Direct Primary Care (DPC):
Potential Impact on Cost, Quality, Health Outcomes, and Provider Workforce Capacity

A Review of Existing Experience & Questions for Evaluation

Health Policy Programs Group

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SCHOOL OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH
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Direct Primary Care (DPC) contracts, or “medical retainer agreements,” are a healthcare delivery model where a provider offers unlimited specified routine health care services for a monthly fee.\(^1\)\(^2\) Proponents of DPC suggest that the delivery method will improve access to care, reduce administrative costs, foster stronger patient-provider relationships, and reduce reliance on expensive emergency department services. Critics of DPC contend that it double-charges for services already covered by insurance, and that DPC contracts lack accountability for quality and access. This paper 1) describes proposed and existing DPC bills, 2) reviews existing DPC experience and evaluations, and 3) considers what effect DPC could have on health care in Wisconsin.

I. Federal Law and DPCs

Federal law concerning DPC arrangements falls into two main categories: DPC and the private insurance market, and DPC and the Medicaid program.

**DPC and the Private Insurance Market**

The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) allows a qualified health plan (QHP) issuer to “provide coverage through a direct primary care medical home...so long as the QHP meets all requirements that are otherwise applicable and the services covered by the direct primary care medical home are coordinated with the QHP issuer.” That is, DPC may be included in plans sold on the ACA insurance exchanges, but must be paired with a wraparound insurance policy covering everything outside of primary care.\(^3\)

In April 2018, the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released a public request for information regarding DPC models for primary care and other specialties, titled “Direct Provider Contracting.” That document is available here: [https://innovation.cms.gov/ini.../direct-provider-contracting/](https://innovation.cms.gov/innovation.cms.gov/ini.../direct-provider-contracting/). CMS solicited input on direct provider contracting between payers and primary care or multi-specialty groups. This would inform potential testing of a DPC model within the Medicare fee-for-service program (Medicare Parts A and B), Medicare Advantage program (Medicare Part C), and Medicaid.

Current Internal Revenue Service (IRS) rules prohibit individuals with health savings accounts (HSAs) paired with high deductible health plans (HDHPs) from having an agreement with a DPC provider. The IRS interprets DPC arrangements as health plans under Section 223(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The law is unclear whether primary care services are qualified health expenses under Section 213(d) of the

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code if paid for as a capitated periodic fee rather than on a fee for service basis. IRS regulations require HSAs be paired with an HDHP, and the HSA holder may not have a second health plan. The IRS interpretation of DPC as a health plan bars an individual who has an agreement with a DPC provider from funding an HSA.

A bipartisan bill in Congress, the Primary Care Enhancement Act (HR 365/S. 1358), clarifies the tax code regarding the use of HSAs for DPC. The bill would clarify the tax code to allow patients with HSAs paired with HDHPs to use those funds to pay for periodic fee-based DPC. As of June 2018, the House Committee on Ways and Means has not yet considered this bill.

**DPC and Medicaid**

Federal Medicaid law specifies that “The State Medicaid agency must require all ordering or referring physicians or other professionals providing services under the State plan or under a waiver of the plan in the fee-for-service program to be enrolled as participating Medicaid providers.”

A DPC provider would need to be a Medicaid participating provider to serve Medicaid members. However, CMS has determined that, in Medicaid risk-based managed care arrangements, states hold discretion over provider enrollment requirements for the ordering or referring physicians.

An advocacy website of a group that supports expansion of DPC contracts reviews questions that DPC practices have about this CMS guidance.

**II. State DPC Laws**

Twenty-five states have passed legislation generally defining DPC outside of state insurance regulation. This state action defines DPC as a medical service, not a health plan. Wisconsin, Georgia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and South Carolina have introduced DPC legislation, but have not enacted those bills into law. Montana Governor Steve Bullock is the only governor to have vetoed a DPC bill, doing so in 2017.

Discussion of the origin, history, and legislative framework for each state’s DPC bill are available from other sources, with detailed tables as of 2017. About half of enacted laws use the phrase “direct primary care” while the other half use the substantively equivalent phrase “medical retainer agreement.” All bills include language expressly stating that DPC is not insurance, and that DPC is not

