

## CHAPTER 968

## COMMENCEMENT OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

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**Cross-reference:** See definitions in s. 967.02.

**968.01 Complaint. (1)** “Facsimile machine” has the meaning given in s. 134.72 (1) (a).

**(2)** The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. A person may make a complaint on information and belief. Except as provided in sub. (3), the complaint shall be made upon oath before a district attorney or judge as provided in this chapter.

**(3)** A person may comply with sub. (2) if he or she makes the oath by telephone contact with the district attorney or judge, signs the statement and immediately thereafter transmits a copy of the signed statement to the district attorney or judge using a facsimile machine. The person shall also transmit the original signed statement, without using a facsimile machine, to the district attorney or judge. If the complaint is filed, both the original and the copy shall be filed under s. 968.02 (2).

**History:** 1989 a. 336; 1995 a. 351.

While a complaint in a criminal prosecution issued subsequent to arrest does not have for its purpose authorization for the seizure of the person of the defendant, it is a jurisdictional requirement for holding him for a preliminary examination or other proceedings; accordingly, the face of the complaint and any affidavits annexed thereto must recite probable cause for defendant's detention. *State ex rel. Cullen v. Ceci*, 45 W (2d) 432, 173 NW (2d) 175.

To be constitutionally sufficient to support issuance of a warrant of arrest and show probable cause, a complaint must contain the essential facts constituting the offense charged; hence a complaint in the instant case upon which the warrant for arrest of defendant's roommate was issued was fatally defective in merely repeating the language of the statute allegedly violated. (Language in *State ex rel. Cullen v. Ceci*, 45 W (2d) 432, that evidence at the hearing may be used, withdrawn.) *State v. Williams*, 47 W (2d) 242, 177 NW (2d) 611.

As to a charge of resisting arrest, a complaint stated in statutory language is sufficient and no further facts are necessary. *State v. Smith*, 50 W (2d) 460, 184 NW (2d) 889.

A complaint is sufficient as to reliability of hearsay information where the officer making it states that it is based on a written statement of the minor victim of the offense charged. *State v. Knudson*, 51 W (2d) 270, 187 NW (2d) 321.

A complaint in a prosecution for disorderly conduct, which alleged that the defendant at a stated time and place violated 947.01 (1), by interfering with a police officer, the complainant, while he was taking another person into custody, and stated that the charge was based on the complainant's personal observations, met the test of legal sufficiency and did not lack specificity so as to invalidate his conviction. *State v. Becker*, 51 W (2d) 659, 188 NW (2d) 449.

Defendant waives objection to the sufficiency of the complaint by not objecting before or at the time he pleaded to the information. *Day v. State*, 52 W (2d) 122, 187 NW (2d) 790.

A complaint alleging that an unidentified man stole property and gave it to defendant who passed it on is insufficient in not alleging that defendant saw the theft or knew that the property was stolen. *State v. Haugen*, 52 W (2d) 791, 191 NW (2d) 12.

A complaint is not defective because based on statements to an officer which cannot be admitted at the trial because the *Miranda* warning was not given. Such an objection is waived if not raised prior to trial. *Gelhaar v. State*, 58 W (2d) 547, 207 NW (2d) 88.

To charge a defendant with the possession or sale of obscene materials the complaint must allege that the defendant knew the nature of the materials; a charge that he acted “feloniously” is insufficient to charge scienter. *State v. Schneider*, 60 W (2d) 563, 211 NW (2d) 630.

The complaint here being based on the police officer's sworn statement of what the alleged victim described as having actually happened meets the test of reliability of the informer and constituted probable cause for the magistrate to proceed with the issuance of a warrant calling for the arrest of the defendant. *Allison v. State*, 62 W (2d) 14, 214 NW (2d) 437.

An absolute privilege attached to the alleged defamatory statements made by the defendant about the plaintiff to an assistant district attorney in seeking issuance of a criminal complaint. *Bergman v. Hupy*, 64 W (2d) 747, 221 NW (2d) 898.

A criminal complaint sufficiently alleges probable cause that the defendant has committed the alleged offense when it recites that a participant in the crime has admitted his own participation and implicates the defendant, since an inference may be reasonably drawn that the participant is telling the truth. *Ruff v. State*, 65 W (2d) 713, 223 NW (2d) 446.

A complaint, alleging defendant burglarized a trailer at a construction site and based in part upon the hearsay statements of the construction foreman that tools found in defendant's automobile had been locked in the trailer, was sufficient to satisfy the two-pronged test of *Aguilar*. *Anderson v. State*, 66 W (2d) 233, 223 NW (2d) 879.

See note to 943.20, citing *Jackson v. State*, 92 W (2d) 1, 284 NW (2d) 685 (Ct. App. 1979).

In determining sufficiency of complaint, credibility of informants or witnesses is adequately tested by 2-pronged *Aguilar* standard. *State v. Marshall*, 92 W (2d) 101, 284 NW (2d) 592 (1979).

See note to 345.11, citing *State v. White*, 97 W (2d) 193, 295 NW (2d) 346 (1980). Application of Franks rule to criminal complaint discussed. *State v. Mann*, 123 W (2d) 375, 367 NW (2d) 209 (1985).

Forms similar to the uniform traffic citation which are used as complaints to initiate criminal prosecutions in certain misdemeanor cases issued by the sheriff are sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court but any conviction which results from their use in the manner described in the opinion is null and void. 968.02, 968.04, 971.01, 971.04, 971.05 and 971.08 discussed. 63 Atty. Gen. 540.

**968.02 Issuance and filing of complaints. (1)** Except as otherwise provided in this section, a complaint charging a person

with an offense shall be issued only by a district attorney of the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed. A complaint is issued when it is approved for filing by the district attorney. The approval shall be in the form of a written indorsement on the complaint.

(2) After a complaint has been issued, it shall be filed with a judge and either a warrant or summons shall be issued or the complaint shall be dismissed, pursuant to s. 968.03. Such filing commences the action.

(3) If a district attorney refuses or is unavailable to issue a complaint, a circuit judge may permit the filing of a complaint, if the judge finds there is probable cause to believe that the person to be charged has committed an offense after conducting a hearing. If the district attorney has refused to issue a complaint, he or she shall be informed of the hearing and may attend. The hearing shall be ex parte without the right of cross-examination.

(4) If the alleged violator under s. 948.55 (2) or 948.60 (2) (c) is or was the parent or guardian of a child who is injured or dies as a result of an accidental shooting, the district attorney may consider, among other factors, the impact of the injury or death on the alleged violator when deciding whether to issue a complaint regarding the alleged violation. This subsection does not restrict the factors that a district attorney may consider in deciding whether to issue a complaint regarding any alleged violation.

**History:** 1977 c. 449; 1991 a. 139.

Judge abused discretion in barring public from hearing under (3). *State ex rel. Newspapers v. Circuit Court*, 124 W (2d) 499, 370 NW (2d) 209 (1985).

Judge's order under (3) is not appealable. *Gavcus v. Maroney*, 127 W (2d) 69, 377 NW (2d) 201 (Ct. App. 1985).

Sub. (3) does not give trial court authority to order district attorney to file different or additional charges than those already brought. *Unnamed Petitioner v. Walworth Circuit Ct.*, 157 W (2d) 157, 458 NW (2d) 575 (Ct. App. 1990).

See note to 968.01, citing 63 Atty. Gen. 540.

Judicial scrutiny of prosecutorial discretion in decision not to file complaint. *Becker*. 71 MLR 749 (1988).

**968.03 Dismissal or withdrawal of complaints.** (1) If the judge does not find probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed or that the accused has committed it, the judge shall indorse such finding on the complaint and file the complaint with the clerk.

(2) An unserved warrant or summons shall, at the request of the district attorney, be returned to the judge who may dismiss the action. Such request shall be in writing, it shall state the reasons therefor in writing and shall be filed with the clerk.

(3) The dismissals in subs. (1) and (2) are without prejudice.

**History:** 1993 a. 486.

**968.04 Warrant or summons on complaint.** (1) WARRANTS. If it appears from the complaint, or from an affidavit or affidavits filed with the complaint or after an examination under oath of the complainant or witnesses, when the judge determines that this is necessary, that there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused has committed it, the judge shall issue a warrant for the arrest of the defendant or a summons in lieu thereof. The warrant or summons shall be delivered forthwith to a law enforcement officer for service.

(a) When an accused has been arrested without a warrant and is in custody or appears voluntarily before a judge, no warrant shall be issued and the complaint shall be filed forthwith with a judge.

(b) A warrant or summons may be issued by a judge in another county when there is no available judge of the county in which the complaint is issued. The warrant shall be returnable before a judge in the county in which the offense alleged in the complaint was committed, and the summons shall be returnable before the circuit court of the county in which the offense alleged in the complaint was committed.

(c) A judge may specify geographical limits for enforcement of a warrant.

(d) An examination of the complainant or witness under sub. (1) may take place by telephone on request of the person seeking the warrant or summons unless good cause to the contrary appears. The judge shall place each complainant or witness under oath and arrange for all sworn testimony to be recorded, either by a stenographic reporter or by means of a voice recording device. The judge shall have the record transcribed. The transcript, certified as accurate by the judge or reporter, as appropriate, shall be filed with the court. If the testimony was recorded by means of a voice recording device, the judge shall also file the original recording with the court.

(2) SUMMONS. (a) In any case the district attorney, after the issuance of a complaint, may issue a summons in lieu of requesting the issuance of a warrant. The complaint shall then be filed with the clerk.

(b) In misdemeanor actions where the maximum imprisonment does not exceed 6 months, the judge shall issue a summons instead of a warrant unless the judge believes that the defendant will not appear in response to a summons.

(c) If a person summoned fails to appear in response to a summons issued by a district attorney, the district attorney may proceed to file the complaint as provided in s. 968.02 and, in addition to indorsing his or her approval on the complaint, shall indorse upon the complaint the fact that the accused failed to respond to a summons.

(3) MANDATORY PROVISIONS. (a) *Warrant.* The warrant shall:

1. Be in writing and signed by the judge.
2. State the name of the crime and the section charged and number of the section alleged to have been violated.
3. Have attached to it a copy of the complaint.
4. State the name of the person to be arrested, if known, or if not known, designate the person to be arrested by any description by which the person to be arrested can be identified with reasonable certainty.
5. State the date when it was issued and the name of the judge who issued it together with the title of the judge's office.
6. Command that the person against whom the complaint was made be arrested and brought before the judge issuing the warrant, or, if the judge is absent or unable to act, before some other judge in the same county.

7. The warrant shall be in substantially the following form:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,  
 .... County  
 State of Wisconsin  
 vs.  
 .... (Defendant(s))  
 THE STATE OF WISCONSIN TO ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER:

A complaint, copy of which is attached, having been filed with me accusing the defendant(s) of committing the crime of .... contrary to sec. ...., Stats., and I having found that probable cause exists that the crime was committed by the defendant(s).

You are, therefore, commanded to arrest the defendant(s) and bring .... before me, or, if I am not available, before some other judge of this county.

Dated ....., .... (year)

....(Signature)

....(Title)

8. The complaint and warrant may be on the same form. The warrant shall be beneath the complaint. If separate forms are used, a copy of the complaint shall be attached to the warrant.

(b) *Summons.* 1. The summons shall command the defendant to appear before a court at a certain time and place and shall be in substantially the form set forth in subd. 3.

2. A summons may be served anywhere in the state and it shall be served by delivering a copy to the defendant personally or by leaving a copy at the defendant's usual place of abode with a person of discretion residing therein or by mailing a copy to the defendant's last-known address. It shall be served by a law enforcement officer.

3. The summons shall be in substantially the following form:

a. When issued by a judge:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

.... County

State of Wisconsin

vs.

.... (Defendant)

THE STATE OF WISCONSIN TO SAID DEFENDANT:

A complaint, copy of which is attached, having been filed with me accusing the defendant of committing the crime of .... contrary to sec. ...., Stats., and I having found that probable cause exists that the crime was committed by the defendant.

You, ....., are, therefore, summoned to appear before Branch .... of the .... court of .... County at the courthouse in the City of .... to answer said complaint, on ....., .... (year) at .... o'clock in the .... noon, and in case of your failure to appear, a warrant for your arrest will be issued.

Dated ....., .... (year)

....(Signature)

....(Title)

b. When issued by a district attorney:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

.... County

State of Wisconsin

vs.

.... (Defendant)

THE STATE OF WISCONSIN TO SAID DEFENDANT:

A complaint, copy of which is attached, having been made before me accusing the defendant of committing the crime of .... contrary to sec. ...., Stats.

You, ....., are, therefore, summoned to appear before Branch .... of the .... court of .... County at the courthouse in the City of .... to answer said complaint, on ....., .... (year), at .... o'clock in the .... noon, and in case of your failure to appear, a warrant for your arrest may be issued.

Dated ....., .... (year)

.... (Signature)

.... District Attorney

4. The complaint and summons may be on the same form. The summons shall be beneath the complaint. If separate forms are used, a copy of the complaint shall be attached to the summons.

