

CHAPTER 948

CRIMES AGAINST CHILDREN

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948.01 Definitions. In this chapter, the following words and phrases have the designated meanings unless the context of a specific section manifestly requires a different construction:

(1) “Child” means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years, except that for purposes of prosecuting a person who is alleged to have violated a state or federal criminal law, “child” does not include a person who has attained the age of 17 years.

(1g) “Joint legal custody” has the meaning given in s. 767.001 (1s).

(1r) “Legal custody” has the meaning given in s. 767.001 (2).

(2) “Mental harm” means substantial harm to a child’s psychological or intellectual functioning which may be evidenced by a substantial degree of certain characteristics of the child including, but not limited to, anxiety, depression, withdrawal or outward aggressive behavior. “Mental harm” may be demonstrated by a substantial and observable change in behavior, emotional response or cognition that is not within the normal range for the child’s age and stage of development.

(3) “Person responsible for the child’s welfare” includes the child’s parent; stepparent; guardian; foster parent; treatment foster parent; an employee of a public or private residential home, institution or agency; other person legally responsible for the child’s welfare in a residential setting; or a person employed by one legally responsible for the child’s welfare to exercise temporary control or care for the child.

(3m) “Physical placement” has the meaning given in s. 767.001 (5).

(4) “Sodomasochistic abuse” means the infliction of force, pain or violence upon a person for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.

(5) “Sexual contact” means any of the following:

(a) Intentional touching by the complainant or defendant, either directly or through clothing by the use of any body part or object, of the complainant’s or defendant’s intimate parts if that intentional touching is either for the purpose of sexually degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant.

(b) Intentional penile ejaculation of ejaculate or intentional emission of urine or feces by the defendant upon any part of the body clothed or unclothed of the complainant if that ejaculation or emission is either for the purpose of sexually degrading or sexually humiliating the complainant or for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the defendant.

(6) “Sexual intercourse” means vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal opening either by the defendant or upon the defendant’s instruction. The emission of semen is not required.

(7) “Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simulated:

(a) Sexual intercourse, meaning vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal opening either by a person or upon the person’s instruction. The emission of semen is not required;

(b) Bestiality;

(c) Masturbation;

(d) Sexual sadism or sexual masochistic abuse including, but not limited to, flagellation, torture or bondage; or

(e) Lewd exhibition of intimate parts.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1989 a. 31; 1993 a. 446; 1995 a. 27, 67, 69, 100, 214.

Instructions were proper that told the jury that “lewd” under sub. (7) (e) when applied to photographs is not mere nudity but requires display of the genital area and sexual suggestiveness as determined by jury in use of common sense. State v. Petrone, 161 Wis. 2d 530, 468 N.W.2d 676 (1991).

When a defendant allows sexual contact initiated by a child, the defendant is guilty of intentional touching as defined in sub. (5). State v. T aylor, 170 Wis. 2d 393, 489 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1992).

The definition of “parent” in sub. (3) is all-inclusive; a defendant whose paternity was admitted but had never been adjudged is a “parent”. State v. Evans, 171 Wis. 2d 471, 492 N.W.2d 141 (1992).

A live-in boyfriend can be a person responsible for the welfare of a child under sub. (3) if he was used by the child’s legal guardian as a caretaker for the child. State v. Sostre, 198 Wis. 2d 409, 542 N.W.2d 774 (1996).

948.015 Other offenses against children. In addition to the offenses under this chapter, offenses against children include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) Sections 103.19 to 103.32 and 103.64 to 103.82, relating to employment of minors.

(2) Section 118.13, relating to pupil discrimination.

(3) Section 125.07, relating to furnishing alcohol beverages to underage persons.

(4) Section 253.11, relating to infant blindness.

(5) Section 254.12, relating to applying lead-bearing paints or selling or transferring a fixture or other object containing a lead-bearing paint.

(6) Sections 961.01 (6) and (9) and 961.49, relating to delivering and distributing controlled substances or controlled substance analogs to children.

(7) Section 444.09 (4), relating to boxing.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1989 a. 31; 1993 a. 27; 1995 a. 448.

948.02 Sexual assault of a child. (1) FIRST DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT. Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of a Class B felony.

(2) SECOND DEGREE SEXUAL ASSAULT. Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a person who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class BC felony.

(3) FAILURE TO ACT. A person responsible for the welfare of a child who has not attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class C felony if that person has knowledge that another person intends to have, is having or has had sexual intercourse or sexual contact with the child, is physically and emotionally capable of taking action which will prevent the intercourse or contact from taking place or being repeated, fails to take that action and the failure to act exposes the child to an unreasonable risk that intercourse or contact may occur between the child and the other person or facilitates the intercourse or contact that does occur between the child and the other person.

(3m) PENALTY ENHANCEMENT; SEXUAL ASSAULT BY CERTAIN PERSONS. If a person violates sub. (1) or (2) and the person is responsible for the welfare of the child who is the victim of the violation, the maximum term of imprisonment may be increased by not more than 5 years.

(4) MARRIAGE NOT A BAR TO PROSECUTION. A defendant shall not be presumed to be incapable of violating this section because of marriage to the complainant.

(5) DEATH OF VICTIM. This section applies whether a victim is dead or alive at the time of the sexual contact or sexual intercourse.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1989 a. 31; 1995 a. 14, 69.

Relevant evidence in child sexual assault cases is discussed. In *Interest of Michael R.B.*, 175 Wis. 2d 713, 499 N.W.2d 641 (1993).

Limits relating to expert testimony regarding child sex abuse victims is discussed. *State v. Hernandez*, 192 Wis. 2d 251, 531 N.W.2d 348 (Ct. App. 1995).

The criminalization under sub. (2) of consensual sexual relations with a child under 16 does not violate the defendant's constitutionally protected privacy rights. *State v. Fisher*, 211 Wis. 2d 664, 565 N.W.2d 565 (Ct. App. 1997).

Second degree sexual assault under sub. (2) is a lesser included offense of first degree sexual assault under sub. (1). *State v. Moua*, 215 Wis. 2d 510, 573 N.W.2d 210 (Ct. App. 1997).

For a guilty plea to a sexual assault charge to be knowingly made, a defendant need not be informed of the potential of being required to register as a convicted sex offender under s. 301.45 or that failure to register could result in imprisonment, as the commitment is a collateral, not direct, consequence of the plea. *State v. Bollig*, 2000 WI 6, 232 Wis. 2d 561, 605 N.W.2d 199.

Constitutionality upheld. *Sweeney v. Smith*, 9 F. Supp.2d 1026 (1998).

948.025 Engaging in repeated acts of sexual assault of the same child. (1) Whoever commits 3 or more violations under s. 948.02 (1) or (2) within a specified period of time involving the same child is guilty of a Class B felony.

(2) If an action under sub. (1) is tried to a jury, in order to find the defendant guilty the members of the jury must unanimously agree that at least 3 violations occurred within the time period applicable under sub. (1) but need not agree on which acts constitute the requisite number.

