A newspaper office may be searched for evidence of a crime even though the newspaper is not suspected of a crime. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).

Stopping a car for no other reason than to check the license and registration was unreasonable under the 4th amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).

In-court identification of the accused was not suppressed as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).

A person has been seized within the meaning of the 4th amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).

Illegally seized evidence was properly admitted to impeach the defendant's false trial testimony, given in response to proper cross-examination, when the evidence did not squarely contradict the defendant's testimony on direct examination. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).

Arcane concepts of property law do not control the ability to claim 4th amendment protections. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980).

Resemblance to a "drug courier profile" was an insufficient basis for seizure. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980).

Objective facts and circumstantial evidence justified an investigative stop of a smuggler's vehicle. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981).

A warrant to search premises for contraband implicitly carries with it limited authority to detain occupants during a search. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).

The automobile exception does not extend to a closed, opaque container located in the luggage compartment. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981).

Police placement of a beeper in a container of precursor chemical used to manufacture an illicit drug and the subsequent surveillance of the defendant's car by monitoring beeper transmissions was not prohibited by the 4th amendment. U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).

The detention and interrogation of an airline passenger fitting a "drug courier profile" was unconstitutional. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).

Under the "independent source" doctrine, evidence discovered during a valid search was admissible regardless of whether initial entry was illegal. Segura v. U.S. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).

The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule allowed the admission of evidence obtained by officers acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant, issued by a detached and neutral magistrate, later found to be unsupported by probable cause. U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).

The "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule is discussed. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).

If a "wanted flyer" has been issued on the basis of articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that a wanted person has committed a crime, other officers may rely on the flyer to stop and question that person. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).

In assessing whether detention is too long to be justified as an investigative stop, it is appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to quickly confirm or dispel their suspicions. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).

Proposed surgery under general anesthetic to recover a bullet from an accused robber's body was an unreasonable search. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).

Fingerprints were not admissible when the police transported the suspect to a station house for fingerprinting without consent, probable cause, or prior judicial authorization. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985).

Apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness requirement. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).

When an officer stopped a car for traffic violations and reached into the car to move papers obscuring the vehicle ID number, discovered evidence was admissible. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).

The reasonable expectation of privacy was not violated when police, acting on an anonymous tip, flew over the defendant's enclosed backyard and observed marijuana plants. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).

Defendants have no reasonable privacy interest in trash left on a curb for pick-up. Therefore, a warrantless search is not prohibited under federal law. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).

The use of a roadblock to halt a suspect's automobile constituted a seizure. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989).

The impeachment exception to the exclusionary rule does not extend to the use of illegally obtained evidence to impeach testimony of defense witnesses other than the defendant. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 107 L. Ed. 2d 676 (1990).

For a seizure of a person to occur there must either be an application of force, however slight, or when force is absent, submission to an officer's "show of authority." California v. Hodari D. 499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 690 (1991).

When an officer has no articulable suspicion regarding a person, but requests that person to allow the search of his luggage, there is no seizure of the person if a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officer's request or end the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991).

Fourth-amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures extend to civil matters. The illegal eviction of a trailer home from a private park with deputy sheriffs present to prevent interference was an unconstitutional seizure of property. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 121 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1992).

Whether police must "knock and announce" prior to entering a residence in executing a warrant is part of the reasonableness inquiry under the 4th amendment. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 131 L. Ed. 2d 976 (1995).

Public school students are granted lesser privacy protections than adults, and student athletes even less. Mandatory drug testing of student athletes did not violate the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. School Dist. 475 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 132 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1995).

It is a violation of the 4th amendment for police to bring members of the media or other 3rd persons into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the 3rd persons in the home is not in aid of the execution of the warrant. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 143 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1999).

Inherent in Summers' authorization to detain an occupant of the place to be searched is the authority to use reasonable force to effectuate the detention. Use of force in the form of handcuffs to effectuate detention in the garage outside the house being searched was reasonable when the governmental interests outweighed the marginal intrusion. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 161 L. Ed. 2d 299, 125 S. Ct. 1465 (2004).

Violation of the "knock-and-announce" rule does not require the suppression of all evidence found in the search. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S 586, 165 L. Ed. 2d 56, 126 S. Ct. 2159 (2006).