**(4) SERVICE.** (a) The warrant shall be directed to all law enforcement officers of the state. A warrant may be served anywhere in the state.

(b) A warrant is served by arresting the defendant and informing the defendant as soon as practicable of the nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged.

(c) An arrest may be made by a law enforcement officer without a warrant in the law enforcement officer's possession when the law enforcement officer has knowledge that a warrant has been issued. In such case, the officer shall inform the defendant as soon as practicable of the nature of the crime with which the defendant is charged.

(d) The law enforcement officer arresting a defendant shall indorse upon the warrant the time and place of the arrest and the law enforcement officer's fees and mileage therefor.

**History:** 1973 c. 12; 1975 c. 39, 41, 199; 1977 c. 449 ss. 480, 497; 1983 a. 535; Sup. Ct. Order, 141 W (2d) xiii (1987); 1987 a. 151; 1993 a. 486; 1997 a. 250.

**Judicial Council Note, 1988:** Sub. (1) (d) permits an arrest warrant or summons to be issued upon the basis of sworn recorded testimony received by telephone on

request of the person seeking the warrant or summons unless good cause to the contrary appears. The telephone procedure permits faster processing of the application, while preserving a record of the basis for subsequent review. [Re Order effective Jan. 1, 1988]

See note to 968.01, citing *State v. Williams*, 47 W (2d) 242, 177 NW (2d) 611.

A warrant was properly issued upon sworn testimony of a sheriff that an accomplice had confessed and implicated defendant, since reliable hearsay is permitted and a confession is not inherently untrustworthy. *Okrasinski v. State*, 51 W (2d) 210, 186 NW (2d) 314.

Where complaint alleged that reliable informant procured sample of drugs from defendant's apartment, inference that informant observed defendant's possession of controlled substance satisfied Aguilar test. *Scott v. State*, 73 W (2d) 504, 243 NW (2d) 215.

**968.05 Corporations or limited liability companies: summons in criminal cases. (1)** When a corporation or limited liability company is charged with the commission of a criminal offense, the judge or district attorney shall issue a summons setting forth the nature of the offense and commanding the corporation or limited liability company to appear before a court at a specific time and place.

**(2)** The summons for the appearance of a corporation or limited liability company may be served as provided for service of a summons upon a corporation or limited liability company in a civil action. The summons shall be returnable not less than 10 days after service.

**History:** 1993 a. 112.

**Cross-reference:** See s. 973.17 for provision for default judgment against a corporation.

**968.06 Indictment by grand jury.** Upon indictment by a grand jury a complaint shall be issued, as provided by s. 968.02, upon the person named in the indictment and the person shall be entitled to a preliminary hearing under s. 970.03, and all proceedings thereafter shall be the same as if the person had been initially charged under s. 968.02 and had not been indicted by a grand jury.

**History:** 1979 c. 291.

**968.07 Arrest by a law enforcement officer. (1)** A law enforcement officer may arrest a person when:

(a) The law enforcement officer has a warrant commanding that such person be arrested; or

(b) The law enforcement officer believes, on reasonable grounds, that a warrant for the person's arrest has been issued in this state; or

(c) The law enforcement officer believes, on reasonable grounds, that a felony warrant for the person's arrest has been issued in another state; or

(d) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed a crime.

**(2)** A law enforcement officer making a lawful arrest may command the aid of any person, and such person shall have the same power as that of the law enforcement officer.

**(3)** If the alleged violator under s. 948.55 (2) or 948.60 (2) (c) is or was the parent or guardian of a child who is injured or dies as a result of an accidental shooting, no law enforcement officer may arrest the alleged violator until at least 7 days after the date of the shooting.

**History:** 1991 a. 139; 1993 a. 486.

If police have probable cause for arrest without a warrant they may break down a door to effect the arrest after announcing their purpose in demanding admission. The remedy for excessive force is not dismissal of the criminal charge. *Nadolinski v. State*, 46 W (2d) 259, 174 NW (2d) 483.

An arrest based solely on evidence discovered after an illegal search is invalid. *State ex rel. Furlong v. Waukesha County Court*, 47 W (2d) 515, 177 NW (2d) 333.

While probable cause for an arrest without a warrant requires that an officer have more than a mere suspicion, he does not need the same quantum of evidence necessary for conviction, but only information which would lead a reasonable officer to believe that guilt is more than a possibility, which information can be based in part on hearsay. *State v. DiMaggio*, 49 W (2d) 565, 182 NW (2d) 466.

An officer need not have a warrant in his possession to make a valid arrest. *Schill v. State*, 50 W (2d) 473, 184 NW (2d) 858.

An arrest is valid where defendant, when approached by the officer, volunteered the statement that he assumed they would be looking for him because he had been the last person to see the victim alive. *Schenk v. State*, 51 W (2d) 600, 187 NW (2d) 853.

Police have grounds to arrest without a warrant where they have information from a reliable informer that a crime is to be committed, where they check the information

and where defendants attempt to escape when stopped. *Molina v. State*, 53 W (2d) 662, 193 NW (2d) 874.

A person is not under arrest and the officer is not attempting an arrest, so far as the right to use force is concerned, until the person knows or should know that the person restraining or attempting to restrain him is an officer. *Celmer v. Quarberg*, 56 W (2d) 581, 203 NW (2d) 45.

An arrest pursuant to a valid warrant is legal even though the officer entered defendant's home without warning or knocking, and therefore the court had personal jurisdiction. *State v. Monsoor*, 56 W (2d) 689, 203 NW (2d) 20.

The fact that a witness had identified defendant by photograph was sufficient to support an arrest even though the witness was not allowed to identify him at the trial. *State v. Wallace*, 59 W (2d) 66, 207 NW (2d) 855.

See note to Art. I, sec. 11, citing *State v. Taylor*, 60 W (2d) 506, 210 NW (2d) 873.

Enforcement officers may make constitutionally valid arrests without warrants under (1) (d) where they have reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime. *Rinehart v. State*, 63 W (2d) 760, 218 NW (2d) 323.

The police force is considered as a unit. Where there is police–channeled communication to the arresting officer and he acts in good faith, the arrest is based on probable cause when facts exist within the police department. *State v. Shears*, 68 W (2d) 217, 229 NW (2d) 103.

Where bags were heavy and contained brick–like objects obtained in overnight trip and where defendant's house was under surveillance, there was probable cause for arrest for possession of marijuana. *State v. Phelps*, 73 W (2d) 313, 243 NW (2d) 213.

Test under (1) (d) is whether arresting officer could have obtained warrant on the basis of information known prior to arrest. Police may rely on eyewitness report of citizen informer. *Loveday v. State*, 74 W (2d) 503, 247 NW (2d) 116.

See note to 66.12, citing *City of Madison v. Ricky Two Crow*, 88 W (2d) 156, 276 NW (2d) 359 (Ct. App. 1979).

See note to Art. I, sec. 11, citing *State v. Lee*, 97 W (2d) 679, 294 NW (2d) 547 (Ct. App. 1980).

Arrest by out–of–state police was valid citizen's arrest. *State v. Slawek*, 114 W (2d) 332, 338 NW (2d) 120 (Ct. App. 1983).

See note to Art. I, sec. 11, citing *State v. Rodgers*, 119 W (2d) 102, 349 NW (2d) 453 (1984).

Municipal police may arrest and detain a person for whom another municipality in another county has issued a civil arrest warrant. 61 Atty. Gen. 275.

City policeman is law enforcement officer and traffic officer within 345.22. 61 Atty. Gen. 419.

### 968.075 Domestic abuse incidents; arrest and prosecution. (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section:

(a) "Domestic abuse" means any of the following engaged in by an adult person against his or her spouse or former spouse, against an adult with whom the person resides or formerly resided or against an adult with whom the person has a child in common:

1. Intentional infliction of physical pain, physical injury or illness.
2. Intentional impairment of physical condition.
3. A violation of s. 940.225 (1), (2) or (3).
4. A physical act that may cause the other person reasonably to fear imminent engagement in the conduct described under subd. 1., 2. or 3.

(b) "Law enforcement agency" has the meaning specified in s. 165.83 (1) (b).

(2) CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING ARREST. (a) Notwithstanding s. 968.07 and except as provided in par. (b), a law enforcement officer shall arrest and take a person into custody if:

1. The officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed domestic abuse and that the person's actions constitute the commission of a crime; and
2. Either or both of the following circumstances are present:
  - a. The officer has a reasonable basis for believing that continuing domestic abuse against the alleged victim is likely.
  - b. There is evidence of physical injury to the alleged victim.

(b) If the officer's reasonable grounds for belief under par. (a) 1. are based on a report of an alleged domestic abuse incident, the officer is required to make an arrest under par. (a) only if the report is received, within 28 days after the day the incident is alleged to have occurred, by the officer or the law enforcement agency that employs the officer.

(3) LAW ENFORCEMENT POLICIES. (a) Each law enforcement agency shall develop, adopt and implement written policies regarding arrest procedures for domestic abuse incidents. The policies shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

1. Statements emphasizing that:
  - a. In most circumstances, other than those under sub. (2), a law enforcement officer should arrest and take a person into cus-

tody if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has committed domestic abuse and that the person's actions constitute the commission of a crime.

b. When the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that spouses, former spouses or other persons who reside together or formerly resided together are committing or have committed domestic abuse against each other, the officer does not have to arrest both persons, but should arrest the person whom the officer believes to be the primary physical aggressor. In determining who is the primary physical aggressor, an officer should consider the intent of this section to protect victims of domestic violence, the relative degree of injury or fear inflicted on the persons involved and any history of domestic abuse between these persons, if that history can reasonably be ascertained by the officer.

c. A law enforcement officer's decision as to whether or not to arrest under this section may not be based on the consent of the victim to any subsequent prosecution or on the relationship of the persons involved in the incident.

d. A law enforcement officer's decision not to arrest under this section may not be based solely upon the absence of visible indications of injury or impairment.

2. A procedure for the written report and referral required under sub. (4).

3. A procedure for notifying the alleged victim of the incident of the provisions in sub. (5), the procedure for releasing the arrested person and the likelihood and probable time of the arrested person's release.

(b) In the development of these policies, each law enforcement agency is encouraged to consult with community organizations and other law enforcement agencies with expertise in the recognition and handling of domestic abuse incidents.

(c) This subsection does not limit the authority of a law enforcement agency to establish policies that require arrests under more circumstances than those set forth in sub. (2).

(4) REPORT REQUIRED WHERE NO ARREST. If a law enforcement officer does not make an arrest under this section when the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a person is committing or has committed domestic abuse and that person's acts constitute the commission of a crime, the officer shall prepare a written report stating why the person was not arrested. The report shall be sent to the district attorney's office, in the county where the acts took place, immediately after investigation of the incident has been completed. The district attorney shall review the report to determine whether the person involved in the incident should be charged with the commission of a crime.

(5) CONTACT PROHIBITION. (a) 1. Unless there is a waiver under par. (c), during the 72 hours immediately following an arrest for a domestic abuse incident, the arrested person shall avoid the residence of the alleged victim of the domestic abuse incident and, if applicable, any premises temporarily occupied by the alleged victim, and avoid contacting or causing any person, other than law enforcement officers and attorneys for the arrested person and alleged victim, to contact the alleged victim.

2. An arrested person who intentionally violates this paragraph shall be required to forfeit not more than \$1,000.

(b) 1. Unless there is a waiver under par. (c), a law enforcement officer or other person who releases a person arrested for a domestic abuse incident from custody less than 72 hours after the arrest shall inform the arrested person orally and in writing of the requirements under par. (a), the consequences of violating the requirements and the provisions of s. 939.621. The arrested person shall sign an acknowledgment on the written notice that he or she has received notice of, and understands the requirements, the consequences of violating the requirements and the provisions of s. 939.621. If the arrested person refuses to sign the notice, he or she may not be released from custody.

2. If there is a waiver under par. (c) and the person is released under subd. 1., the law enforcement officer or other person who

releases the arrested person shall inform the arrested person orally and in writing of the waiver and the provisions of s. 939.621.

3. Failure to comply with the notice requirement under subd. 1. regarding a person who is lawfully released from custody bars a prosecution under par. (a), but does not affect the application of s. 939.621 in any criminal prosecution.

(c) At any time during the 72-hour period specified in par. (a), the alleged victim may sign a written waiver of the requirements in par. (a). The law enforcement agency shall have a waiver form available.

(d) The law enforcement agency responsible for the arrest of a person for a domestic abuse incident shall notify the alleged victim of the requirements under par. (a) and the possibility of, procedure for and effect of a waiver under par. (c).

(e) Notwithstanding s. 968.07, a law enforcement officer shall arrest and take a person into custody if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has violated par. (a).

