Engaging in picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute including any controversy concerning any of the following: wages or salaries; hours; working conditions; benefits, including welfare, sick leave, insurance, pension or retirement provisions; or the managing or maintenance of collective bargaining agreements and the terms to be included in those agreements.
Engaging in union organizing or recruitment activities that are otherwise lawful including attempting to reach workers verbally, in writing, and in the investigation of non-union working conditions.
An exercise of a person's right of free speech or assembly that is otherwise lawful.
History: 2015 a. 158
; 2019 a. 33
Criminal trespass to a medical facility. 943.145(1)(1)
In this section, “medical facility" means a hospital under s. 50.33 (2)
or a clinic or office that is used by a physician licensed under ch. 448
and that is subject to rules promulgated by the medical examining board for the clinic or office that are in effect on November 20, 1985.
Whoever intentionally enters a medical facility without the consent of some person lawfully upon the premises, under circumstances tending to create or provoke a breach of the peace, is guilty of a Class B misdemeanor.
This section does not prohibit any person from participating in lawful conduct in labor disputes under s. 103.53
History: 1985 a. 56
Entry onto a construction site or into a locked building, dwelling or room. 943.15(1)(1)
Whoever enters the locked or posted construction site or the locked and enclosed building, dwelling or room of another without the consent of the owner or person in lawful possession of the premises is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
This section does not apply to an assessor and an assessor's staff entering the construction site, other than buildings, of another if all of the following apply:
The assessor or the assessor's staff enters the construction site in order to make an assessment on behalf of the state or a political subdivision.
The assessor or assessor's staff enters the construction site on a weekday during daylight hours, or at another time as agreed upon by the land owner.
The assessor or assessor's staff spends no more than one hour on the construction site.
The assessor or assessor's staff does not open doors, enter through open doors, or look into windows of structures on the construction site.
The assessor or the assessor's staff leaves in a prominent place on the principal building at the construction site, or on the land if there is not a principal building, a notice informing the owner or occupant that the assessor or the assessor's staff entered the construction site and giving information on how to contact the assessor.
The assessor or the assessor's staff has not personally received a notice from the owner or occupant, either orally or in writing, not to enter or remain on the premises.
“Construction site" means the site of the construction, alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure or other work.
“Owner or person in lawful possession of the premises" includes a person on whose behalf a building or dwelling is being constructed, altered, painted or repaired and the general contractor or subcontractor engaged in that work.
“Posted" means that a sign at least 11 inches square must be placed in at least 2 conspicuous places for every 40 acres to be protected. The sign must carry an appropriate notice and the name of the person giving the notice followed by the word “owner" if the person giving the notice is the holder of legal title to the land on which the construction site is located and by the word “occupant" if the person giving the notice is not the holder of legal title but is a lawful occupant of the land.
History: 1981 c. 68
; 2009 a. 68
Whoever does any of the following may be penalized as provided in sub. (3)
Intentionally takes and carries away, uses, transfers, conceals, or retains possession of movable property of another without the other's consent and with intent to deprive the owner permanently of possession of such property.
By virtue of his or her office, business or employment, or as trustee or bailee, having possession or custody of money or of a negotiable security, instrument, paper or other negotiable writing of another, intentionally uses, transfers, conceals, or retains possession of such money, security, instrument, paper or writing without the owner's consent, contrary to his or her authority, and with intent to convert to his or her own use or to the use of any other person except the owner. A refusal to deliver any money or a negotiable security, instrument, paper or other negotiable writing, which is in his or her possession or custody by virtue of his or her office, business or employment, or as trustee or bailee, upon demand of the person entitled to receive it, or as required by law, is prima facie evidence of an intent to convert to his or her own use within the meaning of this paragraph.
Having a legal interest in movable property, intentionally and without consent, takes such property out of the possession of a pledgee or other person having a superior right of possession, with intent thereby to deprive the pledgee or other person permanently of the possession of such property.
Obtains title to property of another person by intentionally deceiving the person with a false representation which is known to be false, made with intent to defraud, and which does defraud the person to whom it is made. “False representation" includes a promise made with intent not to perform it if it is a part of a false and fraudulent scheme.
Intentionally fails to return any personal property which is in his or her possession or under his or her control by virtue of a written lease or written rental agreement after the lease or rental agreement has expired. This paragraph does not apply to a person who returns personal property, except a motor vehicle, which is in his or her possession or under his or her control by virtue of a written lease or written rental agreement, within 10 days after the lease or rental agreement expires.
“Individual at risk" means an elder adult at risk or an adult at risk.
“Movable property" is property whose physical location can be changed, without limitation including electricity and gas, documents which represent or embody intangible rights, and things growing on, affixed to or found in land.
“Property" means all forms of tangible property, whether real or personal, without limitation including electricity, gas and documents which represent or embody a chose in action or other intangible rights.
