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943.05 943.05 Placing of combustible materials an attempt. Whoever places any combustible or explosive material or device in or near any property with intent to set fire to or blow up such property is guilty of an attempt to violate either s. 943.01, 943.012, 943.013, 943.02, 943.03 or 943.04, depending on the facts of the particular case.
943.05 History History: 1987 a. 348; 1993 a. 50.
943.06 943.06 Molotov cocktails.
943.06(1)(1) As used in this section, "fire bomb" means a breakable container containing a flammable liquid with a flash point of 150 degrees Fahrenheit or less, having a wick or similar device capable of being ignited, but does not mean a device commercially manufactured primarily for the purpose of illumination.
943.06(2) (2) Whoever possesses, manufactures, sells, offers for sale, gives or transfers a fire bomb is guilty of a Class H felony.
943.06(3) (3) This section shall not prohibit the authorized use or possession of any such device by a member of the armed forces or by fire fighters or law enforcement officers.
943.06 History History: 1977 c. 173; 1985 a. 135 s. 83 (3); 2001 a. 109.
943.065 943.065 Injury caused by arson: treble damages.
943.065(1)(1) Any person who incurs injury to his or her person or his, her or its business or property by reason of a violation of s. 943.02, 943.03, 943.04, 943.05 or 943.06, including the state or any municipality which incurs costs in extinguishing or investigating the cause of a fire under those circumstances, may sue the person convicted of the violation for damages. A court shall award treble damages, plus costs and attorney fees, to a person, including the state or a municipality, proving injury under this section. The damages, costs and fees are payable only by the person convicted of the violation. This section does not impose any duty upon a company providing insurance coverage to defend its insured in any action brought under this section.
943.065(2) (2) The treble damages requirement under sub. (1) applies in any wrongful death action under s. 895.03 based on a violation specified in sub. (1).
943.065 History History: 1981 c. 78.
943.07 943.07 Criminal damage to railroads.
943.07(1) (1) Whoever intentionally causes damage or who causes another person to damage, tamper, change or destroy any railroad track, switch, bridge, trestle, tunnel or signal or any railroad property used in providing rail services, which could cause an injury, accident or derailment is guilty of a Class I felony.
943.07(2) (2) Whoever intentionally shoots a firearm at any portion of a railroad train, car, caboose or engine is guilty of a Class I felony.
943.07(3) (3) Whoever intentionally throws, shoots or propels any stone, brick or other missile at any railroad train, car, caboose or engine is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
943.07(4) (4) Whoever intentionally throws or deposits any type of debris or waste material on or along any railroad track or right-of-way which could cause an injury or accident is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
943.07 History History: 1975 c. 314; 1977 c. 173; 2001 a. 109.
subch. II of ch. 943 SUBCHAPTER II
TRESPASS
943.10 943.10 Burglary.
943.10(1g)(1g) In this section:
943.10(1g)(a) (a) "Boat" means any ship or vessel that has sleeping quarters.
943.10(1g)(b) (b) "Motor home" has the meaning given in s. 340.01 (33m).
943.10(1m) (1m) Whoever intentionally enters any of the following places without the consent of the person in lawful possession and with intent to steal or commit a felony in such place is guilty of a Class F felony:
943.10(1m)(a) (a) Any building or dwelling; or
943.10(1m)(b) (b) An enclosed railroad car; or
943.10(1m)(c) (c) An enclosed portion of any ship or vessel; or
943.10(1m)(d) (d) A locked enclosed cargo portion of a truck or trailer; or
943.10(1m)(e) (e) A motor home or other motorized type of home or a trailer home, whether or not any person is living in any such home; or
943.10(1m)(f) (f) A room within any of the above.
943.10(2) (2) Whoever violates sub. (1m) under any of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class E felony:
943.10(2)(a) (a) The person is armed with a dangerous weapon or a device or container described under s. 941.26 (4) (a).
943.10(2)(b) (b) The person is unarmed, but arms himself with a dangerous weapon or a device or container described under s. 941.26 (4) (a) while still in the burglarized enclosure.
943.10(2)(c) (c) While the person is in the burglarized enclosure, he or she opens, or attempts to open, any depository by use of an explosive.
943.10(2)(d) (d) While the person is in the burglarized enclosure, he or she commits a battery upon a person lawfully therein.
943.10(2)(e) (e) The burglarized enclosure is a dwelling, boat, or motor home and another person is lawfully present in the dwelling, boat, or motor home at the time of the violation.
943.10(3) (3) For the purpose of this section, entry into a place during the time when it is open to the general public is with consent.
943.10 History History: 1977 c. 173, 332; 1995 a. 288; 2001 a. 109; 2003 a. 189.
943.10 Annotation Stolen items may be introduced in evidence in a burglary prosecution as the items tend to prove that entry was made with intent to steal. Abraham v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 44, 176 N.W.2d 349 (1970).
