Rule (Computation and enlargement of time). 809.82(1)(1)
In computing any period of time prescribed by these rules, the provisions of s. 801.15 (1)
(2) Enlargement or reduction of time. 809.82(2)(a)(a)
Except as provided in this subsection, the court upon its own motion or upon good cause shown by motion, may enlarge or reduce the time prescribed by these rules or court order for doing any act, or waive or permit an act to be done after the expiration of the prescribed time.
Notwithstanding par. (a)
, the time for filing a notice of appeal or cross-appeal of a final judgment or order, other than in an appeal under s. 809.107
or an appeal under s. 809.30
, may not be enlarged.
The court may not enlarge the time prescribed for an appeal under s. 809.105
without the consent of the minor and her counsel.
A copy of any motion to enlarge time limits under this subsection shall be served on the clerk of circuit court.
Notwithstanding par. (a)
, the time for filing a motion for reconsideration under s. 809.24
may not be enlarged.
Sup. Ct. Order, 83 Wis. 2d xiii (1978); Sup. Ct. Order, 104 Wis. 2d xi (1981); 1981 c. 390
; 1991 a. 263
; Sup. Ct. Order No. 00-02
, 2001 WI 39, 242 Wis. 2d xxvii; Sup. Ct. Order No. 02-01
, 2002 WI 120, 255 Wis. 2d xiii; 2005 a. 293
; 2017 a. 258
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1978: Sub. (1). The provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure as to computation of time are adopted for appeals to avoid any problems resulting from a lack of uniformity.
Sub. (2) continues the first sentence of former Rule 251.45. It eliminates the second sentence of that Rule permitting the attorneys by stipulation to extend the time for filing briefs if the extension does not interfere with the assignment of the case because this procedure interferes with the ability of the court to monitor cases pending before it and because it is not always certain when a case will be on an assignment. The Supreme Court considers that deadlines as to briefs and other actions in the court should have priority over all matters except previously scheduled trials in circuit and county courts and deadlines set by a federal court. Requests for extensions are not, consequently, looked upon with favor by the court. [Re Order effective July 1, 1978]
Judicial Council Committee's Note, 1981: Sub. (2) is amended to permit the court of appeals to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal or cross-appeal in appeals under Rules 809.30 and 809.40 (1), which cover criminal appeals and postconviction motions and appeals in ch. 48, 51 and 55 cases. When read with Rules 809.30 and 809.40 (1), the rule was previously ambiguous regarding extensions of time to file a notice of appeal or cross-appeal in ch. 48, 51 and 55 cases. The amendment clarifies the rules. Other than appeals under Rules 809.30 and 809.40 (1), the time for filing a notice of appeal or cross-appeal may not be extended. [Re Order effective Jan. 1, 1982]
Judicial Council Note, 2001: Subsection (2) (d) was created to provide notice to the clerk of any motion affecting time limits. Subsection (2) (e) was created to facilitate computation of due dates on petitions for review. [Re Order No. 00-02 effective July 1, 2001]
The court of appeals abused its discretion by ordering oral argument one day after the petition for a writ was filed and served. State ex rel. Breier v. Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. 91 Wis. 2d 833
, 284 N.W.2d 102
The authority to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal under sub. (2) does not apply to appeals regarding terminations of parental rights under s. 809.107. Gloria A. v. State, 195 Wis. 2d 268
, 536 N.W.2d 396
(Ct. App. 1995), 95-0315
A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be brought by a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Utilizing sub. (2) as a substitute for habeas corpus, so as to avoid making a substantive determination that a defendant was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Evans, 2004 WI 84
, 273 Wis. 2d 192
, 682 N.W.2d 784
. See also Santana v. Endicott, 2006 WI App 13
, 288 Wis. 2d 707
, 709 N.W.2d 515
It is unwise and unhelpful to replace the good cause standard for deciding extension motions under this section with an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis under Evans
when deciding requests for extensions of time to file notices of intent to pursue postconviction relief. State v. Quackenbush, 2005 WI App 2
, 278 Wis. 2d 611
, 692 N.W.2d 340
The writ of habeas corpus may be used in the court of appeals to seek relief from a termination of parental rights (TPR) even though there is no restraint of liberty of the petitioner, when appellate counsel failed to appeal before the deadline. Under sub. (2) (b), the time for filing an appeal of a TPR may not be enlarged when the petition was filed by someone other than a representative of the public. If the court was not able to recognize the petitioner's right to raise ineffectiveness of counsel, the petitioner will never have an appeal through no fault of his or her own. Amy W. v. David G., 2013 WI App 83
, 348 Wis. 2d 593
, 834 N.W.2d 432