AB-220). Both bills will be receiving a public hearing on Thursday, April 26<sup>th</sup>. **Ms. Long, her children and friends will speak at the press conference and will be testifying at the Assembly Family Law Committee in Room 225 NW of the Capitol at 10:00 am Thursday morning along with Senator Meyer and Representative Johnsrud.** The Senate Judiciary Committee will also hear testimony in Eau Claire on SB-89 on Thursday.

**Erickson, Jessica**

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
**From:** LORI LONG [llong@mhtc.net]  
**Sent:** Monday, April 30, 2001 2:38 PM  
**To:** jessica.erickson@legis.state.wi.us  
**Subject:** Assembly Speech

- I. A. Thank you Madame Chair Owens and esteemed Representatives for allowing me to give testimony on this bill.
  
- B. My name is Lori Long. I am a single mom of four children my daughter Shiva is 18, my daughter Maria is 16, my son Farshaun is 12, and my son Kamran Ardestani is 11.
- C. I divorced my ex-husband almost two years ago obtaining primary placement of our 4 children while sharing joint custody with their father. I did try to gain sole custody to prevent their removal of the children from the United States but was told by my attorney that it was next to impossible in the State of WI as it was rarely, if ever granted. One lawyer not directly involved with the case told a family member that my ex-husband had to be an ax murderer before I would ever be granted sole custody.
- D. Their father is a natural born Iranian citizen who became a United States citizen several years ago. It is their father's intention to remove some or all of our children for a visit to Iran this summer.
- E. My joint custody agreement was entered by a WI court is enforceable in most States, and considered by all the states in the US. It also would be considered in every jurisdiction that is a signator of the Hague convention. In Iran however, this joint custody agreement is meaningless. Iran is by law a Patriarchal Society and under the Iranian legal and religious system that gives the father total and absolute right to determine the fate of the children under Islamic and Iranian law. According to the United States State Department, Islamic courts rarely, if ever, grant custody of children to a parent who will not raise the child as a Muslim, or does not plan to remain in Iran. Even if the mother were granted custody, the permission of the father would be required for the children to leave the country. This requirement, in effect nullifies a joint custody agreement entered by a court in this state.
- F. The children are viewed as the property of the father. The government of Iran only recognizes our children's nationality as Iranian and not as US citizens. The government only recognizes them as Moslems and not Christians as guaranteed by my custody order set forth by WI court that allows me to baptize and educate them in a Christian belief.
- G. Former Muslims who have converted to other religions as well as persons who encourage Muslims to convert are subject to arrest and possible execution.
- H. The United States at this time does not currently have diplomatic or consular relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran and cannot provide protection or routine consular services to American citizens in Iran.
- I. In addition, US citizens of Iranian origin who are considered by Iran to be Iranian citizens have been detained and harassed by Iranian authorities. Iranian dual nationals have been detained from leaving Iran even after obtaining exit visas from that country when documented as US citizens.
- J. (Ask for the exit of children) Madame Chair and honorable representatives I have asked the children to leave as the testimony I am about to relate to you regarding the abusive nature of my relationship with the children's father...they love this man as their father in spite of his abusive behavior.

- I
- K. I met my ex-husband while I was attending the University of Northern Iowa. I found him to be very charming and respectful of my family and myself. After we were married, things began to change rather drastically. He began to tell me what I could wear how to behave in public, who I could be with, and even lied to his family that I had converted to Islam. He told me that I could never live him. One night I chanelled him, and ran out our apartment door and he gave chase caught me by the back of my hair and pulled me back into the apartment by my hair. He told me that the reason he did this was because he loved me so much! And he couldn't stand the thought of losing me!
- L. When I was pregnant with our oldest daughter Shiva I told him of my intentions to baptize the baby. He was so angry! He told me that no child of his would be baptized or raised as a Christian. If I didn't agree to raise our child as a Moslem he would take the baby back to Iran and I would never see it again.
- M. The second incident took place approximately three months after our oldest was born. We were driving when an argument took place while I was driving the car. He ordered me to pull over and when I didn't he grabbed the wheel toward the curbside. The next thing I remember is he striking me in the face on the bridge of my nose and seeing a bright white light. It stunned me as he continued striking blows over my head and face. I tried to fight him off, but became semi-conscious. I remember him shaking me and yelling at me to stop faking it that I wasn't hurt. We drove back to my mother's house and went to bed. I thought he was sleeping and began crying silently to myself. He rolled over and told me to never tell anyone what he did to me or he would take Shiva back to Iran and I would never see her again.
- N. With the next incident I learned how important it was to him not to have anyone see him hitting me. I learned how to offer my face to him as I told him to go ahead and hit me so that I had something to show people what he was doing to me. His violence then turned into breaking furniture such as lamps, a rocking chair, remote controls, and dining room chairs. The children and I knew to be very afraid when he got this certain look in his eyes. It meant something bad was going to happen. I tried to explain away the look to my children so that they would feel comforted, but it didn't work. I
- O. I left him with my two girls when he broke a plate in between their heads and it nicked one of their ears. I ran to an Uncle's home nearby. He found me the next day and told me that no one would take his children away from him. He leaned over and scooped up Maria who was a baby at the time and ran out the door with her. I followed and tried to take Maria back. The police were called and that is when I found out that I could never leave my children with anyone as their father had the right to take them. The next day, I returned home believing in his apology and his love.
- P. The last three years of my marriage began a downward spiral into the depths of hell as he began gambling away my paychecks to pay back his debts. I was discussing divorce with him more and more as he blamed me as the reason for his gambling losses.
- Q. It was when he attacked my oldest daughter Shiva in the same manner in which he had attacked me years ago that finally gave me the courage to live him.
- R. I will never forget the day when I told him I wanted the divorce. His eyes were steely black and he told me you know what will happen and you have not seen anything yet. It was the same threat that I have heard throughout the years.
- S. According to the Department of State, the only treaties which have any application to abductions of children from the United States are the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, and the extradition treaties which the United States has with individual countries. Iran is not a party to the Hague convention and since the US and Iran does not maintain diplomatic relations, there is no bilateral treaty in effect, which would cover parental child abduction.
- T. Last week, I received notice of my ex-husbands intentions of taking our children to Iran

- I
- this summer. You saw my children and if my ex-husband takes them to Iran there is a strong likelihood that I will not see them until many years until they are able to find their way back to the US on their own. I am a law-abiding citizen, but you can imagine the temptation to take my children and run.
- U. I am afraid of this man, his intentions, and his country. I have no recourse if he or his country decides to unlawfully retain my children. I am urging you not only for me but my children's safety and all the other Mom's and Dad's that have to endure this pain that you pass this bill to safeguard our children and their rights as Americans.
  - V. This legislation before you today fills a gap in the law protecting joint custody agreements. Because such agreements are favored by the Courts.
  - W. I am extremely proud and grateful to the state of WI and her constitutes for taking up this issue for ourselves, and our nation for all of you that wrote in your letters and email messages to our representatives voicing your anger and concern I thank you all! I especially want to thank Representative Johnsrud and Senator Mark Meyer for being so instrumental in writing this bill. I also want to thank my family, my friends, my church, Pastor Doug Maithison and Pastor Kent Heppal, Catholic Charities and June Hoeger for sponsoring the domestic abuse program in Prairie du Chien, my co-workers and postmaster of the Prairie du Chien Post Office, and finally my community for standing behind me even during some very scary incidents that have occurred over the last three years. These people are the true heroes that have inspired me to keep going on!
  - X. As I close, I want to leave you with one thought from the US Department of State, Office of Children's issues. They have been keeping statistics on the incidence of custody abductions and unlawful retentions since May of 1997. These statistics indicate that at least one dual-national American child is abducted or unlawfully retained into the Islamic World every week Please don't let his happen to my children.

**DUWAYNE JOHNSRUD**  
State Representative • 96th Assembly District



**MARK MEYER**  
State Senator • 32nd Senate District

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**TO: MEMBERS OF THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE**

**FROM: SENATOR MARK MEYER  
REPRESENTATIVE DUWAYNE JOHNSRUD**

**RE: TESTIMONY ON SENATE BILL 89**

**DATE: THURSDAY, APRIL 26, 2001**

Thank you, Chairman George and distinguished Committee members, for allowing us the opportunity to provide testimony on Senate Bill 89. Unfortunately, we are unable to attend today's hearing. We are in Madison, testifying on the Assembly companion bill to SB 89 with the constituents who brought this issue to our attention.

Although the introduction of this legislation was in response to a constituent case, we both feel that adoption of SB 89 would prevent future Wisconsin families from undergoing the same pain and disruption that the Lori Long family has suffered. A resident of Prairie du Chien, Lori Long recently lost a court case with the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that would have prevented her ex-husband from taking their four children to Iran. Ms. Long had appealed to our judicial system to prohibit her ex-husband from making this trip because she strongly believed that he would never return with the children.

One of Ms. Long's main concerns was that her ex-husband was planning on taking the children to Iran, a country that does not have diplomatic relations with the United States and has not signed on to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. In Iran, the Long children would be considered Iranian citizens because their father is Iranian, and Ms. Long would have no legal claim as their mother. Statistics have proven that it is very unlikely for children taken to countries such as Iran to ever return to the United States again. Over the years, the U.S. Department of State has been involved in almost 100 cases where children have been wrongfully taken to Iran, and almost all of these cases have never been resolved.

