V,10(1)(a) (a) Every bill which shall have passed the legislature shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the governor.
V,10(1)(b) (b) If the governor approves and signs the bill, the bill shall become law. Appropriation bills may be approved in whole or in part by the governor, and the part approved shall become law.
V,10(1)(c) (c) In approving an appropriation bill in part, the governor may not create a new word by rejecting individual letters in the words of the enrolled bill.
V,10(2)(a) (a) If the governor rejects the bill, the governor shall return the bill, together with the objections in writing, to the house in which the bill originated. The house of origin shall enter the objections at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider the bill. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members present agree to pass the bill notwithstanding the objections of the governor, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of the members present it shall become law.
V,10(2)(b) (b) The rejected part of an appropriation bill, together with the governor's objections in writing, shall be returned to the house in which the bill originated. The house of origin shall enter the objections at large upon the journal and proceed to reconsider the rejected part of the appropriation bill. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of the members present agree to approve the rejected part notwithstanding the objections of the governor, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of the members present the rejected part shall become law.
V,10(2)(c) (c) In all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by ayes and noes, and the names of the members voting for or against passage of the bill or the rejected part of the bill notwithstanding the objections of the governor shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively.
V,10(3) (3) Any bill not returned by the governor within 6 days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to the governor shall be law unless the legislature, by final adjournment, prevents the bill's return, in which case it shall not be law. [1905 J.R. 14, 1907 J.R. 13, 1907 c. 661, vote Nov. 1908; 1927 J.R. 37, 1929 J.R. 43, vote Nov. 1930; 1987 A.J.R. 71, 1989 S.J.R. 11, vote Apr. 1990]
In determining whether the governor has acted in 6 days, judicial notice may be taken of the chief clerk's records to establish the date it was presented to him. State ex rel. General Motors Corp. v. Oak Creek, 49 W (2d) 299, 182 NW (2d) 481.
Governor may veto individual words, letters and digits, and may also reduce appropriations by striking digits, as long as what remains after veto is complete, entire and workable law. Wis. Senate v. Thompson, 144 W (2d) 429, 424 NW (2d) 385 (1988).
See note to art. IV, sec. 20, citing 63 Atty. Gen. 346, concerning recording yeas and nays.
Governor may not alter partial vetoes once approved portion of act has been delivered to secretary of state and disapproved portion returned to house of origin. 70 Atty. Gen. 154.
Failure of governor to express his objections to several possible partial vetoes of 1981-82 budget bill make any such possible vetoes ineffective. 70 Atty. Gen. 189.
The Governor's partial veto of section 1117g of 1991 Wisconsin Act 269 did not result in a complete and workable law. The partial veto, therefore, was invalid. because the Governor's approval was not necessary for the bill to become law, the invalidity of the partial veto results in s. 605.35 being enforced as passed by the legislature. OAG 26-92.
Partial veto power violates no federal constitutional provision. Risser v. Thompson, 930 F (2d) 549 (1991).
Wisconsin partial veto. 1989 WLR 1395 (1989).
VI,1 Election of secretary of state, treasurer and attorney general; term. Section 1. [As amended April 1979] The qualified electors of this state, at the times and places of choosing the members of the legislature, shall in 1970 and every 4 years thereafter elect a secretary of state, treasurer and attorney general who shall hold their offices for 4 years. [1977 J.R. 32, 1979 J.R. 3, vote April 1979]
VI,1m Secretary of state; 4-year term. Section 1m. [Created April 1967; repealed April 1979; see 1965 J.R. 80, 1967 J.R. 10 and 15, vote April 1967; 1977 J.R. 32, 1979 J.R. 3, vote April 1979.]
VI,1n Treasurer; 4-year term. Section 1n. [Created April 1967; repealed April 1979; see 1965 J.R. 80, 1967 J.R. 10 and 15, vote April 1967; 1977 J.R. 32, 1979 J.R. 3, vote April 1979.]
VI,1p Attorney general; 4-year term. Section 1p. [Created April 1967; repealed April 1979; see 1965 J.R. 80, 1967 J.R. 10 and 15, vote April 1967; 1977 J.R. 32, 1979 J.R. 3, vote April 1979.]
VI,2 Secretary of state; duties, compensation. Section 2. [As amended Nov. 1946] The secretary of state shall keep a fair record of the official acts of the legislature and executive department of the state, and shall, when required, lay the same and all matters relative thereto before either branch of the legislature. He shall perform such other duties as shall be assigned him by law. He shall receive as a compensation for his services yearly such sum as shall be provided by law, and shall keep his office at the seat of government. [1943 J.R. 60, 1945 J.R. 73, vote Nov. 1946]
VI,3 Treasurer and attorney general; duties, compensation. Section 3. The powers, duties and compensation of the treasurer and attorney general shall be prescribed by law.