(2m) If a person violates sub. (1) and the person is responsible for the welfare of the child who is the victim of the violation, the maximum term of imprisonment may be increased by not more than 5 years.

(3) The state may not charge in the same action a defendant with a violation of this section and with a felony violation involving the same child under ch. 944 or a violation involving the same child under s. 948.02, 948.05, 948.06, 948.07, 948.08, 948.10, 948.11 or 948.12, unless the other violation occurred outside of the time period applicable under sub. (1). This subsection does not prohibit a conviction for an included crime under s. 939.66 when the defendant is charged with a violation of this section.

History: 1993 a. 227; 1995 a. 14.

Sub. (2) is constitutional. The right to a unanimous jury verdict is fulfilled by the requirement the a continuous course of conduct be found. *State v. Molitor*, 210 Wis. 2d 416, 565 N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 1997).

948.03 Physical abuse of a child. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section, "recklessly" means conduct which creates a situation of unreasonable risk of harm to and demonstrates a conscious disregard for the safety of the child.

(2) INTENTIONAL CAUSATION OF BODILY HARM. (a) Whoever intentionally causes great bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class C felony.

(b) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class D felony.

(c) Whoever intentionally causes bodily harm to a child by conduct which creates a high probability of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class C felony.

(3) RECKLESS CAUSATION OF BODILY HARM. (a) Whoever recklessly causes great bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class D felony.

(b) Whoever recklessly causes bodily harm to a child is guilty of a Class E felony.

(c) Whoever recklessly causes bodily harm to a child by conduct which creates a high probability of great bodily harm is guilty of a Class D felony.

(4) FAILING TO ACT TO PREVENT BODILY HARM. (a) A person responsible for the child's welfare is guilty of a Class C felony if that person has knowledge that another person intends to cause, is causing or has intentionally or recklessly caused great bodily harm to the child and is physically and emotionally capable of taking action which will prevent the bodily harm from occurring or being repeated, fails to take that action and the failure to act exposes the child to an unreasonable risk of great bodily harm by the other person or facilitates the great bodily harm to the child that is caused by the other person.

(b) A person responsible for the child's welfare is guilty of a Class D felony if that person has knowledge that another person intends to cause, is causing or has intentionally or recklessly caused bodily harm to the child and is physically and emotionally capable of taking action which will prevent the bodily harm from occurring or being repeated, fails to take that action and the failure to act exposes the child to an unreasonable risk of bodily harm by the other person or facilitates the bodily harm to the child that is caused by the other person.

(5) PENALTY ENHANCEMENT; ABUSE BY CERTAIN PERSONS. If a person violates sub. (2) or (3) and the person is responsible for the welfare of the child who is the victim of the violation, the maximum term of imprisonment may be increased by not more than 5 years.

(6) TREATMENT THROUGH PRAYER. A person is not guilty of an offense under this section solely because he or she provides a child with treatment by spiritual means through prayer alone for healing in accordance with the religious method of healing permitted under s. 48.981 (3) (c) 4. or 448.03 (6) in lieu of medical or surgical treatment.

History: 1987 a. 332.

To obtain a conviction for aiding and abetting a violation of sub. (2) or (3) the state must prove conduct which as a matter of objective fact aids another in executing the crime. *State v. Rundle*, 176 Wis. 2d 985, 500 N.W.2d 916 (Ct. App. 1993).

A live-in boyfriend can be a person responsible for the welfare of a child under sub. (5) if he was used by the child's legal guardian as a caretaker for the child. *State v. Sostre*, 198 Wis. 2d 409, 542 N.W.2d 774 (1996).

948.04 Causing mental harm to a child. (1) Whoever is exercising temporary or permanent control of a child and causes mental harm to that child by conduct which demonstrates substantial disregard for the mental well-being of the child is guilty of a Class C felony.

(2) A person responsible for the child's welfare is guilty of a Class C felony if that person has knowledge that another person has caused, is causing or will cause mental harm to that child, is physically and emotionally capable of taking action which will prevent the harm, fails to take that action and the failure to act

exposes the child to an unreasonable risk of mental harm by the other person or facilitates the mental harm to the child that is caused by the other person.

History: 1987 a. 332.

948.05 Sexual exploitation of a child. (1) Whoever does any of the following with knowledge of the character and content of the sexually explicit conduct involving the child is guilty of a Class C felony:

(a) Employs, uses, persuades, induces, entices or coerces any child to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of photographing, filming, videotaping, recording the sounds of or displaying in any way the conduct.

(b) Photographs, films, videotapes, records the sounds of or displays in any way a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

(1m) Whoever produces, performs in, profits from, promotes, imports into the state, reproduces, advertises, sells, distributes or possesses with intent to sell or distribute, any undeveloped film, photographic negative, photograph, motion picture, videotape, sound recording or other reproduction of a child engaging in sexually explicit conduct is guilty of a Class C felony if the person knows the character and content of the sexually explicit conduct involving the child and if the person knows or reasonably should know that the child engaging in the sexually explicit conduct has not attained the age of 18 years.

(2) A person responsible for a child's welfare who knowingly permits, allows or encourages the child to engage in sexually explicit conduct for a purpose proscribed in sub. (1) (a) or (b) or (1m) is guilty of a Class C felony.

(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for violation of sub. (1) (a) or (b) or (2) if the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the child had attained the age of 18 years. A defendant who raises this affirmative defense has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1999 a. 3.

"Import" under sub. (1) (c) means bringing in from an external source and does not require a commercial element or exempt personal use. *State v. Bruckner*, 151 Wis. 2d 833, 447 N.W.2d 376 (Ct. App. 1989).

The purposes of ss. 948.05, child exploitation, and 948.07, child enticement, are distinct and two distinct crimes are envisioned by the statutes. Charging both for the same act was not multiplicitous. *State v. DeRango*, 2000 WI 89, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833.

948.055 Causing a child to view or listen to sexual activity. (1) Whoever intentionally causes a child who has not attained 18 years of age to view or listen to sexually explicit conduct may be penalized as provided in sub. (2) if the viewing or listening is for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the actor or humiliating or degrading the child.

(2) Whoever violates sub. (1) is guilty of:

(a) A Class C felony if the child has not attained the age of 13 years.

(b) A Class D felony if the child has attained the age of 13 years but has not attained the age of 18 years.

History: 1987 a. 334; 1989 a. 359; 1993 a. 218 ss. 6, 7; Stats. 1993 s. 948.055; 1995 a. 67.

948.06 Incest with a child. Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class BC felony:

(1) Marries or has sexual intercourse or sexual contact with a child he or she knows is related, either by blood or adoption, and the child is related in a degree of kinship closer than 2nd cousin; or

(2) Is a person responsible for the child's welfare and:

(a) Has knowledge that another person related to the child by blood or adoption in a degree of kinship closer than 2nd cousin has had or intends to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact with the child;

(b) Is physically and emotionally capable of taking action that will prevent the intercourse or contact from occurring or being repeated;

(c) Fails to take that action; and

(d) The failure to act exposes the child to an unreasonable risk that intercourse or contact may occur between the child and the other person or facilitates the intercourse or contact that does occur between the child and the other person.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1995 a. 69.