In its decision to allow Ms. Long's ex-husband to travel to Iran with their children, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals said it found no law that prohibits a parent with joint legal custody from taking a child to a foreign country for up to 90 days. The court made this decision even though it acknowledged that it was possible and maybe even likely that the father would not return with the children and that Ms. Long would have no legal recourse to bring them back to the United States.

Unfortunately in this circumstance, there is nothing the State of Wisconsin can currently do to prevent Ms. Long's ex-husband from leaving the country with their children. However, SB 89 would give the state a mechanism to prevent children from traveling to countries in situations where it is likely that they will not return to the United States. In a time when there are very few federal and state statutory guidelines in place to prevent potential child abduction, SB 89 is an important first step toward preventing children from illegally being removed to or detained in foreign countries.

Under SB 89, a parent who has periods of physical placement of a child may not take that child to certain foreign countries only if the other parent objects and that country has not ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. This prohibition applies instead of the current law provision

relating to removing a child or establishing a different legal residence with a child. (However, in all other situations regarding removing a child, the current law provision would apply.) Under current law, a parent who has either joint legal custody or periods of physical placement must notify the other parent of his or her intent to remove the child from Wisconsin. This also includes plans to take a child on a trip to a foreign country. If the other parent objects to the move, a court hearing on the objection will be held. However, if the court rules in favor of the parent requesting a move, the child may be taken outside of the state against the objecting parent's wishes.

If enacted into law, SB 89 would make sure that both parents agree on a trip to a questionable foreign country. When granting physical placement, the court would be responsible for advising the parties of the prohibition and including the prohibition in the order of physical placement.

We believe it is important to note here that SB 89 is not an all-encompassing piece of legislation nor an attempt to broadly crack down on parental rights. Instead, it is an effort to prevent children from being taken to foreign countries where there is a probable likelihood that they could be illegally detained. Many times children are often kept in foreign countries not by a parent, but by a government that refuses to let them leave. **According to statistics from the U.S. Department of State's Office of Children Issues, at least one dual-national American child is abducted to or unlawfully detained in the Islamic World every day.** And those are just statistics from Islamic countries.

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction was adopted in 1980 in an attempt to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of wrongful removal or illegal detainment. Countries that have either ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention have established procedures that would ensure the prompt and safe return of abducted children. Sixty-five countries have signed onto the Convention. Just some of the countries that have not signed the Convention include Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Somalia and Libya. Incidentally, these countries are also among the list of nations that the U.S. Department of State has advised Americans to avoid traveling to.

We believe that this legislation is a good first step toward enacting statutes that would protect our state's children from potential abduction or wrongful detainment. In Ms. Long's current situation, this bill would prevent her ex-husband from taking their children to Iran, where it is possible that they may permanently remain. We appreciate your consideration of SB 89, and ask that you act swiftly so that the bill may be taken up by both the Assembly and the Senate during the May floor period. Thank you once again, Chairman George and Committee members, for hearing our testimony on this bill.



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**WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL  
STAFF MEMORANDUM**

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TO: REPRESENTATIVE DU WAYNE JOHNSRUD

FROM: Laura Rose, Deputy Director

RE: 2001 Assembly Bill 220, Relating to Prohibiting a Parent From Taking a Child to Certain Foreign Countries

DATE: April 24, 2001

This memorandum describes 2001 Assembly Bill 220, relating to prohibiting a parent who has physical placement of a child from taking the child to certain foreign countries without the agreement of the other parent. The memorandum first provides background on current law relating to moving the child's residence within or outside of the state or removing the child from the state for an extended period of time. It also briefly summarizes The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which is referred to in the bill.

**A. CURRENT LAW RELATING TO MOVING A CHILD WITHIN OR OUTSIDE OF THE STATE OR REMOVING THE CHILD FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME**

Under current law, if a court grants periods of physical placement of a child to more than one parent, the court must order a parent with legal custody of and physical placement rights to the child to provide not less than 60 days' written notice to the other parent (with a copy to the court) of his or her intent to do any of the following:

1. Establish his or her legal residence with the child at any location outside the State of Wisconsin.
2. Establish his or her legal residence with the child, at any location within the State of Wisconsin, that is a distance of 150 miles or more from the other parent.
3. Remove the child from this state for more than 90 consecutive days. [s. 767.327 (1), Stats.]

The statutes currently set out procedures for objecting to the notice of the child's move or removal, including procedures for mediation or a court hearing on the objection, if necessary. The statutes also set out standards for the court to follow in determining whether the order of legal custody or physical placement should be modified, in response to the proposed move or removal of the child.

Current law also provides that, unless the parents agree otherwise, a parent with legal custody and physical placement rights is required to notify the other parent before removing the child from his or her "primary residence" for a period of not less than 14 days. [s. 767.327 (6), Stats.] Note that this simple notice requirement does not suffice if the move otherwise falls within the requirements of the moves described above.

Finally, current law prohibits a person to intentionally cause a child to leave, take a child away, or withhold a child for more than 12 hours beyond a court-approved period of physical placement without the consent of the child's legal custodian. Violation of this provision is a Class C felony (a fine not to exceed \$10,000, imprisonment not to exceed 15 years, or both).

### **B. HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION**

The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (hereafter, the "Hague Convention") was adopted in 1980. The United States gave force of law to this treaty through enactment of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. ss. 11601 to 11610, which was passed into law in 1988. [Julia A. Todd, "The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Are the Conventions Goals Being Achieved?", *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*, Volume 2, No. 2, Spring 1995.] The countries which have ratified the Hague Convention as of the date of this memorandum are listed in the *Attachment*.

The purpose of the Hague Convention is to expedite the return of children who were taken from their country of origin to a foreign country. Under the Hague Convention, the country to which the child was taken only has the responsibility to determine whether or not there was a wrongful removal or retention of the child from his or her country of origin. Once the child is returned to the child's country of origin, the courts in the country of origin are responsible for determining the custody issues involved with the child.

Countries which are signatories to the Hague Convention are required to set up a "central authority," that serves as a liaison with the other contracted states to the Hague Convention. [Todd, *Id.*] A parent whose child has been wrongfully removed can file an application with either the central authority of the home country or the country where the child is located. The central authority must take all appropriate measures to discover the whereabouts of the child, prevent harm to the child, protect the interests of the lawful custodian or applicant, and secure the voluntary return of the child to their home country. The Hague Convention's goal is to return abducted children to the factual status quo as soon as possible. [Todd, *Id.*]

### **C. 2001 ASSEMBLY BILL 220**

2001 Assembly Bill 220 modifies current law with regard to moving the child's residence within or outside of the state or removing the child for a period of time. Under Assembly Bill 220, the requirements and procedures under current law governing a move or removal of a child do not apply where a parent seeks to take a child to a country that has not ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention. Instead, under Assembly Bill 220, a parent is *prohibited* from taking a child to a country that has not ratified or acceded to the Hague Convention unless the other parent *agrees in writing* that the child may be taken to the country. This requirement for an agreement in writing applies regardless of the length of time the parent desires or intends to remove a child from the state. This prohibition



applies to parents who have been granted periods of physical placement with the child. The prohibition must be included in the order of physical placement.

LR:rv:tlu;ksm

Attachment

**NON-Member States that have NOT ratified or acceded to the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction**

Afghanistan	Laos	Yugoslavia
Algeria	Libya	Zaire
Angola	Macedonia	Zambia
Azerbaijan	Madagascar	Albania
Bahrain	Malaysia	Andorra
Bangladesh	Maldives	Antigua and Barbuda
Belize	Mali	Armenia
Benin	Mauritania	Barbados
Bhutan	Micronesia	Bolivia
Burma (Myanmar)	Mozambique	Botswana
Cambodia	Nauru	Brunei Darussalam
Cameroon	Nepal	Burundi
Cape Verde	Nigeria	Grenada
Central African Republic	Oman	Kazakhstan
Chad	Palau	Kyrgyzstan
Comoros	Palestinian State	Lebanon
Congo	Papua New Guinea	Lesotho
Congo, Democratic Republic of	Qatar	Liberia
Cote d'Ivoire	Rwanda	Liechtenstein
Cuba	Serbia and Montenegro	Lithuania
Djibouti	Sudan	Malawi
Dominica	Sierra Leone	Marshall Islands
Dominican Republic	St. Lucia	Mongolia
Equatorial Guinea	St. Vincent, & Grenadines	Namibia
Eritrea	Solomon Islands	Niger
Ethiopia	Somalia	Pakistan
Gabon	Syria	Philippines
Gambia	Sao Tome and Principe	Russian Federation
Ghana	Saudi Arabia	Samoa
Guatemala	Senegal	San Marino
Guinea	Thailand	Seychelles
Guinea-Bissau	Togo	Singapore
Guyana	Tunisia	Sri Lanka
Haiti	Tuvalu	Swaziland
India	Taiwan	Tonga
Indonesia	Tajikistan	Ukraine
Iran	Tanzania	
Iraq	Uganda	
Jamaica	United Arab Emirates	
Jordan	Vanuatu	
Kuwait	Vietnam	
Kenya	Western Sahara	
Kiribati	Yemen	

# Mother disappointed in court's decision to let children visit Iran

Dear Editor,

I'm very disappointed with the decision that the appeal courts made!