**(6) CONDITIONAL RELEASE.** A person arrested and taken into custody for a domestic abuse incident is eligible for conditional release. Unless there is a waiver under sub. (5) (c), as part of the conditions of any such release that occurs during the 72 hours immediately following such an arrest, the person shall be required to comply with the requirements under sub. (5) (a) and to sign the acknowledgment under sub. (5) (b). The arrested person's release shall be conditioned upon his or her signed agreement to refrain from any threats or acts of domestic abuse against the alleged victim or other person.

**(6m) OFFICER IMMUNITY.** A law enforcement officer is immune from civil and criminal liability arising out of a decision by the officer to arrest or not arrest an alleged offender, if the decision is made in a good faith effort to comply with this section.

**(7) PROSECUTION POLICIES.** Each district attorney's office shall develop, adopt and implement written policies encouraging the prosecution of domestic abuse offenses. The policies shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) A policy indicating that a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute a domestic abuse incident should not be based:

1. Solely upon the absence of visible indications of injury or impairment;
2. Upon the victim's consent to any subsequent prosecution of the other person involved in the incident; or
3. Upon the relationship of the persons involved in the incident.

(b) A policy indicating that when any domestic abuse incident is reported to the district attorney's office, including a report made under sub. (4), a charging decision by the district attorney should, absent extraordinary circumstances, be made not later than 2 weeks after the district attorney has received notice of the incident.

**(8) EDUCATION AND TRAINING.** Any education and training by the law enforcement agency relating to the handling of domestic abuse complaints shall stress enforcement of criminal laws in domestic abuse incidents and protection of the alleged victim. Law enforcement agencies and community organizations with expertise in the recognition and handling of domestic abuse incidents shall cooperate in all aspects of the training.

**(9) ANNUAL REPORT.** (a) Each district attorney shall submit an annual report to the department of justice listing all of the following:

1. The number of arrests for domestic abuse incidents in his or her county as compiled and furnished by the law enforcement agencies within the county.
2. The number of subsequent prosecutions and convictions of the persons arrested for domestic abuse incidents.

(b) The listing of the number of arrests, prosecutions and convictions under par. (a) shall include categories by statutory reference to the offense involved and include totals for all categories.

History: 1987 a. 346; 1989 a. 293; 1993 a. 319; 1995 a. 304.

**NOTE: 1987 Wis. Act 346, which created this section, states the legislative intent and purpose in section 1 of the Act.**

Questions by officer prior to arrest to determine which spouse is primary physical aggressor under sub. (3) (a) 1. b. are investigatory and *Miranda* warnings are not required where defendant is not deprived of freedom or questioned in coercive environment. *State v. Lepich*, 160 W (2d) 472, 465 NW (2d) 844 (Ct. App. 1991).

Warrantless arrest and detention for bail jumping, 946.49, is authorized if probable cause exists that the arrestee violated the contact prohibition in (5) (a) 1 after being released under ch. 969. 78 Atty. Gen. 177.

This section applies to roommates living in university residence halls, whether privately or state owned. If criteria requiring arrest under (2) exist, law enforcement officer must make custodial arrest. 79 Atty. Gen. 109.

**968.08 Release by law enforcement officer of arrested person.** A law enforcement officer having custody of a person arrested without a warrant may release the person arrested without requiring the person to appear before a judge if the law enforcement officer is satisfied that there are insufficient grounds for the issuance of a criminal complaint against the person arrested.

History: 1993 a. 486.

**968.085 Citation; nature; issuance; release of accused. (1) NATURE.** A citation under this section is a directive, issued by a law enforcement officer, that a person appear in court and answer criminal charges. A citation is not a criminal complaint and may not be used as a substitute for a criminal complaint.

**(2) AUTHORITY TO ISSUE; EFFECT.** A law enforcement officer may issue a citation to any person whom he or she has reasonable grounds to believe has committed a misdemeanor. A citation may be issued in the field or at the headquarters or precinct station of the officer instead of or subsequent to a lawful arrest. If a citation is issued, the person cited shall be released on his or her own recognizance. In determining whether to issue a citation, the law enforcement officer may consider whether:

- (a) The accused has given proper identification.
- (b) The accused is willing to sign the citation.
- (c) The accused appears to represent a danger of harm to himself or herself, another person or property.
- (d) The accused can show sufficient evidence of ties to the community.
- (e) The accused has previously failed to appear or failed to respond to a citation.
- (f) Arrest or further detention appears necessary to carry out legitimate investigative action in accordance with law enforcement agency policies.

**(3) CONTENTS.** The citation shall do all of the following:

- (a) Identify the offense and section which the person is alleged to have violated, including the date, and if material, identify the property and other persons involved.
- (b) Contain the name and address of the person cited, or other identification if that cannot be ascertained.
- (c) Identify the officer issuing the citation.
- (d) Direct the person cited to appear for his or her initial appearance in a designated court, at a designated time and date.

**(4) SERVICE.** A copy of the citation shall be delivered to the person cited, and the original must be filed with the district attorney.

**(5) REVIEW BY DISTRICT ATTORNEY.** If the district attorney declines to prosecute, he or she shall notify the law enforcement agency which issued the citation. The law enforcement agency shall attempt to notify the person cited that he or she will not be charged and is not required to appear as directed in the citation.

**(6) CITATION NO BAR TO CRIMINAL SUMMONS OR WARRANT.** The prior issuance of a citation does not bar the issuance of a summons or a warrant for the same offense.

**(7) PREPARATION OF FORM.** The judicial conference shall prescribe the form and content of the citation under s. 758.171.

History: 1983 a. 433.

**968.09 Warrant on failure to appear. (1)** When a defendant or a witness fails to appear before the court as required, or

violates a term of the defendant's or witness's bond or the defendant's or witness's probation, if any, the court may issue a bench warrant for the defendant's or witness's arrest which shall direct that the defendant or witness be brought before the court without unreasonable delay. The court shall state on the record at the time of issuance of the bench warrant the reason therefor.

(2) Prior to the defendant's appearance in court after the defendant's arrest under sub. (1), ch. 969 shall not apply.

**History:** 1971 c. 298; 1993 a. 486.

A bench warrant may be directed to all law enforcement officers in the state without regard to whether the defendant is charged with violation of a state statute or county ordinance. The form of the warrant should be as suggested by 968.04 (3) (a) 7. 62 Atty. Gen. 208.

See note to 66.119, citing 70 Atty. Gen. 280.

**968.10 Searches and seizures; when authorized.** A search of a person, object or place may be made and things may be seized when the search is made:

- (1) Incident to a lawful arrest;
- (2) With consent;
- (3) Pursuant to a valid search warrant;
- (4) With the authority and within the scope of a right of lawful inspection;
- (5) Pursuant to a search during an authorized temporary questioning as provided in s. 968.25; or
- (6) As otherwise authorized by law.

Totality of circumstances justified search for concealed weapon. *Penister v. State*, 74 W (2d) 94, 246 NW (2d) 115.

See note to Art. I, sec. 11, citing *Kelly v. State*, 75 W (2d) 303.

**968.11 Scope of search incident to lawful arrest.** When a lawful arrest is made, a law enforcement officer may reasonably search the person arrested and an area within such person's immediate presence for the purpose of:

- (1) Protecting the officer from attack;
- (2) Preventing the person from escaping;
- (3) Discovering and seizing the fruits of the crime; or
- (4) Discovering and seizing any instruments, articles or things which may have been used in the commission of, or which may constitute evidence of, the offense.

Automobile search consistent with *Belton* does not violate this section. This section does not require proof of officer's subjective intent when conducting search incident to arrest. *State v. Fry*, 131 W (2d) 153, 388 NW (2d) 565 (1986).

See note to Art. I, s. 11, citing *State v. Tompkins*, 144 W (2d) 116, 423 NW (2d) 823 (1988).

**968.12 Search warrant. (1) DESCRIPTION AND ISSUANCE.** A search warrant is an order signed by a judge directing a law enforcement officer to conduct a search of a designated person, a designated object or a designated place for the purpose of seizing designated property or kinds of property. A judge shall issue a search warrant if probable cause is shown.

(2) **WARRANT UPON AFFIDAVIT.** A search warrant may be based upon sworn complaint or affidavit, or testimony recorded by a phonographic reporter or under sub. (3) (d), showing probable cause therefor. The complaint, affidavit or testimony may be upon information and belief.

(3) **WARRANT UPON ORAL TESTIMONY.** (a) *General rule.* A search warrant may be based upon sworn oral testimony communicated to the judge by telephone, radio or other means of electronic communication, under the procedure prescribed in this subsection.

(b) *Application.* The person who is requesting the warrant shall prepare a duplicate original warrant and read the duplicate original warrant, verbatim, to the judge. The judge shall enter, verbatim, what is read on the original warrant. The judge may direct that the warrant be modified.

(c) *Issuance.* If the judge determines that there is probable cause for the warrant, the judge shall order the issuance of a warrant by directing the person requesting the warrant to sign the judge's name on the duplicate original warrant. In addition, the person shall sign his or her own name on the duplicate original

warrant. The judge shall immediately sign the original warrant and enter on the face of the original warrant the exact time when the warrant was ordered to be issued. The finding of probable cause for a warrant upon oral testimony shall be based on the same kind of evidence as is sufficient for a warrant upon affidavit.

(d) *Recording and certification of testimony.* When a caller informs the judge that the purpose of the call is to request a warrant, the judge shall place under oath each person whose testimony forms a basis of the application and each person applying for the warrant. The judge or requesting person shall arrange for all sworn testimony to be recorded either by a stenographic reporter or by means of a voice recording device. The judge shall have the record transcribed. The transcript, certified as accurate by the judge or reporter, as appropriate, shall be filed with the court. If the testimony was recorded by means of a voice recording device, the judge shall also file the original recording with the court.

(e) *Contents.* The contents of a warrant upon oral testimony shall be the same as the contents of a warrant upon affidavit.

(f) *Entry of time of execution.* The person who executes the warrant shall enter the exact time of execution on the face of the duplicate original warrant.

(4) **LOCATION OF SEARCH.** A search warrant may authorize a search to be conducted anywhere in the state and may be executed pursuant to its terms anywhere in the state.

**History:** 1971 c. 298; 1983 a. 443; Sup. Ct. Order, 141 W (2d) xiii (1987).

**Judicial Council Note, 1988:** Sub. (2) is amended to eliminate the preference for written affidavits as the basis for search warrants. Telephoned testimony allows faster response and the transcribed record is no less adequate for review.

Sub. (3) (a) is amended to eliminate the preference for written affidavits as the basis for search warrants. Telephoned testimony allows faster response and the transcribed record is no less adequate for review.

Sub. (3) (c) is amended to eliminate the preference for written affidavits as the basis for search warrants. Telephoned testimony allows faster response and the transcribed record is no less adequate for review.

Sub. (3) (d) is amended to authorize that the testimony be recorded either by a stenographic reporter or a voice recording device. [Re Order effective Jan. 1, 1988]

**968.13 Search warrant; property subject to seizure.**

(1) A search warrant may authorize the seizure of the following:

(a) Contraband, which includes without limitation because of enumeration lottery tickets, gambling machines or other gambling devices, lewd, obscene or indecent written matter, pictures, sound recordings or motion picture films, forged money or written instruments and the tools, dies, machines or materials for making them, and controlled substances, as defined in s. 961.01 (4), and controlled substance analogs, as defined in s. 961.01 (4m), and the implements for smoking or injecting them. Gambling machines or other gambling devices possessed by a shipbuilding business that complies with s. 945.095 are not subject to this section.

(b) Anything which is the fruit of or has been used in the commission of any crime.

(c) Anything other than documents which may constitute evidence of any crime.

(d) Documents which may constitute evidence of any crime, if probable cause is shown that the documents are under the control of a person who is reasonably suspected to be concerned in the commission of that crime under s. 939.05 (2).

(2) In this section, "documents" includes, but is not limited to, books, papers, records, recordings, tapes, photographs, films or computer or electronic data.

**History:** 1971 c. 219; 1979 c. 81; 1995 a. 11, 448.

An adversary hearing is not necessary for the seizure of a limited quantity of obscene material as evidence but is necessary before more than evidentiary copies are seized. *State ex rel. Howard v. O'Connell*, 53 W (2d) 248, 192 NW (2d) 201.

**968.135 Subpoena for documents.** Upon the request of the attorney general or a district attorney and upon a showing of probable cause under s. 968.12, a court shall issue a subpoena requiring the production of documents, as specified in s. 968.13 (2). The documents shall be returnable to the court which issued the subpoena. Motions to the court, including, but not limited to, motions to quash or limit the subpoena, shall be addressed to the court which issued the subpoena. Any person who unlawfully

refuses to produce the documents may be compelled to do so as provided in ch. 785. This section does not limit or affect any other subpoena authority provided by law.

**History:** 1979 c. 81, 177; 1983 a. 443 s. 4.

Bank's voluntary surrender of records other than those demanded on the subpoena provides no basis for suppression. *State v. Swift*, 173 W (2d) 870, 496 NW (2d) 713 (Ct. App. 1993).

**968.14 Use of force.** All necessary force may be used to execute a search warrant or to effect any entry into any building or property or part thereof to execute a search warrant.

