A public broadcasting network's decision to exclude an independent candidate who had little public support was a permissible exercise of journalistic discretion. Arkansas Educational TV v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 140 L. Ed. 2d 875 (1998).
It is a violation of the 4th amendment for police to bring members of the media or other 3rd persons into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the 3rd persons in the home is not in aid of the execution of the warrant. Wilson v. Layne, 526 US 603, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999).
The financing of student organizations through mandatory student fees does not violate the 1st amendment if viewpoint neutrality is the operational principal. Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 US ___, 146 L. Ed. 2d 193 (2000).
An ordinance prohibiting public nudity was valid when the government's asserted interest was combating the secondary effect associated with adult entertainment and was unrelated to suppression of the erotic message of nude dancing. Erie v. Pap's A.M. 529 US ___, 146 L. Ed. 2d 265 (2000).
A statute that makes it unlawful within regulated areas for any person to "knowingly approach" within eight feet of another person, without that person's consent, "for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person" is constitutional. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. ___, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000)
Generally, the 1st Amendment protects a person from being removed from public employment for purely political reasons. However, exemptions from the patronage dismissal ban are allowed on the theory that a newly elected administration has a legitimate interest in implementing the broad policies it was elected to implement without interference from disloyal employees. Pleva v. Norquist, 195 F.3d 905 (1999).
The dividing line between publications that may be denied to prisoners and those that may not is not a matter of administrative grace but of constitutional right. Gaugh v. Schmidt, 369 F. Supp. 877.
A town board was restrained from discharging its police chief until the issue of impermissible consideration of the chief's political activities was resolved. Kuhlmann v. Bloomfield Tp. 521 F. Supp. 1242 (1981).
Content neutral size restrictions placed on a banner proclaiming "Church/State--Keep Them Separate", after it was hung in the state capitol rotunda served the state's significant interest in protecting the capitol from visual degradation. That a Christmas tree and Menorah in the rotunda were allowed to remain without restriction did not prove content based discrimination. Gaylor v. Thompson, 939 F. Supp. 1363 (1996).
Behind the Curtain of Privacy: How Obscenity Law Inhibits the Expression of Ideas About Sex and Gender. Peterson. 1998 WLR 625.
Testimonial privilege of newsmen. Baxter, 55 MLR 184.
Academic freedom; some tentative guidelines. Keith, 55 MLR 379.
Protection of commercial speech. 60 MLR 138.
Zurcher: third party searches and freedom of the press. Cantrell. 62 MLR 35 (1978).
A newspaper cannot constitutionally be compelled to publish a paid advertisement designed to be an editorial response to previous newspaper reports. 64 MLR 361 (1980).
Granting access to private shopping center property for free speech purposes on the basis of a state constitutional provision does not violate owner's federal constitutional property rights or first amendment free speech rights. 64 MLR 507 (1981).
First amendment and freedom of press: A revised approach to marketplace of ideas concept. Gary. 72 MLR 187 (1989).
Architectural Appearances Ordinances and the 1st Amendment. Rice. 76 MLR 439 (1992).
Hate Crimes: New Limits on the Scope of the 1st Amendment. Resler. 77 MLR 415 (1994).
Improving the Odds of the Central Hudson Balancing Test; Restricting Commercial Speech as a Last Resort. Gulling. 81 MLR 873 (1998).
Researcher-subject testimonial privilege. Newels and Lehman, 1971 WLR 1085.
Freedom of speech, expression and action. Hilmes, 1971 WLR 1209.
Free speech on premises of privately owned shopping center. Felsenthal, 1973 WLR 612.
Constitutional protection of critical speech and the public figure doctrine: Retreat by reaffirmation. 1980 WLR 568.
Corporate "persons" and freedom of speech: The political impact of legal mythology. Payton and Bartlett, 1981 WLR 494.
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Mortices Union Free School District: Creating Greater Protection Religious Speech Through the Illusion of Public Forum Analysis. Ehrmann. 1994 WLR 965.
