



## Legislative Fiscal Bureau

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Joint Committee on Finance

Paper #364

### **Elimination of the Juvenile Boot Camp Program (DOC -- Juvenile Corrections)**

[LFB 2001-03 Budget Summary: Page 229, #8]

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#### **CURRENT LAW**

The Department of Corrections (DOC) is authorized to operate a juvenile boot camp program, for juveniles placed at secured correctional facilities. The boot camp is located at Camp Douglas in Juneau County. Base funding and position authority for the program is \$3,043,800 (\$724,500 GPR and \$2,319,300 PR) and 52.0 positions (4.0 GPR and 48.0 PR).

#### **GOVERNOR**

Delete \$729,400 GPR in 2001-02 and \$746,000 GPR in 2002-03 and 4.0 GPR positions annually, transfer \$2,396,700 PR in 2001-02 and \$2,402,300 PR in 2002-03 and 48.0 PR positions annually to other juvenile facilities and provide 4.0 PR positions annually to reflect the elimination of the Youth Leadership Training Center (the juvenile boot camp) under the bill. Repeal the Department's authority to operate the boot camp program effective on the first day of the third month beginning after publication. Authorize Corrections to operate the boot camp until this date with PR funding only; no GPR funding would be provided for the program during its phase-out. Transfer the PR funding and position authority for the program in 2001-02 and 2002-03, as well as an additional 4.0 PR positions created under the bill to two secured correctional facilities, as follows: (a) \$1,198,400 in 2001-02 and \$1,201,200 in 2002-03 and 26.0 positions annually to the Ethan Allen School; and (b) \$1,198,300 in 2001-02 and \$1,201,100 in 2002-03 and 26.0 positions annually to the Lincoln Hills School. While PR position authority for the facilities is increased by 4.0 positions, no funding is provided under the bill for the new PR positions.

## DISCUSSION POINTS

1. Program revenue funding for the boot camp program derives from a daily rate charged to counties or the state for the care of juveniles in secured correctional facilities. The boot camp has a capacity of 48 juveniles (or "cadets") and the average daily population for the camp in 1999-00 was 39.5 juveniles. The program provides, for each class of cadets, military academy-style training over 18 weeks with programming on military drill and ceremonies, education, vocational training, treatment, adventure activities and community services. Following this phase, a 20-week aftercare component is provided in partnership with community mentoring agencies.

2. The elimination of the boot camp was not part of the Department's 2001-03 budget request. The Governor's provision, according to Department of Administration (DOA) officials, is based on their belief that boot camp programs are generally not effective and that the program is expensive to operate for the average daily population (ADP) of juveniles served by the program.

3. With regards to effectiveness, DOA officials point to research cited by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in a "research in brief" paper published in July, 1998, titled "Preventing Crime: What Works, What Doesn't, What's Promising". The Institute cites four studies published in 1996, which according to the Institute, conclude that juvenile correctional boot camps using traditional military basic training approaches fail to reduce repeat offending after release compared to having similar offenders serve time in secured facilities or in the juvenile equivalent of probation or parole. The conclusion drawn by NIJ is that correctional boot camp programs using traditional military basic training is, based on the evidence of these studies, an example of a program that "does not work." NIJ views its lists as provisional and cites the need for further research.

4. A summary of three of the four studies cited by NIJ (pertaining to boot camps in Denver, Colorado, Cleveland, Ohio and Mobile, Alabama) was published by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. The three studies generally conclude that some positive outcomes can be pointed to in the areas of academic achievement while at the boot camp facility and the number of youth returning to school, entering a GED program or finding full- or part-time employment while on aftercare supervision. The main focus of the studies was on the comparative incidence of re-offending or recidivism. In the Cleveland study, recidivism was significantly higher among boot camp graduates (72%) than for juveniles in the control group (50%). In both the Denver and Mobile studies, recidivism among boot camp graduates and the control groups were similar. In all three studies, the boot camp juveniles who did re-offend, committed new offenses more quickly than re-offending juveniles in the control groups.