See note to Art. I, sec. 11, citing *State v. Meier*, 60 W (2d) 452, 210 NW (2d) 685.

Where a warrant is issued to search a residence for evidence of drug dealing, exigent circumstances exist to allow police to execute a "no knock" search. *State v. Stevens*, 181 W (2d) 410, 511 NW (2d) 591 (1994).

Exigent circumstances are always present in the execution of search warrants involving felonious drug delivery. In such case police are not required to adhere to the rule of announcement when executing such a warrant. *State v. Richards*, 201 W 92d) 839, 569 NW (2d) 218 (1996).

**968.15 Search warrants; when executable. (1)** A search warrant must be executed and returned not more than 5 days after the date of issuance.

**(2)** Any search warrant not executed within the time provided in sub. (1) shall be void and shall be returned to the judge issuing it.

Execution of search warrant is timely if in compliance with (1) and if probable cause which led to issuance still exists at time of execution. Defense has burden of proof in timeliness challenge. *State v. Edwards*, 98 W (2d) 367, 297 NW (2d) 12 (1980).

**968.16 Detention and search of persons on premises.** The person executing the search warrant may reasonably detain and search any person on the premises at the time to protect himself or herself from attack or to prevent the disposal or concealment of any item particularly described in the search warrant.

**History:** 1993 a. 486.

Defendant had sufficient control and dominion over car for it to be considered "premises," justifying search of defendant. *State v. Reed*, 156 W (2d) 546, 457 NW (2d) 494 (Ct. App. 1990).

See note to Article I, Section 11 citing *State v. Jeter*, 160 W (2d) 333, 466 NW (2d) 211 (Ct. App. 1991).

Frisk of person not named in search warrant during execution of warrant was reasonable where occupants of the residence were very likely to be involved in drug trafficking; drugs felt in a pocket during the frisk were lawfully seized where the officer had probable cause to believe there was a connection between what was felt and criminal activity. *State v. Guy*, 172 W (2d) 86, 492 NW (2d) 311 (1992).

**968.17 Return of search warrant. (1)** The return of the search warrant shall be made within 48 hours after execution to the clerk designated in the warrant. The return shall be accompanied by a written inventory of any property taken. Upon request, the clerk shall deliver a copy of the inventory to the person from whom or from whose premises the property was taken and to the applicant for the search warrant.

**(2)** An affidavit or complaint made in support of the issuance of the warrant and the transcript of any testimony taken shall be filed with the clerk within 5 days after the date of the execution of any search warrant.

**History:** 1971 c. 298.

In computing the time within which a search warrant must be returned, the court may exclude the hours between 4:30 Friday and 8 A.M. Monday. Such a delay would not affect the validity of the search. *State v. Meier*, 60 W (2d) 452, 210 NW (2d) 685.

The trial court erred in suppressing controlled substances and associated paraphernalia seized pursuant to search warrant on the ground that a transcript of testimony upon which the warrant was based was not filed within 5 days of its execution, as required by (2), because: (1) 968.22 provides that no evidence seized under search warrant be suppressed due to technical irregularities not affecting defendant's substantial rights; (2) the 5-day filing requirement is a ministerial duty, a violation of which does not invalidate a search absent prejudice; and (3) there was no prejudice where the transcript was filed approximately 6 weeks prior to the filing of the information, before which defendant was statutorily precluded from making any motion to suppress. *State v. Elam*, 68 W (2d) 614, 229 NW (2d) 664.

**968.18 Receipt for seized property.** Any law enforcement officer seizing any items without a search warrant shall give a receipt as soon as practicable to the person from whose possession they are taken. Failure to give such receipt shall not render the evidence seized inadmissible upon a trial.

**968.19 Custody of property seized.** Property seized under a search warrant or validly seized without a warrant shall be safely kept by the officer, who may leave it in the custody of the sheriff and take a receipt therefor, so long as necessary for the purpose of being produced as evidence on any trial.

**968.20 Return of property seized. (1)** Any person claiming the right to possession of property seized pursuant to a search warrant or seized without a search warrant may apply for its return to the circuit court for the county in which the property was seized or where the search warrant was returned. The court shall order such notice as it deems adequate to be given the district attorney and all persons who have or may have an interest in the property and shall hold a hearing to hear all claims to its true ownership. If the right to possession is proved to the court's satisfaction, it shall order the property, other than contraband or property covered under sub. (1m) or (1r) or s. 951.165, returned if:

**NOTE:** Sub. (1) (intro.) is amended eff. 12-1-99 by 1997 Wis. Act 192 to read:

**(1)** Any person claiming the right to possession of property seized pursuant to a search warrant or seized without a search warrant may apply for its return to the circuit court for the county in which the property was seized or where the search warrant was returned. The court shall order such notice as it deems adequate to be given the district attorney and all persons who have or may have an interest in the property and shall hold a hearing to hear all claims to its true ownership. If the right to possession is proved to the court's satisfaction, it shall order the property, other than contraband or property covered under sub. (1m) or (1r) or s. 173.12 or 173.21 (4) (b), returned if:

(a) The property is not needed as evidence or, if needed, satisfactory arrangements can be made for its return for subsequent use as evidence; or

(b) All proceedings in which it might be required have been completed.

**(1m)** (a) In this subsection:

1. "Crime" includes an act committed by a juvenile or incompetent adult which would have been a crime if the act had been committed by a competent adult.

2. "Dangerous weapon" has the meaning given in s. 939.22 (10).

(b) If the seized property is a dangerous weapon or ammunition, the property shall not be returned to any person who committed a crime involving the use of the dangerous weapon or the ammunition. The property may be returned to the rightful owner under this section if the owner had no prior knowledge of and gave no consent to the commission of the crime. Property which may not be returned to an owner under this subsection shall be disposed of under subs. (3) and (4).

**(1r)** If the seized property is a firearm seized under s. 51.20 (13) (cv), the court that issued that order shall order the firearm returned if the prohibition under s. 51.20 (13) (cv) 1. has been canceled under s. 51.20 (13) (cv) 2. or (16) (gm).

**(2)** Property not required for evidence or use in further investigation, unless contraband or property covered under sub. (1m) or (1r) or s. 951.165, may be returned by the officer to the person from whom it was seized without the requirement of a hearing.

**NOTE:** Sub. (2) is amended eff. 12-1-99 by 1997 Wis. Act 192 to read:

**(2)** Property not required for evidence or use in further investigation, unless contraband or property covered under sub. (1m) or (1r) or s. 173.12, may be returned by the officer to the person from whom it was seized without the requirement of a hearing.

**(3)** (a) First class cities shall dispose of dangerous weapons or ammunition seized 12 months after taking possession of them if the owner, authorized under sub. (1m), has not requested their return and if the dangerous weapon or ammunition is not required for evidence or use in further investigation and has not been disposed of pursuant to a court order at the completion of a criminal action or proceeding. Disposition procedures shall be established by ordinance or resolution and may include provisions authorizing an attempt to return to the rightful owner any dangerous weapons or ammunition which appear to be stolen or are reported stolen. If enacted, any such provision shall include a presumption that if the dangerous weapons or ammunition appear to be or are reported stolen an attempt will be made to return the dangerous

weapons or ammunition to the authorized rightful owner. If the return of a seized dangerous weapon other than a firearm is not requested by its rightful owner under sub. (1) and is not returned by the officer under sub. (2), the city shall safely dispose of the dangerous weapon or, if the dangerous weapon is a motor vehicle, as defined in s. 340.01 (35), sell the motor vehicle following the procedure under s. 973.075 (4) or authorize a law enforcement agency to retain and use the motor vehicle. If the return of a seized firearm or ammunition is not requested by its authorized rightful owner under sub. (1) and is not returned by the officer under sub. (2), the seized firearm or ammunition shall be shipped to and become property of the state crime laboratories. A person designated by the department of justice may destroy any material for which the laboratory has no use or arrange for the exchange of material with other public agencies. In lieu of destruction, shoulder weapons for which the laboratories have no use shall be turned over to the department of natural resources for sale and distribution of proceeds under s. 29.934.

(b) Except as provided in par. (a) or sub. (1m) or (4), a city, village, town or county or other custodian of a seized dangerous weapon or ammunition, if the dangerous weapon or ammunition is not required for evidence or use in further investigation and has not been disposed of pursuant to a court order at the completion of a criminal action or proceeding, shall make reasonable efforts to notify all persons who have or may have an authorized rightful interest in the dangerous weapon or ammunition of the application requirements under sub. (1). If, within 30 days after the notice, an application under sub. (1) is not made and the seized dangerous weapon or ammunition is not returned by the officer under sub. (2), the city, village, town or county or other custodian may retain the dangerous weapon or ammunition and authorize its use by a law enforcement agency, except that a dangerous weapon used in the commission of a homicide or a handgun, as defined in s. 175.35 (1) (b), may not be retained. If a dangerous weapon other than a firearm is not so retained, the city, village, town or county or other custodian shall safely dispose of the dangerous weapon or, if the dangerous weapon is a motor vehicle, as defined in s. 340.01 (35), sell the motor vehicle following the procedure under s. 973.075 (4). If a firearm or ammunition is not so retained, the city, village, town or county or other custodian shall ship it to the state crime laboratories and it is then the property of the laboratories. A person designated by the department of justice may destroy any material for which the laboratories have no use or arrange for the exchange of material with other public agencies. In lieu of destruction, shoulder weapons for which the laboratory has no use shall be turned over to the department of natural resources for sale and distribution of proceeds under s. 29.934.

(4) Any property seized which poses a danger to life or other property in storage, transportation or use and which is not required for evidence or further investigation shall be safely disposed of upon command of the person in whose custody they are committed. The city, village, town or county shall by ordinance or resolution establish disposal procedures. Procedures may include provisions authorizing an attempt to return to the rightful owner substances which have a commercial value in normal business usage and do not pose an immediate threat to life or property. If enacted, any such provision shall include a presumption that if the substance appears to be or is reported stolen an attempt will be made to return the substance to the rightful owner.

**History:** 1977 c. 260; 1977 c. 449 s. 497; 1979 c. 221; 1981 c. 160; 1983 a. 189 s. 329 (3); 1983 a. 278; 1985 a. 29 ss. 2447 to 2449, 3200 (35); 1987 a. 203; 1987 a. 332 s. 64; 1993 a. 90, 196; 1996 a. 157; 1997 a. 192, 248.

Claimant of property seized has the burden of showing that it is not contraband and is not needed as evidence in a possible retrial. Money may be applied to the payment of counsel fees. *Welter v. Sauk County Clerk of Court*, 53 W (2d) 178, 191 NW (2d) 852.

Under (1m) (b) term "rightful owner" refers to innocent person who owned firearm or ammunition at time offense was committed. *State v. Williams*, 148 W (2d) 852, 436 NW (2d) 924 (Ct. App. 1989).

Whether explicit photographs seized during the execution of a search warrant were contraband discussed. In re Return of Property in *State v. Benhoff*, 185 W (2d) 600, 518 NW (2d) 307 (Ct. App. 1994).

This section applies although a criminal action has not been commenced; the property owner has the burden of moving for the return of the property. *Supreme Video, Inc. v. Schulz*, 808 F Supp. 1380 (1992).

**968.21 Search warrant; secrecy.** A search warrant shall be issued with all practicable secrecy, and the complaint, affidavit or testimony upon which it is based shall not be filed with the clerk or made public in any way until the search warrant is executed.

**968.22 Effect of technical irregularities.** No evidence seized under a search warrant shall be suppressed because of technical irregularities not affecting the substantial rights of the defendant.

The incorrect identification of a building's address in the warrant was a technical error and did not render the resulting search unreasonable when the search made was of the building identified by the informant which was otherwise correctly identified in the warrant. *State v. Nicholson*, 174 W (2d) 542, 497 NW (2d) 791 (Ct. App. 1993).

See also notes to Art. I, sec. 11.

**968.23 Forms.** The following forms for use under this chapter are illustrative and not mandatory:

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

.... County.

AFFIDAVIT OR COMPLAINT.

In the .... court of the .... of ....

A. B., being duly sworn, says that on the .... day of ....., A. D., .... (year), in said county, in and upon certain premises in the (city, town or village) of .... in said county, occupied by .... and more particularly described as follows: (describe the premises) there are now located and concealed certain things, to wit: (describe the things to be searched for) (possessed for the purpose of evading or violating the laws of the state of Wisconsin and contrary to section .... of the Wisconsin statutes) (or, which things were stolen from their true owner, in violation of section .... of the Wisconsin statutes) (or, which things were used in the commission of (or may constitute evidence of) a crime to wit: (describe crime) committed in violation of section .... of the Wisconsin statutes).

The facts tending to establish the grounds for issuing a search warrant are as follows: (set forth evidentiary facts showing probable cause for issuance of warrant).

Wherefore, the said A. B. prays that a search warrant be issued to search such premises for the said property, and to bring the same, if found, and the person in whose possession the same is found, before the said court (or, before the .... court for .... county), to be dealt with according to law.