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4 42 CFR § 455.410(b)
6 DPC Frontier. Medicaid – A Full Analysis. [https://www.dpcfrontier.com/medicaid/](https://www.dpcfrontier.com/medicaid/)
7 Details on these bills are available at [https://www.dpcare.org/state-level-progress-and-issues](https://www.dpcare.org/state-level-progress-and-issues).
8 Eskew P. Direct Primary Care Business of Insurance and State Law Considerations. Unpublished Paper. [https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c15fbce4b06765d7d750d5/t/59cc42388fd4d26e72d28126/1506558521439/Direct+Primary+Care+Business+of+Insurance+and+State+Law+ConsiderationsNYSBA.pdf](https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54c15fbce4b06765d7d750d5/t/59cc42388fd4d26e72d28126/1506558521439/Direct+Primary+Care+Business+of+Insurance+and+State+Law+ConsiderationsNYSBA.pdf)
9 Appendix to Health Care’s Other “Big Deal”: Direct Primary Care Regulation in Contemporary American Health Law Glenn E. Chappell 66 DUKE L.J. (March 2017) [https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4774/9abed07d68ebbb7006599b15c568e62350c2.pdf](https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4774/9abed07d68ebbb7006599b15c568e62350c2.pdf)
subject to regulation by the state’s Insurance Commissioner or other state insurance regulators. Each of these laws defines DPC similarly, as an agreement between a primary care provider and a patient to provide unlimited access to primary care services in exchange for an agreed-upon monthly fee for an agreed-upon period. Various state laws address other elements. Alabama, for example, expressly includes dentists as providers covered under the bill. The Direct Primary Care Coalition, a group that advocates for expansion of DPC, has drafted model DPC legislation.10

In theory, DPC paired with a wrap-around health plan, may be offered in ACA exchanges, by self-insured employers, unions, and by Medicare Advantage and Medicaid managed care organizations. State laws vary in whether they allow DPCs to engage in third-party billing, or the ability of DPC providers to receive reimbursement from private insurers or state Medicaid agencies:

- Only Washington and Louisiana allow insurer reimbursement for member DPC subscriptions.
- Michigan,11 Nebraska,12 Louisiana,13 and West Virginia14 have statutory language that permit Medicaid payments for DPCs, while Mississippi and Texas preclude DPCs from billing Medicaid.15
- Missouri, Arkansas, and Oklahoma do not prohibit DPCs from billing insurers for services. Missouri’s law expressly allows payments from health savings accounts, flexible spending arrangements, or health reimbursement arrangements.

State Pilot Programs

In 2006, West Virginia enacted the Preventive and Primary Care Pilot Program to provide such services to the uninsured for a prepaid fee (West Virginia Code § 16-2J.)16 The law specified that health care providers in this program were not providing insurance or offering insurance services. A DPC advocate reviewed the West Virginia program and how various elements, such as limiting its scope to the uninsured population, might restrict the success of DPC practices.17 That writer compared the West Virginia provisions to a DPC law passed in 2007 by State of Washington, and concluded that Washington’s legislation, along with elements of other states’ laws, better promotes successful DPC practice:

States considering passing similar legislation should consider enacting a hybrid of the West Virginia, Washington, Utah, and Oregon statutes, taking the most helpful portions from each. Physicians should be able to market their services directly to patients or employers without regard to the current insurance status. Avoiding unneeded scope of service restrictions will

10 https://www.dpcare.org/dpcc-model-legislation
11 Michigan Public Act 158 of 2017
12 Nebraska Neb. Rev.St. § 71-9510.
16 West Virginia Health Care Authority. Primary Care Pilot Program. https://hca.wv.gov/primarycare/Pages/default.aspx
magnify the economic benefits experienced by patients of the DPCMM practices. Rules regarding the acceptance of new patients and discontinuing care are helpful, and the Washington legislation provides an excellent example in this regard.

West Virginia renewed its pilot program through 2016, then adopted a new statutory provision for Direct Primary Care Practice in 2017. The new law allows that, while a provider may not bill third parties for services rendered under the DPC agreement, “[a] primary care provider may accept payment for medical services or medical products provided to a Medicaid or Medicare beneficiary” and “[a] patient or legal representative does not forfeit insurance benefits, Medicaid benefits or Medicare benefits by purchasing medical services or medical products outside the system.”

Michigan’s legislature, in 2017, directed its Medicaid agency to apply to CMS for a waiver to allow DPC for Medicaid enrollees. The legislature appropriated funds for a one-year DPC pilot program, to include no more than 400 enrollees across various Medicaid eligibility categories. Michigan has not yet implemented the pilot program, and the Michigan Medicaid agency reports that the timeframe depends on negotiations between the Medicaid health plans and any potential contracted providers.

The State of Nebraska codified DPC in state law, with the Governor signing 2015 NE L.B. 817 into law in March 2016. With DPC available on the commercial market, Nebraska’s legislature introduced NE L.B. 1119, which the Governor signed in April 2018 as the Direct Primary Care Pilot Program Act. The program begins in fiscal year 2019-2020 and runs through fiscal year 2021-2022. This law requires the State Health Insurance Program to include two direct primary care coverage options for participating state employees.