5. The studies indicate that, for these three programs, there does not appear to be any clear advantage to utilizing boot camp programming, in terms of outcomes for juveniles, as compared to conventional programming. However, it is difficult to compare these three programs to the Wisconsin juvenile boot camp program. While there appear to be general similarities with the Wisconsin program, the boot camps in Cleveland, Denver and Mobile were all significantly less expensive to operate than the Wisconsin program, which may indicate less developed treatment and services. In addition, the studies showed that all three programs had inadequate aftercare services;

this fact may explain in part the recidivism outcomes, particularly in the Cleveland program.

6. An internal DOC study on recidivism among graduates of the Wisconsin juvenile boot camp program was published in September, 1999. The presentation of the data in this study is difficult to interpret. It appears to measure the occurrence of recidivism for the first 20 graduating classes at the boot camp at the same point in time. Thus, the time period following graduation for which recidivism is measured is not uniform. For these reasons, the data has limited use. However, at the point the data was analyzed, at least two years had passed since the graduations of the first eight boot camp classes. Recidivism among these graduates was 36.9%.

7. DOC published a more thorough study of juvenile recidivism in March, 2000. The Department analyzed recidivism (defined as the return to a state juvenile secured correctional facility or an adult prison) among the following juveniles released for the first time over a three-year period: (a) 892 juveniles released from institutions in 1993; (b) 784 juveniles released in 1994; and (c) 779 juveniles released in 1995. The Department's report provides a two-year follow-up on released offenders in all three years and a four-year follow-up on offenders released in 1993. The results of the two-year follow-up for 1993, 1994 and 1995 show that recidivism rates declined from 31.6% of juveniles released in 1993 to 29.4% of those released in 1995.

8. While the two DOC reports are not strictly comparable, the level of recidivism found in the 1999 boot camp study (36.9%) is somewhat higher than that reported in the 2000 two-year follow-up study although the difference may not be significant. The studies of boot camps in other states and the data available from DOC on Wisconsin juveniles indicate that boot camps do not appear to have any demonstrable positive effect on juvenile recidivism rates. Recidivism rates may be affected more by other variables (for example, home and neighborhood environments, the nature and quality of aftercare supervision and vocational opportunities) than by the type of secured correctional setting in which a juvenile is placed.

9. DOA officials also argue that the boot camp program is staff intensive and expensive to operate for the number of juveniles served. The daily rate for secured juvenile correctional facilities is a blended rate based on the combined costs of all the facilities and the total projected ADP for secured care. This blended rate is calculated at \$168.12 in 2001-02 and \$173.20 in 2002-03, based on reestimated ADP projections. If the average daily costs for each of the facilities for male juveniles is calculated (based on each facility's projected budget under the bill, excluding central office and other overhead costs that support all juvenile facilities), the boot camp cost would be about 53% higher than the Ethan Allen School and 39% higher than the Lincoln Hills School. The boot camp, given its small size and more intensive staffing, is more expensive to operate than conventional secured facilities for male juveniles.

10. The cost effectiveness of the boot camp cannot be equated, however, to average daily costs alone. Other factors to examine would include: (a) the total average correctional cost, over the course of the disposition, of boot camp graduates compared to non-boot camp juveniles in secured care; and (b) the extent to which the boot camp reduces costs at other secured facilities.

11. The first of these questions cannot be answered in a definitive way. At this time, the data on juveniles in secured correctional facilities in Wisconsin does not provide the information needed to make this comparison. For example, the following information is not readily available from DOC: (a) the average length of stay in a secured correctional facility of a juvenile before transferring to the boot camp; (b) the average length of stay of non-boot camp juveniles in secured facilities, exclusive of serious juvenile offenders (who stay for longer periods); (c) the types of care provided following release to the community and the average length of stay in these types of care for both boot camp graduates and non-boot camp juveniles; (d) the extent of rule violations or new offenses committed by boot camp graduates versus that of non-boot camp juveniles resulting in a return to a secured correctional facility; and (e) the length of stay when juveniles are returned to a secured correctional facility. Based on discussions with DOC officials, it appears reasonable to assume that the comparative costs between boot camp graduates and non-boot camp juveniles vary on a case-by-case basis. Excluding serious juvenile offenders (who are atypical of other juveniles in secured care in terms of programming costs) it is likely that the total correctional costs (secured care and aftercare) of some boot camp juveniles may be less than the costs of some non-boot camp juveniles. The reverse may also be true for other boot camp participants.