(Signed) A. B.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this .... day of ....., .... (year) ....., Judge of the .... Court.

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

.... County.

SEARCH WARRANT.

In the .... court of the .... of ....

THE STATE OF WISCONSIN, To the sheriff or any constable or any peace officer of said county:

Whereas, A. B. has this day complained (in writing) to the said court upon oath that on the .... day of ....., A. D., .... (year), in said county, in and upon certain premises in the (city, town or village) of .... in said county, occupied by .... and more particularly described as follows: (describe the premises) there are now located and concealed certain things, to wit: (describe the things to be searched for) (possessed for the purpose of evading or violating the laws of the state of Wisconsin and contrary to section .... of the Wisconsin statutes) (or, which things were stolen from their true owner, in violation of section .... of the Wisconsin statutes) (or, which things were used in the commission of (or, may constitute evidence of) a crime, to wit: (describe crime) committed in violation of section .... of the Wisconsin statutes) and prayed that a search warrant be issued to search said premises for said property.



Now, therefore, in the name of the state of Wisconsin you are commanded forthwith to search the said premises for said things, and if the same or any portion thereof are found, to bring the same and the person in whose possession the same are found, and return this warrant within 48 hours before the said court (or, before the .... court for .... county), to be dealt with according to law.

Dated this .... day of ....., .... (year)

....., Judge of the .... Court.

INDORSEMENT ON WARRANT

Received by me ....., .... (year), at .... o'clock ....M.

....., Sheriff (or peace officer)

RETURN OF OFFICER

State of Wisconsin

.... Court,

.... County.

I hereby certify that by virtue of the within warrant I searched the within named premises and found the following things: (describe things seized) and have the same now in my possession subject to the direction of the court.

Dated this .... day of ....., .... (year)

....., Sheriff (or peace officer)

**History:** 1997 a. 250.

**968.24 Temporary questioning without arrest.** After having identified himself or herself as a law enforcement officer, a law enforcement officer may stop a person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, is about to commit or has committed a crime, and may demand the name and address of the person and an explanation of the person's conduct. Such detention and temporary questioning shall be conducted in the vicinity where the person was stopped.

**History:** 1993 a. 486.

Suspicious behavior of driver and passenger justified detention. *State v. Goebel*, 103 W (2d) 203, 307 NW (2d) 915 (1981).

Defendant's flight from police officer may, using totality of circumstances test, justify warrantless investigatory stop. *State v. Jackson*, 147 W (2d) 824, 434 NW (2d) 386 (1989).

Actions suggesting to reasonable police officer that individual is attempting to flee is adequately suspicious to support investigatory stop. *State v. Anderson*, 155 W (2d) 77, 454 NW (2d) 763 (1990).

See note to Art. I, Sec. 11, citing *State v. Richardson*, 156 W (2d) 128, 456 NW (2d) 830 (1990).

Terry rule applies once person becomes valid suspect even though encounter was initially consensual; if circumstances show investigation is not complete, suspect does not have right to terminate it. *State v. Goyer*, 157 W (2d) 532, 460 NW (2d) 424 (Ct. App. 1990).

When a person's activity may constitute either a civil forfeiture or crime, investigative stop may be performed. *State v. Krier*, 165 W (2d) 673, 478 NW (2d) 63 (Ct. App. 1991).

A "showup" where police present a single suspect to a witness for identification, often at or near a crime scene shortly after the crime occurs, is suggestive but not impermissibly suggestive *per se*. *State v. Garner*, 207 W (2d) 520, 558 NW (2d) 916 (Ct. App. 1996).

Detaining a person at his home, then transporting him about one mile to the scene of an accident in which he was involved, was an investigative stop and a reasonable part of an ongoing accident investigation. *State v. Quartana*, 213 W (2d) 440, 570 NW (2d) 618 (Ct. App. 1997).

That the defendant is detained in a temporary Terry stop does not automatically mean *Miranda* warnings are not required. Whether the warnings are required depends on whether a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have considered himself or herself to be in custody. *State v. Gruen*, 218 W (2d) 581, 582 NW (2d) 728 (Ct. App. 1998).

**NOTE:** See also the notes to Article I, section 11, to the Wisconsin Constitution.

**968.25 Search during temporary questioning.** When a law enforcement officer has stopped a person for temporary questioning pursuant to s. 968.24 and reasonably suspects that he or she or another is in danger of physical injury, the law enforcement officer may search such person for weapons or any instrument or article or substance readily capable of causing physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law abiding persons. If the law enforcement officer finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which the law enforcement officer reasonably believes may constitute the commission of a crime, or which may constitute a threat to his or her safety, the

law enforcement officer may take it and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at which time the law enforcement officer shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest the person so questioned.

**History:** 1993 a. 486.

Investigatory stop—and—frisk for sole purpose of discovering suspect's identity was lawful under facts of case. *State v. Flynn*, 92 W (2d) 427, 285 NW (2d) 710 (1979).

Stop and frisk was not unreasonable search and seizure. *State v. Williamson*, 113 W (2d) 389, 335 NW (2d) 814 (1983).

This section permits officer to search passenger compartment of vehicle for weapons where individual who recently occupied vehicle is stopped under 968.24 and officer "reasonably suspects that he or another is in danger of physical injury". *State v. Moretto*, 144 W (2d) 171, 423 NW (2d) 841 (1988).

Terry tempered or torpedoed? The new law of stop and frisk. *Lewis*. WBB Aug. 1988.

**968.255 Strip searches. (1)** In this section:

(a) "Detained" means any of the following:

1. Arrested for any felony.

2. Arrested for any misdemeanor under s. 167.30, 940.19, 941.20 (1), 941.23, 941.237, 941.24, 948.60, 948.605 (2) (a) or 948.61.

3. Taken into custody under s. 938.19 and there are reasonable grounds to believe the juvenile has committed an act which if committed by an adult would be covered under subd. 1. or 2.

4. Arrested for any misdemeanor not specified in subd. 2., any other violation of state law punishable by forfeiture or any local ordinance if there is probable cause to believe the person is concealing a weapon or a thing which may constitute evidence of the offense for which he or she is detained.

(b) "Strip search" means a search in which a detained person's genitals, pubic area, buttock or anus, or a detained female person's breast, is uncovered and either is exposed to view or is touched by a person conducting the search.

(2) No person may be the subject of a strip search unless he or she is a detained person and if:

(a) The person conducting the search is of the same sex as the person detained, unless the search is a body cavity search conducted under sub. (3);

(b) The detained person is not exposed to the view of any person not conducting the search;

(c) The search is not reproduced through a visual or sound recording;

(d) A person conducting the search has obtained the prior written permission of the chief, sheriff or law enforcement administrator of the jurisdiction where the person is detained, or his or her designee, unless there is probable cause to believe that the detained person is concealing a weapon; and

(e) A person conducting the search prepares a report identifying the person detained, all persons conducting the search, the time, date and place of the search and the written authorization required by par. (d), and provides a copy of the report to the person detained.

(3) No person other than a physician, physician assistant or registered nurse licensed to practice in this state may conduct a body cavity search.

(4) A person who intentionally violates this section may be fined not more than \$1,000 or imprisoned not more than 90 days or both.

(5) This section does not limit the rights of any person to civil damages or injunctive relief.

(6) A law enforcement agency, as defined in s. 165.83 (1) (b), may promulgate rules concerning strip searches which at least meet the minimum requirements of this section.

(7) This section does not apply to a search of any person who:

(a) Is serving a sentence, pursuant to a conviction, in a jail, state prison or house of correction.

(b) Is placed in or transferred to a secured correctional facility, as defined in s. 938.02 (15m), or a secured child caring institution, as defined in s. 938.02 (15g).

(c) Is committed, transferred or admitted under ch. 51, 971 or 975.

(d) Is confined as a condition of probation under s. 973.09 (4).

**History:** 1979 c. 240; 1981 c. 297; 1987 a. 332; 1991 a. 17; 1993 a. 95, 105; 1995 a. 77, 154; 1997 a. 35.

Intrusive searches of the mouth, nose or ears are not covered by (3). However, searches of those body orifices should be conducted by medical personnel to comply with 4th and 5th amendments. 71 Atty. Gen. 12.

**968.256 Search of physically disabled person. (1)** In this section, “physically disabled person” means a person who requires an assistive device for mobility, including, but not limited to, a wheelchair, brace, crutch or artificial limb.

(2) A search of a physically disabled person shall be conducted in a careful manner. If a search of a physically disabled person requires the removal of an assistive device or involves a person lacking sensation in some portion of his or her body, the search shall be conducted with extreme care by a person who has had training in handling physically disabled persons.

**History:** 1979 c. 240.

**968.26 John Doe proceeding.** If a person complains to a judge that he or she has reason to believe that a crime has been committed within his or her jurisdiction, the judge shall examine the complainant under oath and any witnesses produced by him or her and may, and at the request of the district attorney shall, subpoena and examine other witnesses to ascertain whether a crime has been committed and by whom committed. The extent to which the judge may proceed in the examination is within the judge’s discretion. The examination may be adjourned and may be secret. Any witness examined under this section may have counsel present at the examination but the counsel shall not be allowed to examine his or her client, cross-examine other witnesses or argue before the judge. If it appears probable from the testimony given that a crime has been committed and who committed it, the complaint may be reduced to writing and signed and verified; and thereupon a warrant shall issue for the arrest of the accused. Subject to s. 971.23, if the proceeding is secret, the record of the proceeding and the testimony taken shall not be open to inspection by anyone except the district attorney unless it is used by the prosecution at the preliminary hearing or the trial of the accused and then only to the extent that it is so used. A court, on the motion of a district attorney, may compel a person to testify or produce evidence under s. 972.08 (1). The person is immune from prosecution as provided in s. 972.08 (1), subject to the restrictions under s. 972.085.

**History:** 1989 a. 122; 1991 a. 88, 223, 315.

A defendant must be allowed to use testimony of witnesses at a secret John Doe proceeding to impeach the same witnesses at the trial, even if the prosecution does not use the John Doe testimony. *Myers v. State*, 60 W (2d) 248, 208 NW (2d) 311.

Immunity hearing must be in open court. *State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit Court*, 65 W (2d) 66, 221 NW (2d) 894.

Person charged as result of John Doe proceeding has no recognized interest in the maintenance of secrecy in that proceeding. *John Doe discussed. State v. O’Connor*, 77 W (2d) 261, 252 NW (2d) 671.

No restrictions of the 4th and 5th amendments preclude enforcement of an order for handwriting exemplars directed by presiding judge in John Doe proceeding. *State v. Doe*, 78 W (2d) 161, 254 NW (2d) 210.

See note to Art. I, sec. 8, citing *Ryan v. State*, 79 W (2d) 83, 255 NW (2d) 910.

This section does not violate constitutional separation of powers doctrine. *John Doe discussed. State v. Washington*, 83 W (2d) 808, 266 NW (2d) 597 (1978).

Balance between public’s right to know and need for secrecy in John Doe proceedings discussed. *In re Wis. Family Counseling Services v. State*, 95 W (2d) 670, 291 NW (2d) 631 (Ct. App. 1980).

John Doe judge may not issue material witness warrant under 969.01 (3). *State v. Brady*, 118 W (2d) 154, 345 NW (2d) 533 (Ct. App. 1984).

When John Doe proceeding is not joint executive and judicial undertaking, procedure does not violate separation of powers doctrine and is constitutional. *State v. Unnamed Defendant*, 150 W (2d) 352, 441 NW (2d) 696 (1989).

A John Doe judge may issue and seal a search warrant and a district attorney may independently issue a criminal complaint regardless of the existence of the John Doe. A John Doe cannot be used to obtain evidence against a defendant who has already been charged. *State v. Cummings*, 199 W (2d) 722, 546 NW (2d) 406 (1996).

To be entitled to a hearing, a John Doe complainant must do more than merely allege in conclusory terms that a crime has been committed. The complainant’s petition must allege facts that raise a reasonable belief that a crime has been committed. *State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane County*, 214 W (2d) 604, 571 NW (2d) 385 (1997).

Limits of judge’s authority in presiding over or conducting John Doe proceeding discussed. 76 Atty. Gen. 217.

**968.27 Definitions.** In ss. 968.28 to 968.37:

(1) “Aggrieved person” means a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, electronic or oral communication or a person against whom the interception was directed.

(2) “Aural transfer” means a transfer containing the human voice at any point from the point of origin to the point of reception.

(3) “Contents” when used with respect to any wire, electronic or oral communication, includes any information concerning the substance, purport or meaning of that communication.

(4) “Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data or intelligence of any nature wholly or partially transmitted by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical system. “Electronic communication” does not include any of the following:

(a) The radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit.

(b) Any wire or oral communication.

(c) Any communication made through a tone-only paging device.

(d) Any communication from a tracking device.

(5) “Electronic communication service” means any service that provides its users with the ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications.

(6) “Electronic communications system” means any wire, radio, electromagnetic, photooptical or photoelectronic facilities for the transmission of electronic communications, and any computer facilities or related electronic equipment for the electronic storage of those communications.

