893.585(1)(1)Notwithstanding ss. 893.54, 893.55, and 893.57, an action under s. 895.441 for damages shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred.
893.585(2)(2)If a person entitled to bring an action under s. 895.441 is unable to bring the action due to the effects of the sexual contact or due to any threats, instructions, or statements from the therapist, the period of inability is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action, except that this subsection shall not extend the time limitation by more than 15 years.
893.585(3)(3)This section does not apply to damages incurred under s. 895.442.
893.585 HistoryHistory: 1985 a. 275; 2003 a. 279; 2005 a. 155.
893.587893.587Sexual assault of a child; limitation. An action to recover damages for injury caused by an act that would constitute a violation of s. 948.02, 948.025, 948.06, 948.085, or 948.095 or would create a cause of action under s. 895.442 shall be commenced before the injured party reaches the age of 35 years or be barred.
893.587 AnnotationA victim’s action was time barred when “flashbacks” more than two years prior to commencing suit made the victim aware of incest that allegedly occurred more than 50 years earlier. The action was barred despite evidence that the victim was unable to shift the blame from herself at the time of discovery. Byrne v. Bercker, 176 Wis. 2d 1037, 501 N.W.2d 402 (1993).
893.587 AnnotationAn adult victim of incest, who at the time of the incestuous act was aware of the identity of the tortfeasor and the impropriety of the conduct, did not qualify for tolling of the statute of limitations under the discovery rule because the victim was unaware of the psychological harm that might occur. Cheryl D. v. Estate of Robert D.B., 207 Wis. 2d 548, 559 N.W.2d 272 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-3510.
893.587 AnnotationClaims for injury caused by an archdiocese’s alleged fraudulent misrepresentation that the archdiocese did not know that priests it assigned had histories of sexually abusing children and did not know the priests were dangerous to children were not barred by this section. None of the listed statutes in this section refers to fraudulent misrepresentations. Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2007 WI 95, 303 Wis. 2d 34, 734 N.W.2d 827, 05-1945.
893.587 AnnotationThe limitations period in this section applies only to claims alleging that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injury by committing an enumerated act. In this case, the issue was not whether the plaintiff could sue the individual who sexually assaulted the plaintiff as a child. The plaintiff’s action to recover damages was for injury caused by a non-profit organization’s act of negligently hiring, retaining, and supervising that individual. Because the plaintiff did not allege that the organization committed an enumerated injury-causing act, the plaintiff’s claim was not an action to recover damages to which this section applied. The governing time limit was instead the three-year statute of limitations under s. 893.54, as extended by s. 893.16. Fleming v. Amateur Athletic Union of the United States, Inc., 2023 WI 40, 407 Wis. 2d 273, 990 N.W.2d 244, 21-1054.
893.59893.59Actions concerning damage to highway or railroad grade. An action under s. 88.87 (3) (b) to recover damages to a highway or railroad grade shall be commenced within 90 days after the alleged damage occurred or be barred.
893.59 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323.
893.59 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section has been created to place into ch. 893 the statute of limitations for an action to recover damages to a highway or railroad grade. (See note following s. 88.87 (3) (b)). [Bill 326-A]
ACTIONS RELATED TO FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
OR GOVERNMENTAL OBLIGATIONS
893.60893.60What actions not affected. Actions against directors or stockholders of a moneyed corporation or banking association or against managers or members of a limited liability company to recover a forfeiture imposed or to enforce a liability created by law shall be commenced within 6 years after the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts upon which the forfeiture attached or the liability was created or be barred.
893.60 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 1993 a. 112.
893.60 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.51 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.61893.61Contract for payment of money; governmental subdivisions. An action upon any bond, coupon, interest warrant or other contract for the payment of money, whether sealed or otherwise, made or issued by any town, county, city, village, school district or technical college district in this state shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred.
893.61 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 1993 a. 399.
893.61 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.19 (2) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.62893.62Action concerning usury. An action under s. 138.06 (3) for interest, principal and charges paid on a loan or forbearance shall be commenced within 2 years after the interest which is at a rate greater than allowed under s. 138.05 is paid or be barred.
893.62 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323.
