III,7(1)(1) No state agency or officer or employee in state government and no political subdivision of the state or officer or employee of a political subdivision may apply for, accept, expend, or use any moneys or equipment in connection with the conduct of any primary, election, or referendum if the moneys or equipment are donated or granted by an individual or nongovernmental entity.

III,7(2)(2) No individual other than an election official designated by law may perform any task in the conduct of any primary, election, or referendum. [2021 J.R. 17, 2023 J.R. 10, vote April 2024]

An “election official designated by law” is synonymous with “election official,” as defined in s. 5.02 (4e), and includes village clerks, municipal clerks, county clerks, municipal and county boards of canvassers, and school district clerks. OAG 1-24.

A “task in the conduct of any primary, election, or referendum” refers to work in directing or leading the administration of an election. Sub. (2) does not apply to more ordinary circumstances in which an election official works with or is assisted by non-election officials in ensuring the proper administration of an election, such as work with vendors on the layout and printing of ballots, information technology personnel on software and hardware security, law enforcement personnel on ballot transport, or employees or volunteers assisting with mailings or other clerical work. It also does not apply to activities that are distinct from the “administration” of an election, such as the kinds of efforts by non-election officials to encourage voting that commonly take place in connection with elections. OAG 1-24.

An act validating existing sewerage districts previously held to be unconstitutionally organized is within the power of the legislature. Madison Metropolitan Sewerage District v. Stein, 47 Wis. 2d 349, 177 N.W.2d 131 (1970).

The power given vocational district boards to levy taxes does not violate this section. The manner of appointing board members is constitutional. Village of West Milwaukee v. Area Board of Vocational, Technical & Adult Education, 51 Wis. 2d 356, 187 N.W.2d 387 (1971).

One legislature cannot dictate action by a future legislature or a future legislative committee. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973).

The legislature may constitutionally prescribe a criminal penalty for the violation of an administrative rule. State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 247 N.W.2d 714 (1976).

Section 144.07 (1m) [now s. 281.43 (1m)], which voids a Department of Natural Resources sewerage connection order if the electors in the affected town area reject annexation to the city ordered to extend sewerage service, represents a valid legislative balancing and accommodation of two statewide concerns: urban development and pollution control. City of Beloit v. Kallas, 76 Wis. 2d 61, 250 N.W.2d 342 (1977).

Mediation-arbitration under s. 111.70 (4) (cm) is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority. Milwaukee County v. Milwaukee District Council 48, 109 Wis. 2d 14, 325 N.W.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1982).

The court will invalidate legislation only for constitutional violations. State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983).

A reference in a statute to a general federal law, as amended, necessarily references the current federal law when the act named in the state statute had been repealed and the law rewritten in another act. When a reference is stated as part of a contingency, it does not constitute unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the U.S. Congress. Dane County Hospital & Home v. LIRC, 125 Wis. 2d 308, 371 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985).

The supreme court declined to review the validity of the procedure used to give notice of a joint legislative committee on conference alleged to violate the state open meetings law. The court will not determine whether internal operating rules or procedural statutes have been complied with by the legislature in the course of its enactments and will not intermeddle in what it views, in the absence of constitutional directives to the contrary, to be purely legislative concerns. State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436, 11-0613.

When administrative agencies promulgate rules, they are exercising legislative power that the legislature has chosen to delegate to them by statute. Stated otherwise, agencies have no inherent constitutional authority to make rules, and their rule-making powers can be repealed by the legislature. It follows that the legislature may place limitations and conditions on an agency’s exercise of rulemaking authority, including establishing the procedures by which agencies may promulgate rules. Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600, 17-2278.

The legislature may enact the laws the executive is duty-bound to execute, but it may not control the executive’s knowledge or intentions about those laws. Nor may the legislature mute or modulate the communication of the executive’s knowledge or intentions to the public. Because there was no set of facts pursuant to which 2017 Wis. Act 369’s restrictions on guidance documents would not impermissibly interfere with the executive’s exercise of core constitutional power, they were in that respect facially unconstitutional. Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35, 19-0614.