(7) “Electronic, mechanical or other device” means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication other than:

(a) Any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facilities, or any component thereof, which is:

1. Furnished to the subscriber or user by a provider of electronic or wire communication service in the ordinary course of its business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business or furnished by the subscriber or user for connection to the facilities of the service and used in the ordinary course of its business; or

2. Being used by a provider of electronic or wire communication service in the ordinary course of its business, or by a law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his or her duties.

(b) A hearing aid or similar device being used to correct sub-normal hearing to not better than normal.

(8) “Electronic storage” means any of the following:

(a) Any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof.

(b) Any storage of a wire or electronic communication by an electronic communication service for purposes of backup protection of the communication.

(9) “Intercept” means the aural or other acquisition of the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication through the use of any electronic, mechanical or other device.

(10) “Investigative or law enforcement officer” means any officer of this state or political subdivision thereof, who is empowered by the laws of this state to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for offenses enumerated in ss. 968.28 to 968.37, and any attorney authorized by law to prosecute or participate in the prosecution of those offenses.

(11) “Judge” means the judge sitting at the time an application is made under s. 968.30 or his or her successor.

(12) “Oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying the expectation. “Oral communication” does not include any electronic communication.

(13) “Pen register” means a device that records or decodes electronic or other impulses that identify the numbers dialed or otherwise transmitted on the telephone line to which the device is attached. “Pen register” does not include any device used by a provider or customer of a wire or electronic communication service for billing, or recording as an incident to billing, for communications services provided by the provider or any device used by a provider or customer of a wire communication service for cost accounting or other like purposes in the ordinary course of its business.

(14) “Readily accessible to the general public” means, with respect to a radio communication, that the communication is not any of the following:

- (a) Scrambled or encrypted.
- (b) Transmitted using modulation techniques whose essential parameters have been withheld from the public with the intention of preserving the privacy of the communication.
- (c) Carried on a subcarrier or other signal subsidiary to a radio transmission.
- (d) Transmitted over a communication system provided by a common carrier, including a commercial mobile radio service provider, as defined in s. 196.01 (2g), unless the communication is a tone-only paging system communication.
- (e) Transmitted on frequencies allocated under 47 CFR part 25, subpart D, E or F of part 74, or part 94, unless in the case of a communication transmitted on a frequency allocated under 47 CFR part 74 that is not exclusively allocated to broadcast auxiliary services, the communication is a 2-way voice communication by radio.

(15) “Trap and trace device” means a device that captures the incoming electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number of an instrument or device from which a wire or electronic communication was transmitted.

(16) “User” means any person who or entity that:

- (a) Uses an electronic communication service; and
- (b) Is duly authorized by the provider of the service to engage in that use.

(17) “Wire communication” means any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, microwave or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of reception, including the use of the connection in any switching station, furnished or operated by any person engaged as a public utility in providing or operating the facilities for the transmission of intrastate, interstate or foreign communications. “Wire communication” includes the electronic storage of any such aural transfer, but does not include the radio portion of a cordless telephone communication that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base unit.

**History:** 1971 c. 40 s. 93; 1987 a. 399; 1991 a. 39; 1997 a. 218.

Constitutionality of 968.27 to 968.30 upheld. State ex rel. Hussong v. Froelich, 62 W (2d) 577, 215 NW (2d) 390.

Informant who is party to tape recorded telephone conversation also acquired conversation in his mind, regardless of use of tape recorder; it is not an “intercept.” Informant may testify to conversation without use of recording. State v. Maloney, 161 W (2d) 127, 467 NW (2d) 215 (Ct. App. 1991).

**968.28 Application for court order to intercept communications.** The attorney general together with the district attorney of any county may approve a request of an investigative or law enforcement officer to apply to the chief judge of the judicial administrative district for the county where the interception is to take place for an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire, electronic or oral communications. The chief judge may under s. 968.30 grant an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire, electronic or oral communications by investigative or law enforcement officers having responsibility for the investigation of the offense for which the application is made. The authorization shall be permitted only if the interception may provide or has provided evidence of the commission of the offense of

homicide, felony murder, kidnapping, commercial gambling, bribery, extortion, dealing in controlled substances or controlled substance analogs, a computer crime that is a felony under s. 943.70, or any conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.

**History:** 1971 c. 219; 1977 c. 449; 1983 a. 438; 1987 a. 399; 1995 a. 448.

**968.29 Authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted wire, electronic or oral communications. (1)** Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by ss. 968.28 to 968.37 or 18 USC 2510 to 2520, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose the contents to another investigative or law enforcement officer only to the extent that the disclosure is appropriate to the proper performance of the official duties of the officer making or receiving the disclosure.

(2) Any investigative or law enforcement officer who, by any means authorized by ss. 968.28 to 968.37 or 18 USC 2510 to 2520, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom may use the contents only to the extent the use is appropriate to the proper performance of the officer’s official duties.

(3) (a) Any person who has received, by any means authorized by ss. 968.28 to 968.37 or 18 USC 2510 to 2520 or by a like statute of any other state, any information concerning a wire, electronic or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom intercepted in accordance with ss. 968.28 to 968.37, may disclose the contents of that communication or that derivative evidence only while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding in any court or before any magistrate or grand jury in this state, or in any court of the United States or of any state, or in any federal or state grand jury proceeding.

(b) In addition to the disclosure provisions of par. (a), any person who has received, in the manner described under s. 968.31 (2) (b), any information concerning a wire, electronic or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom, may disclose the contents of that communication or that derivative evidence while giving testimony under oath or affirmation in any proceeding described in par. (a) in which a person is accused of any act constituting a felony, and only if the party who consented to the interception is available to testify at the proceeding or if another witness is available to authenticate the recording.

(4) No otherwise privileged wire, electronic or oral communication intercepted in accordance with, or in violation of, ss. 968.28 to 968.37 or 18 USC 2510 to 2520, may lose its privileged character.

(5) When an investigative or law enforcement officer, while engaged in intercepting wire, electronic or oral communications in the manner authorized, intercepts wire, electronic or oral communications relating to offenses other than those specified in the order of authorization or approval, the contents thereof, and evidence derived therefrom, may be disclosed or used as provided in subs. (1) and (2). The contents and any evidence derived therefrom may be used under sub. (3) when authorized or approved by the judge who acted on the original application where the judge finds on subsequent application, made as soon as practicable but no later than 48 hours, that the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with ss. 968.28 to 968.37 or 18 USC 2510 to 2520 or by a like statute.

**History:** 1971 c. 40 ss. 91, 93; 1987 a. 399; 1989 a. 121, 359; 1993 a. 98; 1995 a. 30.

Evidence of intercepted oral or wire communications can be introduced only if the interception was authorized under s. 968.30; consent by one party to the communication is not sufficient. State ex rel. Arnold v. County Court, 51 W (2d) 434, 187 NW (2d) 354.

Although one-party consent tapes are lawful, they are not “authorized by ss. 968.28 to 968.33 [1985 stats.] and therefore the contents cannot be admitted as evidence in chief, but s. 968.29 (3) does not prohibit giving such tapes to the state. State v. Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. 81 W (2d) 555, 261 NW (2d) 147.

Where a taped telephone conversation was obtained without a court order, the defendant opened the door to the tape’s admission by extensive reference to the tape

transcript during his case-in-chief. *State v. Albrecht*, 184 W (2d) 287, 516 NW (2d) 776 (Ct. App. 1994).

Sub. (2) authorizes prosecutors to include intercepted communications in a criminal complaint. A prosecutor is a law enforcement officer under sub. (2), and preparation of complaints is within the prosecutor's official duties. *State v. Gilmore*, 193 W (2d) 403, 535 NW (2d) 21 (Ct. App. 1995).

The state may incorporate intercepted communications in a criminal complaint if the complaint is filed under seal. Unilateral public disclosure of such communications in a complaint is not authorized. Such public disclosure does not subject the communication to suppression, but may entitle the defendant to remedies under s. 968.31. *State v. Gilmore*, 201 W (2d) 814, 549 NW (2d) 401 (1996).

The state may use one-party consent recordings of criminal activity the disclosure of which is not authorized under sub. (3) (b) if the evidence inadvertently falls within the "plain hearing" of law enforcement officers conducting authorized surveillance. *State v. Gil*, 208 W (2d) 531, 561 NW (2d) 760 (Ct. App. 1997).

Since interception by government agents of informant's telephone call was exclusively done by federal agents and was lawful under federal law, Wisconsin law did not govern its admissibility into evidence in a federal prosecution notwithstanding that the telephone call may have been a privileged communication under Wisconsin law. *United States v. Beni*, 397 F Supp. 1086.

**968.30 Procedure for interception of wire, electronic or oral communications.** (1) Each application for an order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to the court and shall state the applicant's authority to make the application and may be upon personal knowledge or information and belief. Each application shall include the following information:

(a) The identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application, and the officers authorizing the application.

(b) A full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify the applicant's belief that an order should be issued, including:

1. Details of the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be committed;

2. A particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted;

3. A particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted; and

4. The identity of the person, if known, committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted.

(c) A full and complete statement whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.

(d) A statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained. If the nature of the investigation is such that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been obtained, a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications for the same type will occur thereafter.

(e) A full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known to the individual authorizing and making the application, made to any court for authorization to intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire, electronic or oral communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the action taken by the court on each such application; and

(f) Where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results.

(2) The court may require the applicant to furnish additional testimony or documentary evidence under oath or affirmation in support of the application. Oral testimony shall be reduced to writing.

(3) Upon the application the court may enter an ex parte order, as requested or as modified, authorizing or approving interception of wire, electronic or oral communications, if the court determines

on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that all of the following exist:

(a) There is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a particular offense enumerated in s. 968.28.

(b) There is probable cause for belief that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through such interception.

(c) Other investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous.

(d) There is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which, or the place where, the wire, electronic or oral communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be used, in connection with the commission of the offense, or are leased to, listed in the name of, or commonly used by the person.

(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any wire, electronic or oral communication shall specify:

(a) The identity of the person, if known, whose communications are to be intercepted;

(b) The nature and location of the communications facilities which, or the place where authority to intercept is granted and the means by which such interceptions shall be made;

(c) A particular description of the type of communication sought to be intercepted and a statement of the particular offense to which it relates;

(d) The identity of the agency authorized to intercept the communications and of the person authorizing the application; and

(e) The period of time during which such interception is authorized, including a statement whether or not the interception shall automatically terminate when the described communication has been first obtained.

(5) No order entered under this section may authorize or approve the interception of any wire, electronic or oral communication for any period longer than is necessary to achieve the objective of the authorization, nor in any event longer than 30 days. The 30-day period begins on the earlier of the day on which the investigative or law enforcement officer first begins to conduct an interception under the order or 10 days after the order is entered. Extensions of an order may be granted, but only upon application for an extension made in accordance with sub. (1) and the court making the findings required by sub. (3). The period of extension shall be no longer than the authorizing judge deems necessary to achieve the purposes for which it was granted and in no event be for longer than 30 days. Every order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept shall be executed as soon as practicable, shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter, and must terminate upon attainment of the authorized objective, or in any event in 30 days. In the event the intercepted communication is in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that foreign language or code is not reasonably available during the interception period, minimization may be accomplished as soon as practicable after the interception.

(6) Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered pursuant to ss. 968.28 to 968.33, the order may require reports to be made to the court which issued the order showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception. Such reports shall be made at such intervals as the court requires.

(7) (a) The contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication intercepted by any means authorized by ss. 968.28 to 968.37 shall, if possible, be recorded on tape or wire or other comparable device. The recording of the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication under this subsection shall be done in such way as will protect the recording from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the

order or extensions thereof all such recordings and records of an intercepted wire, electronic or oral communication shall be filed with the court issuing the order and the court shall order the same to be sealed. Custody of the recordings and records shall be wherever the judge handling the application shall order. They shall not be destroyed except upon an order of the issuing or denying judge and in any event shall be properly kept and preserved for 10 years. Duplicate recordings and other records may be made for use or disclosure pursuant to the provisions for investigations under s. 968.29 (1) and (2). The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection, or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom under s. 968.29 (3).

(b) Applications made and orders granted under ss. 968.28 to 968.33 together with all other papers and records in connection therewith shall be ordered sealed by the court. Custody of the applications, orders and other papers and records shall be wherever the judge shall order. Such applications and orders shall be disclosed only upon a showing of good cause before the judge and shall not be destroyed except on order of the issuing or denying judge, and in any event shall be kept for 10 years.

(c) Any violation of this subsection may be punished as contempt of court.

(d) Within a reasonable time but not later than 90 days after the filing of an application for an order of approval under par. (b) which is denied or the termination of the period of an order or extensions thereof, the issuing or denying judge shall cause to be served on the persons named in the order or the application and such other parties to intercepted communications as the judge determines is in the interest of justice, an inventory which shall include notice of:

1. The fact of the entry of the order or the application.
2. The date of the entry and the period of authorized, approved or disapproved interception, or the denial of the application.
3. The fact that during the period wire, electronic or oral communications were or were not intercepted.