893.62 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section has been created to place into ch. 893 the statute of limitations for an action concerning usury. (See note following s. 138.06 (3)). [Bill 326-A]
893.63893.63Actions on cashier’s check, certified check, or bank money order.
893.63(1)(1)Upon the expiration of 2 years from the date of any cashier’s check, certified check or bank money order, there having been no presentment for payment of the check or money order by a holder thereof, the maker shall, upon demand, return to the remitter noted thereon, if any, the full face amount of the cashier’s check, certified check or bank money order, and thereafter shall be relieved of any and all liability upon the cashier’s check, certified check or bank money order, to the remitter, the payee or any other holder thereof.
893.63(2)(2)Subsection (1) applies to all cashier’s checks, certified checks and bank money orders, which have been made before November 2, 1969 but were not presented for payment by a holder within 2 years of their date, but an action by the remitter of a cashier’s check, certified check and bank money order, to recover moneys held by a bank beyond the time limited by sub. (1) shall be subject to s. 893.43.
893.63 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323.
893.63 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.215 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.64893.64Actions upon accounts. In actions brought to recover the balance due upon a mutual and open account current the cause of action shall be deemed to have accrued at the time of the last item proved in such account.
893.64 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323.
893.64 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.25 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.64 AnnotationThere must be mutual debts or setoff before this section applies. Demos v. Carey, 50 Wis. 2d 262, 184 N.W.2d 117 (1971).
893.65893.65Bank bills not affected. This chapter does not apply to any action brought upon any bills, notes or other evidences of debt issued or put into circulation as money by a bank or other person.
893.65 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323.
893.65 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.29 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893 and revised to reflect Lusk v. Stoughton State Bank, 135 Wis. 311, 115 N.W. 813 (1908). [Bill 326-A]
893.66893.66Certified public accountants; limitations of actions.
893.66(1)(1)Except as provided in subs. (1m) to (4), an action to recover damages, based on tort, contract or other legal theory, against any certified public accountant licensed or certified under ch. 442 for an act or omission in the performance of professional accounting services shall be commenced within 6 years from the date of the act or omission or be barred.
893.66(1m)(1m)If a person sustains damages covered under sub. (1) during the period beginning on the first day of the 6th year and ending on the last day of the 6th year after the performance of the professional accounting services, the time for commencing the action for damages is extended one year after the date on which the damages occurred.
893.66(2)(2)If a person sustains damages covered under sub. (1) and the statute of limitations applicable to those damages bars commencement of the cause of action before the end of the period specified in sub. (1), then that statute of limitations applies.
893.66(3)(3)This section does not apply to actions subject to s. 551.509 (10) or 553.51 (4).
893.66(4)(4)This section does not apply to any person who commits fraud or concealment in the performance of professional accounting services.
893.66 HistoryHistory: 1993 a. 310; 2001 a. 16; 2007 a. 196.
subch. VII of ch. 893SUBCHAPTER VII
ACTIONS RELATING TO GOVERNMENTAL
DECISIONS OR ORGANIZATION
893.70893.70Action against certain officials. An action against a sheriff, coroner, medical examiner, town clerk, or constable upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his or her official capacity and in virtue of his or her office or by the omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of money collected upon execution, shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. This section does not apply to an action for an escape.
893.70 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323.
893.70 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.20 (1) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.71893.71County seat; contesting change. An action or proceeding to test the validity of a change of any county seat shall be commenced within 3 years after the date of the publication of the governor’s proclamation of such change or be barred. Every defense founded upon the invalidity of any such change must be interposed within 3 years after the date of the aforesaid publication, and the time of commencement of the action or proceeding to which any such defense is made shall be deemed the time when such defense is interposed.
893.71 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323.
893.71 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.20 (3) renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.72893.72Actions contesting special assessment. An action to avoid any special assessment, or taxes levied pursuant to the special assessment, or to restrain the levy of the taxes or the sale of lands for the nonpayment of the taxes, shall be brought within one year from the notice thereof, and not thereafter. This limitation shall cure all defects in the proceedings, and defects of power on the part of the officers making the assessment, except in cases where the lands are not liable to the assessment, or the city, village or town has no power to make any such assessment, or the amount of the assessment has been paid or a redemption made.