12. It has been argued that boot camps can also be viewed as cost effective if they allow traditional facilities to reduce operating costs. However, this is only possible if the ADP reduction at traditional facilities is large enough to allow for staffing or other infrastructure reductions. There is no evidence that this has been the case in Wisconsin. The boot camp was initiated in Wisconsin in 1995-96 through the provision of funding and positions in addition to that provided to the juvenile correctional institutions. Since then, no funding or staffing reductions relating to secured correctional facilities have been made in response to the boot camp's programming outcomes.

13. DOC officials note that the boot camp, which began operations in 1995-96, was conceived during a period when juvenile populations had been on the rise over several years. The ADP at secured facilities totaled 579 in 1990 and increased each year to a total of 981 in 1996. The boot camp, in addition to any programmatic benefits that were expected, was developed in response to these population increases and was viewed as a way to relieve population pressures at the Ethan Allen School and the Lincoln Hills School. The Prairie du Chien facility was developed for juveniles during this period for the same reasons. However, populations declined after 1996, in part because 17-year old offenders were treated as adults effective July 1, 1996, and Prairie du Chien was never utilized as a juvenile facility (it is currently utilized as a prison for young adult inmates).

14. The juvenile boot camp has a capacity of 48 juveniles and had an ADP of 37.7 juveniles in 1998-99 and 39.5 juveniles in 1999-00. The year-to-date ADP for the boot camp is 28.1 juveniles. It is likely that this decline in part reflects the proposed closing of the facility. The average daily population has declined in each of the last four months and staff vacancies have increased to 19.0 of the 52.0 authorized positions. However, DOC officials note additional factors for declining populations at the boot camp, including: (a) male juvenile populations have declined from the 1995-96 level and the pool of potential candidates for the boot camp is somewhat smaller now; (b) the program is voluntary and juveniles are not currently volunteering to the same extent as

in the past; and (c) an increased emphasis on educational programming limits the number of cadet classes in residence at the boot camp at any one time.

15. Under the bill, \$729,400 GPR in 2001-02 and \$746,000 GPR in 2002-03 and 4.0 GPR positions annually are eliminated, but PR funding and position authority (including 4.0 additional PR positions) are transferred to the Ethan Allen School and the Lincoln Hills School, as follows: (a) \$1,198,400 in 2001-02 and \$1,201,200 in 2002-03 and 26.0 positions annually to the Ethan Allen School; and (b) \$1,198,300 in 2001-02 and \$1,201,100 in 2002-03 and 26.0 positions annually to the Lincoln Hills School. While PR position authority for the facilities is increased by 4.0 positions, no funding is provided under the bill for these positions.

16. DOA officials indicate that the PR funding and positions were not deleted because they wanted to provide DOC with the flexibility to move funding and positions to the other two secured facilities for male juveniles to address the increased ADP at these facilities that would result from the boot camp closing. Further, unneeded positions could be deleted in the next biennial budget.

17. It could be argued, however, that the Ethan Allen School and the Lincoln Hills School could absorb these juveniles (an estimated ADP of 20 juveniles in 2001-02 and 30 juveniles in 2002-03) within their current resources and position authority. The 52 positions currently authorized for the boot camp support, in large part, the basic infrastructure of a separate facility. This number of positions would not be needed at the other facilities where this infrastructure is already in place. DOC officials indicate that programming for an additional 30 juveniles could be provided with approximately 21 positions. While the Ethan Allen and Lincoln Hills facilities would need to make some staffing adjustments to accommodate these juveniles, this could likely be done by hiring vacant positions already allocated to these facilities.