(e) The judge may, upon the filing of a motion, make available to such person or the person's counsel for inspection in the manner provided in ss. 19.35 and 19.36 such portions of the intercepted communications, applications and orders as the judge determines to be in the interest of justice. On an ex parte showing of good cause to the issuing judge the serving of the inventory required by this subsection may be postponed. The judge shall review such postponement at the end of 60 days and good cause shall be shown prior to further postponement.

(8) The contents of any intercepted wire, electronic or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing or other proceeding in any court of this state unless each party, not less than 10 days before the trial, hearing or proceeding, has been furnished with a copy of the court order, and accompanying application, under which the interception was authorized or approved. This 10-day period may be waived by the judge if he or she finds that it was not possible to furnish the party with the above information 10 days before the trial, hearing or proceeding and that the party will not be prejudiced by the delay in receiving the information.

(9) (a) Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing or proceeding in or before any court, department, officer, agency, regulatory body or other authority of this state, or a political subdivision thereof, may move before the trial court or the court granting the original warrant to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that the communication was unlawfully intercepted; the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face; or the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval.

The motion shall be made before the trial, hearing or proceeding unless there was no opportunity to make the motion or the person was not aware of the grounds of the motion. If the motion is granted, the contents of the intercepted wire, electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be treated as having been obtained in violation of ss. 968.28 to 968.37. The judge may, upon the filing of the motion by the aggrieved person, make available to the aggrieved person or his or her counsel for inspection such portions of the intercepted communication or evidence derived therefrom as the judge determines to be in the interest of justice.

(b) In addition to any other right to appeal, the state shall have the right to appeal:

1. From an order granting a motion to suppress made under par. (a) if the attorney general or district attorney certifies to the judge or other official granting such motion that the appeal is not entered for purposes of delay and shall be diligently prosecuted as in the case of other interlocutory appeals or under such rules as the supreme court adopts; or

2. From an order denying an application for an order of authorization or approval, and such an appeal shall be ex parte and shall be in camera in preference to all other pending appeals in accordance with rules promulgated by the supreme court.

(10) Nothing in ss. 968.28 to 968.37 shall be construed to allow the interception of any wire, electronic or oral communication between an attorney and a client.

**History:** 1971 c. 40 s. 93; 1981 c. 335 s. 26; 1987 a. 399; 1993 a. 486.

Where a taped telephone conversation was obtained without a court order, the defendant opened the door to the tape's admission by extensive reference to the tape transcript during his case-in-chief. *State v. Albrecht*, 184 W (2d) 287, 516 NW (2d) 776 (Ct. App. 1994).

The state may incorporate intercepted communications in a criminal complaint if the complaint is filed under seal. Unilateral public disclosure of such communications in a complaint is not authorized. Such public disclosure does not subject the communication to suppression, but may entitle the defendant to remedies under s. 968.31. *State v. Gilmore*, 201 W (2d) 814, 549 NW (2d) 401 (1996).

Suppression of wire communications is reserved for those which are illegally intercepted and does not apply to legally intercepted communications which are improperly disclosed. *State v. Gilmore*, 201 W (2d) 814, 549 NW (2d) 401 (1996).

Communications privacy: A legislative perspective. *Kastenmeier, Leavy & Beier*. 1989 WLR 715 (1989).

**968.31 Interception and disclosure of wire, electronic or oral communications prohibited.** (1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in ss. 196.63 or 968.28 to 968.30, whoever commits any of the acts enumerated in this section may be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 5 years or both:

**NOTE:** Sub. (1) (intro.) is amended eff. 12–31–99 by 1997 Wis. Act 283 to read:

(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in ss. 196.63 or 968.28 to 968.30, whoever commits any of the acts enumerated in this section may be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 7 years and 6 months or both:

(a) Intentionally intercepts, attempts to intercept or procures any other person to intercept or attempt to intercept, any wire, electronic or oral communication.

(b) Intentionally uses, attempts to use or procures any other person to use or attempt to use any electronic, mechanical or other device to intercept any oral communication.

(c) Discloses, or attempts to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication in violation of this section or under circumstances constituting violation of this section.

(d) Uses, or attempts to use, the contents of any wire, electronic or oral communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication in violation of this section or under circumstances constituting violation of this section.

(e) Intentionally discloses the contents of any oral, electronic or wire communication obtained by authority of ss. 968.28, 968.29 and 968.30, except as therein provided.

(f) Intentionally alters any wire, electronic or oral communication intercepted on tape, wire or other device.

**(2)** It is not unlawful under ss. 968.28 to 968.37:

(a) For an operator of a switchboard, or an officer, employe or agent of any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, whose facilities are used in the transmission of a wire or electronic communication to intercept, disclose or use that communication in the normal course of his or her employment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident to the rendition of his or her service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service, except that a provider of a wire or electronic communication service shall not utilize service observing or random monitoring except for mechanical or service quality control checks.

(b) For a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication, where the person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception.

(c) For a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, electronic or oral communication where the person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception unless the communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States or of any state or for the purpose of committing any other injurious act.

(d) For any person to intercept or access an electronic communication made through an electronic communication system that is configured so that the electronic communication is readily accessible to the general public.

(e) For any person to intercept any radio communication that is transmitted:

1. By any station for the use of the general public, or that relates to ships, aircraft, vehicles or persons in distress;
2. By any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense, private land mobile or public safety communications system, including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public;
3. By a station operating on an authorized frequency within the bands allocated to the amateur, citizens band or general mobile radio services; or
4. By any marine or aeronautical communications system.

(f) For any person to engage in any conduct that:

1. Is prohibited by section 633 of the communications act of 1934; or
2. Is excepted from the application of section 705 (a) of the communications act of 1934 by section 705 (b) of that act.

(g) For any person to intercept any wire or electronic communication the transmission of which is causing harmful interference to any lawfully operating station or consumer electronic equipment, to the extent necessary to identify the source of the interference.

(h) For users of the same frequency to intercept any radio communication made through a system that utilizes frequencies monitored by individuals engaged in the provision or the use of the system, if the communication is not scrambled or encrypted.

(i) To use a pen register or a trap and trace device as authorized under ss. 968.34 to 968.37; or

(j) For a provider of electronic communication service to record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect the provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire or electronic communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of the service.

**(2m)** Any person whose wire, electronic or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed or used in violation of ss. 968.28 to 968.37 shall have a civil cause of action against any person who intercepts, discloses or uses, or procures any other person to intercept, disclose, or use, the communication, and shall be entitled to recover from any such person:

(a) Actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages computed at the rate of \$100 a day for each day of violation or \$1,000, whichever is higher;

(b) Punitive damages; and

(c) A reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably incurred.

**(3)** Good faith reliance on a court order or on s. 968.30 (7) shall constitute a complete defense to any civil or criminal action brought under ss. 968.28 to 968.37.

**History:** 1971 c. 40 ss. 92, 93; 1977 c. 272; 1985 a. 297; 1987 a. 399; 1989 a. 56; 1991 a. 294; 1997 a. 283.

Testimony of undercover police officer carrying a concealed eavesdropping device under (2) is not the product of such eavesdropping and is admissible even assuming the eavesdropping was unconstitutional. *State v. Smith*, 72 W (2d) 711, 242 NW (2d) 184.

The use of the "called party control device" by the communications common carrier to trace bomb scares and other harassing telephone calls would not violate any law if used with the consent of the receiving party. 60 Atty. Gen. 90.

**968.32 Forfeiture of contraband devices.** Any electronic, mechanical, or other intercepting device used in violation of s. 968.31 (1) may be seized as contraband by any peace officer and forfeited to this state in an action by the department of justice under ch. 778.

**History:** 1979 c. 32 s. 92 (8).

**968.33 Reports concerning intercepted wire or oral communications.** In January of each year, the department of justice shall report to the administrative office of the United States courts such information as is required to be filed by 18 USC 2519. A duplicate copy of the reports shall be filed, at the same time, with the office of the director of state courts.

**History:** 1973 c. 12 s. 37; 1977 c. 187 s. 135; Sup. Ct. Order, 88 W (2d) xiii (1979).

**968.34 Use of pen register or trap and trace device restricted.** (1) Except as provided in this section, no person may install or use a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order under s. 968.36 or 18 USC 3123 or 50 USC 1801 to 1811.

(2) The prohibition of sub. (1) does not apply with respect to the use of a pen register or a trap and trace device by a provider of electronic or wire communication service:

(a) Relating to the operation, maintenance and testing of a wire or electronic communication service or to the protection of the rights or property of the provider, or to the protection of users of that service from abuse of service or unlawful use of service;

(b) To record the fact that a wire or electronic communication was initiated or completed in order to protect the provider, another provider furnishing service toward the completion of the wire communication, or a user of that service, from fraudulent, unlawful or abusive use of service; or

(c) Where the consent of the user of that service has been obtained.

**(2m)** The prohibition of sub. (1) does not apply to a telephone caller identification service authorized under s. 196.207 (2).

**(3)** Whoever knowingly violates sub. (1) shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year or both.

**NOTE:** Sub. (3) is amended eff. 12–31–99 by 1997 Wis. Act 283 to read:

**(3)** Whoever knowingly violates sub. (1) shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned for not more than 2 years or both.

**History:** 1987 a. 399; 1991 a. 268, 269; 1997 a. 283.

**968.35 Application for an order for a pen register or a trap and trace device.** (1) The attorney general or a district attorney may make application for an order or an extension of an order under s. 968.36 authorizing or approving the installation and

use of a pen register or a trap and trace device, in writing under oath or equivalent affirmation, to a circuit court for the county where the device is to be located.

(2) An application under sub. (1) shall include all of the following:

(a) The identity of the person making the application and the identity of the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation.

(b) A certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that agency.

**History:** 1987 a. 399.

**968.36 Issuance of an order for a pen register or a trap and trace device.** (1) Upon an application made under s. 968.35, the court shall enter an ex parte order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device within the jurisdiction of the court if the court finds that the applicant has certified to the court that the information likely to be obtained by the installation and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.

(2) An order issued under this section shall do all of the following:

(a) Specify the identity, if known, of the person to whom is leased or in whose name is listed the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached.

(b) Specify the identity, if known, of the person who is the subject of the criminal investigation.

(c) Specify the number and, if known, the physical location of the telephone line to which the pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached and, in the case of a trap and trace device, the geographic limits of the trap and trace order.

(d) Provide a statement of the offense to which the information likely to be obtained by the pen register or trap and trace device relates.

(e) Direct, upon the request of the applicant, the furnishing of information, facilities and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen register or trap and trace device under s. 968.37.

(3) An order issued under this section shall authorize the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device for a period not to exceed 60 days.

(4) Extensions of the order may be granted, but only upon an application for an order under s. 968.35 and upon the judicial finding required by sub. (1). The period of extension shall be for a period not to exceed 60 days.

(5) An order authorizing or approving the installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device shall direct that:

(a) The order be sealed until otherwise ordered by the court; and

(b) The person owning or leasing the line to which the pen register or a trap and trace device is attached, or who has been ordered by the court to provide assistance to the applicant, not disclose the existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the investigation to the listed subscriber, or to any other person, unless or until otherwise ordered by the court.

**History:** 1987 a. 399.

**968.37 Assistance in the installation and use of a pen register or trap and trace device.** (1) Upon the request of the attorney general, a district attorney or an officer of a law enforcement agency authorized to install and use a pen register under ss. 968.28 to 968.37, a provider of wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian or other person shall furnish the investigative or law enforcement officer forthwith all information, facilities and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the installation of the pen register unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that the person so ordered by the court accords the party with respect to whom the

installation and use is to take place, if the assistance is directed by a court order under s. 968.36 (5) (b).

(2) Upon the request of the attorney general, a district attorney or an officer of a law enforcement agency authorized to receive the results of a trap and trace device under ss. 968.28 to 968.37, a provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian or other person shall install the device forthwith on the appropriate line and shall furnish the investigative or law enforcement officer all additional information, facilities and technical assistance including installation and operation of the device unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with the services that the person so ordered by the court accords the party with respect to whom the installation and use is to take place, if the installation and assistance is directed by a court order under s. 968.36 (5) (b). Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the results of the trap and trace device shall be furnished to the officer of a law enforcement agency, designated by the court, at reasonable intervals during regular business hours for the duration of the order.

(3) A provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian or other person who furnishes facilities or technical assistance under this section shall be reasonably compensated for the reasonable expenses incurred in providing the facilities and assistance.

(4) No cause of action may lie in any court against any provider of a wire or electronic communication service, its officers, employees or agents or other specified persons for providing information, facilities or assistance in accordance with the terms of a court order under s. 968.36.

(5) A good faith reliance on a court order, a legislative authorization or a statutory authorization is a complete defense against any civil or criminal action brought under ss. 968.28 to 968.37.

