AB392, s. 37 13Section 37. 11.50 (9) of the statutes is amended to read:
AB392,15,2314 11.50 (9) Limitation on grants. The total grant available to an eligible candi
15date may not exceed that amount which, when added to all other contributions ac
16cepted from sources other than individuals, political party committees and legisla
17tive campaign committees, is equal to 45% of the disbursement level limitation
18specified for the applicable office for candidates other than candidates challenging
19incumbent officeholders, as determined
under s. 11.31 (1) and adjusted as provided
20under s. 11.31 (9)
. The board shall scrutinize accounts and reports and records kept
21under this chapter to assure that applicable limitations under ss. 11.26 (9) and 11.31
22are not exceeded and any violation is reported. No candidate or campaign treasurer
23may accept grants exceeding the amount authorized by this subsection.
AB392, s. 38 24Section 38. 11.50 (11) (e) of the statutes is amended to read:
AB392,16,4
111.50 (11) (e) No candidate may expend, authorize the expenditure of or incur
2any obligation to expend any grant if he or she violates the pledge required under
3sub. (2) (a) as a precondition to receipt of a grant, except as authorized in sub. (2) (h)
4or (i)
.
AB392, s. 39 5Section 39. 11.60 (3) of the statutes is amended to read:
AB392,16,106 11.60 (3) Notwithstanding sub. (1), any person, including any committee or
7group, who makes any contribution or disbursement in violation of this chapter may
8be required to forfeit treble the amount of the contribution or portion thereof which
9is illegally unlawfully contributed or treble the amount of the disbursement or por
10tion thereof which is unlawfully disbursed
.
AB392, s. 40 11Section 40. Nonstatutory provisions legislative findings. The legisla
ture, drawing on its collective experience with campaigns for public office and on the
independent evidence presented to it by qualified analysts, finds and declares that:
AB392,16,16 12(1)  Wisconsin has historically experienced a high level of civic participation in
13responsible government, which however is now in decline as the direct result of cam
14paign financing arrangements that have the clear tendency to distance voters from
15the electoral process, and that cannot be successfully corrected under applicable rul
16ings of the U.S. supreme court.
AB392,16,21 17(2)  Current campaign financing arrangements, with their perceived preferen
18tial access to lawmakers for special interests that are capable of contributing sizeable
19sums to lawmakers' campaigns, have provoked public disaffection with elective gov
20ernment, as manifested by declines in voting percentages and in Wisconsin election
21campaign fund participation. 
AB392,17,3
1(3)  The Wisconsin election campaign fund system has lost popular support be
2cause it does not diminish the perceived preferential access of the special interests
3and is therefore judged to be ineffective.
AB392,17,6 4(4)  Before 1976, Wisconsin in company with 33 other states had these matters
5under regulatory control through a system of mandatory spending limits applicable
6to all candidates for state elective office.
AB392,17,8 7(5)  In 1976, the U.S. supreme court, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, invali
8dated all such spending limits while approving campaign contribution limits.
AB392,17,11 9(6)  Since that time campaign expenditures have risen steeply, doubling in
10Wisconsin legislative races since 1980. The addition has been made up principally
11by contributions from special interests.
AB392,17,14 12(7)  Contribution limits are inadequate by themselves to check this trend. So
13long as spending is effectively unrestrained, contributions will find ways to protect
14favored candidates from being outspent.
AB392,17,17 15(8)  Among such ways have been personal spending by wealthy candidates, in
16dependent expenditures that favor or oppose an identified candidate, and the use of
17political parties as conduits for the support of selected candidates.
AB392,17,23 18(9)  Experience shows in particular that so-called "independent" support —
19whether by individuals, committees, or other entities — can be coordinated with a
20candidate's campaign, by means of informal "understandings", without losing its
21professedly independent character. Likewise, contributions to a political party for
22ostensible "party-building" purposes can be and are routed, by design, to the support
23of identified candidates.
AB392,18,3 24(10)  Public financing cannot cure the problem so long as spending limits are
25so readily evadable. After 15 years of experience with the present law, and a 42%

1decline in Wisconsin election campaign fund designations, it has become evident that
2Wisconsin voters await some successful repair of the campaign finance system before
3they will give it their financial support.
AB392,18,9 4(11)  The legislature agrees with the 1992 finding of the California commission
5on campaign financing, made after 8 years of study, that an effective remedy to this
6problem requires the reconsideration of Buckley v. Valeo. The legislature believes
7with that commission that it is "strongly desirable to present the [Supreme] Court
8with carefully researched data and arguments so that it can consider upholding rea
9sonable spending limitations." This act is a step in that direction.
AB392,18,14 10(12)  The supreme court based its Buckley decision on a concern that spending
11limits could restrict political speech, "by reducing the number of issues discussed, the
12depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." The experience of
13those engaged in the electoral process is otherwise. It is unlimited expenditure that
14can drown or distort political discourse, in a flood of distractive repetition.
AB392,18,17 15(13)  The least distorted and most instructive channels of campaign commu
16nication are often free or inexpensive: debates, call-in programs, local interviews,
17and other voter connections that are not dependent on the power of money.
AB392,18,21 18(14)  The expanded use of such low-cost channels, stimulated by the adoption
19of sensible spending limits, would benefit political discourse by drawing candidates
20out of the packaged world of media advertisements and into the real world of voter
21engagement and accountability.
AB392,18,25 22(15)  Turning down the noise level of campaign communication, through rea
23sonable spending limits, increases the opportunity for newer and quieter voices to
24be heard. It tends to increase the number, depth and diversity of ideas presented to
25the public.
AB392,19,5
1(16)  Finally, a reasonable limit on campaign spending relieves candidates and
2officeholders alike from the constant necessity of engaging in defensive fund raising,
3arising as this does from the continual risk of massively financed opposition chal
4lenges to everything they may say or do. The conduct both of campaigns and of office
5will be thereby improved.
AB392, s. 41 6Section 41. Nonstatutory provisions; nonseverability.
AB392,19,9 7(1)  This act shall be considered a unit and its provisions inseparable. Notwith
8standing section 990.001 (11) of the statutes, if any provision of the statutes, as af
9fected by this act, is declared unconstitutional, the entire act is void.
AB392, s. 42 10Section 42. Initial applicability.
AB392,19,12 11(1)  The treatment of section 11.31 (9) of the statutes first applies to adjustment
12of disbursement limitations for the biennium beginning on January 1, 1997.
AB392, s. 43 13Section 43. Effective date.
AB392,19,14 14(1) This act takes effect on January 1, 1997.
AB392,19,1515 (End)
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