18. Under the bill, 4.0 PR positions are provided to DOC, but no funding is provided for the positions. Providing these 4.0 PR positions, which equal the deletion of 4.0 GPR positions, would retain all 52.0 positions in DJC. Given that position authority at Ethan Allen and Lincoln Hills appears to be adequate, these 4.0 PR positions could be eliminated.

19. If current law is maintained, the boot camp would be retained and \$729,400 GPR in 2001-02 and \$746,000 GPR in 2002-03 and 4.0 GPR positions annually would be restored to the bill. GPR funding for the boot camp was first provided under 1999 Act 9, the 1999-01 biennial budget act, as a way to reduce daily rates for secured facility care. An alternative approach to current law would be to retain the boot camp, but operate the camp with program revenue funding and positions only. Under this alternative the 4.0 PR positions provided in the bill, without funding, would be deleted. The boot camp would continue to operate with \$2,396,700 PR in 2001-02 and \$2,402,300 PR in 2002-03 and 48.0 PR positions annually. This level of staffing would appear to be adequate for the average daily population placed at the camp. There would be no funding change to the bill under this alternative.

20. However, the PR funding that is retained under the bill counts in the calculation of

the daily rate for secured facility care charged to the counties and the state (for serious juvenile offenders). Under the bill's provisions and recent population reestimates, the daily rate for secured juvenile correctional facilities would be \$168.12 in 2001-02 and \$173.20 in 2002-03 (compared to \$154.08 under current law). Eliminating the PR funding and position authority relating to the boot camp, effective three months after budget passage, would result in decreases to the bill of \$1,587,000 PR in 2001-02 and \$2,402,300 PR in 2002-03 and 52.0 PR positions annually. This would reduce the daily rates for secured facilities by \$4.53 in 2001-02 and \$6.85 in 2002-03, and bring the rates down to \$163.59 in 2001-02 and \$166.35 in 2002-03.

21. These rate reductions would save counties, collectively, an estimated \$1.3 million in 2001-02 and \$1.9 million in 2002-03 in secured correctional facility charges. In addition, the state would save an estimated \$0.3 million GPR in 2001-02 and \$0.4 million GPR in 2002-03 in charges related to serious juvenile offenders.

22. Under the bill, \$58,400 PR annually for utilities and heating and \$53,900 PR annually for institutional repair and maintenance would remain budgeted for the boot camp. DOA has indicated that this was an error and would like this funding to also be transferred to the Ethan Allen School and Lincoln Hills School facilities. Under this alternative, an additional \$29,200 PR annually would be allocated to both Ethan Allen School and Lincoln Hills School for utilities and heating and \$27,000 PR annually would be allocated to Ethan Allen School and \$26,900 PR annually to Lincoln Hills School for repairs and maintenance. Funding under the bill would be unchanged by adopting this alternative. DOC officials argue that, given rising fuel costs and the ongoing pressure to make repairs at these older facilities, it would be beneficial to transfer these funds to Ethan Allen School and Lincoln Hills School.

23. It could also be argued that these funds are allocated for a facility that would be eliminated under the bill and, therefore, the funding should also be deleted. Institutional fuel and utility costs are estimated separately and these reestimates would capture estimated increased fuel costs at Ethan Allen School and Lincoln Hills School. While funding needed for repairs and maintenance at Ethan Allen School and/or Lincoln Hills School could potentially be affected by the increased ADP resulting from the boot camp closure it could be argued that any increased costs have not been identified. Again, reducing PR costs would also reduce the daily rate for facility care (by \$0.26 a day in 2001-02 and by \$0.32 a day in 2002-03).