**Wisconsin DPC Bills: 2017 AB 798 and SB 670**

Wisconsin’s 2017 Assembly Bill 798 (AB 798) was introduced in December 2017, along with companion Senate Bill 670 (SB 670). The Senate Committee on Public Benefits, and the Assembly Committee on Small Business Development passed identical substitute amendments to SB 670 and AB 798, respectively, in February 2018. The full Assembly passed AB 798, as amended, but the Senate did not take up the bill before the end of the legislative session, and the proposal was not enacted into law.

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18 W. Va. Code § 30-3F-2. See also: West Virginia Board of Medicine, Direct Primary Care Practice. https://wvbom.wv.gov/Direct_Primary_Care_Practice.asp#30-3F-2
22 https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2017/proposals/sb670
23 https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2017/related/amendments/sb670/ssa1_sb670
The original bill would have specified that DPC does not fall under regulation as an insurance plan, and required that the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS) establish and implement a DPC program for Medicaid enrollees. The Legislative Reference Bureau summarizes SB 670 as follows:

The bill allows a health care provider and an individual patient or employer to enter into a direct primary care agreement and requires the Department of Health Services to establish and implement a direct primary care program for Medical Assistance recipients. A direct primary care agreement is a contract in which the health care provider agrees to provide routine health services such as screening, assessment, diagnosis, and treatment for the purpose of promotion of health or the detection and management of disease or injury, dispensing of medical supplies and prescription drugs, and certain laboratory services for a specified fee over a specified duration. A valid direct primary care agreement outside of the Medical Assistance program must, among other things, state that the agreement is not health insurance and that the agreement alone may not satisfy individual or employer insurance coverage requirements under federal law. The bill exempts direct primary care agreements from the application of insurance law. The bill also allows DHS to investigate complaints related to private direct primary care agreements.

Services. The bill defines “routine health care service” to mean screening, assessment, diagnosis, and treatment for the purpose of promotion of health or the detection and management of disease or injury. The substitute amendment removed the bill’s specific provisions on laboratory services and dispensing of medical supplies and prescription drugs.

Medicaid Pilot Program
The Wisconsin Legislative Council summarizes the provisions of the bill and substitute amendment as follows:

The bill requires the Department of Health Services (DHS) to contract with one or more primary care providers to implement a direct primary care program for MA recipients. DHS must enter participants into a direct primary care agreement to receive routine health services from one of these providers for a monthly fee, as will be specified in the agreement. After the program is implemented, DHS must submit annual reports to the Legislature. The substitute amendment removes these provisions and instead requires DHS to convene a work group to propose a direct primary care pilot program. A hearing must be held on the proposal, and legislation must be introduced following the hearing. The work group is also directed to submit a report regarding implementation of an “alternative payment model” for potentially preventable hospital readmissions of MA recipients.

The bill text, prior to removal by substitute amendment, contemplates how the Medicaid pilot might operate, specifically noting an average fee of $70 per month.
III. Evaluations and Case Studies

This existing scholarly literature on DPCs provides descriptive and survey information,\(^{24}\) but generally lacks rigorous studies on cost, quality, and outcomes.\(^{25}\)

One study assessed the effect of the personalized health care model used by MD-Value in Prevention (MDVIP), a collective direct primary care group with practices in 43 states and the District of Columbia.\(^{26}\) This study reported substantial savings per patient, mostly because of reductions in hospital utilization. But the study did not adjust for baseline health or socioeconomic factors of its members relative to comparison population – factors that would affect health care use. This study, therefore, does not allow conclusion about the impact of the delivery model.

The Qliance Medical Group has received perhaps the most attention in the literature. Founded in 2007 in Seattle, Qliance established itself as the nation's largest DPC healthcare consortia. Supported by Washington State’s permissive DPC law, Qliance served individuals, employers, and Medicaid members.\(^{27}\) In 2014, the company became the nation’s first DPC provider to join the ACA health insurance exchange. By 2015, Qliance groups served 35,000 patients in the Seattle area, half of whom Medicaid covered.\(^{28}\)

Qliance had early success with market expansion, but faltered financially and, by 2017, had closed all clinic operations.\(^{29}\) The Qliance Medical Group filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy on May 7, 2018.\(^{30}\) The payment levels apparently proved insufficient to cover the DPC costs. Others have voiced this concern: One 2015 review of existing DPC practices reported that DPCs charged patients an average $77.38 per month,\(^{31}\) while another reported monthly rates between $42 and $125.\(^{32}\) Such rates fall substantially

\(^{24}\) [https://www.dpcfrontier.com/academic-articles](https://www.dpcfrontier.com/academic-articles)

\(^{25}\) Cole E. Direct Primary Care: Applying Theory to Potential Changes in Delivery and Outcomes. J Am Board Fam Med July-August 2018; 31:605-611


short of the average of $182.76 per month charged by "concierge" or "boutique" medical practices, which also usually bill insurers for their services.