943.10 Annotation Since attempted robbery requires proof of elements in addition to those elements required to prove burglary, they are separate and distinct crimes. State v. DiMaggio, 49 Wis. 2d 565, 182 N.W.2d 466 (1971).
943.10 Annotation The state need not prove that the defendant knew that his or her entry was without consent. Hanson v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 396, 190 N.W.2d 129 (1971).
943.10 Annotation The unexplained possession of recently stolen goods raises an inference that the possessor is guilty of theft, and also of burglary if the goods were stolen in a burglary, and calls for an explanation of how the possessor obtained the property. Gautreaux v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 489, 190 N.W.2d 542 (1971).
943.10 Annotation An information is defective if it charges entry into a building with intent to steal or to commit a felony, since these are different offenses. Champlain v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 751, 193 N.W.2d 868 (1972).
943.10 Annotation While intent to steal will not be inferred from the fact of entry alone, additional circumstances such as time, nature of place entered, method of entry, identity of the accused, conduct at the time of arrest, or interruption, and other circumstances, without proof of actual losses, can be sufficient to permit a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant entered with an intent to steal. State v. Barclay, 54 Wis. 2d 651, 196 N.W.2d 745 (1972).
943.10 Annotation Evidence that the defendant walked around a private dwelling knocking on doors, then broke the glass in one, entered, and when confronted offered no excuse, was sufficient to sustain a conviction for burglary. Raymond v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 482, 198 N.W.2d 351 (1972).
943.10 Annotation A burglary is completed after a door is pried open and entry made. It was no defense that the defendant had changed his mind and started to leave the scene when arrested. Morones v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 544, 213 N.W.2d 31 (1973).
943.10 Annotation Hiding in the false ceiling of the men's room, perfected by false pretenses and fraud, rendered an otherwise lawful entrance into a restaurant unlawful. Levesque v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 412, 217 N.W.2d 317 (1974).
943.10 Annotation Failure to allege lack of consent in an information charging burglary was not a fatal jurisdictional defect. Schleiss v. State, 71 Wis. 2d 733, 239 N.W.2d 68 (1976).
943.10 Annotation In a burglary prosecution, ordinarily once proof of entry is made, it is the defendant's burden to show consent. When a private residence is broken into at night, little evidence is required to support an inference of intent to steal. LaTender v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 383, 253 N.W.2d 221 (1977).
943.10 Annotation Entry into a hotel lobby open to the public, with intent to steal, is not burglary. Champlin v. State, 84 Wis. 2d 621, 267 N.W.2d 295 (1978).
943.10 Annotation Section 939.72 (3) does not bar convictions for possession of burglarious tools and burglary arising out of a single transaction. Dumas v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 518, 280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979).
943.10 Annotation Intent to steal is capable of being gleaned from the defendant's conduct and the circumstances surrounding it. State v. Bowden, 93 Wis. 2d 574, 288 N.W.2d 139 (1980).
943.10 Annotation Under the facts of the case, the defendant's employer did not give the defendant consent to enter the employer's premises after hours by providing the defendant with a key to the premises. State v. Schantek, 120 Wis. 2d 79, 353 N.W.2d 832 (Ct. App. 1984).
943.10 Annotation Felonies that form the basis of burglary charges include only offenses against persons and property. State v. O'Neill, 121 Wis. 2d 300, 359 N.W.2d 906 (1984).
943.10 Annotation To negate the intent to steal through the defense of "self-help" repossession of property stolen from the defendant, the money repossessed must consist of the exact coins and currency owed to him or her. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).
943.10 Annotation As used in sub. (2) (d), "battery" applies only to simple battery. Convictions for both intermediate battery under s. 940.19 (3) and burglary/battery under sub. (2) (d) did not violate double jeopardy. State v. Reynolds, 206 Wis. 2d 356, 557 N.W.2d 821 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0265.
943.10 Annotation A firearm with a trigger lock is within the applicable definition of a dangerous weapon under s. 939.22 (10). State v. Norris, 214 Wis. 2d 25, 571 N.W.2d 857 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2158.
943.10 Annotation Sub. (1) requires only an intent to commit a felony. There is not a unanimity requirement that the jury agree on the specific felony that was intended. State v. Hammer, 216 Wis. 2d 214, 576 N.W.2d 285 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-3084.
943.10 Annotation A nexus between the burglary and the weapon is not required for an armed burglary conviction. Being armed is a necessary separate element. That a nexus is not required does not violate due process and fundamental fairness. State v. Gardner, 230 Wis. 2d 32, 601 N.W.2d 670 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2655.
943.10 Annotation The defendant's violation of the bail jumping statute by making an unauthorized entry into the initial crime victim's premises in violation of the defendant's bond with the purpose of intimidating the victim constituted a felony against persons or property that would support a burglary charge. State v. Semrau, 2000 WI App 54, 233 Wis. 2d 508, 608 N.W.2d 376, 98-3443.