“Property of another" includes property in which the actor is a co-owner and property of a partnership of which the actor is a member, unless the actor and the victim are husband and wife.
Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, “value" means the market value at the time of the theft or the cost to the victim of replacing the property within a reasonable time after the theft, whichever is less. If the property stolen is a document evidencing a chose in action or other intangible right, “value" means either the market value of the chose in action or other right or the intrinsic value of the document, whichever is greater. If the property stolen is scrap metal, as defined in s. 134.405 (1) (f)
, or “plastic bulk merchandise container" as defined in s. 134.405 (1) (em)
, “value" also includes any costs that would be incurred in repairing or replacing any property damaged in the theft or removal of the scrap metal or plastic bulk merchandise container. If the thief gave consideration for, or had a legal interest in, the stolen property, the amount of such consideration or value of such interest shall be deducted from the total value of the property.
If the value of the property does not exceed $2,500, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.
If the value of the property exceeds $2,500 but does not exceed $5,000, is guilty of a Class I felony.
If the value of the property exceeds $5,000 but does not exceed $10,000, is guilty of a Class H felony.
If the value of the property exceeds $10,000 but does not exceed $100,000, is guilty of a Class G felony.
If the value of the property exceeds $100,000, is guilty of a Class F felony.
If any of the following circumstances exists, is guilty of a Class H felony:
The property is taken from a building which has been destroyed or left unoccupied because of physical disaster, riot, bombing or the proximity of battle.
The property is taken after physical disaster, riot, bombing or the proximity of battle has necessitated its removal from a building.
The property is taken from a patient or resident of a facility or program under s. 940.295 (2)
or from an individual at risk.
If the property is taken from the person of another or from a corpse, is guilty of a Class G felony.
Use of photographs as evidence.
In any action or proceeding for a violation of sub. (1)
, a party may use duly identified and authenticated photographs of property which was the subject of the violation in lieu of producing the property.
Misappropriation of funds by contractor or subcontractor as theft, see s. 779.02 (5)
If one person takes property from the person of another, and a 2nd person carries it away, the evidence may show a theft from the person under subs. (1) (a) and (3) (d) 2. [now sub. (3) (e)], either on a theory of conspiracy or of complicity. Hawpetoss v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 71
, 187 N.W.2d 823
Attempted theft by false representation (signing another's name to a car purchase contract) is not an included crime of forgery (signing the owner's name to a car title to be traded in). State v. Fuller, 57 Wis. 2d 408
, 204 N.W.2d 452
Under sub. (1) (d), it is not necessary that the person who parts with property be induced to do so by a false and fraudulent scheme; the person must be deceived by a false representation that is part of such a scheme. Schneider v. State, 60 Wis. 2d 765
, 211 N.W.2d 511
In abolishing the action for breach of promise to marry, the legislature did not sanction either civil or criminal fraud by the breaching party against the property of a duped victim. Restrictions on civil actions for fraud are not applicable to related criminal actions. Lambert v. State, 73 Wis. 2d 590
, 243 N.W.2d 524
Sub. (1) (a) should be read in the disjunctive so as to prohibit both the taking of, and the exercise of unauthorized control over, property of another. The sale of stolen property is thus prohibited. State v. Genova, 77 Wis. 2d 141
, 252 N.W.2d 380
The state may not charge a defendant under sub. (1) (a) in the disjunctive by alleging that the defendant took and carried away or used or transferred. Jackson v. State, 92 Wis. 2d 1
, 284 N.W.2d 685
(Ct. App. 1979).
Circumstantial evidence of owner nonconsent was sufficient to support a jury's verdict. State v. Lund, 99 Wis. 2d 152
, 298 N.W.2d 533
Section 943.20 (1) (e) does not unconstitutionally imprison one for debt. State v. Roth, 115 Wis. 2d 163
, 339 N.W.2d 807
(Ct. App. 1983).
A person may be convicted under s. 943.20 (1) (a) for concealing property and be separately convicted for transferring that property. State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155
, 378 N.W.2d 883
A violation of sub. (1) (d) does not require proof that the accused personally received property. State v. O'Neil, 141 Wis. 2d 535
, 416 N.W.2d 77
(Ct. App. 1987).
“Obtains title to property," as used in sub. (1) (d), includes obtaining property under a lease by fraudulent misrepresentation. State v. Meado, 163 Wis. 2d 789
, 472 N.W.2d 567
(Ct. App. 1991).
The federal tax on a fraudulently obtained airline ticket was properly included in its value for determining whether the offense was a felony under sub. (3). State v. McNearney, 175 Wis. 2d 485
, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993).
The definition of “bailee" under s. 407.102 (1) is not applicable to sub. (1) (b); definitions of “bailment" and are “bailee" discussed. State v. Kuhn, 178 Wis. 2d 428
, 504 N.W.2d 405
(Ct. App. 1993).
