51.20 AnnotationCircuit courts in recommitment proceedings are to make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of sub. (1) (a) 2. on which the recommitment is based. Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, 391 Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277, 18-0145. See also Sheboygan County v. M.W., 2022 WI 40, 402 Wis. 2d 1, 974 N.W.2d 733, 21-0006.
51.20 AnnotationThe issuance of a detention order under sub. (10) (d) extends the time to hold a recommitment hearing until seven days after the subject individual is detained. Marathon County v. R.J.O., 2020 WI App 20, 392 Wis. 2d 157, 943 N.W.2d 898, 18-1037.
51.20 AnnotationReliance on assumptions concerning a recommitment at some unidentified point in the past, and conclusory opinions parroting the statutory language without actually discussing dangerousness, are insufficient to prove dangerousness under sub. (1) (am) in an extension hearing. Each extension hearing requires proof of current dangerousness. Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, 393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d 761, 19-2277.
51.20 AnnotationNeither sub. (1) (am) nor the applicable case law requires an expert or circuit court to speculate on the precise course of an individual’s impending decompensation by identifying specific future dangerous acts or omissions the individual might theoretically undertake without treatment. Dangerousness in an extension proceeding can and often must be based on the individual’s precommitment behavior, coupled with an expert’s informed opinions and predictions; provided, of course, that there is a proper foundation for the latter. Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, 393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d 761, 19-2277.
51.20 AnnotationSub. (1) (am) creates an alternative path to give counties a more realistic basis by which to prove current dangerousness when it is likely the committed individual would discontinue treatment if no longer committed. Thus, the state has a rational basis for treating those recommitted under sub. (1) (am) and those committed under sub. (1) (a) 2. e. differently. Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, 395 Wis. 2d 460, 954 N.W.2d 366, 18-1887.
51.20 AnnotationSub. (11) (a) does not limit the filing of a jury demand to only the first time that a final hearing is set. Rather, when a final hearing is rescheduled, sub. (11) (a) allows a jury demand to be filed up until 48 hours prior to the rescheduled final hearing. Waukesha County v. E.J.W., 2021 WI 85, 399 Wis. 2d 471, 966 N.W.2d 590, 20-0370. See also Walworth County v. M.R.M., 2023 WI 59, 408 Wis. 2d 316, 992 N.W.2d 809, 22-0140.
51.20 AnnotationThe court in this case changed the special verdict question to read, “Is the subject dangerous to herself or to others if not recommitted?” The modified special verdict question failed to ask the jury to determine whether the individual was “currently” dangerous, instead directing the jury to consider future events—whether the individual would become dangerous in the future if she were not recommitted. Therefore, the question improperly stated the legal standard at issue, was misleading, and was inherently prejudicial to the individual. Outagamie County v. C.J.A., 2022 WI App 36, 404 Wis. 2d 1, 978 N.W.2d 493, 20-2032.
51.20 AnnotationAn examiner’s report prepared pursuant to sub. (9) (a) 5. need not be admitted into evidence for the circuit court to consider the report during initial commitment proceedings. The reports are not created for the parties’ benefit such that the parties must then seek to admit the evidence into the record. In a recommitment hearing, an examiner’s report must be received into evidence to be considered by the circuit court because this section does not provide an alternative statutory procedure for the court to review and consider the examiner’s report apart from admission of the report into the record under the rules of evidence in civil actions as provided under sub. (10) (c). Outagamie County v. L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI App 17, 407 Wis. 2d 441, 991 N.W.2d 518, 20-1806.
51.20 AnnotationUnder sub. (2), a court can entertain proceedings for involuntary commitment of a person admitted as a voluntary inpatient. 68 Atty. Gen. 97.
51.20 AnnotationSub. (14) requires a sheriff to transport the subject of a petition under this section at all stages of the proceedings, regardless of reimbursement. 68 Atty. Gen. 225.
51.20 AnnotationAn individual in the custody of a sheriff for transport to, from, and during an involuntary commitment hearing has rights to the least restrictive restraint appropriate. 71 Atty. Gen. 183.
51.20 AnnotationDiscussing the duties and obligations of a corporation counsel in involuntary civil commitment proceedings under this chapter. 79 Atty. Gen. 129.