943.10 Annotation A person commits a burglary by entering premises with the intent of committing a felony against persons or property while on the premises, regardless of whether the person's actions while within the premises constitute a new crime or the continuation of an ongoing offense. Felon in possession of a firearm in violation of s. 941.29 is a crime against persons or property that may be an underlying felony for a burglary charge. State v. Steele, 2001 WI App 34, 241 Wis. 2d 269, 625 N.W.2d 525, 00-0190.
943.10 Annotation Each paragraph of sub. (2) defines a complete stand-alone crime. Separate convictions under separate paragraphs arising from the same event do not constitute double jeopardy. State v. Beasley, 2004 WI App 42, 271 Wis. 2d 469, 678 N.W.2d 600, 02-2229.
943.11 943.11 Entry into locked vehicle. Whoever intentionally enters the locked and enclosed portion or compartment of the vehicle of another without consent and with intent to steal therefrom is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
943.11 History History: 1977 c. 173.
943.12 943.12 Possession of burglarious tools. Whoever has in personal possession any device or instrumentality intended, designed or adapted for use in breaking into any depository designed for the safekeeping of any valuables or into any building or room, with intent to use such device or instrumentality to break into a depository, building or room, and to steal therefrom, is guilty of a Class I felony.
943.12 History History: 1977 c. 173; 2001 a. 109.
943.12 Annotation A homemade key used to open parking meters is a burglarious tool. Perkins v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 341, 212 N.W.2d 141 (1973).
943.12 Annotation It was implausible that the defendant was looking for the home of an acquaintance in order to pick up some artwork while carrying a crowbar, a pair of gloves, and a pair of socks. Hansen v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 541, 219 N.W.2d 246 (1974).
943.12 Annotation Section 939.72 (3) does not bar convictions for possession of burglarious tools and burglary arising out of a single transaction. Dumas v. State, 90 Wis. 2d 518, 280 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1979).
943.12 Annotation The defendant's 2 prior convictions for burglary were admissible to prove intent to use gloves, a long pocket knife, a crowbar, and a pillow case as burglarious tools. Vanlue v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 81, 291 N.W.2d 467 (1980).
943.125 943.125 Entry into locked coin box.
943.125(1) (1) Whoever intentionally enters a locked coin box of another without consent and with intent to steal therefrom is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
943.125(2) (2) Whoever has in personal possession any device or instrumentality intended, designed or adapted for use in breaking into any coin box, with intent to use the device or instrumentality to break into a coin box and to steal therefrom, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
943.125(3) (3) In this section, "coin box" means any device or receptacle designed to receive money or any other thing of value. The term includes a depository box, parking meter, vending machine, pay telephone, money changing machine, coin-operated phonograph and amusement machine if they are designed to receive money or other thing of value.
943.125 History History: 1977 c. 173.
943.13 943.13 Trespass to land.
943.13(1e)(1e) In this section:
943.13(1e)(aL) (aL) "Carry" has the meaning given in s. 175.60 (1) (ag).
943.13(1e)(ar) (ar) "Dwelling unit" means a structure or that part of a structure which is used or intended to be used as a home, residence or sleeping place by one person or by 2 or more persons maintaining a common household, to the exclusion of all others.
943.13(1e)(az) (az) "Implied consent" means conduct or words or both that imply that an owner or occupant of land has given consent to another person to enter the land.
943.13(1e)(b) (b) "Inholding" means a parcel of land that is private property and that is surrounded completely by land owned by the United States, by this state or by a local governmental unit or any combination of the United States, this state and a local governmental unit.
943.13(1e)(bm) (bm) "Licensee" means a licensee, as defined in s. 175.60 (1) (d), or an out-of-state licensee, as defined in s. 175.60 (1) (g).
943.13(1e)(c) (c) "Local governmental unit" means a political subdivision of this state, a special purpose district in this state, an instrumentality or corporation of the political subdivision or special purpose district or a combination or subunit of any of the foregoing.
943.13(1e)(cm) (cm) "Nonresidential building" includes a nursing home as defined in s. 50.01 (3), a community-based residential facility as defined in s. 50.01 (1g), a residential care apartment complex as defined in s. 50.01 (6d), an adult family home as defined in s. 50.01 (1), and a hospice as defined in s. 50.90 (1).
943.13(1e)(cr) (cr) "Open land" means land that meets all of the following criteria:
943.13(1e)(cr)1. 1. The land is not occupied by a structure or improvement being used or occupied as a dwelling unit.
943.13(1e)(cr)2. 2. The land is not part of the curtilage, or is not lying in the immediate vicinity, of a structure or improvement being used or occupied as a dwelling unit.
943.13(1e)(cr)3. 3. The land is not occupied by a public building.
943.13(1e)(cr)4. 4. The land is not occupied by a place of employment.
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2011-12 Wisconsin Statutes updated though 2013 Wis. Act 200 and all Supreme Court Orders entered before April 18, 2014. Published and certified under s. 35.18. Changes effective after April 18, 2014 are designated by NOTES. (Published 4-18-14)