971.095(1)(1)In this section:
971.095(1)(a) (a) “District attorney" has the meaning given in s. 950.02 (2m).
971.095(1)(b) (b) “Victim" has the meaning given in s. 950.02 (4).
971.095(2) (2)In any case in which a defendant has been charged with a crime, the district attorney shall, as soon as practicable, offer all of the victims in the case who have requested the opportunity an opportunity to confer with the district attorney concerning the prosecution of the case and the possible outcomes of the prosecution, including potential plea agreements and sentencing recommendations. The duty to confer under this subsection does not limit the obligation of the district attorney to exercise his or her discretion concerning the handling of any criminal charge against the defendant.
971.095(3) (3)At the request of a victim, a district attorney shall make a reasonable attempt to provide the victim with notice of the date, time and place of scheduled court proceedings in a case involving the prosecution of a crime of which he or she is a victim and any changes in the date, time or place of a scheduled court proceeding for which the victim has received notice. This subsection does not apply to a proceeding held before the initial appearance to set conditions of release under ch. 969.
971.095(4) (4)If a person is arrested for a crime but the district attorney decides not to charge the person with a crime, the district attorney shall make a reasonable attempt to inform all of the victims of the act for which the person was arrested that the person will not be charged with a crime at that time.
971.095(5) (5)If a person is charged with committing a crime and the charge against the person is subsequently dismissed, the district attorney shall make a reasonable attempt to inform all of the victims of the crime with which the person was charged that the charge has been dismissed.
971.095(6) (6)A district attorney shall make a reasonable attempt to provide information concerning the disposition of a case involving a crime to any victim of the crime who requests the information.
971.095 History History: 1997 a. 181.
971.10 971.10 Speedy trial.
971.10(1)(1)In misdemeanor actions trial shall commence within 60 days from the date of the defendant's initial appearance in court.
971.10(2) (2)
971.10(2)(a)(a) The trial of a defendant charged with a felony shall commence within 90 days from the date trial is demanded by any party in writing or on the record. If the demand is made in writing, a copy shall be served upon the opposing party. The demand may not be made until after the filing of the information or indictment.
971.10(2)(b) (b) If the court is unable to schedule a trial pursuant to par. (a), the court shall request assignment of another judge pursuant to s. 751.03.
971.10(3) (3)
971.10(3)(a)(a) A court may grant a continuance in a case, upon its own motion or the motion of any party, if the ends of justice served by taking action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. A continuance shall not be granted under this paragraph unless the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of the continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
971.10(3)(b) (b) The factors, among others, which the court shall consider in determining whether to grant a continuance under par. (a) are:
971.10(3)(b)1. 1. Whether the failure to grant the continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding impossible or result in a miscarriage of justice.
971.10(3)(b)2. 2. Whether the case taken as a whole is so unusual and so complex, due to the number of defendants or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this section.
971.10(3)(b)3. 3. The interests of the victim, as defined in s. 950.02 (4).
971.10(3)(c) (c) No continuance under par. (a) may be granted because of general congestion of the court's calendar or the lack of diligent preparation or the failure to obtain available witnesses on the part of the state.
971.10(4) (4)Every defendant not tried in accordance with this section shall be discharged from custody but the obligations of the bond or other conditions of release of a defendant shall continue until modified or until the bond is released or the conditions removed.
971.10 Annotation A federal court applied balancing test is applicable to review the exercise of a trial court's discretion on a request for the substitution of trial counsel, with the associated request for a continuance. Phifer v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 24, 218 N.W.2d 354 (1974).
971.10 Annotation A party requesting a continuance on grounds of surprise must show: 1) actual surprise from an unforeseeable development; 2) when surprise is caused by unexpected testimony, the probability of producing contradictory or impeaching evidence; and 3) resulting prejudice if the request is denied. Angus v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 191, 251 N.W.2d 28 (1977).