948.07 Child enticement. Whoever, with intent to commit any of the following acts, causes or attempts to cause any child who has not attained the age of 18 years to go into any vehicle, building, room or secluded place is guilty of a Class BC felony:

(1) Having sexual contact or sexual intercourse with the child in violation of s. 948.02 or 948.095.

(2) Causing the child to engage in prostitution.

(3) Exposing a sex organ to the child or causing the child to expose a sex organ in violation of s. 948.10.

(4) Taking a picture or making an audio recording of the child engaging in sexually explicit conduct.

(5) Causing bodily or mental harm to the child.

(6) Giving or selling to the child a controlled substance or controlled substance analog in violation of ch. 961.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1995 a. 67, 69, 448, 456.

The penalty scheme of sub. (3) is not unconstitutionally irrational. That the statute, unlike sub. (1), did not distinguish between victim 16 years or older and other children victims is a matter for the legislature. *State v. Hanson*, 182 Wis. 2d 481, 513 N.W.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1994).

This section includes the attempted crime, as well as the completed crime, and cannot be combined with the general attempt statute. *State v. DeRango*, 229 Wis. 2d 1, 599 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1999).

The purposes of ss. 948.05, child exploitation, and 948.07, child enticement, are distinct and two distinct crimes are envisioned by the statutes. Charging both for the same act was not multiplicitous. *State v. DeRango*, 2000 WI 89, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833.

This section creates one crime with multiple modes of commission. The alternate modes of commission are not so dissimilar as to implicate fundamental fairness, and, as such, a defendant is not entitled to a unanimity instruction. *State v. DeRango*, 2000 WI 89, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833.

948.08 Soliciting a child for prostitution. Whoever intentionally solicits or causes any child to practice prostitution or establishes any child in a place of prostitution is guilty of a Class BC felony.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1995 a. 69.

948.09 Sexual intercourse with a child age 16 or older. Whoever has sexual intercourse with a child who is not the defendant's spouse and who has attained the age of 16 years is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

History: 1987 a. 332.

948.095 Sexual assault of a student by a school instructional staff person. (1) In this section:

(a) "School" means a public or private elementary or secondary school.

(b) "School staff" means any person who provides services to a school or a school board, including an employee of a school or a school board and a person who provides services to a school or a school board under a contract.

(2) Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a child who has attained the age of 16 years and who is not the defendant's spouse is guilty of a Class D felony if all of the following apply:

(a) The child is enrolled as a student in a school or a school district.

(b) The defendant is a member of the school staff of the school or school district in which the child is enrolled as a student.

History: 1995 a. 456.

948.10 Exposing genitals or pubic area. (1) Whoever, for purposes of sexual arousal or sexual gratification, causes a child to expose genitals or pubic area or exposes genitals or pubic area to a child is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply under any of the following circumstances:

- (a) The child is the defendant's spouse.
- (b) A mother's breast-feeding of her child.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1989 a. 31; 1995 a. 165.

948.11 Exposing a child to harmful material or harmful descriptions or narrations. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section:

(ag) "Harmful description or narrative account" means any explicit and detailed description or narrative account of sexual excitement, sexually explicit conduct, sadomasochistic abuse, physical torture or brutality that, taken as a whole, is harmful to children.

(ar) "Harmful material" means:

1. Any picture, photograph, drawing, sculpture, motion picture film or similar visual representation or image of a person or portion of the human body that depicts nudity, sexually explicit conduct, sadomasochistic abuse, physical torture or brutality and that is harmful to children; or

2. Any book, pamphlet, magazine, printed matter however reproduced or sound recording that contains any matter enumerated in subd. 1., or explicit and detailed verbal descriptions or narrative accounts of sexual excitement, sexually explicit conduct, sadomasochistic abuse, physical torture or brutality and that, taken as a whole, is harmful to children.

(b) "Harmful to children" means that quality of any description, narrative account or representation, in whatever form, of nudity, sexually explicit conduct, sexual excitement, sadomasochistic abuse, physical torture or brutality, when it:

1. Predominantly appeals to the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of children;

2. Is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is suitable for children; and

3. Lacks serious literary, artistic, political, scientific or educational value for children, when taken as a whole.

(bm) "Knowledge of the nature of the description or narrative account" means knowledge of the character and content of a harmful description or narrative account.

(c) "Knowledge of the nature of the material" means knowledge of the character and content of any material described herein.

(d) "Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area or buttocks with less than a full opaque covering, or the showing of the female breast with less than a fully opaque covering of any portion thereof below the top of the nipple, or the depiction of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state.

(e) "Person" means any individual, partnership, firm, association, corporation or other legal entity.

(f) "Sexual excitement" means the condition of human male or female genitals when in a state of sexual stimulation or arousal.

(2) CRIMINAL PENALTIES. (a) Whoever, with knowledge of the nature of the material, sells, rents, exhibits, transfers or loans to a child any harmful material, with or without monetary consideration, is guilty of a Class E felony.

(am) Any person who has attained the age of 17 and who, with knowledge of the nature of the description or narrative account, verbally communicates, by any means, a harmful description or narrative account to a child, with or without monetary consideration, is guilty of a Class E felony.

(b) Whoever, with knowledge of the nature of the material, possesses harmful material with the intent to sell, rent, exhibit, transfer or loan the material to a child is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a violation of this section if the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that the child had attained the age of 18 years, and the child exhibited to the defendant a draft card, driver's license, birth certificate or other official or apparently official document purporting to estab-

lish that the child had attained the age of 18 years. A defendant who raises this affirmative defense has the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

NOTE: The supreme court in *State v. Weidner*, 2000 WI 52, 235 Wis. 2d 306, concluded that sub. (2) is unconstitutional in the context of the internet and other situations that do not involve face-to-face contact.

(3) EXTRADITION. If any person is convicted under sub. (2) and cannot be found in this state, the governor or any person performing the functions of governor by authority of the law shall, unless the convicted person has appealed from the judgment of contempt or conviction and the appeal has not been finally determined, demand his or her extradition from the executive authority of the state in which the person is found.

(4) LIBRARIES AND EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. (a) The legislature finds that the libraries and educational institutions under par. (b) carry out the essential purpose of making available to all citizens a current, balanced collection of books, reference materials, periodicals, sound recordings and audiovisual materials that reflect the cultural diversity and pluralistic nature of American society. The legislature further finds that it is in the interest of the state to protect the financial resources of libraries and educational institutions from being expended in litigation and to permit these resources to be used to the greatest extent possible for fulfilling the essential purpose of libraries and educational institutions.