After the legislative process has been completed and funds have been appropriated, the legislature cannot insert itself into the machinery of the executive branch in an attempt to control the executive branch’s ability to carry out the law. While the legislature retains the power to repeal, modify, or alter a law through the enactment of a bill, it cannot seize for itself the authority to prevent an expenditure of state funds appropriated under article VIII, section 2. In enacting the Knowles-Nelson Stewardship Program, the legislature elected to leave some decisions to executive branch discretion, subject to a legislative veto embodied in a committee the legislature empowered to reject the executive’s manner of carrying out the law. Because the legislative review provisions under s. 23.0917 (6m) and (8) (g) 3. give core executive power to the legislative branch, they are unconstitutional. Evers v. Marklein, 2024 WI 31, 412 Wis. 2d 525, 8 N.W.3d 395, 23-2020.

Proposed amendments to bills creating variable obscenity laws that would exempt motion picture films shown at theaters that comply with the film ratings of the motion picture association of America constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 58 Atty. Gen. 36.

The one man-one vote principle is inapplicable to legislative committees since that principle applies only to the exercise of legislative powers and those powers cannot constitutionally be delegated to those committees. There has been no unconstitutional delegation as to the Joint Committee on Finance, the Board on Government Operations, the Joint Legislative Council, or the Committee to Visit State Properties. Discussing legislative oversight of administrative rules. 63 Atty. Gen. 173.

The elections clause under article I, section 4, of the U.S. Constitution does not insulate state legislatures from review by state courts for compliance with state law. Nothing in the elections clause instructs that a state legislature may prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner of holding federal elections in defiance of provisions of the state’s constitution. A state legislature may not create congressional districts independently of requirements imposed by the state constitution with respect to the enactment of laws. Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2065, 216 L. Ed. 2d 729 (2023).

IV,2Legislature, how constituted. Section 2. The number of the members of the assembly shall never be less than fifty-four nor more than one hundred. The senate shall consist of a number not more than one-third nor less than one-fourth of the number of the members of the assembly.

IV,3Apportionment. Section 3. [As amended Nov. 1910, Nov. 1962, and Nov. 1982] At its first session after each enumeration made by the authority of the United States, the legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the senate and assembly, according to the number of inhabitants. [1907 J.R. 30, 1909 J.R. 55, 1909 c. 478, vote Nov. 1910; 1959 J.R. 30, 1961 J.R. 32, vote Nov. 1962; 1979 J.R. 36, 1981 J.R. 29, vote Nov. 1982]

The phrase “according to the number of inhabitants” in this section was intended to secure the preexisting right to proportionate representation and apportionment as nearly equal as practicable among the several counties for the election of members of the legislature. This section gives the legislature the duty to enact a redistricting plan after each federal census to prevent one person’s vote in an underpopulated district from having more weight than another’s in an overly populated district. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450.

Unlike the Wisconsin Constitution’s Declaration of Rights, article IV, sections 3, 4, and 5, of the Wisconsin Constitution express a series of discrete requirements governing redistricting. These are the only Wisconsin constitutional limits the supreme court has ever recognized on the legislature’s discretion to redistrict. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450.

The Wisconsin Constitution requires the legislature—a political body—to establish the legislative districts in this state. Just as the laws enacted by the legislature reflect policy choices, so will the maps drawn by that political body. Nothing in the constitution empowers the supreme court to second-guess those policy choices, and nothing in the constitution vests the court with the power of the legislature to enact new maps. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450.

In this state’s constitutional order, redistricting remains the legislature’s duty. Any remedy the court may impose would be in effect only until such time as the legislature and governor have enacted a valid legislative apportionment plan. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450.

State and federal law require a state’s population to be distributed equally amongst legislative districts with only minor deviations. When it comes to population equality, courts adopting remedial maps are held to a higher standard than state legislatures as courts have a judicial duty to achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation. Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2023 WI 79, 410 Wis. 2d 1, 998 N.W.2d 370, 23-1399.