A claim of "excessive force in the course of making a seizure of the person is properly analyzed under the 4th Amendment's objective reasonableness standard. A police officer's attempt to terminate a dangerous high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does not violate the 4th Amendment, even when it places the fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. ___, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).

The "reasonableness" of the investigative detention: An "ad hoc" constitutional test. Wiseman. 67 MLR 641 (1984).

The exclusionary rule and the 1983-1984 term. Gammon. 68 MLR 1 (1984).

The constitutionality of the canine sniff search: From Katz to dogs. Fitzgerald. 68 MLR 57 (1984).

Analyzing the reasonableness of bodily intrusions. Sarnacki. 68 MLR 130 (1984).

The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule: The latest example of "new federalism" in the states. 71 MLR 166 (1987).

Search and seizure—abandonment. 1974 WLR 212.

Terry revisited: Critical update on recent stop-and-frisk developments. 1977 WLR 877.

The future of the exclusionary rule and the development of state constitutional law. 1987 WLR 377.

Search and Seizure of Computer Data. McChrystal, Gleisner, Kuborn. Wis. Law. Dec. 1998.

The good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Wiseman. WBB Aug. 1986.

CONSENT AND STANDING

The fact that consent to the search of a car was given while the defendant was in custody does not establish involuntariness. It was not improper for the police to tell the defendant that if a search did not produce stolen goods he would be released. Gautreaux v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 489, 190 N.W.2d 542.

When police opened a package in the possession of an express company without a warrant or the consent of the addressee, persons later arrested in possession of the package, other than the addressee, had no standing to challenge the evidence on the ground of illegal search. Defendants would have to establish a possessory interest in the package at the time of the search. State v. Christel, 61 Wis. 2d 143, 211 N.W.2d 801.

The defendant was qualified to challenge the admissibility of evidence taken from his wife, when he and his wife were in each other's presence when arrested for the same crime, a search of her person at that time would have been at a place where the defendant had a legitimate right to be; the object of the search, incident to the arrest for robbery could only be for weapons and incriminating evidence against him and his wife; and this situation carried over into a custodial search of the wife which was thereafter conducted at the police station where the search occurred. State v. Mabra, 61 Wis. 2d 613, 213 N.W.2d 545.

Sons of a murdered property owner did not, as such, have authority to consent to a search of the premises. Kelly v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 303, 249 N.W.2d 800.

A person living in a tent in the yard of a house had no authority to grant consent to a warrantless search of the house. A police officer's observation through a window of a cigarette being passed in the house did not constitute probable cause for a warrantless search of the house for marijuana. The "plain view" doctrine discussed. State v. McGovern, 77 Wis. 2d 203, 252 N.W.2d 365.

An estranged wife had no authority to consent to the warrantless search of property she owned jointly with her defendant husband but did not occupy at that time. State v. Verhagen, 86 Wis. 2d 262, 272 N.W.2d 105 (Ct. App. 1978).

The boyfriend of an apartment lessee who paid no rent or expenses and whose access to the apartment was at the whim of the lessee did not have even a limited reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises when away form the premises. State v. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981).

The impoundment and subsequent warrantless inventory search of car, including a locked glove box, were not unconstitutional. Automatic standing is discussed. State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982).

A defendant had no standing to contest the legality of search of a van because of a lack of dominion and control over the van. State v. Wisurmerski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982).

When the defendant's mother admitted police into her home to talk to her son, the subsequent arrest of the son was valid. State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 102, 349 N.W.2d 453 (1984).

When police reentered a home to recreate a crime 45 hours after consent to enter was given, evidence seized was properly suppressed. State v. Douglas, 123 Wis. 2d 13, 365 N.W.2d 580 (1985).

A person who borrows a car with the owner's permission has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle. State v. Dixon, 177 Wis. 2d 461, 501 N.W.2d 442 (1993).

In a consent search, voluntariness and freedom from coercion, not fully informed consent, must be shown. Language and cultural background are relevant in determining whether the police took advantage in gaining consent. State v. Xiong, 178 Wis. 2d 525, 504 N.W.2d 428 (Ct. App. 1993).

A warrantless entry by uniformed officers to make arrests after undercover agents gained permissive entrance to the premises was justified under the consent exception and no exigent circumstances were required. State v. Johnston, 184 Wis. 2d 794, 518 N.W.2d 759 (1994).