I went into this knowing that my chances of winning my battle were slim since there were no guidelines set forth by other cases here in the state of Wisconsin! It was my hope that the appeal court would establish some type of criteria in which the best interests of the child would be upheld above all else!

I reported violent outbursts to the police, I reported two cases of abuse involving his children to the Crawford County Human Services, two restraining orders were issued to protect myself, my sister-in-law, and my niece and nephew, and he had made threats of taking my children back to Iran three months after the birth of our oldest daughter. It is hard for me to understand how he is considered stable enough to take innocent children to a country that does not recognize the laws that are set to help protect them here in the state of Wisconsin.

Even if my ex-husband's intentions are to bring back our children there are still

too many risks involved. The State Department still recommends that you not travel to Iran. They have stated that Iran has been detaining Iranian citizens with American citizenship. There are families that do not take their sons to Iran after the age of twelve as there is too much risk involved with the government not allowing them out of the country because of the military requirement of service.

Iran does not recognize my children's American citizenship! They do not recognize my right as their mother since I'm a woman, non-Moslem, and Non-Iranian. Iran is not a signatory to the Hague Convention which means there is no treaty signed to uphold my custody established by the state of Wisconsin. I also wouldn't have the luxury of an American Embassy in Iran that could check on my children's well being.

The \$17,000 retirement bond that was put up by Mr. Ardestani wouldn't even be a drop in the bucket for legal expenses according to one of my expert witnesses. Mr. Ardestani did not turn over a thrift savings account that is worth a considerable amount.

And still this would not cover the court costs!

The words of Judge Michael Kirchman that will forever haunt me as he tried to render his verdict when he said that he'd made some bad decisions before, but he hoped this isn't one of them. It isn't good enough for me when deciding on the safety of my children! I will continue to fight this issue but not by the judicial system that has failed so miserably to protect my children, but with the lawmaker's themselves. Wisconsin's ignorance in this matter will no longer be acceptable for its people.

For all of you that have asked to help or give me support, I'm now asking that you start writing to your assembly representatives, congressmen, senators and newspapers on our behalf.

Contact: Senator Mark Meyer, P.O. Box 7882, Madison, Wis. 53707-7882, Email: sen.meyer@legis.state.wi.us

Congressman Ron Kind, 1713 Longworth, House Office Building, Washington D.C. 20515-4906; Email: Ron.Kind@mail.house.gov

Lori Long  
Prairie du Chien

308 S. Michigan St.  
Prairie du Chien, WI 53821  
February 14, 2001

Senator Mark Meyer:

The above letter to the Courier-Press newspaper in Prairie du Chien is from an anguished mother who is an American citizen, and whose children are American citizens, telling that her ex-husband, with dual American and Iranian citizenship, is being allowed by the courts to take their children, all or most of whom are girls, to Iran for a visit.

We all know what will happen when he does this. They will stay in Iran and the girls will become virtual slaves like all Iranian women! Women in Iran have no rights!

How is anyone allowed to have dual citizenship? I thought when you become an American Citizen that you swear allegiance to America. How would it be possible to swear allegiance to America and Iran at the same time? Iran is a rogue nation. WE have no formal relations with Iran, so these children will be absolutely defenseless if they get to Iran!

I am losing all respect for our courts. I think we should fire all the judges and start over. How could our courts allow such a thing to happen?

Please do what you can to help this poor mother and her children. Thank you for any help you can give.

*Sincerely,  
Ruth Beneker*


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Wauzeka vs. Seneca, See Sports

MONDAY, JANUARY 29, 2001



## From Bluff View to B.A. Kennedy

Desks, chairs and other school supplies are loaded onto a trailer Thursday afternoon at Bluff View Intermediate School in preparation for the move into the newly renovated B.A. Kennedy School. B.A. Kennedy will be the Prairie du Chien School District's new Pre K-2 school. The planned first day of school at BAK is set for Wednesday, Jan. 31. On Tuesday, Jan. 30, from 3 p.m. to 6 p.m., B.A. Kennedy School will be open for parents and children interested in seeing the school.

## County Drug Enforcement Task Force receives grant

County gets \$26,924 out of \$4 million statewide

Gov. Thompson announced the award of \$26,924 to the Crawford County Drug Enforcement Task Force. The award will help the multi-jurisdictional unit to continue its efforts to reduce the availability and use of illegal drugs, and to reduce the levels of violent crime throughout Crawford County.

Governor Thompson awarded more than four million dollars to 32 Drug Enforcement Task Forces that operate throughout Wisconsin. These multi-jurisdictional units represent 71 counties and nearly 300 local governmental units around the state.

Governor Thompson stated, "Wisconsin continues to experience a wide range of problems with drug use. The involvement of street gangs and the increase of juveniles involved in illegal drug activities make these problems more complicated to solve. In our efforts to fight the problems illegal drugs present, we must recognize the importance of these multi-jurisdictional drug units and continue this important fund support. We are grateful to Wisconsin's Drug Enforcement Task Forces and all law enforcement officers for their dedication and service to the community."

The Task Forces made over 7,100 arrests in 1999 alone, according to statistics from the Office of Justice Assistance. Outside of Milwaukee County, the multi-jurisdictional units made about 80 percent of all drug trafficking arrests re-

*"We must recognize the importance of these multi-jurisdictional drug units and continue this important fund support."*

Governor Thompson

corded in the state.

This is the 14th year of funding for the Task Force programs, which are formed through the cooperation and collaboration of local sheriff's departments, police departments and district attorneys. Funds awarded are made available to the state through the Federal Edward Byrne Memorial, State and Local Law Enforcement Assistance Program and are administered by the

Office of Justice Assistance.

Three Rivers Anti-Drug Enforcement Unit, known as TRADE, was awarded a grant of \$13,194 for the year 2000. Officers investigated approximately 75 drug related cases resulting in numerous arrests. Some of the cases still have charges pending. TRADE officers consist of investigators from the Crawford County Sheriff's Department and the Prairie du Chien Police Department. They work closely with surrounding counties and the State of Iowa.

Sheriff Ostrander has also announced that TRADE has received a grant from the United States Army Electronic Proving Ground through the Technology Transfer Programs. The Grant consists of an Audio Surveillance System. One of their investigators will receive free training, with all expenses paid, at the U.S. Army White Sands Missile Range at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Sheriff Ostrander applied for the Surveillance System in November of 2000. In early January 2001 notice was received from the Department of the Army that the application has been approved and the agency will be receiving the grant of an Audio Surveillance System.

## Iranian father prevails in court

*PdC man will be allowed to take his children to Iran*

By Ted Pennkamp

The 4th District Court of Appeals in Madison ruled Thursday that a Prairie du Chien man may take his children to visit his family even though his ex-wife wouldn't be able to get them back if he decided to stay. Mohammad Ardestani, 49, who has dual Iranian and U.S. citizenship, may take the children to his homeland, the court ruled.

The court's decision came over strong objection from the children's mother, Lori Long, 40, of Prairie du Chien.

Long had fought efforts by Ardestani to travel to Iran with their children, saying that she feared that he would follow through on threats to never return and that she would never see her children again.

Ardestani denied making such threats and said he would never keep the children from their mother or their country.

"If there was any danger to the children, I wouldn't take them there (Iran), ever," Ardestani said from his Prairie du Chien home Friday. "I would never put the children in danger of getting hurt, nor in danger of being kept from their mother."

Ardestani said that he only wants what's best for the children and that he wants the children to visit their grandparents in a Tehran, Iran, suburb.

"I'm just happy with the ruling. I would like to thank the judges. I am happy for the children to have the opportu-

nity to visit their grandparents," Ardestani said. "The children are happy."

In November 1999, Ardestani had told Long that he wanted to take their daughters—Shiya, 18, and Marie, 16—and sons—Farshaun, 12, and Kamran, 10—to Iran.

Long objected and asked Crawford County Circuit Court Judge Michael Kirchman to stop the trip.

Long said that, being a woman and not a Muslim nor an Iranian citizen, she would not be able to demand Iranian courts to return her children if Ardestani were to stay in Iran.

The United States has no formal diplomatic relations with Iran, which has not signed the International Child Abduction treaty.

When contacted Monday, Long said that she is very disappointed in the appellate court's decision and that she hasn't decided whether to take the matter to the State Supreme Court.

"I knew going in it would be an uphill battle," said Long. "Without full custody, it's very difficult to do in Wisconsin."

Long said that she has a real fear that she may never see her two boys again if her ex-husband is allowed to take them to Iran. She said Ardestani has shown an interest in taking the boys in the past.

"I've lived that terror for 19 years, that's why I stayed with him for as long as I did," she said.