(b) No person who is an employee, a member of the board of directors or a trustee of any of the following is liable to prosecution for violation of this section for acts or omissions while in his or her capacity as an employee, a member of the board of directors or a trustee:

1. A public elementary or secondary school.
2. A private school, as defined in s. 115.001 (3r).
3. Any school offering vocational, technical or adult education that:

a. Is a technical college, is a school approved by the educational approval board under s. 45.54 or is a school described in s. 45.54 (1) (e) 6., 7. or 8.; and

b. Is exempt from taxation under section 501 (c) (3) of the internal revenue code, as defined in s. 71.01 (6).

4. Any institution of higher education that is accredited, as described in s. 39.30 (1) (d), and is exempt from taxation under section 501 (c) (3) of the internal revenue code, as defined in s. 71.01 (6).

5. A library that receives funding from any unit of government.

(5) SEVERABILITY. The provisions of this section, including the provisions of sub. (4), are severable, as provided in s. 990.001 (11).

History: 1987 a. 332; 1989 a. 31; 1993 a. 220, 399; 1995 a. 27 s. 9154 (1); 1997 a. 27, 82; 1999 a. 9.

This section is not unconstitutionally overbroad. The exemption from prosecution of libraries, educational institutions and their employees and directors does not violate equal protection rights. *State v. Thiel*, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994).

The lack of a requirement in sub. (2) (a) that the defendant know the age of the child exposed to the harmful material does not render the statute unconstitutional on its face. *State v. Kevin L.C.* 216 Wis. 2d 166, 576 N.W.2d 62 (Ct. App. 1997).

948.12 Possession of child pornography. Whoever possesses any undeveloped film, photographic negative, photograph, motion picture, videotape or other pictorial reproduction or audio recording of a child engaged in sexually explicit conduct under all of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class E felony:

(1) The person knows that he or she possesses the material.

(2) The person knows the character and content of the sexually explicit conduct shown in the material.

(3) The person knows or reasonably should know that the child engaged in sexually explicit conduct has not attained the age of 18 years.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1995 a. 67.

A violation of this section must be based on the content of the photograph and how it was produced. Evidence of the location and manner of storing the photo are not properly considered. *State v. A. H.* 211 Wis. 2d 561, 566 N.W.2d 858 (Ct. App. 1997).

948.13 Child sex offender working with children.

(1) In this section, “serious child sex offense” means any of the following:

(a) A crime under s. 940.22 (2) or 940.225 (2) (c) or (cm), if the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the offense, or a crime under s. 948.02 (1), 948.025 (1), 948.05 (1) or (1m), 948.06 or 948.07 (1), (2), (3) or (4).

(b) A crime under federal law or the law of any other state or, prior to May 7, 1996, under the law of this state that is comparable to a crime specified in par. (a).

(2) Whoever has been convicted of a serious child sex offense and subsequently engages in an occupation or participates in a volunteer position that requires him or her to work or interact primarily and directly with children under 16 years of age is guilty of a Class C felony. This subsection does not apply to a person who is exempt under a court order issued under sub. (2m).

(2m) (a) A person who has been convicted of a crime under s. 948.025 (1) may petition the court in which he or she was convicted to order that the person be exempt from sub. (2) and permitted to engage in an occupation or participate in a volunteer position that requires the person to work or interact primarily and directly with children under 16 years of age. The court may grant a petition filed under this paragraph if the court finds that all of the following apply:

1. At the time of the commission of the crime under s. 948.025 (1) the person had not attained the age of 19 years and was not more than 4 years older or not more than 4 years younger than the child with whom the person had sexual contact or sexual intercourse.

1m. The child with whom the person had sexual contact or sexual intercourse had attained the age of 13 but had not attained the age of 16.

2. It is not necessary, in the interest of public protection, to require the person to comply with sub. (2).

(b) A person filing a petition under par. (a) shall send a copy of the petition to the district attorney who prosecuted the person. The district attorney shall make a reasonable attempt to contact the victim of the crime that is the subject of the person’s petition to inform the victim of his or her right to make or provide a statement under par. (d).

(c) A court may hold a hearing on a petition filed under par. (a) and the district attorney who prosecuted the person may appear at the hearing.

(d) Before deciding a petition filed under par. (a), the court shall allow the victim of the crime that is the subject of the petition to make a statement in court at any hearing held on the petition or to submit a written statement to the court. A statement under this paragraph must be relevant to the issues specified in par. (a) 1., 1m. and 2.

(e) 1. Before deciding a petition filed under par. (a), the court may request the person filing the petition to be examined by a physician, psychologist or other expert approved by the court. If the person refuses to undergo an examination requested by the court under this subdivision, the court shall deny the person’s petition without prejudice.

2. If a person is examined by a physician, psychologist or other expert under subd. 1., the physician, psychologist or other expert shall file a report of his or her examination with the court, and the court shall provide copies of the report to the person and, if he or she requests a copy, to the district attorney. The contents of the report shall be confidential until the physician, psychologist or other expert has testified at the hearing held under par. (c). The report shall contain an opinion regarding whether it would be in the interest of public protection to require the person to comply with sub. (2) and the basis for that opinion.

3. A person who is examined by a physician, psychologist or other expert under subd. 1. is responsible for paying the cost of the services provided by the physician, psychologist or other expert, except that if the person is indigent the cost of the services pro-

vided by the physician, psychologist or other expert shall be paid by the county. If the person claims or appears to be indigent, the court shall refer the person to the authority for indigency determinations under s. 977.07 (1), except that the person shall be considered indigent without another determination under s. 977.07 (1) if the person is represented by the state public defender or by a private attorney appointed under s. 977.08.

(f) The person who filed the petition under par. (a) has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that he or she satisfies the criteria specified in par. (a) 1., 1m. and 2. In deciding whether the person has satisfied the criterion specified in par. (a) 2., the court may consider any of the following:

1. The ages, at the time of the violation, of the person who filed the petition and the victim of the crime that is the subject of the petition.

2. The relationship between the person who filed the petition and the victim of the crime that is the subject of the petition.

3. Whether the crime that is the subject of the petition resulted in bodily harm to the victim.

4. Whether the victim of the crime that is the subject of the petition suffered from a mental illness or mental deficiency that rendered him or her temporarily or permanently incapable of understanding or evaluating the consequences of his or her actions.

5. The probability that the person who filed the petition will commit other serious child sex offenses in the future.

6. The report of the examination conducted under par. (e).

7. Any other factor that the court determines may be relevant to the particular case.

(3) Evidence that a person engages in an occupation or participates in a volunteer position relating to any of the following is prima facie evidence that the occupation or position requires him or her to work or interact primarily and directly with children under 16 years of age: teaching children, child care, youth counseling, youth organization, coaching children, parks or playground recreation or school bus driving.

History: 1995 a. 265; 1997 a. 130, 220; 1999 a. 3.

948.20 Abandonment of a child. Whoever, with intent to abandon the child, leaves any child in a place where the child may suffer because of neglect is guilty of a Class D felony.

History: 1977 c. 173; 1987 a. 332 s. 35; Stats. 1987 s. 948.20.