The literature includes descriptive reports of Qliance early operations, but offers no independent evaluations of Qliance performance. Qliance, in a 2015 press release, announced that its model "delivers 20% lower overall healthcare costs, increases patient satisfaction, and delivers better care." Qliance attributed these savings to a substantial reduction in ER visits, inpatient days, specialist visits, advanced radiology visits, along with more primary care visits.

However, external evaluators did not conduct the Qliance study. The study was not subject to peer review, and was not published in a scientific journal. It does not specify whether the underlying risk status differed between those who joined Qliance relative to a comparison group, how long the Qliance members had been with Qliance, or whether the Qliance members might have visited any providers outside of their Qliance contract that went unrecorded in the study. For these reasons, the Qliance’s reported results may not be attributable to the DPC as a delivery model. DPC may attract a lower risk member population, and some observers suggest that unlimited primary care encourages the "worried well" to get more care than they need, but does not necessarily promote evidence-based services that improve health.

IV. The Value Proposition for Purchasers and Consumers

DPC offers a potential value proposition in two regards: potential savings in health care costs, and improved patient experience and satisfaction. DPC proponents point to potential benefits for the health care system, through a reduction in overall health insurance premiums or health care payments if the DPC can avert unnecessary referral, specialty, hospital, imaging, laboratory, prescription drug costs and other services. DPC’s value proposition to consumer: expansive access to a primary care provider and all services provided within that provider’s practice, and longer visit times with their health care provider, potentially improving the health care experience.

Ultimately, the value to both purchaser and consumer depends on whether the model reduces financial outlays and improves health outcomes. This section looks at the DPC interaction with other insurance benefits and the potential to deliver cost savings to the consumer.

A. Preventive Services Covered by Health Plans

A low-risk consumer could likely get many, if not most, needs met through their primary care provider. That consumer would then need to get a wrap-around plan with a high deductible and co-payments in the event of a hospitalization or need for specialist services. However, with the ACA’s preventive services requirement, that plan will already provide coverage for most of the screening and preventive

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services that the DPC would also provide. The question here becomes whether the DPC subscription fee adds value beyond the preventive services already built into any other coverage that includes mandated preventive services.

The ACA requires that private insurance plans cover recommended preventive services without any patient cost-sharing. This means that consumers paying for both insurance and DPC will be paying twice for those services, unless the insurance plan can carve out the required preventive service benefit and use the DPC provider to fulfill the requirement.

In 2013, the IRS confirmed that high-deductible health plans (HDHPs) also must cover all preventive services mandated under the ACA without imposing a deductible. Private health plans must cover a range of preventive services and may not impose cost-sharing (such as copayments, deductibles, or coinsurance) on patients receiving these services. These requirements apply to all private plans – including individual, small group, large group, and self-insured, except plans that maintain “grandfathered” status. To have been classified as “grandfathered,” plans must have existed prior to March 23, 2010, and cannot make significant changes to their coverage (for example, increasing patient cost-sharing, cutting benefits, or reducing employer contributions).

The clinical preventive services fall into four categories: 1) Evidence-Based Screenings and Counseling, 2) Routine immunizations, 3) Preventive Services for Children and Youth, and 4) Preventive Services for Women.

Table 1 compares the coverage that consumers might have for services under a DPC agreement, as defined by SB 670, relative to what they would have under standard health plan. A consumer within a DPC agreement would presumably also purchase a complimentary “wrap-around” health plan to cover the services not provided within by the DPC contract, including most prescription drugs, laboratory, specialist, and hospitalization services. The degree to which a consumer would use such coverage would depend on risk profile and the consumer’s pre-existing health conditions.