971.10 Annotation A delay of 84 days between a defendant's first court appearance and trial on misdemeanor traffic charges was not so inordinate as to raise a presumption of prejudice. State v. Mullis, 81 Wis. 2d 454, 260 N.W.2d 696 (1978).
971.10 Annotation A stay of proceedings caused by the state's interlocutory appeal stopped the running of the time period under sub. (2). State ex rel. Rabe v. Ferris, 97 Wis. 2d 63, 293 N.W.2d 151 (1980).
971.10 Annotation Violations of the right to a speedy trial are waived by entry of a guilty plea. State v. Asmus, 2010 WI App 48, 324 Wis. 2d 427, 782 N.W.2d 435, 08-2980.
971.10 Annotation Following a guilty plea, the defendant could not raise a speedy trial issue. United States v. Gaertner, 583 F.2d 308 (1978).
971.105 971.105 Child victims and witnesses; duty to expedite proceedings. In all criminal and delinquency cases, juvenile fact-finding hearings under s. 48.31 and juvenile dispositional hearings involving a child victim or witness, as defined in s. 950.02, the court and the district attorney shall take appropriate action to ensure a speedy trial in order to minimize the length of time the child must endure the stress of the child's involvement in the proceeding. In ruling on any motion or other request for a delay or continuance of proceedings, the court shall consider and give weight to any adverse impact the delay or continuance may have on the well-being of a child victim or witness.
971.105 History History: 1983 a. 197; 1985 a. 262 s. 8; 1993 a. 98; 1995 a. 77.
971.109 971.109 Freezing assets of a person charged with financial exploitation of an elder person.
971.109(1)(1)Definitions. In this section:
971.109(1)(a) (a) “Elder person” means any individual who is 60 years of age or older.
971.109(1)(b) (b) “Financial exploitation” has the meaning given in s. 46.90 (1) (ed).
971.109(2) (2) Seizure of assets.
971.109(2)(a)(a) If a defendant is charged with a crime that is financial exploitation, the crime involves the taking or loss of property valued at more than $2,500, and the crime victim is an elder person, a prosecuting attorney may file a petition with the court in which the defendant has been charged to freeze the funds, assets, or property of the defendant in an amount up to 100 percent of the alleged value of funds, assets, or property in the defendant's pending criminal proceeding for purposes of restitution to the crime victim. The hearing on the petition may be held ex parte. The rules of evidence do not apply in a hearing under this paragraph.
971.109(2)(b) (b) In the hearing under par. (a), if there is a showing of probable cause that the defendant used, was using, is about to use, or is intending to use any funds, assets, or property in a way that constitutes or would constitute financial exploitation, the court shall issue an order to freeze or seize the funds, assets, or property of the defendant in the amount calculated under par. (a). A copy of the order shall be served upon the defendant whose funds, assets, or property has been frozen or seized.
971.109(2)(c) (c) The court's order shall prohibit the sale, gifting, transfer, or wasting of the funds, assets, or real or personal property of the elder person that are owned by or vested in the defendant without the express permission of the court. The court's order shall be binding upon a financial institution, as defined in s. 943.80 (2), and any 3rd party that is in possession of the funds, assets, or property.
971.109(3) (3) Release of funds. At any time within 30 days after service of the order under sub. (2) (b), the defendant or any person claiming an interest in the funds, assets, or property may file a petition to release the funds, assets, or property. The court shall hold a hearing on the motion within 10 days from the date the motion is filed. The procedure under s. 968.20 applies to a petition under this subsection.
971.109(4) (4) Dismissal or acquittal. If the prosecution of a charge of financial exploitation is dismissed or if a judgment of acquittal is entered, the court shall vacate the order issued under sub. (2) (b).
971.109(5) (5) Conviction. If the prosecution of a charge of financial exploitation results in a conviction, the court may order that the funds, assets, or property that were frozen or seized under sub. (2) (b) be released only for the purpose of paying restitution ordered under s. 973.20 (2).
971.109 History History: 2021 a. 76.
971.11 971.11 Prompt disposition of intrastate detainers.