51.20 AnnotationUnder sub. (14), the director of the county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 may request the sheriff of the county in which an individual was placed under emergency detention to transport that individual to another designated inpatient facility prior to the initial court hearing under this chapter, and the sheriff must do so within a reasonable time. 80 Atty. Gen. 299.
51.20 AnnotationA corporation counsel has discretion to refuse to file a petition for examination after receiving signed statements under oath that meet the requirements contained in sub. (1) if the corporation counsel determines that it is not in the interests of the public to file the petition. A good faith discretionary determination on the part of the corporation counsel that the filing of a petition for examination would not be in the interests of the public is not susceptible to challenge in a mandamus action. OAG 4-10.
51.20 AnnotationThe state cannot confine, without more, nondangerous persons capable of surviving safely in freedom alone or with help from family or friends. O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1975).
51.20 AnnotationDue process does not require states to use the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard in civil commitment proceedings. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979).
51.20 AnnotationIn signing a commitment application, a county employee was in essence acting as a witness in a judicial proceeding and as such was entitled to immunity. Martens v. Tremble, 481 F. Supp. 831 (1979).
51.20 AnnotationPersons confined in a state hospital under this section and ss. 51.37, 971.14, 971.17, and 975.06 are being subjected to punishment within the meaning of the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325 (1981).
51.20 AnnotationBeyond Overt Violence: Wisconsin’s Progressive Civil Commitment Statute as a Marker of a New Era in Mental Health Law. Erickson, Vitacco, & Van Rybroek. 89 MLR 359 (2005).
51.20 AnnotationThe Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Commitment Proceedings. Wesson. 1980 WLR 697.
51.2251.22Care and custody of persons.
51.22(1)(1)Except as provided in s. 51.20 (13) (a) 4. or 5., any person committed under this chapter shall be committed to the county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 serving the person’s county of residence, and such county department shall authorize placement of the person in an appropriate facility for care, custody and treatment according to s. 51.42 (3) (as) 1r. or 51.437 (4rm) (a).
51.22(2)(2)Except for admissions that do not involve the department or a county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 or a contract between a treatment facility and the department or a county department, admissions under ss. 51.10, 51.13, and 51.45 (10) shall be through the county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 serving the person’s county of residence, or through the department if the person to be admitted is a nonresident of this state. Admissions through a county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 shall be made in accordance with s. 51.42 (3) (as) 1r. or 51.437 (4rm) (a). Admissions through the department shall be made in accordance with sub. (3).
51.22(3)(3)Whenever an admission is made through the department, the department shall determine the need for inpatient care of the individual to be admitted. Unless a state-operated facility is used, the department may only authorize care in an inpatient facility which is operated by or under a purchase of service contract with a county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 or an inpatient facility which is under a contractual agreement with the department. Except in the case of state treatment facilities, the department shall reimburse the facility for the actual cost of all authorized care and services from the appropriation under s. 20.435 (5) (da). For collections made under the authority of s. 46.10 (16), moneys shall be credited or remitted to the department no later than 60 days after the month in which collections are made. Such collections are also subject to s. 46.036 or special agreement. Collections made by the department under ss. 46.03 (18) and 46.10 shall be deposited in the general fund.
51.22(4)(4)If a patient is placed in a facility authorized by a county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437 and the placement is outside the jurisdiction of that county department under s. 51.42 or 51.437, the placement does not transfer the patient’s residence to the county of the facility’s location while such patient is under commitment or placement.
51.22(5)(5)The board to which a patient is committed shall provide the least restrictive treatment alternative appropriate to the patient’s needs, and movement through all appropriate and necessary treatment components to assure continuity of care.
51.22 HistoryHistory: 1975 c. 430; 1977 c. 428; 1983 a. 27 s. 2202 (20); 1983 a. 474; 1985 a. 176; 1989 a. 31; 2001 a. 16; 2005 a. 387, 444; 2009 a. 28; 2015 a. 55.
51.22 AnnotationThe standard for determining whether the state has adequately protected a patient’s rights is whether professional judgment was in fact exercised. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 73 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1982).
51.3051.30Records.