See also: Preventive Services Covered under the Affordable Care Act. Quartz. https://unityhealth.com/docs/default-source/docs/acapreventiveservices.pdf?sfvrsn=2
37 For detail, see https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/preventive-services-covered-by-private-health-plans/#endnote_link_160040-3
### Table 1. Services Covered under DPC Contract and under Standard Health Plan Coverage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Direct Primary Care</th>
<th>Standard Health Plan Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Screening</td>
<td>No additional cost to consumer for screening services that fall within the scope of the DPC’s ability and scope.</td>
<td>No out-of-pocket cost to the consumer; most screening services will fall within the ACA’s preventive services mandate and therefore would be covered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment, Diagnosis, and Treatment</td>
<td>No additional cost to consumer for assessment, diagnosis, and treatment services that fall within the scope of the DPC’s ability and scope. Consumer remains exposed to full cost for assessment, diagnosis, and treatment services by other providers beyond the DPC, including referrals, specialists, and second opinions.</td>
<td>No out-of-pocket cost to consumer for some assessment, diagnosis, and treatment that occur incidental to the preventive services. For example, removal of polyps during a routine colonoscopy would be included as a “free preventive service.” Other office visits, assessment, diagnosis, and treatment services would be covered, often pre-deductible and subject to a co-payment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispensing of Medical Supplies and Prescription Drugs</td>
<td>Limited only to product dispensed directly within the clinic by the DPC provider. Consumer remains fully exposed to most prescription drug costs, as those are generally dispensed by a licensed pharmacy outside of the primary care office setting.</td>
<td>Covered, subject to health plan’s cost-sharing and deductible provisions. Many prescription drugs covered prior pre-deductible, subject to co-payment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laboratory services, including routine blood screening and routine pathology screening</td>
<td>No coverage for any laboratory services that fall outside of the DPC’s on-site lab or the lab that has entered into an agreement with the DPC.</td>
<td>Some laboratory services that fall within the ACA’s preventive services mandates covered at no out-of-pocket cost to consumer: Other laboratory services covered, some pre-deductible, subject to health plan copayment and deductible provisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist services</td>
<td>No coverage</td>
<td>Covered, some pre-deductible, subject to health plan co-payment and deductible provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Department</td>
<td>No coverage</td>
<td>Covered, subject to health plan co-payment and deductible provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalization</td>
<td>No coverage</td>
<td>Covered, subject to health plan co-payment and deductible provisions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
B. Value-Added Calculation for Consumers

The monetary value of a DPC arrangement to a consumer would depend on comparison of these two cost bundles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation 1: DPC plus HDHP/HSA</th>
<th>Situation 2: Standard Insurance Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Costs to Consumer</td>
<td>Costs to Consumer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monthly DPC fee</td>
<td>• Monthly premium for standard insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Monthly HDHP premium with HSA deposits</td>
<td>• Out-of-pocket costs not covered by standard insurance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Out-of-Pocket costs for specialist, lab, prescription drug, and hospitalization services pre-deductible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note also that the bills considered by the Legislature in the 2017-19 session specify that direct primary care payments may not count towards the patient’s insurance deductibles or out-of-pocket expenses. A consumer using an insurance plan rather than a DPC would have their payments for primary care services applied toward any deductibles. Table 2 compares cost-exposure for a consumer across the range of services, pre- and post-deductible.

Table 2: Sources of Coverage for Health Care Services, DPC with HDHP compared to Standard Health Insurance Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preventive Services (ACA mandated)</th>
<th>Pre-Deductible</th>
<th>Post Deductible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Primary care office visits:</td>
<td>Specialist, lab, imaging, prescription, emergency department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation 1: DPC plus HDHP</td>
<td>DPC fee</td>
<td>Consumer out-of-pocket (or HSA payments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDHP covered services</td>
<td>DPC subscription fee</td>
<td>DPC fee Cost-sharing provisions for other services, up to HPDP out-of-pocket maximum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation 2: Standard Insurance Coverage</td>
<td>Standard plan covered services</td>
<td>Covered pre-deductible, often subject to co-pays; copayments applied toward deductible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cost-sharing provisions, up to out-of-pocket maximum</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Private Market: Standard Insurance Coverage vs DPC-plus-HDHP

This section compares costs to the consumer for Situation 1 (DPC and HDHP insurance plan) and Situation 2 (Standard non-HDHP plan).

A consumer in a DPC arrangement would have to pay the DPC fees, and decide whether to enroll in a plan that offers coverage for services not included in the DPC contract, such as specialist and hospital services. The relative monetary value will depend on whether a consumer has overall out-of-pocket costs lower than what would be required under standard insurance after copayments, and restrictions on covered benefits. This will depend on how many referral, specialty, or hospital services, laboratory, imaging, and prescription drugs a patient needs in a given year beyond what the DPC offers. A consumer with a HDHP must pay the full retail pricing, or discounted rates negotiated by their insurer, for these additional services and medications until they meet the full amount of their deductible.