Long said she will pursue through legislative means to get laws passed that will address custody situations similar to hers so that what happened to her doesn't happen

See FATHER, page two

## Here's the 1st clues for Ports of Discovery Medallion hunt

By Kelli Boylen Clue #1

The annual Ports of Discovery Medallion hunt is now underway. This year there are a total of five clues. A new set of clues will appear in each Courier Press newspaper until all the clues appear or the medallion is found.

The medallion may be located in Prairie du Chien, McGregor or Marquette.

The medallion is hidden in an area of public access. It will not be in a place of danger. It will be located in a proper placement for finding.

The medallion will say Ports of Discovery 2001 on the back. The finder of the medallion must call and report his or her find within hours of locating the medallion to collect the prize. They must call Cathie Nelson at (608)326-8602 evening and weekends, or Kay Morel at 800-488-7572 days.

*The bells are ringing out the news; It's February and time for clues.*

*Read the papers, listen to the radio; You'll find what to do & where to go*

# ASK THE COURIER



Have a question about a local issue? Contact the Courier at 326-2441 and we'll find the answer. We reserve the right to edit questions for content and space.

**Q:** Why don't the police check the disabled parking spots which are being used by people with a disabled sticker but do not have a disabled person in the car?

**A:** We've covered this issue before, but we'll go over it one more time. Sitting and monitoring parking spots in business lots is a very time consuming task, and the Prairie du Chien Police Department, like most citizens in the city, feel that safety issues, such as solving crime and monitoring speeding is more important. If an officer sees a car without a disabled sticker in the car parked in a disabled stall they will issue a ticket, but they usually just don't have the time to sit and watch who comes out and gets into the car.

If you see someone violating the laws concerning disabled parking stalls, please record the type of vehicle it was and the license plate number and notify the police department.

## Wyalusing to hold candlelight ski hike

The Friends of Wyalusing State Park will host the seventh annual candlelight ski/hike Saturday, Feb. 10 from 6 to 9 p.m. The route will traverse a 1.5 mile loop of the Mississippi Ridge Trail. The trail begins and ends at the Hugh Harper Indoor Group Camp. Refreshments and warming fire will be provided at the lodge.

Small candles that have been placed at intervals along the trail will light the trail route.

A charcoal fire for cooking will be available at the lodge area.

The idea to hold ski and hiking outings on trails lit by candles in Wisconsin state parks has become very popular with park visitors.

Visitors are reminded that vehicle admission stickers are required. Daily or annual stickers may be purchased at the park when you arrive.



Wyalusing State Park

More information may be obtained by contacting the park office at 608-996-2261.

If snow conditions are not suitable for skiing, the event will still be held as a hike. In the case of exceptionally bad weather, the event will be canceled. Please call the park for information if the weather is questionable.

## FATHER, from page one

to other mothers. "To me, it was a common sense issue," she said. "There is a lot of ignorance on the part of judges and lawyers in dealing with this issue. There are no guidelines set."

Ardestani and Long were divorced in July 1999 after a 19-year marriage. They share legal custody of their three minor children, who live primarily in Long's Prairie du Chien home.

Ardestani said that he had taken Farshaun to Iran in 1991, and his daughters in 1997 and returned from each visit. He also said that he has a longtime job and pension plan that he would not abandon.

In making its ruling, the 4th District Court of Appeals found no law that prohibits a parent with joint legal custody from taking a child to a foreign country for up to 90 days.

The appeals court said it recognized that Ardestani might not return with the children and, if that should happen, Long would have no legal remedy.

The appeals court ruled, however, that acting in the best interest of the children gives courts broad authority regardless of the situation.

Ardestani said Friday that Long was just trying to hurt him because of their divorce.

"I went through a lot of pain," Ardestani said. "God is with us."

Long said she has received numerous calls of support since Thursday's ruling. She said she would urge those who called to write to their congressmen and senators to get something done.

## AAA says gas prices are increasing with OPEC cutback

The current average price for self-serve regular unleaded gasoline in Wisconsin is \$1.582 per gallon, according to AAA's Fuel Gauge Report.

That price is 10.5 cents higher than a month ago this time and 25.7 cents higher than a year ago at this time.

The Wisconsin per-gallon price breakdown from AAA's Fuel Gauge survey is: Average Self-Serve - Unleaded regular - \$1.582; Unleaded mid-grade - \$1.642; Unleaded premium - \$1.718.

Although gas prices had been falling during the Christmas-New Year holiday, they began moving upward again

as OPEC debated and proved a 1.5 million barrel day cut in oil production starting Feb. 1.

OPEC's actions likely may fuel prices are returning the level seen before Christmas holiday, when Wisconsin motorists saw prices near the \$1.60 mark.

Other average prices regular unleaded gas in region are: Illinois, \$1.5 Iowa, \$1.458; Minnesota \$1.582; and Michigan \$1.5

AAA's Fuel Gauge Report based on data from Oil Price Information Service, the nation's most comprehensive source of petroleum price information.

## Campion website offers look at history

By M. Stemper

When surfing the net, local browsers interested in Prairie du Chien history, especially Campion's story, will find a treasure at www.campion.org.


The site is a mini-museum offering a history of the school with some pictures and post-card images and enrollment figures from 1880-1975 as well as other areas.

In 1925-26 when Campion

became a high school the enrollment was 354. The highest enrollment was 598 1964-65. In its final year 1974-75 the number had dropped to 290.

Sections have been taken from various "Knights," the Campion annual.


Thomas Olson, class of 1972, is the webmaster of the site and 20 other graduates contributed to the site



### Visit the COURIER PRESS

at: www.prairieduchienarea.com/courier

## It's Our 5th Anniversary!!



Deb George, Becki Olson, Sue Kaber

In Celebration of our 5th Anniversary we're offering these great specials

now through February 28th!

**FREE** Back to Basics Styling Aid w/\$30 of service special w/Becki

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## Classic Cuts

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Tues. 10 a.m. - 8 p.m.; Wed. 8 a.m. - 5 p.m.; Thurs. Noon - 8 p.m.; Fri. 8 a.m. - 6 p.m.; Sat. 8 a.m. - 3 p.m.



<p><b>Precipitation</b></p> <p>Jan. 26 — trace</p> <p>Jan. 27 — 1.0"</p> <p>Jan. 28 — 0.0"</p> <p>Jan. 29 — 0.0"</p> <p><small>data from Lock &amp; Dam #9, Lynxville</small></p>	<p><b>Weather</b></p> <p>AS OF JAN. 29, 2001</p> <p><b>MONDAY</b> Ice Storm Warning today and tonight. Periods of freezing rain with significant ice accumulation. Highs in the lower 30s. East wind at 10 to 15 mph. Tonight periods of freezing rain possibly mixed with rain. Significant ice accumulation. Lows near 30. Southeast wind 10 to 15 mph. Precipitation chance 100%.</p> <p><b>TUESDAY</b> Cloudy with a 30% chance of snow. Highs in the upper 30s. Lows near 25.</p> <p><b>WEDNESDAY</b> A chance of light snow. Highs 25 to 30.</p> <p><b>THURSDAY AND FRIDAY</b> Mostly cloudy. Lows 10 to 15. Highs in the middle to upper 20s.</p> <p><b>SATURDAY AND SUNDAY</b> A chance of snow. Lows near 20. Highs 30 to 35.</p> <p><small>Weather information courtesy of The Weather Underground (http://www.wunderground.com)</small></p> <p>Brought to you by</p>
<p><b>River Stages</b></p> <p><b>MISSISSIPPI RIVER</b></p> <p>Jan. 26 — 8.26</p> <p>Jan. 27 — 8.22</p> <p>Jan. 28 — 8.21</p> <p>Jan. 29 — 8.23</p> <p><b>WISCONSIN RIVER</b></p> <p>NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL SPRING</p> <p><b>KICKAPOO RIVER</b></p> <p>Jan. 26 — 7.56</p> <p>Jan. 27 — 7.54</p> <p>Jan. 28 — 7.63</p> <p>Jan. 29 — 7.77</p> <p><small>data from Lock &amp; Dam #9, Lynxville</small></p>	

**COURT OF APPEALS  
DECISION  
DATED AND FILED**

January 25, 2001

Cornelia G. Clark  
Clerk, Court of Appeals  
of Wisconsin

**NOTICE**

This opinion is subject to further editing. If published, the official version will appear in the bound volume of the Official Reports.

A party may file with the Supreme Court a petition to review an adverse decision by the Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and RULE 809.62.

No. 00-1429

STATE OF WISCONSIN

IN COURT OF APPEALS  
DISTRICT IV

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IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

LORI LONG F/K/A LORI ARDESTANI,

PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

v.

MOHAMMAD ARDESTANI,

RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT.

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APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Crawford County:  
MICHAEL KIRCHMAN, Judge. *Affirmed.*

Before Vergeront, Roggensack and Deininger, JJ.