948.21 Neglecting a child. (1) Any person who is responsible for a child’s welfare who, through his or her actions or failure to take action, intentionally contributes to the neglect of the child is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor or, if death is a consequence, a Class C felony.

(2) Under sub. (1), a person responsible for the child’s welfare contributes to the neglect of the child although the child does not actually become neglected if the natural and probable consequences of the person’s actions or failure to take action would be to cause the child to become neglected.

History: 1987 a. 332.

948.22 Failure to support. (1) In this section:

(a) “Child support” means an amount which a person is ordered to provide for support of a child by a court of competent jurisdiction in this state or in another state, territory or possession of the United States, or, if not ordered, an amount that a person is legally obligated to provide under s. 49.90.

(b) “Grandchild support” means an amount which a person is legally obligated to provide under s. 49.90 (1) (a) 2. and (11).

(c) “Spousal support” means an amount which a person is ordered to provide for support of a spouse or former spouse by a court of competent jurisdiction in this state or in another state, territory or possession of the United States, or, if not ordered, an amount that a person is legally obligated to provide under s. 49.90.

(2) Any person who intentionally fails for 120 or more consecutive days to provide spousal, grandchild or child support

which the person knows or reasonably should know the person is legally obligated to provide is guilty of a Class E felony. A prosecutor may charge a person with multiple counts for a violation under this subsection if each count covers a period of at least 120 consecutive days and there is no overlap between periods.

(3) Any person who intentionally fails for less than 120 consecutive days to provide spousal, grandchild or child support which the person knows or reasonably should know the person is legally obligated to provide is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

(4) Under this section, the following is prima facie evidence of intentional failure to provide child, grandchild or spousal support:

(a) For a person subject to a court order requiring child, grandchild or spousal support payments, when the person knows or reasonably should have known that he or she is required to pay support under an order, failure to pay the child, grandchild or spousal support payment required under the order.

(b) For a person not subject to a court order requiring child, grandchild or spousal support payments, when the person knows or reasonably should have known that he or she has a dependent, failure to provide support equal to at least the amount established by rule by the department of workforce development under s. 49.22 (9) or causing a spouse, grandchild or child to become a dependent person, or continue to be a dependent person, as defined in s. 49.01 (2).

(5) Under this section, it is not a defense that child, grandchild or spousal support is provided wholly or partially by any other person or entity.

(6) Under this section, affirmative defenses include but are not limited to inability to provide child, grandchild or spousal support. A person may not demonstrate inability to provide child, grandchild or spousal support if the person is employable but, without reasonable excuse, either fails to diligently seek employment, terminates employment or reduces his or her earnings or assets. A person who raises an affirmative defense has the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

(7) (a) Before trial, upon petition by the complainant and notice to the defendant, the court may enter a temporary order requiring payment of child, grandchild or spousal support.

(b) In addition to or instead of imposing a penalty authorized for a Class E felony or a Class A misdemeanor, whichever is appropriate, the court shall:

1. If a court order requiring the defendant to pay child, grandchild or spousal support exists, order the defendant to pay the amount required including any amount necessary to meet a past legal obligation for support.

2. If no court order described under subd. 1. exists, enter such an order. For orders for child or spousal support, the court shall determine the amount of support in the manner required under s. 767.25 or 767.51, regardless of the fact that the action is not one for a determination of paternity or an action specified in s. 767.25 (1)

(bm) Upon request, the court may modify the amount of child or spousal support payments determined under par. (b) 2. if, after considering the factors listed in s. 767.25 (1m), regardless of the fact that the action is not one for a determination of paternity or an action specified in s. 767.25 (1), the court finds, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, that the use of the percentage standard is unfair to the child or to either of the child's parents.

(c) An order under par. (a) or (b), other than an order for grandchild support, constitutes an income assignment under s. 767.265 and may be enforced under s. 767.30. Any payment ordered under par. (a) or (b), other than a payment for grandchild support, shall be made in the manner provided under s. 767.29.

History: 1985 a. 29, 56; 1987 a. 332 s. 33; Stats. 1987 s. 948.22; 1989 a. 31, 212; 1993 a. 274, 481; 1995 a. 289; 1997 a. 35, 191, 252; 1999 a. 9.

Under s. 940.27 (2), 1987 Stats., [now 948.22 (2)], the state must prove that the defendant had an obligation to provide support and failed to do so for 120 days; the state need not prove that the defendant was required to pay a specific amount. Sub.

(6) does not unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof. *State v. Duprey*, 149 Wis. 2d 655, 439 N.W.2d 837 (Ct. App. 1989).

Multiple prosecutions for a continuous failure to pay child support are allowed. *State v. Grayson*, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 493 N.W.2d 23 (1992).

Jurisdiction in a criminal nonsupport action under s. 948.22 does not require that the child to be supported be a resident of Wisconsin during the charged period. *State v. Gantt*, 201 Wis. 2d 206, 548 N.W.2d 134 (Ct. App. 1996).

Evidence of incarceration to prove inability to pay was not excluded under sub. (6), and there was no basis to find the evidence irrelevant. *State v. Stutesman*, 221 Wis. 2d 178, 585 N.W.2d 181 (Ct. App. 1998).

This section does not distinguish between support and arrearages. It criminalizes failure to pay arrearages even after the child for whom support is ordered attains majority. Incarceration for violation of this section is not unconstitutional imprisonment for a debt. *State v. Lenz*, 230 Wis. 2d 529, 602 N.W.2d 172 (Ct. App. 1999).

If nonsupport is charged as a continuing offense, the statute of limitations runs from the last date the defendant intentionally fails to provide support. If charges are brought for each 120 day period that a person does not pay, the statute of limitations bars charging for those 120 periods that are more than 6 years old. The running of the statute of limitations does not prevent inclusion of all unpaid amounts in a later arrearage order. *State v. Monarch*, 230 Wis. 2d 542, 602 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1999).

948.23 Concealing death of child. Any person who conceals the corpse of any issue of a woman's body with intent to prevent a determination of whether it was born dead or alive is guilty of a Class E felony.

History: 1977 c. 173; 1987 a. 332 s. 47; Stats. 1987 s. 948.23.

948.24 Unauthorized placement for adoption.

(1) Whoever does any of the following is guilty of a Class D felony:

(a) Places or agrees to place his or her child for adoption for anything exceeding the actual cost of the items listed in s. 48.913 (1) (a) to (m) and the payments authorized under s. 48.913 (2).

(b) For anything of value, solicits, negotiates or arranges the placement of a child for adoption except under s. 48.833.

(c) In order to receive a child for adoption, gives anything exceeding the actual cost of the legal and other services rendered in connection with the adoption and the items listed in s. 48.913 (1) (a) to (m) and the payments authorized under s. 48.913 (2).

(2) This section does not apply to placements under s. 48.839. **History:** 1981 c. 81; 1987 a. 332 s. 50; Stats. 1987 s. 948.24; 1989 a. 161; 1997 a. 104.