971.11(1)(1)Whenever the warden or superintendent receives notice of an untried criminal case pending in this state against an inmate of a state prison, the warden or superintendent shall, at the request of the inmate, send by certified mail a written request to the district attorney for prompt disposition of the case. The request shall state the sentence then being served, the date of parole eligibility, if applicable, or the date of release to extended supervision, the approximate discharge or conditional release date, and prior decision relating to parole. If there has been no preliminary examination on the pending case, the request shall state whether the inmate waives such examination, and, if so, shall be accompanied by a written waiver signed by the inmate.
971.11(2) (2)If the crime charged is a felony, the district attorney shall either move to dismiss the pending case or arrange a date for preliminary examination as soon as convenient and notify the warden or superintendent of the prison thereof, unless such examination has already been held or has been waived. After the preliminary examination or upon waiver thereof, the district attorney shall file an information, unless it has already been filed, and mail a copy thereof to the warden or superintendent for service on the inmate. The district attorney shall bring the case on for trial within 120 days after receipt of the request subject to s. 971.10.
971.11(3) (3)If the crime charged is a misdemeanor, the district attorney shall either move to dismiss the charge or bring it on for trial within 90 days after receipt of the request.
971.11(4) (4)If the defendant desires to plead guilty or no contest to the complaint or to the information served upon him or her, the defendant shall notify the district attorney thereof. The district attorney shall thereupon arrange for the defendant's arraignment as soon as possible and the court may receive the plea and pronounce judgment.
971.11(5) (5)If the defendant wishes to plead guilty to cases pending in more than one county, the several district attorneys involved may agree with the defendant and among themselves for all such pleas to be received in the appropriate court of one of such counties, and s. 971.09 shall govern the procedure thereon so far as applicable.
971.11(6) (6)The prisoner shall be delivered into the custody of the sheriff of the county in which the charge is pending for transportation to the court, and the prisoner shall be retained in that custody during all proceedings under this section. The sheriff shall return the prisoner to the prison upon the completion of the proceedings and during any adjournments or continuances and between the preliminary examination and the trial, except that if the department certifies a jail as being suitable to detain the prisoner, he or she may be detained there until the court disposes of the case. The prisoner's existing sentence continues to run and he or she receives time credit under s. 302.11 while in custody.
971.11(7) (7)If the district attorney moves to dismiss any pending case or if it is not brought on for trial within the time specified in sub. (2) or (3) the case shall be dismissed unless the defendant has escaped or otherwise prevented the trial, in which case the request for disposition of the case shall be deemed withdrawn and of no further legal effect. Nothing in this section prevents a trial after the period specified in sub. (2) or (3) if a trial commenced within such period terminates in a mistrial or a new trial is granted.
971.11 Annotation A request for prompt disposition under this section must comply with sub. (1) in order to impose on the state the obligation to bring the case to trial within 120 days. State v. Adams, 207 Wis. 2d 568, 558 N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-1680.
971.11 Annotation Whether dismissal under sub. (7) is with or without prejudice is within the court's discretion. State v. Davis, 2001 WI 136, 248 Wis. 2d 986, 637 N.W.2d 62, 00-0889.
971.11 Annotation The responsibility for complying with the sub. (2) 120-day time limit for bringing a case to trial cannot be imposed on the defendant. Once the district attorney receives the request under sub. (1), the responsibility for prompt disposition is placed on the district attorney. The trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the case when the 120-day time limit was not met. State v. Lewis, 2004 WI App 211, 277 Wis. 2d 446, 690 N.W.2d 668, 03-3191.
971.11 Annotation Violations of the right to a speedy trial are waived by entry of a guilty plea. When a defendant chooses to accept a plea agreement rather than inconveniencing the district attorney by requiring the filing of a new complaint, the protections of this section are forfeited. State v. Asmus, 2010 WI App 48, 324 Wis. 2d 427, 782 N.W.2d 435, 08-2980.