The powers of the attorney general in Wisconsin. Van Alstyne, Roberts, 1974 WLR 721.
VI,4 County officers; election, terms, removal; vacancies. Section 4. [As amended Nov. 1882, April 1929, Nov. 1962, April 1965, April 1967, April 1972 and April 1982]
VI,4(1) (1) Sheriffs, coroners, registers of deeds, district attorneys, and all other elected county officers except judicial officers and chief executive officers, shall be chosen by the electors of the respective counties once in every 2 years.
VI,4(2) (2) The offices of coroner and surveyor in counties having a population of 500,000 or more are abolished. Counties not having a population of 500,000 shall have the option of retaining the elective office of coroner or instituting a medical examiner system. Two or more counties may institute a joint medical examiner system.
VI,4(3) (3) Sheriffs shall hold no other office. Sheriffs may be required by law to renew their security from time to time, and in default of giving such new security their office shall be deemed vacant.
VI,4(4) (4) The governor may remove any elected county officer mentioned in this section, giving to the officer a copy of the charges and an opportunity of being heard.
VI,4(5) (5) All vacancies in the offices of sheriff, coroner, register of deeds or district attorney shall be filled by appointment. The person appointed to fill a vacancy shall hold office only for the unexpired portion of the term to which appointed and until a successor shall be elected and qualified. [1881 J.R. 16A, 1882 J.R. 3, 1882 c. 290, vote Nov. 1882; 1927 J.R. 24, 1929 J.R. 13, vote April 1929; 1959 J.R. 68, 1961 J.R. 64, vote Nov. 6, 1962; 1963 J.R. 30, 1965 J.R. 5, vote April 1965; 1965 J.R. 61, 1967 J.R. 12, vote April 1967; 1969 J.R. 33, 1971 J.R. 21, vote April 1972; 1979 J.R. 38, 1981 J.R. 15, vote April 1982]
The Shawano district attorney may properly serve as district attorney of Menominee county since the latter was not organized for judicial purposes. Pamanet v. State, 49 W (2d) 501, 182 NW (2d) 459.
This section does not bar a county from assisting in the defense of actions brought against the sheriff as a result of the sheriff's official acts. Bablitch and Bablitch v. Lincoln County, 82 W (2d) 574, 263 NW (2d) 218.
Sheriff's powers and duties discussed. Professional Police Ass'n. v. Dane County, 106 W (2d) 303, 316 NW (2d) 656 (1982).
Sheriff's assignment of deputy to undercover drug investigation falls within constitutionally protected powers of the sheriff and could not be limited by a collective bargaining agreement. Manitowoc Co. v. Local 986B 168 W (2d) 819, 484 NW (2d) 534 (1992).
Implementation legislation is necessary before counties under 500,000 may abolish office of coroner. 61 Atty. Gen. 355.
County board in county under 500,000 can abolish elective office of coroner and implement medical examiner system to be effective at end of incumbent coroner's term. Language in 61 Atty. Gen. 355 inconsistent herewith is withdrawn. 63 Atty. Gen. 361.
This section does not immunize counties from liability for their own acts. Soderbeck v. Burnett County, Wis. 752 F (2d) 285 (1985).
County sheriff was officer of state, not county, when fulfilling constitutional obligations. Soderbeck v. Burnett County, Wis., 821 F (2d) 446 (7th Cir. 1987).
VII,1 Impeachment; trial. Section 1. [As amended Nov. 1932] The court for the trial of impeachments shall be composed of the senate. The assembly shall have the power of impeaching all civil officers of this state for corrupt conduct in office, or for crimes and misdemeanors; but a majority of all the members elected shall concur in an impeachment. On the trial of an impeachment against the governor, the lieutenant governor shall not act as a member of the court. No judicial officer shall exercise his office, after he shall have been impeached, until his acquittal. Before the trial of an impeachment the members of the court shall take an oath or affirmation truly and impartially to try the impeachment according to evidence; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, or removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, profit or trust under the state; but the party impeached shall be liable to indictment, trial and punishment according to law. [1929 J.R. 72, 1931 J.R. 58, vote Nov. 1932]
VII,2 Court system. Section 2. [As amended April 1966 and April 1977] The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a unified court system consisting of one supreme court, a court of appeals, a circuit court, such trial courts of general uniform statewide jurisdiction as the legislature may create by law, and a municipal court if authorized by the legislature under section 14. [1963 J.R. 48, 1965 J.R. 50, vote April 1966; 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977]
The Shawano-Menominee court was a constitutional district court since Menominee county was not organized for judicial purposes. Pamanet v. State, 49 W (2d) 501, 182 NW (2d) 459.