948.30 Abduction of another's child; constructive custody. (1) Any person who, for any unlawful purpose, does any of the following is guilty of a Class C felony:

(a) Takes a child who is not his or her own by birth or adoption from the child's home or the custody of his or her parent, guardian or legal custodian.

(b) Detains a child who is not his or her own by birth or adoption when the child is away from home or the custody of his or her parent, guardian or legal custodian.

(2) Any person who, for any unlawful purpose, does any of the following is guilty of a Class B felony:

(a) By force or threat of imminent force, takes a child who is not his or her own by birth or adoption from the child's home or the custody of his or her parent, guardian or legal custodian.

(b) By force or threat of imminent force, detains a child who is not his or her own by birth or adoption when the child is away from home or the custody of his or her parent, guardian or legal custodian.

(3) For purposes of subs. (1) (a) and (2) (a), a child is in the custody of his or her parent, guardian or legal custodian if:

(a) The child is in the actual physical custody of the parent, guardian or legal custodian; or

(b) The child is not in the actual physical custody of his or her parent, guardian or legal custodian, but the parent, guardian or legal custodian continues to have control of the child.

History: 1987 a. 332.

948.31 Interference with custody by parent or others.

(1) (a) In this subsection, "legal custodian of a child" means:

1. A parent or other person having legal custody of the child under an order or judgment in an action for divorce, legal separa-

tion, annulment, child custody, paternity, guardianship or habeas corpus.

2. The department of health and family services or the department of corrections or any person, county department under s. 46.215, 46.22 or 46.23 or licensed child welfare agency, if custody or supervision of the child has been transferred under ch. 48 or 938 to that department, person or agency.

(b) Except as provided under chs. 48 and 938, whoever intentionally causes a child to leave, takes a child away or withholds a child for more than 12 hours beyond the court–approved period of physical placement or visitation period from a legal custodian with intent to deprive the custodian of his or her custody rights without the consent of the custodian is guilty of a Class C felony. This paragraph is not applicable if the court has entered an order authorizing the person to so take or withhold the child. The fact that joint legal custody has been awarded to both parents by a court does not preclude a court from finding that one parent has committed a violation of this paragraph.

(2) Whoever causes a child to leave, takes a child away or withholds a child for more than 12 hours from the child’s parents or, in the case of a nonmarital child whose parents do not subsequently intermarry under s. 767.60, from the child’s mother or, if he has been granted legal custody, the child’s father, without the consent of the parents, the mother or the father with legal custody, is guilty of a Class E felony. This subsection is not applicable if legal custody has been granted by court order to the person taking or withholding the child.

(3) Any parent, or any person acting pursuant to directions from the parent, who does any of the following is guilty of a Class C felony:

(a) Intentionally conceals a child from the child’s other parent.

(b) After being served with process in an action affecting the family but prior to the issuance of a temporary or final order determining child custody rights, takes the child or causes the child to leave with intent to deprive the other parent of physical custody as defined in s. 822.02 (9).

(c) After issuance of a temporary or final order specifying joint legal custody rights and periods of physical placement, takes a child from or causes a child to leave the other parent in violation of the order or withholds a child for more than 12 hours beyond the court–approved period of physical placement or visitation period.

(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for violation of this section if the action:

1. Is taken by a parent or by a person authorized by a parent to protect his or her child in a situation in which the parent or authorized person reasonably believes that there is a threat of physical harm or sexual assault to the child;

2. Is taken by a parent fleeing in a situation in which the parent reasonably believes that there is a threat of physical harm or sexual assault to himself or herself;

3. Is consented to by the other parent or any other person or agency having legal custody of the child; or

4. Is otherwise authorized by law.

(b) A defendant who raises an affirmative defense has the burden of proving the defense by a preponderance of the evidence.

(5) The venue of an action under this section is prescribed in s. 971.19 (8).

(6) In addition to any other penalties provided for violation of this section, a court may order a violator to pay restitution, regardless of whether the violator is placed on probation under s. 973.09, to provide reimbursement for any reasonable expenses incurred by any person or any governmental entity in locating and returning the child. Any such amounts paid by the violator shall be paid to the person or governmental entity which incurred the expense on a prorated basis. Upon the application of any interested party,

the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the amount of reasonable expenses.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1989 a. 31, 56, 107; 1993 a. 302; 1995 a. 27 ss. 7237, 9126 (19); 1995 a. 77; 1997 a. 290.

“Imminent physical harm” under sub. (4) is discussed. *State v. McCoy*, 143 Wis. 2d 274, 421 N.W.2d 107 (1988).

When a mother had agreed to the father’s taking their child on a camping trip, but the father actually intended to permanently take, and did abscond to Canada with, the child, the child was taken based on the mother’s “mistake of fact”, which under s. 939.22 (48) rendered the taking of the child “without consent”. *State v. Inglin*, 224 Wis. 2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999).

948.35 Solicitation of a child to commit a felony. (1)

(a) Except as provided in pars. (b) to (d) or s. 961.455, any person who has attained the age of 17 years and who, with the intent that a felony be committed and under circumstances that indicate unequivocally that he or she has the intent, knowingly solicits, advises, hires, directs or counsels a person 17 years of age or under to commit that felony may be fined or imprisoned or both, not to exceed the maximum penalty for the felony.

(b) For a solicitation to commit a Class A felony under the circumstances described under par. (a), the person may be imprisoned not to exceed the maximum period of imprisonment for a Class B felony.

(c) For a solicitation to commit a Class B felony under the circumstances described under par. (a), the person may be fined or imprisoned or both, not to exceed the maximum penalties for a Class C felony.

(d) For a solicitation to commit a Class C felony under the circumstances described under par. (a), the person may be fined or imprisoned or both, not to exceed the maximum penalties for a Class D felony.

(2) The knowledge requirement under sub. (1) does not require proof of knowledge of the age of the child. A defendant does not have a defense to a prosecution under this section because he or she mistakenly believed that the person who was solicited, advised, hired, directed or counseled had attained the age of 18 years, even if the mistaken belief was reasonable.

History: 1991 a. 153; 1995 a. 27, 448.

948.36 Use of child to commit a Class A felony. (1)

Any person who has attained the age of 17 years and who, with the intent that a Class A felony be committed and under circumstances that indicate unequivocally that he or she has that intent, knowingly solicits, advises, hires, directs, counsels, employs, uses or otherwise procures a person 17 years of age or under to commit that Class A felony may, if the Class A felony is committed by the child, be imprisoned for not more than 5 years in excess of the maximum period of imprisonment provided by law for that Class A felony.

(2) The knowledge requirement under sub. (1) does not require proof of knowledge of the age of the child. A defendant does not have a defense to a prosecution under this section because he or she mistakenly believed that the person who was advised, hired, directed, counseled, employed, used or procured had attained the age of 18 years, even if the mistaken belief was reasonable.

History: 1991 a. 153; 1995 a. 27.