When the factual basis for a plea to felony theft does not establish the value of the property taken, the conviction must be set aside and replaced with a misdemeanor conviction. State v. Harrington, 181 Wis. 2d 985
, 512 N.W.2d 261
(Ct. App. 1994).
The words “uses," “transfers," “conceals," and “retains possession" in sub. (1) (b) are not synonyms describing the crime of theft but describe separate offenses. A jury must be instructed that there must be unanimous agreement on the manner in which the statute was violated. State v. Seymour, 183 Wis. 2d 683
, 515 N.W.2d 874
Theft from the person includes theft of a purse from the handle of an occupied wheelchair. State v. Hughes, 218 Wis. 2d 538
, 582 N.W.2d 49
(Ct. App. 1998), 97-0638
When the victim had pushed her purse against a car door with her leg and the defendant's action caused her to fall back, dislodging the purse, his act of taking it constituted taking property from the victim's person under sub. (3) (d) 2. [now sub. (3) (e)]. State v. Graham, 2000 WI App 138
, 237 Wis. 2d 620
, 614 N.W.2d 504
Multiple convictions for the theft of an equal number of firearms arising from one incident did not violate the protection against double jeopardy. State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77
, 244 Wis. 2d 523
, 628 N.W.2d 801
A party to a business transaction has a duty to disclose a fact when: 1) the fact is material to the transaction; 2) the party with knowledge of the fact knows the other party is about to enter into the transaction under a mistake as to the fact; 3) the fact is peculiarly and exclusively within the knowledge of one party, and the mistaken party could not reasonably be expected to discover it; and 4) on account of the objective circumstances, the mistaken party would reasonably expect disclosure of the fact. If a duty to disclose exists, failure to disclose is a representation under sub. (1) (d). State v. Ploeckelman, 2007 WI App 31
, 299 Wis. 2d 251
, 729 N.W.2d 784
The intent of the “from the person" penalty enhancer under sub. (3) (e) was to cover circumstances that made stealing particularly dangerous and undesirable. Although the cash register the defendant was attempting to steal was not connected to the manager at the register, at the time of the attempted theft the manager was within arm's reach of the defendant while the defendant was smashing the register and was in constructive possession of the money when the attempted theft occurred even if the money was not physically touching her person. The manager's constructive possession of the money made this a particularly dangerous and undesirable theft. State v. Tidwell, 2009 WI App 153
, 321 Wis. 2d 596
, 774 N.W.2d 650
The market value to the telephone company of the services that a prisoner's scam fraudulently obtained was the correct measure of the value of the stolen property in this case. State v. Steffes, 2012 WI App 47
, 340 Wis. 2d 576
, 812 N.W.2d 529
There is no requirement under that at least one co-conspirator expressly promise that he or she will pay for fraudulently obtained property. Under sub. (1) (d), a false representation “includes a promise made with intent not to perform if it is part of a false and fraudulent scheme." Because “includes" is not restrictive, other conduct aside from an express promise falls under the umbrella of a “false representation." Providing fictitious business names and stolen personal identifying information to a phone company with the intent of setting up temporary phone numbers constitutes a false representation. State v. Steffes, 2013 WI 53
, 347 Wis. 2d 683
, 832 N.W.2d 101
Applied electricity that a telephone company uses to power its network is included within the definition of “property" found in sub. (2) (b). State v. Steffes, 2013 WI 53
, 347 Wis. 2d 683
, 832 N.W.2d 101
Section 971.36 (3) (a) and (4) allow for aggregation of the value of property alleged stolen when multiple acts of theft are prosecuted as one count. Reading sub. (1) (a) and s. 971.36 (3) (a) and (4) together, multiple acts of theft occurring over a period of time may, in certain circumstances, constitute one continuous offense that is not complete until the last act is completed. State v. Elverman, 2015 WI App 91
, 366 Wis. 2d 169
, 873 N.W.2d 528
In this case, the court's determination that the subcontractor did not prove its theft-by-contractor claim because the prime contractor was “solvent and always able to pay" was incorrect as a matter of law when the evidence unquestionably showed that the prime contractor retained and used the money it owed to the subcontractor to support the prime contractor's general account for payment of its own business obligations. The fact that the prime contractor, almost a year after it refused the subcontractor's first demand for payment and after the subcontractor's second demand, placed the entire contract amount into the trust account of the prime contractor's attorney amounted to little more than a continued refusal to pay the amount owed. Century Fence Co. v. American Sewer Services, Inc., 2021 WI App 75
, 399 Wis. 2d 742
, 967 N.W.2d 32
In this case, when the subcontractor undisputedly completed the job as the contract required, a question about how much work was necessary to complete the job was irrelevant to the question of what was owed to the subcontractor under the contract. The prime contractor had no legitimate ground for withholding payment simply because it, after-the-fact, may have regretted not negotiating the contract differently. There was no “bona fide" dispute. Century Fence Co. v. American Sewer Services, Inc., 2021 WI App 75
, 399 Wis. 2d 742
, 967 N.W.2d 32