The Journalist's Privilege. Kassel. Wis. Law. Feb. 1996.
The Price of Free Speech: Regents v. Southworth. Furlow. Wis. Law. June 2000.
LIBEL
The burden of proof and determination of damages in libel cases is discussed. Dalton v. Meister, 52 Wis. 2d 173, 188 N.W.2d 494.
In a libel action involving a public figure or a matter of public concern, the defendant is entitled to the "clear and convincing" burden of proof and also to a finding of the type of malice involved. Polzin v. Helmbrecht, 54 Wis. 2d 578, 196 N.W.2d 685.
In determining punitive damages in libel cases it is relevant to consider the maximum fine for a similar offense under the criminal code. Wozniak v. Local 1111 of UE, 57 Wis. 2d 725, 205 N.W.2d 369.
The executive committee of the medical staff of a private hospital is not a quasi-judicial body so as to render a letter to it privileged. DiMiceli v. Klieger, 58 Wis. 2d 359, 206 N.W.2d 184.
"Public figure" is defined. The constitutional protections of news media and individual defamers are discussed. Denny v. Mertz, 106 Wis. 2d 636, 318 N.W.2d 141 (1982).
A private citizen may become a public figure regarding a particular issue that is of substantial public interest and must prove actual malice to prevail in a libel action. Weigel v. Capital Times Co. 145 Wis. 2d 71, 426 N.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1988).
Discussion of the absolute privilege to defame in the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings. Rady v. Lutz, 150 Wis. 2d 643, 444 N.W.2d 58 (Ct. App. 1989).
A fire department captain with considerable power and discretion is a public official who must meet the malice requirement. Defendant firefighters had a common law privilege to comment in writing on the captain's fitness for office. Miller v. Minority Brotherhood, 158 Wis. 2d 589, 463 N.W.2d 690 (Ct. App. 1990).
Where a defamation plaintiff is a public figure there must be proof of actual malice. The deliberate choice of one interpretation of a number of possible interpretations does not create a jury issue of actual malice. The selective destruction by a defendant of materials likely to be relevant to defamation litigation allows an inference that the materials would have provided evidence of actual malice. Torgerson v. Journal/Sentinel, Inc. 210 Wis. 2d 525, 563 N.W.2d 472 (1997).
For purposes of libel law, a "public figure" who must prove malice includes a person who by being drawn into or interjecting himself or herself into a public controversy becomes a public figure for a limited purpose because of involvement in the particular controversy, which status can be created without purposeful or voluntary conduct by the individual involved. Erdmann v. SF Broadcasting of Green Bay, Inc. 229 Wis. 2d 156, 599 N.W.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1999).
A "public dispute" is not simply a matter of interest to the public. It must be a real dispute, the outcome of which affects the general public in an appreciable way. Essentially private concerns do not become public controversies because they attract attention; its ramifications must be felt by persons who are not direct participants. Maguire v. Journal Sentinel, Inc. 2000 WI App 4, 232 Wis. 2d 236, 605 N.W.2d 881.
State libel laws are preempted by federal labor laws to the extent statements made without knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth are at issue. Old Dominion Br. No. 496, Nat. Asso., Letter Car. v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264.
A public figure who sues media companies for libel may inquire into the editorial processes of those responsible where proof of "actual malice" is required for recovery. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
"Public figure" principle in libel cases are discussed. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Assn., Inc. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
Defamation law of Wisconsin. Brody, 65 MLR 505 (1982).
Limitations on damages awarded public officials in defamation suits. Kampen, 1972 WLR 574.
I,4 Right to assemble and petition. Section 4. The right of the people peaceably to assemble, to consult for the common good, and to petition the government, or any department thereof, shall never be abridged.
A narrowly drawn anti-cruising ordinance did not violate the right to assemble or travel. Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 179 Wis. 2d 469, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1993).
The right to intrastate travel, including the right to move about one's neighborhood in an automobile, is fundamental, but infringements on the right are not subject to strict scrutiny. Cruising ordinances, reasonable in time, place and manner, do not violate this right. Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 544 N.W.2d 849 (1996).