Table 3 displays the premiums for 2018 ACA-compliant coverage at the various ACA metal levels in Wisconsin, before and after federal premium subsidies. Most consumers (over 80%) purchasing individual coverage qualify for premium subsidies, while 43% also qualified for cost-sharing reductions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wisconsin 2018: ACA-compliant health plans on Exchange</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Bronze Plan</th>
<th>Silver Plan</th>
<th>Gold Plan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Consumers Selecting Plans (225,435 total consumers)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>54.1%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Premium (monthly)</td>
<td>$750</td>
<td>$626</td>
<td>$833</td>
<td>$759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average premium after Subsidy (monthly)</td>
<td>$190</td>
<td>$209</td>
<td>$158</td>
<td>$278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Premiums after APTC among consumers receiving APTC (monthly)</td>
<td>$106</td>
<td>$74</td>
<td>$105</td>
<td>$193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The deductive and scope of coverage HSA model and standard insurance model are comparable. However, standard insurance plans generally offer coverage, prior to the consumer meeting deductible, for a range of common services. For example, a Wisconsin standard commercial plan with a $5,000 deductible may cover primary and specialist office visits before deductible with a $25 copayment. The HSA model generally requires the consumer to meet the full deductible before covering any services, other than the ACA mandated preventive health services.

Table 4 displays the deductibles and copayments for sample HSA plays offered by Wisconsin issuers. The HSA model offers potential savings due to its likely lower up-front premiums (although these premiums may not be substantially lower if the consumer receives federal premium subsidies). The savings in

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premium payments for the HSA/HDHP-participant, in order to deliver value, will need to exceed the out-of-pocket costs the consumer incurs that a standard might have covered.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Sample 2018 HSA Individual and Family Plan Options, Wisconsin⁴⁰</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Deductible – In Network (Single/Family)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Out-of-Pocket– In Network (Single/Family)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coinsurance In-Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Network Preventive Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-Network Primary Care, Specialist, Urgent Care, Emergency Room, and Prescription Drugs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Medicaid Coverage: Standard Medicaid vs. DPC plus Medicaid-wraparound

Table 5 displays the average benefit cost by eligibility group in Medicaid, for 2015-16.⁴¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5. Average annual Wisconsin Medicaid per member per month cost, 2015-16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childless Adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BadgerCare Plus Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The costs and benefits to the state budget would depend on the up-front costs of paying for the DPC contracts, the extent to which primary care may be “carved out” of current managed care contracts, and any reductions or increases in other medical or pharmacy service costs for individuals enrolled in Medicaid DPC. As an example, if DHS implemented a DPC benefit that cost $70 per month (as

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⁴⁰ Samples from Quartz Health Plans:
https://unityhealth.com/docs/default-source/docs/uh01445-(0817)-primeoverview-v5_final56382ad2b76b509b7eff0000a05e52.pdf?sfvrsn=2
and from Common Ground Healthcare Cooperative: https://www.commongroundhealthcare.org/our-plans/individuals-families/

⁴¹ Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau. Medical Assistance and Related Programs (BadgerCare Plus, EBD Medicaid, Family Care, and SeniorCare) Information Paper 41. Table 1.5: 2015-16 Total and Average Benefit Cost by Eligibility Group. January 2017.
http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/misc/lfb/informational_papers/january_2017/0041_medical_assistance_and_related_programs_informational_paper_41.pdf
contemplated in the original Wisconsin bill), the DPC model would need to reduce other Medicaid benefit costs by at least $70 per month in order to save costs. This would depend on several factors:

- Do the health plans continue to price in the required preventive services into their premiums, apart from the DPC, or carve out these services and rely on the DPC to provide them?
- Does DPC provide and participate in after-hours care, or do their enrolled patients rely on other sources of care for after-hours services?
- How much does the DPC rely on laboratory, imaging, and specialist referrals?
- Does the DPC model avert other specialty, lab, imaging, referral, and hospital costs that would otherwise accrue to the Medicaid program?

V. Health System Value: Utilization, Quality, and Outcomes

Section IV details how the DPC value proposition depends on how much a DPC can handle a consumer’s total health care needs relative to how much a consumer would need to spend outside of the monthly DPC subscription fee to have sufficient coverage. This section considers how DPC might affect the demand for and use of health care services, the quality of services delivered, and how this might relate to health care and cost outcomes.

A. Volume of Care and Utilization

Most health care costs are concentrated in a small proportion of high-cost, high need patients – often referred to as super-utilizers.\(^{42}\) In fact, and the costliest five percent of patients account for half of all health care spending. The superutilizer populations generally have complex chronic and acute needs. It is not clear whether this population, their health care needs, and their costs can be managed within a primary care office setting, as many of their needs require significant and intensive specialist management and care coordination.