948.40 Contributing to the delinquency of a child.

(1) No person may intentionally encourage or contribute to the delinquency of a child. This subsection includes intentionally encouraging or contributing to an act by a child under the age of 10 which would be a delinquent act if committed by a child 10 years of age or older.

(2) No person responsible for the child’s welfare may, by disregard of the welfare of the child, contribute to the delinquency of the child. This subsection includes disregard that contributes to an act by a child under the age of 10 that would be a delinquent act if committed by a child 10 years of age or older.

(3) Under this section, a person encourages or contributes to the delinquency of a child although the child does not actually become delinquent if the natural and probable consequences of the person's actions or failure to take action would be to cause the child to become delinquent.

(4) A person who violates this section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor, except:

(a) If death is a consequence, the person is guilty of a Class C felony; or

(b) If the child's act which is encouraged or contributed to is a violation of a state or federal criminal law which is punishable as a felony, the person is guilty of a Class D felony.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1989 a. 31; 1995 a. 77.

948.45 Contributing to truancy. (1) Except as provided in sub. (2), any person 17 years of age or older who, by any act or omission, knowingly encourages or contributes to the truancy, as defined under s. 118.16 (1) (c), of a person 17 years of age or under is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who has under his or her control a child who has been sanctioned under s. 49.26 (1) (h).

(3) An act or omission contributes to the truancy of a child, whether or not the child is adjudged to be in need of protection or services, if the natural and probable consequences of that act or omission would be to cause the child to be truant.

History: 1987 a. 285; 1989 a. 31 s. 2835m; Stats. 1989 s. 948.45; 1995 a. 27.

948.50 Strip search by school employee. (1) The legislature intends, by enacting this section, to protect pupils from being strip searched. By limiting the coverage of this section, the legislature is not condoning the use of strip searches under other circumstances.

(2) In this section:

(a) "School" means a public, parochial or private school which provides an educational program for one or more grades between kindergarten and grade 12 and which is commonly known as a kindergarten, elementary school, middle school, junior high school, senior high school or high school.

(b) "Strip search" means a search in which a person's genitals, pubic area, buttock or anus, or a female person's breast, is uncovered and either is exposed to view or is touched by a person conducting the search.

(3) Any official, employee or agent of any school or school district who conducts a strip search of any pupil is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.

(4) This section does not apply to a search of any person who:

(a) Is serving a sentence, pursuant to a conviction, in a jail, state prison or house of correction.

(b) Is placed in or transferred to a secured correctional facility, as defined in s. 938.02 (15m), or a secured child caring institution, as defined in s. 938.02 (15g).

(c) Is committed, transferred or admitted under ch. 51, 971 or 975.

(5) This section does not apply to any law enforcement officer conducting a strip search under s. 968.255.

History: 1983 a. 489; 1987 a. 332 s. 38; Stats. 1987 s. 948.50; 1995 a. 77.

948.51 Hazing. (1) In this section "forced activity" means any activity which is a condition of initiation or admission into or affiliation with an organization, regardless of a student's willingness to participate in the activity.

(2) No person may intentionally or recklessly engage in acts which endanger the physical health or safety of a student for the purpose of initiation or admission into or affiliation with any organization operating in connection with a school, college or university. Under those circumstances, prohibited acts may include any brutality of a physical nature, such as whipping, beating, brand-

ing, forced consumption of any food, liquor, drug or other substance, forced confinement or any other forced activity which endangers the physical health or safety of the student.

(3) Whoever violates sub. (2) is guilty of:

(a) A Class A misdemeanor if the act results in or is likely to result in bodily harm to another.

(b) A Class E felony if the act results in great bodily harm or death to another.

History: 1983 a. 356; 1987 a. 332 s. 32; Stats. 1987 s. 948.51.

948.55 Leaving or storing a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a child. (1) In this section, "child" means a person who has not attained the age of 14 years.

(2) Whoever recklessly stores or leaves a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a child is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if all of the following occur:

(a) A child obtains the firearm without the lawful permission of his or her parent or guardian or the person having charge of the child.

(b) The child under par. (a) discharges the firearm and the discharge causes bodily harm or death to himself, herself or another.

(3) Whoever recklessly stores or leaves a loaded firearm within the reach or easy access of a child is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor if all of the following occur:

(a) A child obtains the firearm without the lawful permission of his or her parent or guardian or the person having charge of the child.

(b) The child under par. (a) possesses or exhibits the firearm in a public place or in violation of s. 941.20.

(4) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply under any of the following circumstances:

(a) The firearm is stored or left in a securely locked box or container or in a location that a reasonable person would believe to be secure.

(b) The firearm is securely locked with a trigger lock.

(c) The firearm is left on the person's body or in such proximity to the person's body that he or she could retrieve it as easily and quickly as if carried on his or her body.

(d) The person is a peace officer or a member of the armed forces or national guard and the child obtains the firearm during or incidental to the performance of the person's duties.

(e) The child obtains the firearm as a result of an illegal entry by any person.

(f) The child gains access to a loaded firearm and uses it in the lawful exercise of a privilege under s. 939.48.

(g) The person who stores or leaves a loaded firearm reasonably believes that a child is not likely to be present where the firearm is stored or left.

(h) The firearm is rendered inoperable by the removal of an essential component of the firing mechanism such as the bolt in a breech-loading firearm.

(5) Subsection (2) does not apply if the bodily harm or death resulted from an accident that occurs while the child is using the firearm in accordance with s. 29.304 or 948.60 (3).

History: 1991 a. 139; 1997 a. 248.

948.60 Possession of a dangerous weapon by a person under 18. (1) In this section, "dangerous weapon" means

any firearm, loaded or unloaded; any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295 (4); metallic knuckles or knuckles of any substance which could be put to the same use with the same or similar effect as metallic knuckles; a nunchaku or any similar weapon consisting of 2 sticks of wood, plastic or metal connected at one end by a length of rope, chain, wire or leather; a cestus or similar material weighted with metal or other substance and worn on the hand; a shuriken or any similar pointed star-like object intended to injure a person when thrown; or a manrikigusari or similar length of chain having weighted ends.

(2) (a) Any person under 18 years of age who possesses or goes armed with a dangerous weapon is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

(b) Except as provided in par. (c), any person who intentionally sells, loans or gives a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age is guilty of a Class E felony.

(c) Whoever violates par. (b) is guilty of a Class D felony if the person under 18 years of age under par. (b) discharges the firearm and the discharge causes death to himself, herself or another.

(d) A person under 17 years of age who has violated this subsection is subject to the provisions of ch. 938 unless jurisdiction is waived under s. 938.18 or the person is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of criminal jurisdiction under s. 938.183.

(3) (a) This section does not apply to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a dangerous weapon when the dangerous weapon is being used in target practice under the supervision of an adult or in a course of instruction in the traditional and proper use of the dangerous weapon under the supervision of an adult. This section does not apply to an adult who transfers a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age for use only in target practice under the adult's supervision or in a course of instruction in the traditional and proper use of the dangerous weapon under the adult's supervision.