The legislature cannot prohibit an individual from entering the capitol or its grounds. 59 Atty. Gen. 8.
Section 947.06, Stats. 1969, which prohibits unlawful assemblies, is constitutional. Cassidy v. Ceci, 320 F. Supp. 223.
Wisconsin, a Constitutional Right to Intrastate Travel, and Anti-Cruising Ordinances. Mode. 78 MLR 735.
I,5 Trial by jury; verdict in civil cases. Section 5. [As amended Nov. 1922] The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law without regard to the amount in controversy; but a jury trial may be waived by the parties in all cases in the manner prescribed by law. Provided, however, that the legislature may, from time to time, by statute provide that a valid verdict, in civil cases, may be based on the votes of a specified number of the jury, not less than five-sixths thereof. [1919 J.R. 58; 1921 J.R. 17 A; 1921 c. 504; vote Nov. 1922]
Note: See also the notes to Article I, Section 7—Jury Trial and Juror Qualifications for notes relating to jury trials in criminal cases.
When a juror is struck after the trial has commenced, a litigant cannot be required to proceed with 11 jurors in a civil case. The trial court must declare a mistrial or grant a nonsuit with the right to plead over. It is error to grant a nonsuit and then direct a verdict for the defendant because the plaintiff refused to continue with 11 jurors. State ex rel. Polk v. Johnson, 47 Wis. 2d 207, 177 N.W.2d 122.
Neither the constitution, statutes or common law affords the right to trial by jury in a will contest. Estate of Elvers, 48 Wis. 2d 17, 179 N.W.2d 881.
Where defendant, through his attorney, signed a notice of issue stating there was an issue of fact for the court, which was filed with the clerk, jury trial was effectually waived, because such conduct on the part of defendant's attorney amounted to written consent filed with the clerk as prescribed in 270.32, Stats. 1971. Theuerkauf v. Schnellbaecher, 64 Wis. 2d 79, 218 N.W.2d 295.
Requirement that defendant prepay jury fees in civil traffic forfeiture action is constitutional. State v. Graf, 72 Wis. 2d 179, 240 N.W.2d 387.
Requiring the payment of a jury fee did not violate the right to a trial by jury. County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466, 312 N.W.2d 731 (1981).
The right to 12-member jury can only be waived personally by the defendant. State v. Cooley, 105 Wis. 2d 642, 315 N.W.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1981).
The right to a jury trial does not extend to equitable actions; however defendants who are required to plead legal counterclaims in equitable actions or lose those claims are entitled to a jury trial of their claims. Green Spring Farms v. Spring Green Farms, 172 Wis. 2d 28, 492 N.W.2d 392 (Ct. App. 1992).
Use of collateral estoppel to prevent a civil defendant from testifying that he did not commit an act where in an earlier criminal trial the defendant was convicted by a jury of committing the act did not deny the defendant's right to a jury. Michelle T. v. Crozier, 173 Wis. 2d 681, 495 N.W.2d 327 (1993).
Where collateral estoppel compels raising a counterclaim in an equitable action, that compulsion does not result in the waiver of the right to a jury trail. Norwest Bank v. Plourde, 185 Wis. 2d 377, 518 N.W.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1994).
A party has a constitutional right to a jury trial on a statutory claim when the statute codifies an action known at common law in 1848 and the action was regarded as at law in 1848. State v. Ameritech, 185 Wis. 2d 686, 517 N.W.2d 705 (Ct. App. 1994).
There is neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to have all parties identified to a jury, but as a procedural rule the court should in all cases apprise the jurors of the names of all the parties. Stoppleworth v. Refuse Hideaway, Inc. 200 Wis. 2d 512, 546 N.W.2d 870 (Ct. App. 1996).
A jury trial is not constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528.