Most consumers, however, use relatively few health care services. About half of all U.S. residents visit the physician three or fewer times in a year, while another quarter incur 4-9 visits annually.\(^ {43}\) (Table 6) These include all visits – for primary and specialty care services. On a national level, 51% of those visits occur with primary care physicians, 28% with another medical specialist and 21% with a surgical


\(^{43}\) U.S. CDC. Health, United States 2016. Table 65 Health care visits to doctor offices, emergency departments, and home visits within the past 12 months, by selected characteristics: United States, selected years 1997–2015. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus16.pdf#065
specialist; on average in 2015, U.S. residents incurred 1.6 visits per year with primary care physicians, and 1.5 visits per year to medical and surgical specialists. Table 7

| Table 6. Average Number of Physician Office Visits Annually |
|----------------|-------------|-----------|-----------|
|                | None       | 1-3       | 4-9       | 10 or more|
| Total Population | 15.0%    | 48.4%      | 23.7%      | 12.8%      |
| Medicaid        | 12.4%    | 43.4%      | 25.4%      | 18.8%      |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7. Physician Office Visits 2015: Percent of Total Visits and Average Number of Annual Visits Across Specialties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specialty Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Specialty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surgical Specialty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures suggest that most U.S. residents incur fewer than five primary care visits annually, and about half would incur none, or only one or two visits, for which they would make use of their DPC contract provider. The other half of their medical needs, along with the lab, imaging, and pharmacy services associated with their primary care visits, may fall outside of the DPC contract and depend on their insurance coverage and related cost-sharing exposure.

B. DPC Impact on Health Outcomes and Quality

Among recent trends in health care improvement and cost-containment, efforts have come to focus on reducing overuse of services that lack a clear medical basis, which incur costs (and possible medical harm) that exceed likely benefit. It will be important to understand the degree to which DPC practices provide evidence-based services to their members and avert costly services outside of the DPC that their patients would otherwise have incurred.

DPC advocates assert that physicians are able to provide coordinated and comprehensive care, allow access to physicians at any time, permit longer appointments with the physician, offer chronic disease management, and provide cost-effective convenience. As noted above, it remains unclear whether


the extra time and additional visits available to the current DPC user population do in fact improve health outcomes and avert other specialty and referral services that would otherwise occur. The American College of Physicians, in its 2015 position paper,\(^{48}\) warns as follows:

> Retainer practices note that they are able to see their patients more often throughout the year. Once again, there is no evidence to suggest that this is always necessary or effective. With all of the “amenities” offered by these practices, it is important to do a cost–benefit analysis to understand the true effect of the “extras” in a practice. At this time, no research or data are available to indicate that many of these amenities in a practice yield better clinical outcomes. It is important to be aware of the potential for overutilization of physician time and medical services.

DPCs not participating in insurance may not participate in quality measurement programs, interoperability with other electronic health record systems, and the associated effect on quality and outcomes.\(^{49}\) It will be important for the DPC to report its encounter data to the health plan or other monitoring entity, to allow ongoing quality review, and report its Medicaid and performance measures. Lacking insurance regulation or payer oversight, DPC practices theoretically lack accountability to professional review; “bad actors” could overload their practices with subscribing patients and compromise on quality of care. Wisconsin’s DPC bill, as amended, would have relied on insurance plans to regulate such conduct, specifying that direct primary care providers who wish to be part of an insurance network must comply with the insurance carrier’s terms of participation.

**VI. How do DPCs affect the primary care workforce?**

U.S. primary care physicians maintain a practice panel of about 2,300 patients,\(^{50}\) while DPCs typically limit their patient panels to several hundred patients.\(^{51,52,53}\) Direct primary care (DPC) allows physicians to reduce their patient panel size and the daily volume of patients, while maintaining a competitive income.

Proponents of DPC point to this decreased panel size, and increased time a provider can spend with each patient, as one of the primary benefits of this model. Table 8 displays the time spent with physicians in U.S. office visits, as reported in 2015.\(^{54}\) About half last fewer than 15 minutes, 42% last up


\(^{49}\) Ibid.


to 30 minutes, and about 15% last up to an hour. This will vary by specialty, with primary care specialties averaging about 20 minutes overall.\textsuperscript{55}

In comparison, survey reports show that DPC physicians spend an average of 35 minutes with each patient visit, and patients in the practice average four visits annually.\textsuperscript{56} However, this comparison of averages does not necessarily reflect an actual upgrade in service for each patient. The overall U.S. average includes all patients, including those with high acuity and intensive service needs, averaged with those that have few health care needs. Recall, as detailed above, that most of the population requires very few health care visits annually while a minor proportion require a large number of visits.

Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time spent with physician</th>
<th>Number of visits in thousands</th>
<th>Percent distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All visits</td>
<td>990,808</td>
<td>100.0...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits at which no physician was seen</td>
<td>10,058 (1,663)</td>
<td>1.0 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits at which a physician was seen</td>
<td>980,750 (48,769)</td>
<td>99.0 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>980,750</td>
<td>100.0...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1–5 minutes</td>
<td>9,452 (2,339)</td>
<td>1.0 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6–10 minutes</td>
<td>85,744 (13,024)</td>
<td>8.7 (1.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11–15 minutes</td>
<td>326,626 (27,844)</td>
<td>33.3 (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16–30 minutes</td>
<td>411,334 (24,603)</td>
<td>41.9 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31–60 minutes</td>
<td>138,070 (11,430)</td>
<td>14.1 (1.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61 minutes and over</td>
<td>9,494 (2,193)</td>
<td>1.0 (0.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those persons with higher health care services needs very likely receive longer and more visits, while those with fewer needs receive fewer and shorter visits. As well, primary care providers may refer those with higher health care needs out to specialists for their additional health care visits. Some of those referral services may be unnecessary and could be appropriately handled in the primary care setting, while some may quite necessary given the needs of the patient.

In contrast, the DPC visit average includes only the limited population of patients enrolled in the DPC subscription model. The DPC model, at this point, may in fact be enrolling an overall healthier patient population; existing studies show enrolment of smaller proportions of African American and Hispanic


residents, and a tendency to locate in wealthier communities.\(^{57}\) DPC patients may include the “worried well” who appreciate DPC practice amenities and a relationship with the physician. But evidence does not yet exist to show that, for these patients, more time with the physician or more visits improve outcomes, or whether this population in fact needs these visits.

The extra time and visits provided by the DPC may not, for a generally well population, avert other specialty or referral costs that would otherwise been incurred. If not, the DPC model would not necessarily produce health care savings or reduce overall demand for services.\(^{58}\)

The DPC model lowers the patient-to-provider ratio, meaning a community needs more providers to accommodate its population base at the primary care level. DPCs would need to reduce overall service demand in the community to avoid creating or exacerbating workforce capacity shortages. If the extra time and visits that DPCs provide for their patients do in fact alleviate need and demand for specialty services, then the model could have a beneficial effect on the health care workforce.

DPC advocates also argue that the model can improve physician satisfaction and retention in practice. They point to studies showing that U.S. physicians are among the least satisfied in the world.\(^{59}\) Primary care physicians express frustration with the limited time they can spend with each patient and with income stability,\(^{60}\) along with the amount of time their practices spend on administrative burdens related to insurance or payment claims.\(^{61}\) DPC may encourage more physicians to stay in practice or pursue primary care specialties.\(^{62}\) Whether such potential primary care physician retention, or potential increase in the supply, can sufficiently offset the reduction in patient-to-provider ratio within their practices, remains uncertain.


VII. Conclusion: Questions for Consideration

Many states, including Wisconsin, have adopted or are considering legislation to define DPC arrangements as medical services rather than an insurance plan, and provide a framework for Medicaid coverage of DPC services. The evidence has not yet established the effect of DPC on health care spending, quality, or access.

As these discussions continue in Wisconsin, particularly regarding direction of Medicaid funding, lawmakers may want to consider some of the following questions regarding the private insurance market to guide their decisions:

- Will DPC duplicate benefits provided through other private insurance coverage – particularly the required preventive services that all insurance products must offer.
- Will insurance premiums and products carve-out the preventive care component included in the DPC subscription? If so, what is the effect on care coordination?
- What are the actuarial projections for use of DPC services within the subscription fee relative to the cost of other laboratory, imaging, prescription, drug, specialist referral, and hospital services for which the consumer will experience cost exposure?
- Does DPC avert additional care needs, such as hospitalization or prescription drug costs, such that the consumer does not insure out-of-pocket costs that would have been covered under a standard insurance plan?
- Does this model reduce utilization and, thereby, costs in the health care system as a whole?
- Can the DPC model sufficiently manage the care of high needs patients that currently incur most of the costs within health care generally and specifically within the Medicaid program? Or
- Are DPCs better positioned as an option for generally healthy, lower needs populations and, if so, where do DPC’s find cost savings?
- Given existing and projected primary care provider shortages, what effect would DPC expansion have on access to care?

A Medicaid-DCP pilot program may additionally focus on the following questions:

- Would DPC affect the types of services needed by Medicaid enrollees, and would that the DPC model generate savings to compensate for the cost of the DPC contracts?
- How would DPC affect current managed care contracts, and would carving out primary care from those contracts affect care coordination and/or quality measurement?
VIII. Other Background Reading