971.11 Annotation The specific conclusion by the Davis, 2001 WI 136, and Adams, 207 Wis. 2d 568 (1996), courts was that the “subject to s. 971.10" language following the 120-day time period in sub. (2) refers to the court's authority to grant a continuance for the reasons specified in s. 971.10 (3) (a). The defendant's conclusion that the 120-day time period cannot be extended is fundamentally inconsistent with the Davis court's conclusion that failure to bring a case to trial within 120 days triggers dismissal, which can be without prejudice and allow for refiling. State v. Butler, 2014 WI App 4, 352 Wis. 2d 484, 844 N.W.2d 392, 12-2243.
971.12 971.12 Joinder of crimes and of defendants.
971.12(1)(1)Joinder of crimes. Two or more crimes may be charged in the same complaint, information or indictment in a separate count for each crime if the crimes charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors, or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on 2 or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. When a misdemeanor is joined with a felony, the trial shall be in the court with jurisdiction to try the felony.
971.12(2) (2) Joinder of defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the same complaint, information or indictment if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting one or more crimes. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.
971.12(3) (3) Relief from prejudicial joinder. If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of crimes or of defendants in a complaint, information or indictment or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. The district attorney shall advise the court prior to trial if the district attorney intends to use the statement of a codefendant which implicates another defendant in the crime charged. Thereupon, the judge shall grant a severance as to any such defendant.
971.12(4) (4) Trial together of separate charges. The court may order 2 or more complaints, informations or indictments to be tried together if the crimes and the defendants, if there is more than one, could have been joined in a single complaint, information or indictment. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single complaint, information or indictment.
971.12 History History: 1993 a. 486.
971.12 Annotation If two defendants were charged and the cases consolidated, and one then pleads guilty, there is no need for a severance, especially if the trial is to the court. Nicholas v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 678, 183 N.W.2d 8 (1971).
971.12 Annotation Severance is not required if the two charges involving a single act or transaction are so inextricably intertwined so as to make proof of one crime impossible without proof of the other. Holmes v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 389, 217 N.W.2d 657 (1974).
971.12 Annotation Due process of law was not violated, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion, by denying the defendant's motion to sever three counts of sex offenses from a count of first-degree murder. Bailey v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 331, 222 N.W.2d 871 (1974).
971.12 Annotation In a joint trial on charges of burglary and obstructing an officer, while evidence as to the fabrication of an alibi by the defendant was probative as to the burglary, the substantial danger that the jury might employ the evidence as affirmative proof of the elements of that crime, for which the state was required to introduce separate and independent evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, required the court to administer a clear and certain cautionary instruction that the jury should not consider evidence on the obstructing count as sufficient in itself to find the defendant guilty of burglary. Peters v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 22, 233 N.W.2d 420 (1975).
971.12 Annotation Joinder was not prejudicial to the defendant moving for severance when the possibly prejudicial effect of inadmissible hearsay regarding the other defendant was presumptively cured by instructions. State v. Jennaro, 76 Wis. 2d 499, 251 N.W.2d 800 (1977).
971.12 Annotation If a codefendant's antagonistic testimony merely corroborates overwhelming prosecution evidence, refusal to grant severance is not an abuse of discretion. Haldane v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 182, 270 N.W.2d 75 (1978).
971.12 Annotation Joinder of charges against the defendant was proper when separate acts exhibited some modus operandi. Francis v. State, 86 Wis. 2d 554, 273 N.W.2d 310 (1979).
971.12 Annotation The trial court properly deleted implicating references from a codefendant's confession rather than granting the defendant's motion for severance under sub. (3). Pohl v. State, 96 Wis. 2d 290, 291 N.W.2d 554 (1980).
971.12 Annotation The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a severance motion and failing to caution the jury against prejudice when two counts were joined. State v. Bettinger, 100 Wis. 2d 691, 303 N.W.2d 585 (1981).
971.12 Annotation Joinder is not prejudicial when the same evidence would be admissible under s. 904.04 if there were separate trials. State v. Hall, 103 Wis. 2d 125, 307 N.W.2d 289 (1981).