893.72 HistoryHistory: 1979 c. 323; 1993 a. 246.
893.72 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section is previous s. 893.24 renumbered for more logical placement in restructured ch. 893. [Bill 326-A]
893.72 AnnotationThe one-year bar under this section does not apply if the municipality did not have the power to make the assessment. State ex rel. Robinson v. Town of Bristol, 2003 WI App 97, 264 Wis. 2d 318, 667 N.W.2d 14, 02-1427.
893.73893.73Actions contesting governmental decisions.
893.73(1)(1)The following actions are barred unless brought within 180 days after the adoption of the order, resolution, ordinance or ordinance amendment contested:
893.73(1)(a)(a) An action to contest the validity of a county zoning ordinance or amendment, if s. 59.69 (14) applies to the action.
893.73(1)(b)(b) An action to review the validity of proceedings for division or dissolution of a town under s. 60.03.
893.73(2)(2)The following actions are barred unless brought within 90 days after the adoption of the order, annexation ordinance or final determination of the action contested:
893.73(2)(a)(a) An action under s. 60.73 contesting an act of a town board or the department of natural resources in the establishment of a town sanitary district.
893.73(2)(b)(b) An action to contest the validity of an annexation, if s. 66.0217 (11) applies to the action.
893.73 NoteNOTE: 2003 Wis. Act 214, which affected this section, contains extensive explanatory notes.
893.73 NoteJudicial Council Committee’s Note, 1979: This section has been created to consolidate into one provision of ch. 893 six types of actions presently outside of the chapter involving the contesting of governmental decisions. The actions have been broken down into 2 separate categories, those which must be commenced within 180 days of the adoption of the governmental decision and those that must be commenced within 90 days of the decision.
893.73 NoteThe previous 180-day period within which to contest a county zoning ordinance or amendment remains unchanged.
893.73 NoteThe one-year period in which to commence an action to contest the proceedings to constitute or divide a town has been shortened to 180 days (see note following s. 60.05 (4)). The previous 180-day time period to commence an action contesting the validity of the creation of a soil and water district remains unchanged (see note following s. 92.16).
893.73 NoteThe previous 20-day period to commence an action to set aside an action of a town board to establish a sanitary district has been increased to 90 days (see note following s. 60.304).
893.73 NoteThe previous 60-day period within which to commence an action to contest the validity of an annexation has been increased to 90 days (see note following s. 66.021 (10) (a)).
893.73 NoteThe 90-day period to commence an action contesting the validity of an order regarding a highway or highway records remains unchanged (see note following s. 80.34 (2)). [Bill 326-A]
893.73 AnnotationUnder sub. (2), “adoption” refers to a legislative body’s approval of an annexation ordinance. The statute of limitations begins to run on that date. Town of Sheboygan v. City of Sheboygan, 150 Wis. 2d 210, 441 N.W.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1989).
893.735893.735Action by prisoner contesting a governmental decision.
893.735(1)(1)In this section, “prisoner” has the meaning given in s. 801.02 (7) (a) 2.
893.735(2)(2)An action seeking a remedy available by certiorari made on behalf of a prisoner is barred unless commenced within 45 days after the cause of action accrues. The 45-day period shall begin on the date of the decision or disposition, except that the court may extend the period by as many days as the prisoner proves have elapsed between the decision or disposition and the prisoner’s actual notice of the decision or disposition. Subject to no contact requirements of a court or the department of corrections, a prisoner in administrative confinement, program segregation or adjustment segregation may communicate by 1st class mail, in accordance with department of corrections’ rules or with written policies of the custodian of the prisoner, with a 3rd party outside the institution regarding the action or special proceeding.
893.735(3)(3)In this section, an action seeking a remedy available by certiorari is commenced at the time that the prisoner files a petition seeking a writ of certiorari with a court.
893.735 HistoryHistory: 1997 a. 133.
893.735 AnnotationThe words “on behalf of” in sub. (2) are not restricted to third-party conduct. The time limit applies to actions filed by a prisoner on behalf of himself or herself. State ex rel. Collins v. Cooke, 2000 WI App 101, 235 Wis. 2d 63, 611 N.W.2d 774, 99-1212.
893.735 AnnotationPersons seeking certiorari review of probation revocation are prisoners subject to the 45-day filing deadline under sub. (2). State ex rel. Cramer v. Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 2000 WI 86, 236 Wis. 2d 473, 613 N.W.2d 591, 99-1089.