(b) This section does not apply to a person under 18 years of age who is a member of the armed forces or national guard and who possesses or is armed with a dangerous weapon in the line of duty. This section does not apply to an adult who is a member of the armed forces or national guard and who transfers a dangerous weapon to a person under 18 years of age in the line of duty.

(c) This section does not apply to a person under 18 years of age who possesses or is armed with a firearm having a barrel 12 inches in length or longer and who is in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593. This section does not apply to an adult who transfers a firearm having a barrel 12 inches in length or longer to a person under 18 years of age who is in compliance with ss. 29.304 and 29.593.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1991 a. 18, 139; 1993 a. 98; 1995 a. 27, 77; 1997 a. 248. Sub. (2) (b) does not set a standard for civil liability, and violation of sub. (2) (b) does not constitute negligence *per se*. *Logarto v. Gustafson*, 998 F. Supp. 998 (1998).

948.605 Gun-free school zones. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section:

(a) "Encased" has the meaning given in s. 167.31 (1) (b).

(ac) "Firearm" does not include any beebee or pellet-firing gun that expels a projectile through the force of air pressure or any starter pistol.

(am) "Motor vehicle" has the meaning given in s. 340.01 (35).

(b) "School" has the meaning given in s. 948.61 (1) (b).

(c) "School zone" means any of the following:

1. In or on the grounds of a school.
2. Within 1,000 feet from the grounds of a school.

(2) POSSESSION OF FIREARM IN SCHOOL ZONE. (a) Any individual who knowingly possesses a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

(b) Paragraph (a) does not apply to the possession of a firearm:

1. On private property not part of school grounds;
2. If the individual possessing the firearm is licensed to do so by a political subdivision of the state or bureau of alcohol, tobacco and firearms in which political subdivision the school zone is located, and the law of the political subdivision requires that, before an individual may obtain such a license, the law enforcement authorities of the political subdivision must verify that the individual is qualified under law to receive the license;

3. That is not loaded and is:

- a. Encased; or
- b. In a locked firearms rack that is on a motor vehicle;

4. By an individual for use in a program approved by a school in the school zone;

5. By an individual in accordance with a contract entered into between a school in the school zone and the individual or an employer of the individual;

6. By a law enforcement officer acting in his or her official capacity; or

7. That is unloaded and is possessed by an individual while traversing school grounds for the purpose of gaining access to public or private lands open to hunting, if the entry on school grounds is authorized by school authorities.

(3) DISCHARGE OF FIREARM IN A SCHOOL ZONE. (a) Any individual who knowingly, or with reckless disregard for the safety of another, discharges or attempts to discharge a firearm at a place the individual knows is a school zone is guilty of a Class D felony.

(b) Paragraph (a) does not apply to the discharge of, or the attempt to discharge, a firearm:

1. On private property not part of school grounds;
2. As part of a program approved by a school in the school zone, by an individual who is participating in the program;
3. By an individual in accordance with a contract entered into between a school in a school zone and the individual or an employer of the individual; or
4. By a law enforcement officer acting in his or her official capacity.

(4) CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE. Notwithstanding s. 973.15 (2) to (4), if a court imposes a term of imprisonment under this section, the court shall impose the sentence consecutive to any other sentence.

History: 1991 a. 17; 1993 a. 336.

948.61 Dangerous weapons other than firearms on school premises. (1) In this section:

(a) "Dangerous weapon" has the meaning specified in s. 939.22 (10), except "dangerous weapon" does not include any firearm and does include any beebee or pellet-firing gun that expels a projectile through the force of air pressure or any starter pistol.

(b) "School" means a public, parochial or private school which provides an educational program for one or more grades between grades 1 and 12 and which is commonly known as an elementary school, middle school, junior high school, senior high school or high school.

(c) "School premises" means any school building, grounds, recreation area or athletic field or any other property owned, used or operated for school administration.

(2) Any person who knowingly possesses or goes armed with a dangerous weapon on school premises is guilty of:

(a) A Class A misdemeanor.

(b) A Class E felony, if the violation is the person's 2nd or subsequent violation of this section within a 5-year period, as measured from the dates the violations occurred.

(3) This section does not apply to any person who:

(a) Uses a weapon solely for school-sanctioned purposes.

(b) Engages in military activities, sponsored by the federal or state government, when acting in the discharge of his or her official duties.

(c) Is a law enforcement officer acting in the discharge of his or her official duties.

(d) Participates in a convocation authorized by school authorities in which weapons of collectors or instructors are handled or displayed.

(e) Drives a motor vehicle in which a dangerous weapon is located onto school premises for school-sanctioned purposes or for the purpose of delivering or picking up passengers or property. The weapon may not be removed from the vehicle or be used in any manner.

(4) A person under 17 years of age who has violated this section is subject to the provisions of ch. 938, unless jurisdiction is waived under s. 938.18 or the person is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of criminal jurisdiction under s. 938.183.

History: 1987 a. 332; 1991 a. 17; 1993 a. 336; 1995 a. 27, 77.

A pellet gun or BB gun is a dangerous weapon under this section. Interest of Michelle A.D. 181 Wis. 2d 917, 512 N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 1994).

948.62 Receiving stolen property from a child.

(1) Whoever intentionally receives stolen property from a child or conceals stolen property received from a child is guilty of:

(a) A Class E felony, if the value of the property does not exceed \$500.

(b) A Class D felony, if the value of the property exceeds \$500 but does not exceed \$2,500.

(c) A Class C felony, if the value of the property exceeds \$2,500.

(2) Under this section, proof of all of the following is prima facie evidence that property received from a child was stolen and that the person receiving the property knew it was stolen:

(a) That the value of the property received from the child exceeds \$500.

(b) That there was no consent by a person responsible for the child's welfare to the delivery of the property to the person.

History: 1987 a. 332.

948.63 Receiving property from a child. Whoever does either of the following is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor:

(1) As a dealer in secondhand articles or jewelry or junk, purchases any personal property, except old rags and waste paper, from any child, without the written consent of his or her parent or guardian; or

(2) As a pawnbroker or other person who loans money and takes personal property as security therefor, receives personal property as security for a loan from any child without the written consent of his or her parent or guardian.

History: 1971 c. 228; 1977 c. 173; 1987 a. 332 s. 40; Stats. 1987 s. 948.63; 1989 a. 257.

948.70 Tattooing of children. (1) In this section:

(a) "Physician" has the meaning given in s. 448.01 (5).

(b) "Tattoo" means to insert pigment under the surface of the skin of a person, by pricking with a needle or otherwise, so as to produce an indelible mark or figure through the skin.

(2) Subject to sub. (3), any person who tattoos or offers to tattoo a child is subject to a Class D forfeiture.

(3) Subsection (2) does not prohibit a physician from tattooing or offering to tattoo a child in the course of his or her professional practice.

History: 1991 a. 106.