971.12 Annotation The trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for severance of codefendants' trials when the movant made an initial showing that his codefendant's testimony would have established his alibi defense and his entire defense was based on the alibi. State v. Brown, 114 Wis. 2d 554, 338 N.W.2d 857 (Ct. App. 1983).
971.12 Annotation Joinder under sub. (2) was proper when two robberies were instigated by one defendant's prostitution and the other defendant's systematic robbing of customers who refused to pay. State v. King, 120 Wis. 2d 285, 354 N.W.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1984).
971.12 AnnotationMisjoinder was harmless error. State v. Leach, 124 Wis. 2d 648, 370 N.W.2d 240 (1985).
971.12 Annotation To be of “the same or similar character" under sub. (1), crimes must be of the same type, occur over a relatively short time period, and evidence as to each must overlap. State v. Hamm, 146 Wis. 2d 130, 430 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1988).
971.12 Annotation If an appellate court vacates a conviction on one or more counts when multiple counts are tried together, the defendant is entitled to a new trial on the remaining counts upon showing compelling prejudice arising from evidence introduced to support the vacated counts. State v. McGuire, 204 Wis. 2d 372, 556 N.W.2d 111 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-3138.
971.12 Annotation A violation of sub. (3) does not require a new trial in all cases but is subject to harmless error analysis. State v. King, 205 Wis. 2d 81, 555 N.W.2d 189 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-3442.
971.12 Annotation Simultaneous trials of two defendants before two juries is permissible. An impermissible confession in one case not heard by the jury in that case accomplishes the required severance of the cases. State v. Avery, 215 Wis. 2d 45, 571 N.W.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2873.
971.12 Annotation For severance to be granted, it is not sufficient to show that some prejudice was caused. Any joinder of offenses is apt to involve some element of prejudice to the defendant, since a jury is likely to feel that a defendant charged with several crimes must be a bad individual who has done something wrong. However, if the notion of involuntary joinder is to retain any validity, a higher degree of prejudice, or certainty of prejudice, must be shown before relief will be in order. State v. Linton, 2010 WI App 129, 329 Wis. 2d 687, 791 N.W.2d 222, 09-2256.
971.12 Annotation Sub. (1) is broadly construed in favor of initial joinder. The court has historically favored initial joinder particularly when the charged crimes were all committed by the same defendant. State v. Salinas, 2016 WI 44, 369 Wis. 2d 9, 879 N.W.2d 609, 13-2686.
971.12 Annotation In assessing whether separate crimes are sufficiently “connected together" for purposes of initial joinder under sub. (1), the court looks to a variety of factors, including: 1) are the charges closely related; 2) are there common factors of substantial importance; 3) did one charge arise out of the investigation of the other; 4) are the crimes close in time or close in location, or do the crimes involve the same victims; 5) are the crimes similar in manner, scheme, or plan; 6) was one crime committed to prevent punishment for another; and 7) would joinder serve the goals and purposes of this section. State v. Salinas, 2016 WI 44, 369 Wis. 2d 9, 879 N.W.2d 609, 13-2686.
971.12 Annotation In evaluating the potential for prejudice, when evidence of the counts sought to be severed would be admissible in separate trials, the risk of prejudice arising because of joinder is generally not significant. State v. Watkins, 2021 WI App 37, 398 Wis. 2d 558, 961 N.W.2d 884, 19-1996.
971.12 Annotation Criminal Law—Joinder and Severance Under the New Wisconsin Criminal Procedure Code. 1971 WLR 604.
971.13 971.13 Competency.
971.13(1)(1)No person who lacks substantial mental capacity to understand the proceedings or assist in his or her own defense may be tried, convicted or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures.
971.13(2) (2)A defendant shall not be determined incompetent to proceed solely because medication has been or is being administered to restore or maintain competency.
971.13(3) (3)The fact that a defendant is not competent to proceed does not preclude any legal objection to the prosecution under s. 971.31 which is susceptible of fair determination prior to trial and without the personal participation of the defendant.
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