¶1 VERGERONT, J. Lori Long appeals a trial court order denying her motion to prohibit her former husband, Mohammad Ardestani, from traveling to Iran with their minor children to visit his family. She contends the trial court

erroneously exercised its discretion when it refused to grant a continuance to permit a key witness to testify, erred by placing the burden on her to prove that it was likely that Ardestani would not return with the children, and erred by failing to consider the best interests of the children. She and the guardian ad litem ask this court to rule, as a matter of law, that, if a parent objects to the other parent taking their children to visit a country with which the United States does not have diplomatic relations and which is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, the parent may not take the children to that country to visit.<sup>1</sup>

¶2 We conclude the trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance; properly placed the burden on Long, as the moving party, to show that it was not in the children's best interests to travel to Iran with their father to visit his family; and properly considered the children's best interests in ruling on the motion. We decline to adopt the proposed ruling of law because we conclude that the existing standard of the best interests of the child, applied by trial courts in the exercise of their discretion, already allows for full consideration of all relevant concerns. Because the trial court properly exercised its discretion in its application of the best interests standard, we affirm.

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<sup>1</sup> The purpose of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction is "to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention and to establish procedures to ensure prompt return to the State of their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights of access." *Mezo v. Elmergawi*, 855 F. Supp. 59, 62 (E.D. N.Y. 1994). The Hague Convention provisions apply only to those countries who sign it and thereby agree to abide by its terms. *Id.*

## BACKGROUND

*Motion to Prohibit Travel*

¶3 Ardestani was born in Iran and moved to the United States in 1978 when he was twenty-eight years old. He and Long were married in 1980 and have four children: Shiva, d/o/b 5/24/82; Maria, d/o/b 10/22/84; Farshaun, d/o/b 7/02/88; and Kamran, d/o/b 4/01/90. Pursuant to the stipulated judgment of divorce, entered on July 22, 1999, in Crawford County, the parties have joint legal custody of the four children. Long has primary physical placement, with Ardestani to have placement every other weekend, every Tuesday and Thursday from 3:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m., three to six weeks in the summer depending on the children's wishes, and certain holidays. The judgment of divorce also provided, pursuant to the parties' stipulation:

H. In the event the respondent desires to take the minor children outside of the United States, he shall give sixty (60) days' notice of his intention to petitioner who then has thirty (30) days to move the Crawford County Circuit Court for an order prohibiting the trip or requiring the respondent to post a bond. In the event respondent desires to take the children to Iran for a summer vacation visit, respondent may have physical placement of the children up to six (6) weeks regardless of the respondent's placement entitlement under paragraph I.B.4. above provided, however, respondent shall not be entitled to any additional physical placement during the summer during which the Iranian visit occurs. If the Iranian vacation uses less physical placement time than the respondent is ordinarily entitled to under paragraph I.B.4., respondent shall receive the additional placements to which he is entitled.

¶4 In November 1999 after Ardestani told Long he intended to take the minor children to Iran to visit, Long moved the court for an order prohibiting Ardestani from removing the minor children from the United States. She asserted



as grounds for the motion that Ardestani had repeatedly stated his intentions to take the children to Iran with him and not allow them to return; that, as a woman who was not a Moslem and not a citizen of Iran, she would not have standing in an Iranian court to demand the return of the children; and her remedies under international law were severely limited because the United States does not have diplomatic relations with Iran.

¶5 At the May 5, 2000 hearing on the motion, Long, represented by counsel, presented two witnesses who testified on Iranian law as follows. Iran is not a signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Hague Convention) and does not have diplomatic relations with the United States. Under Iranian law, which is based on the Koran, the mother's custody of children is restricted to the age of two for boys and seven for girls and, above those ages, the father has custody; the mother has no claim to custody.<sup>2</sup> If a mother has custody and physical placement of a child under an order of a court in the United States and the child is taken to Iran, the Iranian court does not give any weight to the United States court order, particularly if the mother is not a Moslem; if the father does not give permission to the child to leave Iran, the mother would not be permitted to take the child from Iran back to the United States. Boys need their father's permission to leave Iran up to a minimum age of eighteen, and girls need it regardless of age as long as they are unmarried. This would apply to Long's and Ardestani's children if they were in Iran, even though they are United States citizens and even though Ardestani is a United States citizen. Ardestani is still an Iranian citizen, the children are also Iranian citizens by virtue of their

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<sup>2</sup> There was also testimony that the age at which transfer of custody from the mother to the father varied in different regions of Iran and could be older than seven, depending on the gender of the child.

father's relation to Iran, and the children would be considered Iranian by Iranian authorities. If Ardestani were to die or become incapacitated or were not able to be contacted, his authority under Iranian law with regard to the children would transfer to the next male of authority within his family line.

¶6 Kristine Uhlman testified that a boy between the ages of twelve and fourteen can be drafted into the Iranian army, and this might interfere with a boy that age being able to leave Iran. According to Uhlman, Iranian families, in an effort to avoid having their boys drafted into the army, have sent them out of the country for education. She also testified that there is no existing legal mechanism that addresses the return of an abducted child if the child were taken to Iran. She agreed that, if Ardestani took the children to Iran, having the children returned would depend upon his good faith.

¶7 Long testified that she feared Ardestani would not return the children because, when she asked him for a divorce in May 1998 he said, "You know what will happen. And you haven't seen nothing yet." This meant to her that he would take the children to Iran and she would never see them, because in 1981 when she was pregnant with their first child and asked if she could have the child baptized, he made that threat explicitly saying, "If you don't raise them [sic] Moslem I will take the baby back to Iran and you'll never see it again." He also repeated that threat another time. Thereafter, during the course of their marriage when he wanted to control her he would say, "you know what will happen," and she understood he meant he would take the children and she would never see them. For this reason, when he said this in May 1998, she destroyed his American and Iranian passports and took other documents from his briefcase. During their marriage Ardestani also told her that men had sole custody of children in Iran and the mothers were never given custody. In 1997 he took the two girls, Shiva and

Maria, for a visit to Iran, and when he came back he talked about some day moving to Iran: it was getting better, more open, he said. In the period just before the divorce, he said if they were divorced, he was going to leave. He has told her he "has to save face," and he wants revenge.

¶8 Long acknowledged that Ardestani took Farshaun to Iran in 1991, when he was three, and the two girls in 1997, and there was no problem with him bringing them back. She is aware that Kamran wants to go with his father to Iran. She would encourage Ardestani to bring his parents to the United States, she would help him do this, and she would give him more time with the children then.

¶9 Ardestani, representing himself, testified as follows. He moved to Prairie du Chien in 1981 and began employment at 3M. He is still employed there, now working as an operator, and has a pension plan. He denied that he ever told Long that if they got a divorce, he would take the children away. He described himself as a citizen of this country who lives and works here and helps the community. His brother and sister-in-law live here and own real estate as part of their business, and they have a child. He is trying to help his sister come here. He wants his children to see their grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins; his mother is ill and that is why he wants to take the children now, especially Kamran, who has not seen her. Ardestani stated he would like to take all the children, if they wanted to go, and he had four weeks of vacation time which he would like to spend there.

¶10 Ardestani testified that he would not separate his children from their mother or from this country. Ardestani agreed it would be devastating to the children if they were taken to Iran and not allowed to return. He will do whatever is necessary to guarantee that they will come back safely, including signing over

his pension, and his brother would also come to court and guarantee. He, Ardestani, has his retirement and career here, ten years left to work, and he is not going to give them up.

¶11 In response to the guardian ad litem's questions, Ardestani explained that he has looked into bringing his parents to the United States. However, they would have to apply for a permanent residency and they do not want to live here because they are old. Also, he has to have a certain amount of income for each family member he wants to bring here, and he has only enough for one person. He talked about it with his family and they decided it made more sense to take the children to Iran so they could see the whole family, rather than bringing just one person here to see the children. In response to a question on the possibility of his parents meeting his children in a third country, Ardestani testified that his parents could not travel on their own to a third country; it would be too expensive; and he wants the children to see his culture, where he was born and where he lived. Farshaun was too young to remember and Kamran has never been there.

¶12 The therapist who had been meeting with Farshaun and Kamran since November 1999 also testified. (She had also met with Ardestani and with Long.) The boys' concern about their father's expressions of anger had been alleviated for a number of reasons, they were doing well, and they probably needed no more counseling except a session for closure. She had discussed a possible trip to Iran with them. Kamran was excited to go; Farshaun said he did not know if he wanted to be gone that long from his friends and activities, which the therapist described as a typical reaction for an eleven year old. The boys told her that some people believe their father would not bring them back, but Kamran said if something happened and they could not get back with their father, he

believed their uncle, who lives in Prairie du Chien, would come to get them. Both boys are close to their uncle.

¶13 The therapist testified that she has no reason to believe that Ardestani would want to separate the children from their mother. Her view was that Ardestani has the ability now to concentrate on what is best for his children and to set aside the feelings he had about their mother and the divorce. The therapist's concern, she explained, is what would happen if a tragedy occurred in Iran, given that it has no diplomatic relations with the United States. However, because Ardestani has a brother here, and four younger siblings in Iran, there would probably be family who would help the children come back to their mother. She agreed that it would be emotionally devastating to the children if their relationship with their mother were severed because Ardestani decided to keep them in Iran.

¶14 After the evidence, the guardian ad litem recommended that the children and Ardestani be accompanied to Iran by a trusted adult male relative, preferably their uncle who lives in Prairie du Chien, and that the trip be limited to three weeks.