## **ALTERNATIVES TO BILL**

1. Approve the Governor's recommendation to delete \$729,400 GPR in 2001-02 and \$746,000 GPR in 2002-03 and 4.0 GPR positions annually, transfer \$2,396,700 PR in 2001-02 and \$2,402,300 PR in 2002-03 and 48.0 PR positions annually and provide 4.0 PR positions annually to reflect the elimination of the Youth Leadership Training Center (the juvenile boot camp). Repeal the Department's authority to operate the boot camp program effective on the first day of the third month beginning after publication. Authorize DOC to operate the boot camp until this date with PR funding only. Transfer the PR funding and position authority for the program in 2001-02 and 2002-

03, as well as an additional 4.0 PR positions created under the bill to two secured correctional facilities, as follows: (a) \$1,198,400 in 2001-02 and \$1,201,200 in 2002-03 and 26.0 positions annually to the Ethan Allen School; and (b) \$1,198,300 in 2001-02 and \$1,201,100 in 2002-03 and 26.0 positions annually to the Lincoln Hills School. Provide no funding for the 4.0 PR positions created under the bill.

2. Modify the Governor’s recommendation by eliminating the 4.0 PR positions that would be created under the bill. [No PR funding was provided for the positions.]

<b>Alternative 2</b>	<b>PR</b>
<b>2002-03 POSITIONS</b> (Change to Bill)	- 4.00

3. Modify the Governor’s recommendation by deleting \$1,587,000 PR in 2001-02 and \$2,402,300 PR in 2002-03 and 52.0 PR positions annually that would transfer to the Ethan Allen School and the Lincoln Hills School under the bill.

<b>Alternative 3</b>	<b>PR</b>
<b>2001-03 FUNDING</b> (Change to Bill)	- \$3,989,300
<b>2002-03 POSITIONS</b> (Change to Bill)	- 52.00

4. In addition to Alternative 1, 2 or 3, adopt one of the following:

a. Transfer the following funds currently allocated to the juvenile boot camp (1) \$21,800 PR in 2001-02 and \$29,200 PR in 2002-03 to the Ethan Allen School and \$21,800 PR in 2001-02 and \$29,200 PR 2002-03 to the Lincoln Hills School for utilities and heating costs; and (2) \$23,400 PR in 2001-02 and \$27,000 PR in 2002-03 to the Ethan Allen School and \$23,300 PR in 2001-02 and \$26,900 PR in 2002-03 to the Lincoln Hills School for repairs and maintenance costs.

b. Delete \$90,300 PR in 2001-02 and \$112,300 PR in 2002-03, as follows: (1) \$43,600 in 2001-02 and \$58,400 in 2002-03 relating to utilities and heating costs of the juvenile boot camp; and (2) \$46,700 in 2001-02 and \$53,900 in 2002-03 relating to repair and maintenance costs of the juvenile boot camp.

<b>Alternative 4B</b>	<b>PR</b>
<b>2001-03 FUNDING</b> (Change to Bill)	- \$202,600

c. Delete \$43,600 PR in 2002-01 and \$58,400 PR in 2002-03 relating to utilities and heating costs of the juvenile boot camp. Transfer \$23,400 PR in 2001-02 and \$27,000 PR in 2002-03 to the Ethan Allen School and \$23,300 PR in 2001-02 and \$26,900 PR in 2002-03 to the Lincoln Hills School for repairs and maintenance costs.

<b>Alternative 4C</b>	<b>PR</b>
<b>2001-03 FUNDING</b> (Change to Bill)	- \$102,000

5. Delete the provision to eliminate the juvenile boot camp and retain program revenue funding and 48.0 PR positions for the operation of the facility. Eliminate 4.0 PR positions provided under the bill. [No PR funding was provided for the positions that would be deleted.]

<b>Alternative 5</b>	<b>PR</b>
<b>2001-03 POSITIONS</b> (Change to Bill)	- 4.0

6. Maintain current law. Under this alternative, \$729,400 GPR in 2001-02 and \$746,000 GPR in 2002-03 and 4.0 GPR positions annually would be restored to DOC for boot camp operations and 4.0 PR positions provided under the bill would be deleted.

<b>Alternative 5</b>	<b>GPR</b>	<b>PR</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>2001-03 FUNDING</b> (Change to Bill)	\$1,475,400	\$0	\$1,475,400
<b>2002-03 POSITIONS</b> (Change to Bill)	4.00	- 4.00	0.00

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