Evidence obtained in a consensual search of the defendant's car when the consent was given during an illegal search was admissible as the evidence was not "come at" by information learned in the interrogation. State v. Goetsch, 186 Wis. 2d 1, 519 N.W.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1994).

All occupants of a vehicle in a police-initiated stop are seized and have standing to challenge the lawfulness of the seizure. To establish lawfulness, the state must establish that the police possessed reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize someone in the vehicle. State v. Harris, 206 Wis. 2d 243, 557 N.W.2d 247 (1996), 95-1595.

Whether persons have "common authority" to consent to a search of a premises depends, not on property rights, but on the relationship between the consenting party and the premises. Co-residents have "common authority" to consent to a search, but relatives of residents and property owners do not. Consent of one who possesses common authority is binding against an absent resident, but is not against a nonconsenting party who is present. State v. Kieffer, 207 Wis. 2d 462, 558 N.W.2d 664 (Ct. App. 1996), 96-0008; Affirmed 217 Wis. 2d 531, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998), 96-0008. See also, State v. St. Germaine, 2007 WI App 214, 305 Wis. 2d 511, 740 N.W.2d 148, 06-2555.

Consent to a search must be knowledgeably and voluntarily given. When consent is not requested, it cannot be knowledgeably and voluntarily given. State v. Kiekhefer, 212 Wis. 2d 460, 569 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2052.

A defendant's consent to a search obtained following illegal police activity may be admissible. The court must consider the temporal proximity of the misconduct to the statements by the defendant, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct. State v. Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d 180, 577 N.W.2d 794 (1998), 95-2912. See also State v. Bermudez, 221 Wis. 2d 338, 585 N.W.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-0809.

Suddenly placing a police officer at each side of a vehicle just prior to asking for consent to search cannot be said to create or to be intended to create a coercive situation. State v. Stankus, 220 Wis. 2d 232, 582 N.W.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2131.

A person with no property interest who may have entered the premises legitimately but did not have permission to remain to the time of a search is without standing to challenge the search. State v. McCray, 220 Wis. 2d 705, 583 N.W.2d 668 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-2746.

To have standing to challenge the pre-delivery seizure of a package not addressed to the defendant, the defendant has the burden of establishing some reasonable expectation of privacy in the package, which will be determined on a case-by-case basis. State v. Ramirez, 228 Wis. 2d 561, 598 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-0996.

Non-objected to warrantless entry by police into living quarters is entry demanded under color of office granted in submission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right. If consent is granted only in acquiescence to an unlawful assertion of authority, the consent is invalid. An initial refusal to permit a search when asked militates against a finding of voluntariness. State v. Munroe, 2001 WI App 104, 244 Wis. 2d 1, 630 N.W.2d 223, 00-0260.

When officers gained entry into a motel room for the stated, but false, reason of determining whether the occupant had violated an ordinance requiring the presentation of proper identification when renting a room, any license granted by acquiescence to their entry vanished when proper identification was presented, and the officers had no authority to conduct a general search. State v. Munroe, 2001 WI App 104, 244 Wis. 2d 1, 630 N.W.2d 223, 00-0260.

In light of the reduced expectation of privacy that applies to property in an automobile, the search of a vehicle passenger's jacket based upon the driver's consent to the search of the vehicle was reasonable. State v. Matejka, 2001 WI 5, 241 Wis. 2d 52, 621 N.W.2d 891, 99-0070.

A social guest who is not an overnight guest may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in premises giving standing to challenge a warrantless search if the guest's relationship to the property and host is firmly rooted. State v. Trecroci, 2001 WI App 126, 246 Wis. 2d 261, 630 N.W.2d 555, 00-1079.

Warrants for administrative or regulatory searches modify the conventional understanding of probable cause requirements for warrants as the essence of the search search is that there is no probable cause to believe a search will yield evidence of a violation. Refusal of consent is not a constitutional requirement for issuing the warrant, although it may be a statutory violation. Suppression only applies to constitutional violations. State v. Jackowski, 2001 WI App 187, 247 Wis. 2d 430, 633 N.W.2d 649, 00-2851.

A visual body cavity search is more intrusive than a strip search. It is not objectively reasonable for police to conclude that consent to a strip search includes consent to scrutiny of body cavities. State v. Wallace, 2002 WI App 61, 251 Wis. 2d 625, 642 N.W.2d 549, 00-3524.