Juror intoxication is not external influence about which jurors may testify to impeach verdict. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
I,6 Excessive bail; cruel punishments. Section 6. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor shall excessive fines be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Imposition of a 3-year sentence as a repeater is not cruel and unusual even though the present offense only involved the stealing of 2 boxes of candy, which carries a maximum sentence of 6 months. Hanson v. State, 48 Wis. 2d 203, 179 N.W.2d 909.
It is not a cruel and unusual punishment to sentence a defendant to 25 years for armed robbery where the maximum would be 30 years, since by stipulation the court took into consideration 5 other uncharged armed robberies. Mallon v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 185, 181 N.W.2d 364.
Current standards of what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment should not be applied in reviewing old sentences of long standing. State ex rel. Warren v. County Court, 54 Wis. 2d 613, 197 N.W.2d 1.
A sentence is not discriminatory and excessive because it is substantially greater than that received by a codefendant. State v. Studler, 61 Wis. 2d 537, 213 N.W.2d 24.
Deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Santiago v. Leik, 179 Wis. 2d 786, 508 N.W.2d 456 (Ct. App. 1993).
Actions for the forfeiture of property which are commenced by the government and are driven in whole or in part by a desire to punish may violate the guarantees against excessive punishment. State v. Hammad, 213 Wis. 2d 343, 569 N.W.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1997).
A prison inmate does not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in his body that permits a 4th amendment challenge to strip searches. Prisoners convicted of crimes are protected from cruel and unusual treatment that prohibits prison officials from utilizing strip searches to punish, harass, humiliate or intimidate inmates regardless of their status in the institution. Al Ghashhiyah v. McCaughtry, 230 Wis. 2d 587, 602 N.W.2d 307 (Ct. App. 1999).
Paddling students is not cruel and unusual punishment. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651.
Defendant's life sentence was not cruel and unusual where defendant's 3 property crime felony convictions subjected him to recidivist penalty. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
Prison term of 40 years and fine of $20,000 for possession and sale of 9 ounces of marijuana was not cruel and unusual punishment. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
Excessive fines clause of U.S. Constitution does not apply to civil punitive damages award in action between private parties. Browning-Ferris v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 106 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1989).
Exposure to unreasonable risk of serious damage to future health is a basis for a cause of action for cruel and unusual punishment. Risk from environmental tobacco smoke held to be a basis for a cause of action. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 125 L. Ed. 2d 22 (1993).
Persons confined in central state hospital under 51.20, 51.37, 971.14, 971.17 and 975.06 are being subjected to punishment within meaning of cruel and unusual punishment clause. Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325 (1981).
Solitary confinement; punishment within the letter of the law or psychological torture? Thoenig, 1972 WLR 223.
Appellate sentence review. 1976 WLR 655.
I,7 Rights of accused. Section 7. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein the offense shall have been committed; which county or district shall have been previously ascertained by law.
CONFRONTATION AND COMPULSORY PROCESS
The right to have compulsory process to obtain witnesses in one's behalf does not require that the state be successful in attempting to subpoena the defendant's witnesses, but only that the process issue and that a diligent, good faith attempt be made by the officer to secure service of the process. Since the primary responsibility for having witnesses present in court rests with the parties and not the court, a motion for a continuance to obtain the attendance of witnesses is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed upon appeal or review except where it is clearly shown that there has been an abuse. Elam v. State, 50 Wis. 2d 383, 184 N.W.2d 176.
An accused should be allowed to cross-examine to discover why an accomplice has pleaded guilty and has testified against him. Champlain v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 751, 193 N.W.2d 868.
When a witness is not available for trial and when the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that witness, former testimony, including that given at a preliminary examination, may be introduced without violating either the constitutional mandates or the hearsay rule of evidence. State v. Lindsey, 53 Wis. 2d 759, 193 N.W.2d 699.
Because there was no showing that the witness was permanently ill, the defendant was denied his constitutional right to confrontation by the court allowing the use of the witness' deposition. Sheehan v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 757, 223 N.W.2d 600.
Whether a witness' refusal on 5th amendment grounds to answer otherwise permissible questions violates defendant's right to confrontation must be determined from the whole record. West v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 390, 246 N.W.2d 675.
