## Fiscal Estimate - 2009 Session

$\boxtimes$	Original		Updated		Correcte	ed		Supple	mental
LRB	Number	09-1575/1		Introd	duction	Numbe	r A	B-010	5
<b>Descr</b> arbitra Emplo	<b>iption</b> tion and fair-s yment Relatio	hare agreeme	nts during coll	ective bargai	ning nego	itiations un	der the	• Municip	oal
Fiscal	Effect								
		Existing tions Existing	Reve	ase Existing enues ease Existing enues			within Yes	agency	e possible s budget \[ \] No
	No Local Gov Indeterminate 1. Increase Permiss 2. Decrease	e Costs sive 🔲 Mandate	3.  Incre ory Perm 4. Decr	ase Revenue nissive ☐ Mar ease Revenu nissive ☐ Mar	e ndatory ie	i.Types of Governme Affected Town Coun	ent Uni s 🔯 ties	its Village Others WTCS Districts	Cities Sewerage Districts, Library
Fund Sources Affected  Affected Ch. 20 Appropriations  GPR FED PRO PRS SEG SEGS 101, 134									
Agen	cy/Prepared	Ву		Authorized	Signatur	e			Date
ERC/	Georgann Kra	amer (608) 266	6-9287	Peter Davis (608) 266-2993					3/4/2009

## Fiscal Estimate Narratives ERC 3/4/2009

LRB Number <b>09-1575/1</b>	Introduction Number	AB-0105	Estimate Type	Original						
<b>Description</b> arbitration and fair-share agreements during collective bargaining negotiations under the Municipal Employment Relations Act.										

## Assumptions Used in Arriving at Fiscal Estimate

Almost all municipal public sector collective bargaining agreements contain: (1) a provision requiring that the municipal employer deduct monies from the paychecks of employees who have chosen not to be union members in an amount equal to the employees' "fair share" of the costs of collective bargaining and contract administration; and (2) a grievance arbitration procedure for resolving disputes over the meaning of the agreement.

Under current law, the municipal employer is not obligated to continue to take "fair share" fees from non-member employees once a contract expires. When the employer discontinues taking "fair share" payments from employees, it does not produce any litigation before the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission (WERC) or elsewhere. Thus, loss of the right to discontinue "fair share" payments pursuant to AB 105 would have no fiscal impact on the WERC or local government.

Under current law, if a collective bargaining agreement expires, the parties to the agreement are not obligated to continue to use the arbitration procedure for resolving disputes over the meaning of the now expired agreement. If either party to an expired agreement declines to continue to use the arbitration procedure, a dispute over the meaning of the now expired agreement can be brought to the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission as a prohibited practice complaint. Because a hiatus between contracts is commonplace in the public sector, several such complaints are filed with the Commission each year. If AB 105 became law, the Commission would no longer receive such complaints and the dispute would instead be resolved by a grievance arbitrator.

This portion of AB 105 would likely lead to a slight increase in WERC revenues. The income lost by WERC because this type of prohibited practice complaint will no longer be filed is \$100 (paid by the filing party-typically the union) per case. If, as will be true in a majority of instances, a WERC employee serves as the grievance arbitrator, WERC will gain income of \$800 (split equally between the union and employer) per case. WERC estimates an annual increase in revenue of \$3500.

This portion of AB 105 would likely produce a slight decrease in local government costs. Litigation costs (primarily attorneys fees) in a prohibited practice complaint proceeding are typically greater than the litigation costs in a grievance arbitration proceeding. WERC estimates that the decrease in litigation costs will be greater than the increase in costs incurred by the higher level of WERC filing fees for grievance arbitration or by use of a non-WERC grievance arbitrator.

Long-Range Fiscal Implications