893.735 AnnotationThe definition of “prisoner” in s. 801.02 (7) (a) 2. does not include a Wisconsin inmate sent to an out-of-state county jail, and, therefore, the 45-day limit does not apply to the inmate. State ex rel. Frohwirth v. Wisconsin Parole Commission, 2000 WI App 139, 237 Wis. 2d 627, 614 N.W.2d 541, 99-2079.
893.735 AnnotationWhen a prison inmate places a certiorari petition in the prison’s mailbox for forwarding to the circuit court, the 45-day limit under sub. (2) is tolled. However, other defects in filing may nonetheless result in rejection by the court. State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle, 2000 WI App 262, 240 Wis. 2d 310, 622 N.W.2d 763, 00-0841.
893.735 AnnotationTo invoke the tolling of the 45-day limit under sub. (2), an inmate must present an affidavit or some other sufficient evidence of the date on which the petition was deposited in the institution mailbox. State ex rel. Shimkus v. Sondalle, 2000 WI App 262, 240 Wis. 2d 310, 622 N.W.2d 763, 00-0841.
893.735 AnnotationA verified petition, being a sworn statement, that was unchallenged by the state was sufficient to establish the number of days between the date of the challenged decision and the prisoner’s receipt of it. There were no circumstances justifying not extending the 45-day limit pursuant to sub. (2). State ex rel. Johnson v. Litscher, 2001 WI App 47, 241 Wis. 2d 407, 625 N.W.2d 887, 00-1485.
893.735 AnnotationThat out-of-state inmates have a longer filing deadline for challenging parole revocation under Frohwirth, 2000 WI App 139, does not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. State ex rel. Saffold v. Schwarz, 2001 WI App 56, 241 Wis. 2d 253, 625 N.W.2d 333, 99-2945.
893.735 AnnotationThe statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner waits for the Department of Justice to provide the certification required by ss. 801.02 (7) (d) and 802.05 (3) (c). State ex rel. Locklear v. Schwarz, 2001 WI App 74, 242 Wis. 2d 327, 629 N.W.2d 30, 99-3211.
893.735 AnnotationFor purposes of sub. (2), tolling of the 45-day clock for prisoners to commence actions begins when the documents over which prisoners have control have been mailed, and all of the documents over which prisoners have no control have been requested by the prisoners. The time begins running again when those documents are within the prisoners’ control. State ex rel. Walker v. McCaughtry, 2001 WI App 110, 244 Wis. 2d 177, 629 N.W.2d 17, 00-1439.
893.735 AnnotationTo invoke the tolling of the 45-day limit under sub. (2), a prisoner must submit proper documents and comply with statutory fee or fee-waiver requirements. State ex rel. Tyler v. Bett, 2002 WI App 234, 257 Wis. 2d 606, 652 N.W.2d 800, 01-2808.
893.735 AnnotationPetitioners were entitled to equitable relief when they timely asked counsel to file for certiorari, counsel promised to do so, and due to counsel’s failure to timely file they were denied certiorari review. The 45-day time limit for the filing of a writ of certiorari was equitably tolled as of the date that counsel promised to file for certiorari review. State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 2004 WI 36, 270 Wis. 2d 235, 677 N.W.2d 259, 01-2345.
893.735 AnnotationThe combined effects of subs. (2) and (3) and s. 801.02 (7) (c) is that the administrative-process documents expansively described in s. 801.02 (7) (c) are required to timely pursue a prepayment waiver, and they are also required under this section to timely commence a writ action. Mitchell v. Buesgen, 2024 WI App 14, 411 Wis. 2d 269, 4 N.W.3d 596, 22-1076.
893.74893.74School district; contesting validity. No appeal or other action attacking the legality of the formation of a school district, either directly or indirectly, may be commenced after the school district has exercised the rights and privileges of a school district for a period of 90 days.
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2021-22 Wisconsin Statutes updated through 2023 Wis. Act 272 and through all Supreme Court and Controlled Substances Board Orders filed before and in effect on November 8, 2024. Published and certified under s. 35.18. Changes effective after November 8, 2024, are designated by NOTES. (Published 11-8-24)