A search authorized by consent is wholly valid unless that consent is given while an individual is illegally seized. The general rule is that a seizure has occurred when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. Questioning alone does not a seizure make. That a defendant spontaneously and voluntarily responded to an officer's questions is not enough to transform an otherwise consensual exchange into an illegal seizure. State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 646 N.W.2d 834, 01-0463.

There is no bright-line rule that a tenant in an unlocked apartment building with at least four units does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of the stairways, hallways, and basement. Whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is decided on a case-by-case basis. State v. Eskridge, 2002 WI App 158, 256 Wis. 2d 314, 647 N.W.2d 434, 01-2720.

A teenage child may have apparent common authority to consent to police entry into the family home justifying a warrantless entry. State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367, 00-3134.

Consent to a vehicle search, given following the conclusion of a traffic stop, when the police had given verbal permission for the defendant to leave but continued to ask questions, was valid. Applying a "reasonable person" test, there was no "seizure" at the time and consent to the search was not an invalid result of an illegal seizure. State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919, 00-3065.

Detaining, in handcuffs, a person who had arrived at a motel room with the person who had rented the room pending the arrival of and during the execution of a search warrant for the hotel room was reasonable. Consent to a search of the person's living quarters on completion of the search, which resulted in the seizure of illegal drugs, when the person had been repeatedly told she was being detained but was not under arrest was voluntarily given and not the product of an illegal seizure. State v. Vorburger, 2002 WI 105, 255 Wis. 2d 537, 648 N.W.2d 829, 00-0971.

Questioning the defendant's 3-year-old son outside the defendant's presence did exceed the scope of the defendant's consent to search his home when the child was left with a police officer without any restrictions and there was no evidence of trickery, deceit, or coercion. The questioning constituted on-the-scene questioning of a potential witness in an ongoing investigation. There was no applicable prohibition against speaking with the boy about whether a gun was in the house. State v. Ragsdale, 2004 WI App 178, 276 Wis. 2d 52, 687 N.W.2d 785, 03-2795.

For a search with no probable cause made after a traffic stop to be consensual, the consent must be given under circumstances where a reasonable person granting the consent would have believed that he or she was free to leave. Some verbal or physical demonstration by the officer, or some other equivalent facts, clearly conveying to the person that the traffic matter is concluded and the person should be on his or her way is necessary. Absent that, it is a legal fiction to conclude that a reasonable person would believe that he or she is free to depart the scene. State v. Jones, 2005 WI App 26, 278 Wis. 2d 774, 693 N.W.2d 104, 03-3216.

In a traffic stop context, where the test of consent to search is whether a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business, the fact that the person's driver's license or other official documents are retained by the officer is a key factor in assessing whether the person is seized and, therefore, whether consent is voluntary. State v. Luebeck, 2006 WI App 87, 292 Wis. 2d 748, 715 N.W.2d 639, 05-1013.

Orderly submission to law enforcement officers who, in effect, incorrectly represent that they have the authority to search and seize property, is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary consent under the 4th Amendment. When officers offered the defendant a fleeting glimpse of a subpoena signed by a judge, they suggested authority they did not possess that led the defendant to believe he could not refuse consent for the officers to search his room and seize his computer. State v. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239, 297 Wis. 2d 446, 724 N.W.2d 402, 06-0189.

The holding of Jones, 2005 WI App 26, is inapplicable to consent to the search of a vehicle made after the defendant had been lawfully seized. State v. Hartwig, 2007 WI App 160, 302 Wis. 2d 678, 735 N.W.2d 597, 06-2804.

Passengers had no "legitimate expectation of privacy" in the glove box or under the seat of a car. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).

A court may not suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a 3rd party not before court. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).

Defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own 4th-amendment rights have in fact been violated. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).

When police entered a 3rd party's house to execute an arrest warrant, evidence discovered during the search was inadmissible. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981).

A prisoner has no constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her cell. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984).

The state need not prove that the defendant consenting to search knew of the right to withhold consent. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984).

Loading...
Loading...
Wisconsin Constitution updated by the Legislative Reference Bureau. Published November 8, 2024. Click for the Coverage of Annotations for the Annotated Constitution. Report errors at 608.504.5801 or lrb.legal@legis.wisconsin.gov.