An oral order of a state court that an injunction be issued was valid even though the case was removed to federal court before the order was signed. Heidel v. Voight, 456 F. Supp. 959
Suing by fictitious name or as unknown; partners' names unknown. 807.12(1)(1)
When the name or a part of the name of any defendant, or when any proper party defendant to an action to establish or enforce, redeem from or discharge a lien or claim to property is unknown to the plaintiff, such defendant may be designated a defendant by so much of the name as is known, or by a fictitious name, or as an unknown heir, representative, owner or person as the case may require, adding such description as may reasonably indicate the person intended. But no person whose title to or interest in land appears of record or who is in actual occupancy of land shall be proceeded against as an unknown owner.
When the name of such defendant is ascertained the process, pleadings and all proceedings may be amended by an order directing the insertion of the true name instead of the designation employed.
In an action against a partnership, if the names of the partners are unknown to the plaintiff, all proceedings may be in the partnership name until the names of the partners are ascertained, whereupon the process, pleadings and all proceedings shall be amended by order directing the insertion of such names.
History: Sup. Ct. Order, 67 Wis. 2d 585, 748 (1975).
This section does not authorize judgment against an unnamed individual. Miller v. Smith, 100 Wis. 2d 609
, 302 N.W.2d 468
When an action against an unnamed defendant under s. 807.12 was filed on the last day of the limitation period and amended process naming the defendant was served within 60 days after filing, the action was not barred. Relation back requirements of s. 802.09 (3) were inapplicable. Lak v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 100 Wis. 2d 641
, 302 N.W.2d 483
A fictitiously designated defendant's right to extinction of an action does not effectively vest until 60 days after the statute of limitations runs. Lavine v. Hartford Acc. & Indemnity, 140 Wis. 2d 434
, 410 N.W.2d 623
(Ct. App. 1987).
A cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knows the tortfeasor's identity or reasonably should have discovered it. Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis. 2d 630
, 436 N.W.2d 308
Telephone and audiovisual proceedings. 807.13(1)(1)
The court may permit any oral argument by telephone.
In civil actions and proceedings, including those under chs. 48
, and 55
, the court may admit oral testimony communicated to the court on the record by telephone or live audiovisual means, subject to cross-examination, when:
The proponent shows good cause to the court. Appropriate considerations are:
Whether any undue surprise or prejudice would result;
Whether the proponent has been unable, after due diligence, to procure the physical presence of the witness;
The convenience of the parties and the proposed witness, and the cost of producing the witness in relation to the importance of the offered testimony;
Whether the procedure would allow full effective cross-examination, especially where availability to counsel of documents and exhibits available to the witness would affect such cross-examination;
The importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses in open court, where the finder of fact may observe the demeanor of the witness, and where the solemnity of the surroundings will impress upon the witness the duty to testify truthfully;
Whether the quality of the communication is sufficient to understand the offered testimony;
Whether a physical liberty interest is at stake in the proceeding; and
Such other factors as the court may, in each individual case, determine to be relevant.
Whenever the applicable statutes or rules so permit, or the court otherwise determines that it is practical to do so, conferences in civil actions and proceedings may be conducted by telephone.
Notice; reporting; effect of actions taken; access.
In any proceeding conducted by telephone under this section:
If the proceeding is required to be reported, a court reporter shall be in simultaneous voice communication with all parties to the call, whether or not in the physical presence of any of them.
Parties entitled to be heard shall be given prior notice of the manner and time of the proceeding. Any participant other than the reporter electing to be present with any other participant shall give reasonable notice thereof to the other participants.
Regardless of the physical location of any party to the call, any waiver, stipulation, motion, objection, decision, order or any other action taken by the court or a party to a reported telephone hearing has the same effect as if made in open court.
With the exception of scheduling conferences and pretrial conferences, proceedings shall be conducted in a courtroom or other place reasonably accessible to the public. Participants in the proceeding may participate by telephone from any location or may elect to be physically present with one or more of the other participants. Simultaneous access to the proceeding shall be provided to persons entitled to attend by means of a loudspeaker or, upon request to the court, by making a person party to the telephone call without charge.
Sup. Ct. Order, 141 Wis. 2d xiii (1987); Sup. Ct. Order, 158 Wis. 2d xvii (1990); 1991 a. 32
; 1997 a. 252
; 1999 a. 85
; 2005 a. 387
Effective date note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: This section [created] allows oral arguments to be heard, evidence to be taken, or conferences to be conducted, by telephone. Sub. (4) prescribes the basic procedure for such proceedings. [Re Order eff. 1-1-88]
Effective date note
Judicial Council Note, 1990: The change in sub. (2) (c) (intro.) from “interest of justice" to “good cause" is not intended as substantive, but merely to conform it to the language used in other statutes relating to use of telephonic procedures in judicial proceedings. SS. 967.08, 970.03 (13), 971.14 (1) (c) and (4) (b), and 971.17 (2), Stats. [Re Order eff. 1-1-91]
Speaker-telephone testimony in civil jury trials: The next best thing to being there? 1988 WLR 293.
Videoconference Trial Testimony. Mondschein. Wis. Law. July 1997.
On request of any party, the court may permit an interpreter to act in any civil proceeding other than trial by telephone or live audiovisual means.
Sup. Ct. Order, 141 Wis. 2d xiii (1987); 1997 a. 252
Judicial Council Note, 1988: This section [created] allows interpreters to serve by telephone or live audio-visual means in civil proceedings other than trials, on request of any party and approval by the court. [Re Order effective Jan. 1, 1988]
Se Habla Everything: The Right to an Impartial, Qualified Interpreter. Araiza. Wis. Law. Sept. 1997.
Penalty for certain actions by prisoners. 807.15(2)
In any action or special proceeding, including a petition for a common law writ of certiorari, brought by a prisoner, the court may, on its own motion or on the motion of any party, order the department of corrections to extend the prisoner's mandatory release date calculated under s. 302.11 (1)
or the prisoner's eligibility for release to extended supervision under s. 302.113 (3) (bm)
or 302.114 (3) (c)
or order the sheriff to deprive the prisoner of good time under s. 302.43
if the court finds that any of the following applies:
The action or special proceeding was filed for a malicious purpose.
The action or special proceeding was filed solely to harass the party against which it was filed.
The prisoner testifies falsely or otherwise knowingly offers false evidence or provides false information to the court.
Subject to pars. (b)
, if a court orders the department of corrections to extend a prisoner's mandatory release date or eligibility for release to extended supervision or orders the sheriff to deprive the prisoner of good time under sub. (2)
, the order shall specify the number of days by which the mandatory release date or eligibility for release to extended supervision is to be extended or the good time deprived.
An order under sub. (2)
to extend a prisoner's mandatory release date or deprive a prisoner of good time may not require the prisoner to serve more days than provided for under the prisoner's sentence.
An order under sub. (2)
to extend the eligibility for release to extended supervision of a prisoner subject to s. 302.113
may not require the prisoner to serve more days in prison than the total length of the prisoner's bifurcated sentence.
This section applies to prisoners who committed an offense on or after September 1, 1998.
History: 1997 a. 133