¶15 The court first decided that because Shiva was soon to be eighteen, it was up to her if she wanted to go with her father to Iran: the court would neither require nor prohibit that. The court then ruled that the burden was on Long, the moving party, to show that Ardestani should be prohibited from taking the other children to Iran. Next, the court determined that if Ardestani took the children to Iran and decided not to return, there would be little that could be done to return the children to the United States. The court acknowledged the serious harm that would result should this occur. The court found that Long really was afraid that

Ardestani might keep the children in Iran, and she was not acting to harm or get even with Ardestani. However, the court decided that in order for Long to prevail on her motion, she had to do more than show she had a genuine fear that Ardestani would keep the children in Iran and that the harm if he did keep them, because of her lack of recourse, would be great. The court identified the critical question as the likelihood that Ardestani would keep the children in Iran, and it then reviewed the evidence going to that question.

¶16 The court described Ardestani's statements that were the basis for Long's fears as "not very specific in recent years," and as generally concerning his authority as the father and husband. The court found that much of Ardestani's conduct and statements upon which Long's belief was based were part of the culture from Iran that Ardestani still carried with him, and were not evidence he was going to take the children from their mother. Against that conduct and statements, the court weighed Ardestani's statements made "numerous times" that he has no intention of fleeing the country with the children and no motive to do so. The court also referred to psychological evaluations of Ardestani, which did not provide a basis for concerns about his personality or psychology in relation to the issue before the court, and to the therapist's testimony that she did not have a concern that Ardestani would try to keep the children from their mother. For these reasons, the court determined Long had not proved there was a likelihood Ardestani would not return the children. However, the court did permit Long to exercise some type of control over Ardestani's pension, if she chose.

¶17 The written order entered by the court on May 22, 2000, denied Long's motion and directed that, upon her request, Ardestani was to provide and sign all documents with respect to his pension and retirement benefits necessary to

provide Long with security to insure the return of the children.<sup>3</sup> Three days later Ardestani filed a performance bond with the court, assigning his entire interest in his 3M pension, retirement, and voluntary investment program benefits to the Crawford County Clerk of Courts for the benefit of Long; the assignment was to terminate when he returned the children and, if he did not, distribution was to be made to Long as if he were deceased and she his sole beneficiary.

*Motion for Reconsideration*

¶18 Long appealed the trial court's order and asked the trial court, pending appeal, to prohibit Ardestani from taking the children out of the United States. The court denied the motion, and Long sought the same relief in this court. At oral argument on her motion in this court, Long argued, among other points, that the trial court did not consider the evidence presented at the May 5 hearing on the conscription of twelve- to fourteen-year-old boys by the Iranian government. The guardian ad litem informed us that, based on the information about the draft, which he did not remember from the May 5 hearing, his recommendation had changed and he now recommended that neither of the boys travel to Iran. Since the court reporter had not yet had time to prepare the transcript from the May 5 hearing, we were unable to determine what testimony had been presented on conscription at the May 5 hearing.<sup>4</sup> Long presented to this court an affidavit from Uhlman averring it was her understanding that boys twelve and older were

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<sup>3</sup> The order also directed the minor children's passports to be held by the court until they reach eighteen at which time the passports will be released to the children, with release to either parent before then being on court order. Release to Ardestani was specifically ordered to facilitate the trip to Iran during the summer of 2000.

<sup>4</sup> The transcript then before us from the hearing in the trial court on relief pending appeal showed Long's counsel made the argument about the conscription evidence, and both the trial court and the guardian ad litem indicated they did not recall that evidence.

routinely drafted into the military by the Iranian government, and the United States citizenship of a boy would not protect him from the draft. This affidavit had not been presented to the trial court.

¶19 On June 19, 2000, we remanded the matter to the trial court to allow Long to bring a motion for reconsideration so the trial court could consider evidence on conscription into the Iranian army and consider the guardian ad litem's changed recommendation. We imposed a short time period for bringing the motion and for preparation of the May 5 transcript, and ordered Ardestani not to remove the children from the country until further order from this court.

¶20 At the June 23, 2000 hearing on remand, Ardestani, still proceeding pro se, presented testimony by telephone from K. Alipour. Alipour testified he was in charge of legal affairs of the Iranian Interests Section in the Pakistani Embassy. He was born and raised in Iran and served in the Iran military. According to the Iranian law and constitution, Iranian male citizens are eligible for the draft at age eighteen if they are not continuing their education. This has been the law since the end of the Iran-Iraq war. During that war, 1980-87, young males below eighteen voluntarily served in the military. Ardestani's sons are not eligible for the draft until they are eighteen, and until that age, they can travel freely in and out of Iran. Alipour was aware of no law that would allow the Iranian government to detain children between the ages of twelve and fourteen so that they would not leave the country prior to being eligible for military service and he was aware of no practice of doing that. If something happened to Ardestani while he was in Iran with his children, their mother could go to get them or a close relative could send them back to the United States. The Iranian Interests Section issues visas in the United States for travel to Iran that contain stamps granting permission to leave



Iran without getting authorization in Iran. Many American citizens are now traveling to Iran on such visas.

¶21 After Alipour's testimony, the hearing concluded for the day and was continued to June 28, 2000. At the beginning of the hearing on June 28, Long's counsel asked for a continuance. She explained that Uhlman had been prepared to testify on June 23, but was then scheduled to travel and testify on another matter, and she had not heard back from Uhlman in response to telephone calls and faxes to arrange for her testimony on June 28. Long's counsel did have two dates, July 3 and July 10, on which Uhlman could testify by telephone. Long's counsel also explained that she was attempting to obtain more information in response to Alipour's testimony, but she had not been able to complete that effort. The guardian ad litem joined in the request for a continuance.

¶22 The court denied the request for a continuance because this court had ordered the transcript for the hearing on remand to be filed by July 10. The trial court stated it understood the reason this court wanted to expedite the matter, observing that, in response to the order entered by this court, Ardestani had to change his plane tickets to a date uncertain at a financial cost.

¶23 The trial court did receive Uhlman's affidavit as evidence, while acknowledging it was hearsay, and did allow Long's counsel to make an offer of proof on what Uhlman's testimony would be. According to the offer of proof, Uhlman would testify as follows. She has specific information that there were teenagers who served in the Iranian army under the age of eighteen. She has information or is under the impression that boys were detained between the ages of twelve and fourteen so they would be available for military service at a later age. She had a case in which an Iranian/American wanted to travel with his son at

age eleven or earlier to Iran because he would not be comfortable once his son turned twelve. It is common practice that teenagers are sent out of the country during their teenage years to avoid the possibility of draft. It is possible the constitution sets the age for draft at eighteen, but Iran changes its law by decree, so if there were a reason to have more young people in the military, the age could change by decree. She knew of no specific instance in which a teenager came to Iran for a visit in a situation such as this and was drafted into the military service.

¶24 In response to the court's questions, Long's counsel stated she had not asked Uhlman whether her knowledge of boys under eighteen serving in the military was based on the time of the Iran-Iraq war.

¶25 The court denied Long's motion for reconsideration. The court found there was not "a reasonable possibility," it was "not likely" and not "probable to any reasonable degree" that Ardestani would keep the children in Iran. The court referred to Ardestani's pledge of his retirement benefits, the many years he had lived here, his relatives here, and his children that would not be going.<sup>5</sup> The court rejected the argument that, because the harm to the children if they were retained in Iran would be so devastating, the mere possibility of that occurrence was sufficient to prevent Ardestani from taking the children to Iran, regardless of the likelihood of that occurrence. With respect to the issue of the draft, the court discussed Uhlman's affidavit and offer of proof and Alipour's testimony, as well as Long's arguments that Alipour's testimony was not credible. The court determined that Alipour's testimony was credible and logical, observing that Alipour provided explanations for his statements. The court found that

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<sup>5</sup> Although Long's motion and the court's order denying it referred to "the minor children," it appears Ardestani made specific plans to take only Farshaun and Kamran.

“during these times” there was not a reasonable likelihood or probability that the children would be drafted during their trip to Iran with their father.

¶26 With the transcripts of the May 5 hearing and the hearing on remand before us, we entered an order granting the relief Long sought pending disposition of the appeal, and we expedited the briefing schedule.<sup>6</sup>

## DISCUSSION

### *Continuance*

¶27 Long contends the trial court erred in denying her request for a continuance of the hearing on her motion for reconsideration so that Uhlman could testify. We disagree.

¶28 A motion for a continuance is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. *State v. Anastas*, 107 Wis. 2d 270, 271, 320 N.W.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1982). We affirm discretionary decisions when the trial court examines the relevant facts, applies the correct legal standard, and uses a rational process to reach a conclusion a reasonable judge could reach. *F.R. v. T.B.*, 225 Wis. 2d 628, 637, 593 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1999).