**History:** 1987 a. 399.

**968.38 Testing for HIV infection and certain diseases.**

(1) In this section:

(a) “Health care professional” means a physician or a registered nurse or licensed practical nurse who is licensed under ch. 441.

(b) “HIV” means any strain of human immunodeficiency virus, which causes acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.

(bm) “Physician” has the meaning given in s. 448.01 (5).

(c) “Sexually transmitted disease” has the meaning given in s. 252.11 (1).

(d) “Significantly exposed” has the meaning given in s. 252.15 (1) (em).

(2) In a criminal action under s. 940.225, 948.02, 948.025, 948.05, 948.06 or 948.095, if all of the following apply, the district attorney shall apply to the circuit court for his or her county to order the defendant to submit to a test or a series of tests administered by a health care professional to detect the presence of HIV, antigen or nonantigenic products of HIV, an antibody to HIV or a sexually transmitted disease and to disclose the results of the test or tests as specified in sub. (4) (a) to (c):

(a) The district attorney has probable cause to believe that the defendant has significantly exposed the alleged victim or victim. If the defendant is convicted or found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, this paragraph does not apply.

(b) The alleged victim or victim who is not a minor or the parent or guardian of the alleged victim or victim who is a minor requests the district attorney to so apply for an order.

(3) The district attorney may apply under sub. (2) for an order at any of the following times, and, within those times, shall do so as soon as possible so as to enable the court to provide timely notice:

(a) At or after the initial appearance and prior to the preliminary examination.

(b) After the defendant waives the preliminary examination, at any time after the court binds the defendant over for trial and before a verdict is rendered.

(c) At any time after the defendant is convicted or is found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect.

(d) If the court has determined that the defendant is not competent to proceed under s. 971.14 (4) and suspended the criminal proceedings, at any time after the determination that the defendant is not competent to proceed.

(4) The court shall set a time for a hearing on the matter under sub. (2) during the preliminary examination, if sub. (3) (a) applies; after the defendant is bound over for trial and before a verdict is rendered, if sub. (3) (b) applies; after conviction or a finding of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect, if sub. (3) (c) applies; or, subject to s. 971.13 (4), after the determination that the defendant is not competent, if sub. (3) (d) applies. The court shall give the district attorney and the defendant notice of the hearing at least 72 hours prior to the hearing. The defendant may have counsel at the hearing, and counsel may examine and cross-examine witnesses. If the court finds probable cause to believe that the defendant has significantly exposed the victim or alleged victim, the court shall order the defendant to submit to a test or a series of tests administered by a health care professional to detect the presence of HIV, antigen or nonantigenic products of HIV, an antibody to HIV or a sexually transmitted disease. The court shall require the health care professional who performs the test to disclose the test results to the defendant. The court shall require the health care professional who performs the test to refrain, notwithstanding s. 252.15 (4) (c), from making the test results part of the defendant's permanent medical record and to disclose the results of the test to any of the following:

(a) The alleged victim or victim, if the alleged victim or victim is not a minor.

(b) The parent or guardian of the alleged victim or victim, if the alleged victim or victim is a minor.

(c) The health care professional who provides care to the alleged victim or victim, upon request by the alleged victim or victim or, if the alleged victim or victim is a minor, by the parent or guardian of the alleged victim or victim.

**History:** 1991 a. 269; 1993 a. 27, 32, 183, 227, 495; 1995 a. 456; 1997 a. 182.

Acquittal on a charge of sexual intercourse with a minor did not prevent an order for HIV testing following a conviction for sexual assault; the test is probable cause and is not governed by the outcome of the trial. *State v. Parr*, 182 W (2d) 349, 513 NW (2d) 647 (Ct. App. 1994).

**968.40 Grand jury. (1) SELECTION OF GRAND JURY LIST.** Any judge may, in writing, order the clerk of circuit court to select a grand jury list within a specified reasonable time. The clerk shall select from the prospective juror list for the county the names of not fewer than 75 nor more than 150 persons to constitute the prospective grand juror list. The list shall be kept secret.

(3) **EXAMINATION OF PROSPECTIVE JURORS.** At the time set for the prospective grand jurors to appear, the judge shall and the district attorney or other prosecuting officer may examine the prospective jurors under oath or affirmation relative to their qualifications to serve as grand jurors and the judge shall excuse those who are disqualified, and may excuse others for any reason which seems proper to the judge.

(4) **ADDITIONAL GRAND JURORS.** If after such examination fewer than 17 grand jurors remain, additional prospective jurors shall be selected, summoned and examined until there are at least 17 qualified jurors on the grand jury.

(6) **TIME GRAND JURORS TO SERVE.** Grand jurors shall serve for a period of 31 consecutive days unless more days are necessary to complete service in a particular proceeding. The judge may discharge the grand jury at any time.

(7) **ORDERS FILED WITH CLERK.** All orders mentioned in this section shall be filed with the clerk of court.

(8) **INTERCOUNTY RACKETEERING AND CRIME.** When a grand jury is convened pursuant to this section to investigate unlawful activity under s. 165.70, and such activity involves more than one county, including the county where the petition for such grand jury

is filed, then if the attorney general approves, all expenses of such proceeding shall be charged to the appropriation under s. 20.455 (1) (d).

**History:** 1971 c. 125 s. 522 (1); 1977 c. 29 s. 1656 (27); 1977 c. 187 ss. 95, 135; 1977 c. 318; 1977 c. 447 s. 210; 1977 c. 449; Stats. 1977 s. 756.10; 1991 a. 39; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.40.

Claim of grand jury discrimination necessitates federal habeas corpus review. *Rose v. Mitchell*, 443 US 545 (1979).

The grand jury in Wisconsin. Coffey, Richards, 58 MLR 518.

**968.41 Oath or affirmation of grand jurors.** Grand jurors shall, before they begin performance of their duties, solemnly swear or affirm that they will diligently inquire as to all matters and things which come before the grand jury; that they will keep all matters which come before the grand jury secret; that they will indict no person for envy, hatred or malice; that they will not leave any person unindicted for love, fear, favor, affection or hope of reward; and that they will indict truly, according to the best of their understanding.

**History:** 1975 c. 94 s. 91 (12); 1977 c. 187 s. 95; Stats. 1977 s. 756.11; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.41.

**968.42 Presiding juror and clerk.** The grand jury shall select from their number a presiding juror and a clerk. The clerk shall preserve the minutes of the proceedings before them and all exhibits.

**History:** 1977 c. 187 s. 95; Stats. 1977 s. 756.12; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.42.

**968.43 Reporter; salary; assistant. (1)** Every grand jury shall when ordered by the judge ordering such grand jury, employ one or more reporters to attend their sessions and to make and transcribe a verbatim record of all proceedings had before them.

(2) Before assuming the duties under this section, each reporter shall make and file an oath or affirmation faithfully to record and transcribe all of the proceedings before the grand jury and to keep secret the matters relative to the proceedings. Each reporter shall be paid out of the county treasury of the county in which the service is rendered such sum for compensation and expenses as shall be audited and allowed as reasonable by the court ordering the grand jury. Each reporter may employ on his or her own account a person to transcribe the testimony and proceedings of the grand jury, but before entering upon the duties under this subsection, the person shall be required to make and file an oath or affirmation similar to that required of each reporter.

(3) Any person who violates an oath or affirmation required by sub. (2) may be imprisoned for not more than 5 years.

**NOTE:** Sub. (3) is repealed and recreated eff. 12–31–99 by 1997 Wis. Act 283 to read:

(3) Any person who violates an oath or affirmation required by sub. (2) may be imprisoned for not more than 7 years and 6 months.

**History:** 1977 c. 187 s. 95; Stats. 1977 s. 756.13; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.43.; 1997 a. 283

**968.44 Witnesses.** The presiding juror of every grand jury and the district attorney or other prosecuting officer who is before the grand jury may administer all oaths and affirmations in the manner prescribed by law to witnesses who appear before the jury for the purpose of testifying in any matter of which the witnesses have cognizance. At the request of the court, the presiding juror shall return to the court a list, under his or her hand, of all witnesses who are sworn before the grand jury. That list shall be filed by the clerk of circuit court.

**History:** 1977 c. 187 s. 95; 1977 c. 449; Stats. 1977 s. 756.14; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.44.

**968.45 Witness rights; transcripts. (1)** Any witness appearing before a grand jury may have counsel present, but the counsel shall not be allowed to examine his or her client, cross-examine other witnesses or argue before the judge. Counsel may consult with his or her client while before a grand jury. If the prosecuting officer, attorney for a witness or a grand juror believes that a conflict of interest exists for an attorney or attorneys to represent more than one witness before a grand jury, the person so believing may make a motion before the presiding judge to dis-



qualify the attorney from representing more than one witness before the grand jury. A hearing shall be held upon notice with the burden upon the moving party to establish the conflict.

(2) No grand jury transcript may be made public until the trial of anyone indicted by the grand jury and then only that portion of the transcript that is relevant and material to the case at hand. This subsection does not limit the defendant's rights to discovery under s. 971.23.

**History:** 1979 c. 291; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.45.

**968.46 Secrecy.** Notwithstanding s. 757.14, all motions, including but not limited to those for immunity or a privilege, brought by a prosecuting officer or witness appearing before a grand jury shall be made, heard and decided in complete secrecy and not in open court if the prosecuting officer or witness bringing the motion or exercising the immunity or privilege so requests.

**History:** 1979 c. 291; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.46.

**968.47 District attorney, when to attend.** Whenever required by the grand jury it shall be the duty of the district attorney of the county to attend them for the purpose of examining witnesses in their presence or of giving them advice upon any legal matter, and to issue subpoenas and other process to bring up witnesses.

**History:** 1977 c. 187 s. 95; Stats. 1977 s. 756.15; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.47.

**968.48 Attendance; absence; excuse; number required for grand jury session; number required to concur in indictment.** Each grand juror shall attend every session of the grand jury unless excused by the presiding juror. The presiding juror may excuse a grand juror from attending a grand jury session only for a reason which appears to the presiding juror in his or her discretion as good and sufficient cause for the excuse. No business may be transacted at any session of the grand jury at which less than 14 members of the grand jury are in attendance and no indictment may be found by any grand jury unless at least 12 of their number shall concur in the indictment.

**History:** 1977 c. 187 s. 95; Stats. 1977 s. 756.16; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.48.

**968.49 Fine for nonattendance.** Any person lawfully summoned to attend as a grand juror who fails to attend without any sufficient excuse shall pay a fine not exceeding \$40, which shall be imposed by the court to which the person was summoned and shall be paid into the county treasury.

**History:** Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997).

**968.50 Report progress and return indictments.** A grand jury may report progress and return indictments to the court from time to time during its session and until discharged.

**History:** 1977 c. 187 s. 95; Stats. 1977 s. 756.17; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.50.

Grand jury performs a judicial rather than legislative function; therefore, progress report unconnected to an indictment may not be made public. *State ex rel. Caledonia v. Racine County Ct.* 78 W (2d) 429, 254 NW (2d) 317.

**968.505 Procedure upon discharge of grand jury.** When the grand jury is discharged the clerk shall collect all transcripts of testimony, minutes of proceedings, exhibits and other records of the grand jury, and deliver them as the jury directs either to the attorney general or to the district attorney, or upon approval of the court deliver them to the clerk of the court who shall impound them subject to the further order or orders of the court.

**History:** 1977 c. 187 s. 95; Stats. 1977 s. 756.18; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.505; 1997 a. 35 s. 586.

**968.51 Indictment not to be disclosed.** No grand juror or officer of the court, if the court shall so order, shall disclose the fact that any indictment for a felony has been found against any person not in custody or under recognizance, otherwise than by issuing or executing process on such indictment, until such person has been arrested.

**History:** 1977 c. 187 s. 95; Stats. 1977 s. 756.19; Sup. Ct. Order, No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.51.

**968.52 Votes not to be disclosed.** No grand juror may be allowed to state or testify in any court in what manner he or she or any other member of the jury voted on any question before them, or what opinion was expressed by any juror in relation to the question.

**History:** 1977 c. 187 s. 95; Stats. 1977 s. 756.20; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.52.

**968.53 When testimony may be disclosed.** Members of the grand jury and any grand jury reporter may be required by any court to testify whether the testimony of a witness examined before the jury is consistent with or different from the evidence given by the witness before the court; and they may also be required to disclose the testimony given before the grand jury by any person upon a complaint against the person for perjury, or upon trial for the offense. Any transcript of testimony taken before the grand jury and certified by a grand jury reporter to have been carefully compared by the reporter with his or her minutes of testimony so taken and to be a true and correct transcript of all or a specified portion of the transcript, may be received in evidence with the same effect as the oral testimony of the reporter to the facts so certified, but the reporter may be cross-examined by any party as to the matter.

**History:** 1977 c. 187 s. 95; Stats. 1977 s. 756.21; Sup. Ct. Order No. 96–08, 207 W (2d) xv (1997); Stats. 1997 s. 968.53.