If 425.113 were to be interpreted so as to remove a court's power to issue a body attachment for one who chooses to ignore its orders, such interpretation would cause the statute to be unconstitutional as a violation of the principle of separation of powers. Smith v. Burns, 65 W (2d) 638, 223 NW (2d) 562.
Courts have no inherent power to stay or suspend execution of sentence in absence of statutory authority. Court's refusal to impose legislatively mandated sentence constitutes abuse of discretion and usurpation of legislative field. State v. Sittig, 75 W (2d) 497, 249 NW (2d) 770.
WERC is authorized by 111.06 (1) (L) to determine whether conduct in violation of criminal law has occurred. Such authorization is not a delegation of judicial power in violation of Art. VII, sec. 2 nor does the administrative procedure violate Art. I, sec. 8. Layton School of Art & Design v. WERC, 82 W (2d) 324, 262 NW (2d) 218.
Courts have no inherent power to dismiss criminal complaint with prejudice prior to attachment of jeopardy. State v. Braunsdorf, 92 W (2d) 849, 286 NW (2d) 14 (Ct. App. 1979).
Sections 489m, 490m and 561 (8), ch. 90, laws of 1973, may provide for and implement a legislative appointment to the office of county judge contrary to sec. 2 and Art. XIII, sec. 10. 63 Atty. Gen. 24.
In mental hearings under 51.02, 1973 stats., or alcohol or drug abuse hearings under 51.09 (1), 1973 stats., power to appoint attorney at public expense, to determine indigency and to fix compensation are judicial and must be exercised by the court or under its direction and cannot be limited by the county board or delegated to private nonprofit corporation. 63 Atty. Gen. 323.
Unless acting in clear absence of all jurisdiction, judges are immune from liability for judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 US 349 (1978).
Integrated state bar's use of mandatory dues to fund political or ideological activities violates free speech provisions. Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 US 226, 110 LEd 2d 1 (1990).
Court reform of 1977: The Wisconsin supreme court ten years later. Bablitch. 72 MLR 1 (1988).
The separation of powers control of courts and lawyers. Currie, Resh, 1974 WBB No. 6.
VII,3 Supreme court: jurisdiction. Section 3. [As amended April 1977]
VII,3(1) (1) The supreme court shall have superintending and administrative authority over all courts.
VII,3(2) (2) The supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all courts and may hear original actions and proceedings. The supreme court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.
VII,3(3) (3) The supreme court may review judgments and orders of the court of appeals, may remove cases from the court of appeals and may accept cases on certification by the court of appeals. [1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977]
Authority of supreme court to review and modify criminal sentences discussed. Riley v. State, 47 W (2d) 801, 177 NW (2d) 838.
The supreme court's authority to issue a writ of error is not dependent upon a specific legislative enactment, but the constitution and statutes relating to its appellate jurisdiction give it the authority to issue such writs as are necessary to exercise its appellate jurisdiction. Shavie v. State, 49 W (2d) 379, 182 NW (2d) 505.
A writ of error coram nobis cannot be used for the purpose of producing newly discovered evidence affecting only the credibility of a confession. Mikulovsky v. State, 54 W (2d) 699, 196 NW (2d) 748.
The supreme court exercises an inherent supervisory power over the practice of the law and this can be more effectively exercised with an independent review. Contrary language, if any, in prior cases withdrawn. Herro, McAndrews & Porter v. Gerhardt, 62 W (2d) 179, 214 NW (2d) 401.
The supreme court declines to adopt the equitable doctrine of "substituted judgment" under which a court substitutes its judgment for that of a person incompetent to arrive at a decision for himself. In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 67 W (2d) 4, 226 NW (2d) 180.
Adoption by the supreme court in 1967 of the Code of Judicial Ethics and of Rule 17 thereof in 1974 requiring annual financial disclosure by judges of assets and liabilities was valid and enforceable under the court's inherent power to function as the supreme court and under the court's general superintending control over all inferior courts, as expressly set forth in sec. 3. In re Hon. Charles E. Kading, 70 W (2d) 508, 235 NW (2d) 409.
Declaration of rights is an appropriate vehicle for exercise of superintending control over inferior courts. State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 W (2d) 276, 249 NW (2d) 573.
Supreme court has power to formulate and carry into effect court system budget. State ex rel. Moran v. Dept. of Admin. 103 W (2d) 311, 307 NW (2d) 658 (1981).
Court will invalidate legislation only for constitutional violations. State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 W (2d) 358, 338 NW (2d) 684 (1983).
Statute which required withholding of judge's salary for failure to decide cases within specified time was unconstitutional intrusion by legislature into area of exclusive judicial authority. In Matter of Complaint Against Grady, 118 W (2d) 762, 348 NW (2d) 559 (1984).
Virginia supreme court was not immune from suit under s. 1983. Supreme Court of VA. v. Consumers Union, 446 US 719 (1980).