¶29 In its order remanding to the trial court, this court imposed a strict time schedule for proceedings in the trial court because we were at the same time

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<sup>6</sup> One of the issues to be decided on appeal—whether Ardestani should be permitted to take the children to Iran, even if he intends to bring them back, because there is no legal mechanism to effectuate their return if something happens to him—is an issue of first impression in Wisconsin. We therefore appointed counsel to represent Ardestani from the Volunteer Pro Bono Program established by the Wisconsin State Bar Appellate Division. Subsequently, we denied Ardestani’s motion to vacate the order prohibiting him from removing the children from this country pending disposition of the appeal.

temporarily prohibiting Ardestani from leaving the country, even though we had not yet decided Long was entitled to such a prohibition pending appeal. The specific purpose of the remand was to provide Long with an opportunity to more fully develop the record with Uhlman's testimony. We recognize Long arranged for Uhlman to testify by telephone on the first day of the hearing on remand, and it was not through any fault of Long or Uhlman that Uhlman did not testify that day. However, the trial court accurately understood the importance this court placed on an expeditious proceeding on remand. The trial court also correctly perceived that, if it granted the continuance, it would not be able to meet the deadline we had imposed after already granting one request for an extension due to the court reporter's difficulty in meeting the first deadline we set.

¶30 Moreover, the trial court accommodated Long's desire to provide additional information from Uhlman by agreeing to consider the contents of Uhlman's affidavit and Long's offer of proof. At oral argument in this court, Long's counsel stated she had no information from Uhlman other than that which was presented to the trial court by affidavit and offer of proof. Therefore, Long has not established that a continuance would have produced evidence from Uhlman that the court did not already have from her affidavit and the offer of proof.

¶31 Under these circumstances, we have no hesitancy in concluding the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying the continuance.

### *Burden of Proof*

¶32 Long next argues the trial court improperly placed the burden of proof on her, rather than Ardestani, to prove he should be prohibited from taking

the children to Iran.<sup>7</sup> She contends the issue, properly framed, is whether it is in the children's best interests to go to Iran with their father, and this issue was not litigated in the divorce proceedings; rather, the parties stipulated to preserving this issue for later determination by the court. Therefore, according to Long, the court is really making an initial determination on the best interests of the children, and both parties have an equal burden of showing what is in the best interests of the children. Long relies on *Gochenaur v. Gochenaur*, 45 Wis. 2d 8, 172 N.W.2d 6 (1969), and *Pamperin v. Pamperin*, 112 Wis. 2d 70, 331 N.W.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1993), for her position. We conclude neither case advances Long's position.

¶33 In *Gochenaur* the court held that a parent moving for custody of her children, after she stipulated to custody with the father, did not have the burden of proving a change of conditions because the court had not made a full inquiry into, and a determination of, the children's best interest. *Gochenaur*, 45 Wis. 2d at 18-19. However, in *Corcoran v. Corcoran*, 109 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 324 N.W.2d 901 (Ct.

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<sup>7</sup> In its decision on remand, the trial court stated:

And it is the petitioner who must make a showing that it is likely. I guess it is burden of proof here is, perhaps, an issue that was mentioned before the Court of Appeals. But whatever the burden is, you haven't met it because it's not been shown to be likely. It's a mere possibility. As Mr. Ardestani says it's possible he could, someone go outside the courtroom and be struck by a car today. It could happen. You try to bootstrap onto that the risk is too great, that there is any possibility that the risk is too great. I do not believe that is correct. And, so, it is not likely. It is not probable.

Ardestani reads this statement to mean that the trial court's decision would be the same no matter which party had the burden of proof. Long, as her counsel explained at oral argument, understands the trial court to mean that, whatever the degree of certainty Long had to meet to fulfill her burden of proof, she had not met it. In Long's view, the trial court is still adhering to its statement in its May 5 ruling that she had the burden of proof. Because we review de novo the question which party has the burden of proof, we need not resolve these conflicting interpretations.

App. 1982), we held that WIS. STAT. § 767.32(2) (1979-80), governing modification of custody orders (and enacted after *Gochenaur* was decided), did not treat stipulated custody awards differently than custody awards after litigation. Therefore, *Gochenaur* is no longer the law regarding modifications in custody or placement orders. In any event, Long's motion did not seek a modification of any provision in the divorce judgment, but was brought pursuant to one of those provisions on an issue not decided in the judgment.

¶34 The statement in *Pamperin* on which Long relies also is not relevant to this case. In *Pamperin* we stated that when the court makes an initial determination of custody, each party bears an equal burden to show an award of custody to that party is in the child's best interest. *Pamperin*, 112 Wis. 2d at 74-75.<sup>8</sup> In this case, the initial determination of custody and placement was already made in the judgment of divorce.

¶35 The guardian ad litem, while also contending the court erred in placing the burden of proof on Long, takes a different position of the correct rule. The guardian ad litem contends that, when one parent wishes to travel with his or her children over the objection of the other parent to a country that is not a signatory to the Hague Convention, the parent who wishes to make the trip should have the burden of proving the trip should be allowed.

¶36 Which party has the burden of proof presents a question of law, which we review de novo. *Wolfe v. Wolfe*, 2000 WI App 93, 234 Wis. 2d 449,

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<sup>8</sup> We noted in *Pamperin v. Pamperin*, 112 Wis. 2d 70, 74-75, 331 N.W.2d 648 (Ct. App. 1983), that our instruction to the trial court on the prior appeal in the same case—that this standard should be used because the parties had stipulated to custody—was in error in light of *Corcoran v. Corcoran*, 109 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 324 N.W.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1982), but that it was nonetheless binding as law of the case.

457, 610 N.W.2d 222. We are persuaded that the trial court correctly concluded Long had the burden of proving that prohibiting Ardestani from taking the children to visit his family in Iran was in the children's best interests.

¶37 The general rule is that the party seeking judicial process to advance a position carries the burden of proof. *Id.*<sup>9</sup> In this case Long is seeking a court order prohibiting Ardestani from taking the minor children to Iran for a visit. She is doing so consistent with the procedure the parties stipulated to, which was incorporated in the judgment of divorce. Under that procedure Long has the obligation to move the court to prohibit Ardestani from taking the children to Iran; Ardestani's only obligation before taking the children is to notify Long sixty days in advance of his desire to take the children. The same stipulated provision also specifies the length of such a visit and its effect on the placement schedule. This indicates the parties contemplated that, if Long did not move the court to prohibit Ardestani, he could take the children without seeking any court approval, consistent with the terms of the provision.

¶38 This procedure is similar to that in the statute governing situations in which a parent wishes to remove a minor child from the state of Wisconsin for a

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<sup>9</sup> In *Wolfe v. Wolfe*, 2000 WI App 93, 234 Wis. 2d 449, 457, 610 N.W.2d 222, we concluded that, although the father, who had not had contact with his son, brought a motion seeking minimal contact, the mother had the burden of proving endangerment under WIS. STAT. § 767.24(4) (1997-98). (This section provides that a child is entitled to physical contact with both parents unless, after a hearing, the court finds "physical placement with a parent would endanger the child's physical, mental, or emotional health.") We concluded the mother bore the burden, even though the father brought the motion, because, under the statute, the court could not deny his motion unless it found endangerment, and the mother was the party advancing that position. *Wolfe*, 234 Wis. 2d at 457. Whether this conclusion conflicts with our statement in *Sterlingworth Condominium Ass'n v. DNR*, 205 Wis. 2d 710, 726, 556 N.W.2d 791 (Ct. App. 1996), that "[t]he customary common-law rule [is] that the moving party has the burden of proof, including not only the burden of going forward but also the burden of persuasion," is an issue we need not decide in this case.

period of more than ninety consecutive days and the other parent has periods of physical placement. WIS. STAT. § 767.327.<sup>10</sup> The parent wishing to do so must give the other parent notice at least sixty days in advance to allow the other parent to object. Section 767.327(1). A parent wishing to prohibit the removal must do so by motion to the court and has the burden of proof to show prohibition is in the children's best interests. Section 767.327(3)(c)2.

¶39 There is no statutory provision prohibiting a parent with joint legal custody and physical placement from taking the child on a visit outside Wisconsin, including to a foreign country, for less than ninety days. Also, in the absence of a provision in the divorce judgment to the contrary, there is no reason a parent with joint legal custody may not take a child on a visit to another country during the child's physical placement with that parent, without the other parent's permission, as long as the visit is less than ninety days.

¶40 We conclude that, when parents have agreed, as they have here, that one parent must move the court to prohibit the other from taking a particular trip with the children, the moving party has the burden of proof—both the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuading the court that prohibiting the trip is in the children's best interests. Although the guardian ad litem urges us to adopt a different rule when the trip is to a country that is not a signatory to the Hague Convention, he provides us with no case law authority for such a rule.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> WISCONSIN STAT. § 767.327(1)(a)2 also governs situations in which one parent wishes to establish legal residence with the child outside the state or within a distance of 150 miles from the residence of the other parent.

<sup>11</sup> We discuss the two cases the guardian ad litem cites, *Al-Zouhayli v. Al-Zouhayli*, 486 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992), and *Soltanieh v. King*, 826 P.2d 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), later in this opinion.



Moreover, in the one article brought to our attention that addresses the question of burden of proof—Susan L. Barone, *International Parental Child Abduction: A Global Dilemma With Limited Relief—Can Something More Be Done?*, 8 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 95, n.199 (1995)—the author “proposes that the threatened parent should have the burden of proving an abduction threat by a preponderance of the evidence.”