Inherent power and administrative court reform. 58 MLR 133.
VII,4 Supreme court: election, chief justice, court system administration. Section 4. [As amended Nov. 1877, April 1889, April 1903 and April 1977]
VII,4(1) (1) The supreme court shall have 7 members who shall be known as justices of the supreme court. Justices shall be elected for 10-year terms of office commencing with the August 1 next succeeding the election. Only one justice may be elected in any year. Any 4 justices shall constitute a quorum for the conduct of the court's business.
VII,4(2) (2) The justice having been longest a continuous member of said court, or in case 2 or more such justices shall have served for the same length of time, the justice whose term first expires, shall be the chief justice. The justice so designated as chief justice may, irrevocably, decline to serve as chief justice or resign as chief justice but continue to serve as a justice of the supreme court.
VII,4(3) (3) The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the administrative head of the judicial system and shall exercise this administrative authority pursuant to procedures adopted by the supreme court. The chief justice may assign any judge of a court of record to aid in the proper disposition of judicial business in any court of record except the supreme court. [1876 J.R. 10, 1877 J.R. 1, 1877 c. 48, vote Nov. 1877; 1887 J.R. 5, 1889 J.R. 3, 1889 c. 22, vote April 1889; 1901 J.R. 8, 1903 J.R. 7, 1903 c. 10, vote April 1903; 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977]
VII,5 Judicial circuits. Section 5. [Repealed April 1977; see 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977.]
VII,5(1) Court of appeals. Section 5. [As created April 1977] (1) The legislature shall by law combine the judicial circuits of the state into one or more districts for the court of appeals and shall designate in each district the locations where the appeals court shall sit for the convenience of litigants.
VII,5(2) (2) For each district of the appeals court there shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the district one or more appeals judges as prescribed by law, who shall sit as prescribed by law. Appeals judges shall be elected for 6-year terms and shall reside in the district from which elected. No alteration of district or circuit boundaries shall have the effect of removing an appeals judge from office during the judge's term. In case of an increase in the number of appeals judges, the first judge or judges shall be elected for full terms unless the legislature prescribes a shorter initial term for staggering of terms.
VII,5(3) (3) The appeals court shall have such appellate jurisdiction in the district, including jurisdiction to review administrative proceedings, as the legislature may provide by law, but shall have no original jurisdiction other than by prerogative writ. The appeals court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction and shall have supervisory authority over all actions and proceedings in the courts in the district. [1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977]
Court of appeals does not have jurisdiction to entertain original action unrelated to its supervisory or appellate authority over circuit court. State ex rel. Swan v. Elections Bd., 133 W (2d) 87, 394 NW (2d) 732 (1986).
VII,6 Circuit court: boundaries. Section 6. [As amended April 1977] The legislature shall prescribe by law the number of judicial circuits, making them as compact and convenient as practicable, and bounding them by county lines. No alteration of circuit boundaries shall have the effect of removing a circuit judge from office during the judge's term. In case of an increase of circuits, the first judge or judges shall be elected. [1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977]
VII,7 Circuit court: election. Section 7. [As amended April 1897, Nov. 1924 and April 1977] For each circuit there shall be chosen by the qualified electors thereof one or more circuit judges as prescribed by law. Circuit judges shall be elected for 6-year terms and shall reside in the circuit from which elected. [1895 J.R. 8, 1897 J.R. 9, 1897 c. 69, vote April 1897; 1921 J.R. 24S, 1923 J.R. 64, 1923 c. 408, vote Nov. 1924; 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977]
VII,8 Circuit court: jurisdiction. Section 8. [As amended April 1977] Except as otherwise provided by law, the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state and such appellate jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature may prescribe by law. The circuit court may issue all writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction. [1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977]
The rule of State ex rel. Dore v. Stoltz, 42 W (2d) 534 is not limited to post-bindover situations. State ex rel. Cullen v. Ceci, 45 W (2d) 432, 173 NW (2d) 175.
Although prohibition is not the appropriate remedy to suppress prosecution on an illegal search warrant, the supreme court treated the case as a petition for habeas corpus. State ex rel. Furlong v. Waukesha County Court, 47 W (2d) 515, 177 NW (2d) 333.
Certiorari cannot be used to upset the legislative discretion of a city council but the court should review the council's action to determine whether there was a rational factual basis for it. The review is limited to the record consisting of the petition and the return to the writ, plus matters of which the court could take judicial notice. State ex rel. Hippler v. Baraboo, 47 W (2d) 603, 178 NW (2d) 1.
A writ of prohibition may not be used to test the admissibility of evidence at an impending trial. State ex rel. Cortez v. Bd. of F. & P. Comm. 49 W (2d) 130, 181 NW (2d) 378.