### *Best Interests of Children*

¶41 The best interests of the children is the dominant concern in any decision in divorce actions affecting custody or physical placement of children. *Racine Family Court Comm'r v. M.E.*, 165 Wis. 2d 530, 536, 478 N.W.2d 21 (Ct. App. 1991). Long argues the trial court failed to consider the best interests of the children in making its ruling. If Long means the trial court did not apply the standard of the best interests of the children, we disagree.

¶42 The parties' arguments to the court at both the May 5 hearing and on the motion for reconsideration make clear that the parties and the court understood the issue was whether it was in the children's best interests to go to Iran with their father. There was evidence that it would be beneficial for the children to travel with their father to the country of his birth and visit his family with him, assuming the children were returned, and there was no evidence to the contrary. There was no dispute it would be devastating to the children if they were not returned. We agree with the trial court and Ardestani that it was necessary for the court to consider not only the benefit to the children of going and the harm to them if they were not returned—neither of which were disputed—but also the likelihood of their not returning, which was the central factual dispute in this case. Accordingly, the evidence and the trial court's decision were focused on this

dispute. However, this focus does not mean the trial court was not ultimately deciding what was in the children's best interests.

¶43 We understand Long to also argue that the trial court erred in applying the best interest standard because it did not give proper weight to the devastating effect on the children if they were not returned to their mother in the United States. Because the determination of a child's best interests depends on firsthand observations and experience with the persons involved, it is committed to the trial court's discretion. *F.R.*, 225 Wis. 2d at 637. We therefore examine the trial court's ruling to determine whether it properly exercised this discretion. In doing so, we are mindful that assessing the credibility of witnesses and weighing their testimony are functions of the trial court, not this court, and we do not reverse the trial court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2); *State ex rel. T.R.S. v. L.F.E.*, 125 Wis. 2d 399, 401, 373 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1985).

¶44 In this case the critical question of the likelihood of the children being returned has these component questions: (1) What is the likelihood that Ardestani will intentionally refuse to return the children or refuse to see that they are returned? (2) What is the likelihood that one or both boys would be detained by the Iranian government so that they could serve in the military? (3) What is the likelihood that, if Ardestani through accident becomes unable to return the children, they will be able to return nonetheless? (4) What legal mechanisms exist to insure that if Ardestani does intentionally refuse to return the children or see that they are returned, and if his relatives refuse to or are unable to see that they are returned, Long can nonetheless secure their return?

¶45 The trial court carefully evaluated Long's and Ardestani's testimony, and considered the other testimony and evidence presented relevant to Ardestani's intentions. The trial court found Ardestani intended to bring the children back as he said he would. This is a factual finding highly dependent on the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses. There is ample evidence in the record to support such a finding, which the trial court explained. Therefore, we will not set aside this finding.

¶46 The trial court's finding that there is no reasonable likelihood of detainment for military service in Iran or of conscription was based on its assessment of the persuasiveness of the testimony of Alipour as compared to the proffered testimony of Uhlman. Again, this is an assessment for the trial court to make, not this court, and we will not disturb it.

¶47 The court also considered the evidence on the question of what would happen if Ardestani was unable to bring the children back himself. It heard the testimony of the children's therapist, who had considered this question, and evidence that Ardestani had relatives both in Iran and in the United States who could help bring the children home. There was no evidence suggesting that any family member who would have authority over the children under Iranian law if something happened to Ardestani would not help them return to Long.

¶48 Finally, the court considered the undisputed evidence that Iran was not a signatory to the Hague Convention, it did not have diplomatic relations with the United States, and the courts of Iran would not recognize an order of a court of the United States awarding Long custody of her children. The court did not ignore this evidence, but forthrightly addressed it: the court acknowledged that it could not absolutely rule out the possibility that Ardestani would act other than as he

promised, and, if this occurred, Long would be without a legal remedy and the effect on the children would be devastating. Ultimately, the court had to weigh the benefit to the children of going to Iran with their father against the likelihood that they would not be returned, along with the harm to them if they were not returned. That weighing, we conclude, is part of the exercise of the trial court's discretion in deciding what is in the children's best interests. We are satisfied the trial court properly exercised its discretion in deciding it should not prohibit Ardestani from taking the children to Iran.

¶49 Both Long and the guardian ad litem ask that we rule as a matter of law that a parent, even one having custody or joint custody, may not take a child to a country that is not a signatory to the Hague Convention if the other parent objects, even if a court finds the parent wishing to take the child intends to return the child and otherwise comply with court orders. They argue such a rule is good policy because the consequences of a failure to return the child in such situations are so severely adverse to the child.

¶50 However, none of the cases brought to our attention from other jurisdictions even hint at such a rule. Rather, in those cases in which courts have ordered restricted visitation in this country because of fear of abduction to another country,<sup>12</sup> or have prohibited a parent from taking a child to, or having visitation with the child in, another country,<sup>13</sup> the courts have examined the facts and circumstances of each case to arrive at the best interests of the child. In some cases the trial courts have found, based on the evidence, that there is sufficient

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<sup>12</sup> See, e.g., *Soltanieh v. King*, 826 P.2d 1076 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); *Al-Silham v. Al-Silham*, 1995 WL 803808 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).

<sup>13</sup> See, e.g., *Bergstrom v. Bergstrom*, 320 N.W.2d 119 (N.D. 1982).

likelihood a parent may flee the country with the child, as the other parent fears, to justify restrictions.<sup>14</sup> In others cases trial courts have found, based on the evidence, there is not a sufficient likelihood of that occurring to justify either supervised visitation in this country<sup>15</sup> or a prohibition on visitation in another country.<sup>16</sup> The appellate courts in these cases have reviewed the trial courts' factual findings and discretionary determinations under deferential standards similar to those we have already enunciated in this case.

¶51 While in some cases the difficulty of obtaining the return of the child in the event of an abduction (because the other country is not a signatory to the Hague Convention or for other reasons) is one factor courts have considered in imposing restrictions, *see, e.g., Al-Silham v. Al-Silham*, 1994 WL 102480 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994), in no case of which we are aware is this the only factor. Indeed, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has specifically rejected such an argument in the context of deciding whether visitation in this country should be supervised or not. *See Al-Zouhayli v. Al-Zouhayli*, 486 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (decision whether to order supervised visitation depends on particular facts of the case and unwillingness of non-custodial parent's native country to enforce trial court's order is not controlling). In addition, none of the articles to which the

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<sup>14</sup> See footnote 12.

<sup>15</sup> *See, e.g., Al-Zouhayli v. Al-Zouhayli*, 486 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).

<sup>16</sup> *See, e.g., Markus v. Markus*, 427 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); *Lolli-ghetti v. Lolli-ghetti*, 556 N.Y.S.2d 324 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (allowing visitation in Monaco and eliminating bond); *Hatzievgenakis v. Hatzievgenakis*, 434 N.W.2d 914 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (allowing visitation in Greece upon posting of reduced bond).

parties have directed us suggest the adoption of a rule such as Long and the guardian ad litem propose.<sup>17</sup>

¶52 We are satisfied that the standard of the best interests of the child, comprehensive as it is, permits a full consideration of concerns both about a parent's intention in abducting a child and about the lack of a remedy should that occur. We are also satisfied that there is no need to alter the deference appellate courts give to trial courts' decisions on a child's best interests in order to insure a full consideration of those concerns.

¶53 The guardian ad litem suggests, as an alternative to adopting the rule of law he advances, that we provide guidance to trial courts by listing the factors they should take into account in deciding whether to permit one parent to take a child to another country for a visit, and that we remand to permit evidence on these factors. At oral argument the guardian ad litem mentioned such factors as: the intention of the parent to return with the child; methods of providing security that the parent will return with the child; the effect on the child; the desires of the child; the reason for the visit; and the current policies, laws, and practices of the country to which the parent wishes to take the child for a visit. While we can readily agree these are appropriate factors to consider in this case, and, perhaps in many others, we see no need to establish a definitive list of factors. The virtue of the best interests standard is that it permits the trial court to take into account all

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<sup>17</sup> See Patricia E. Apy, *Managing Child Custody Cases Involving Non-Hague Contracting States*, 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 77 (1997); Susan L. Barone, *International Parental Child Abduction: A Global Dilemma With Limited Relief—Can Something More Be Done?*, 8 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 95 (1995); Monica E. Henderson, *U.S. State Court Review Of Islamic Law Custody Decrees—When Are Islamic Custody Decrees In The Child's Best Interest?*, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 423 (1997-98); and Mary A. Ryan, Statement before the Committee on International Relations United States House of Representatives Concerning Implementation of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (Oct. 14, 1999).

facts and circumstances bearing on the best interests of the particular child, and we view an attempt to define what those might be in a general category of cases as neither necessary nor fruitful.

¶54 We also see no need for a remand in this case. The trial court had before it evidence bearing on all the factors the guardian ad litem suggests are relevant, and it considered those factors in reaching its decision not to prohibit Ardestani from traveling to Iran with his minor sons. As we have already concluded, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in making that decision.

*By the Court.*—Order affirmed.

Recommended for publication in the official reports.

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