SB179-engrossed,2 7Section 2. 69.186 (1) (k) and (L) of the statutes are created to read:
SB179-engrossed,3,108 69.186 (1) (k) If the unborn child is considered to be capable of experiencing
9pain under s. 253.107 (3) (a), the nature of the medical emergency, as defined in s.
10253.10 (2) (d), that the pregnant woman had.
SB179-engrossed,3,1711 (L) If the unborn child is considered to be capable of experiencing pain under
12s. 253.107 (3) (a), a statement whether the method of abortion used was one that, in
13reasonable medical judgment, provided the best opportunity for the unborn child to
14survive or, if such a method was not used, the basis of the determination that
15termination of the pregnancy in that manner posed a greater risk either of the death
16of the pregnant woman or of the substantial and irreversible physical impairment
17of a major bodily function of the woman than other available methods.
1Section 3. 253.10 (2) (dr) of the statutes is created to read:
SB179-engrossed,4,72 253.10 (2) (dr) "Perinatal hospice" means comprehensive support that includes
3support from the time of a terminal diagnosis of an unborn child through the birth
4and death of the child and through the postpartum period and may include the
5supportive care of maternal-fetal medical specialists, obstetricians, neonatologists,
6anesthesia specialists, specialty nurses, psychiatrists, psychologists, mental health
7professionals, clergy, social workers, and other professionals.
SB179-engrossed,4 8Section 4. 253.10 (3) (c) 1. b. of the statutes is amended to read:
SB179-engrossed,4,149 253.10 (3) (c) 1. b. The probable gestational age of the unborn child, the
10probable postfertilization age of the unborn child, as defined in s. 253.107 (1) (c), and
11the numerical odds of survival for an unborn child delivered at that probable
12postfertilization age,
at the time that the information is provided. The physician or
13other qualified physician shall also provide this information to the woman in writing
14at this time.
SB179-engrossed,5 15Section 5. 253.10 (3) (c) 2. em. of the statutes is created to read:
SB179-engrossed,4,1716 253.10 (3) (c) 2. em. That the printed materials described in par. (d) contain
17information on the availability of perinatal hospice.
SB179-engrossed,6 18Section 6. 253.10 (3) (d) 1. of the statutes is amended to read:
SB179-engrossed,6,219 253.10 (3) (d) 1. Geographically indexed materials that are designed to inform
20a woman about public and private agencies, including adoption agencies, and
21services that are available to provide information on family planning, as defined in
22s. 253.07 (1) (a), including natural family planning information, to provide
23ultrasound imaging services, to assist her if she has received a diagnosis that her
24unborn child has a disability or if her pregnancy is the result of sexual assault or
25incest and to assist her through pregnancy, upon childbirth and while the child is

1dependent. The materials shall include a comprehensive list of the agencies
2available, a description of the services that they offer and a description of the manner
3in which they may be contacted, including telephone numbers and addresses, or, at
4the option of the department, the materials shall include a toll-free, 24-hour
5telephone number that may be called to obtain an oral listing of available agencies
6and services in the locality of the caller and a description of the services that the
7agencies offer and the manner in which they may be contacted. The materials shall
8provide information on the availability of governmentally funded programs that
9serve pregnant women and children. Services identified for the woman shall include
10medical assistance for pregnant women and children under s. 49.47 (4) (am) and
1149.471, the availability of family or medical leave under s. 103.10, the Wisconsin
12works program under ss. 49.141 to 49.161, child care services, child support laws and
13programs and the credit for expenses for household and dependent care and services
14necessary for gainful employment under section 21 of the Internal Revenue Code.
15The materials shall state that it is unlawful to perform an abortion for which consent
16has been coerced, that any physician who performs or induces an abortion without
17obtaining the woman's voluntary and informed consent is liable to her for damages
18in a civil action and is subject to a civil penalty, that the father of a child is liable for
19assistance in the support of the child, even in instances in which the father has
20offered to pay for an abortion, and that adoptive parents may pay the costs of
21prenatal care, childbirth and neonatal care. The materials shall include
22information, for a woman whose pregnancy is the result of sexual assault or incest,
23on legal protections available to the woman and her child if she wishes to oppose
24establishment of paternity or to terminate the father's parental rights. The
25materials shall include information on services in the state that are available for

1victims or individuals at risk of domestic abuse. The materials shall include
2information on the availability of perinatal hospice.
SB179-engrossed,7 3Section 7. 253.107 of the statutes is created to read:
SB179-engrossed,6,5 4253.107 Probable postfertilization age; later-term abortions. (1)
5Definitions. In this section:
SB179-engrossed,6,66 (a) "Abortion" has the meaning given in s. 253.10 (2) (a).
SB179-engrossed,6,77 (b) "Medical emergency" has the meaning given in s. 253.10 (2) (d).
SB179-engrossed,6,98 (c) "Probable postfertilization age of the unborn child" means the number of
9weeks that have elapsed from the probable time of fertilization of a woman's ovum.
SB179-engrossed,6,14 10(2) Probable postfertilization age. Except in the case of a medical emergency,
11no physician may perform or induce an abortion, or attempt to perform or induce an
12abortion, unless the physician performing or inducing it has first made a
13determination of the probable postfertilization age of the unborn child or relied upon
14such a determination made by another physician.
SB179-engrossed,6,20 15(3) Protection of unborn child capable of feeling pain from abortions. (a)
16No person shall perform or induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion upon
17a woman when the unborn child is considered capable of experiencing pain unless
18the woman is undergoing a medical emergency. For purposes of this subsection, an
19unborn child is considered to be capable of experiencing pain if the probable
20postfertilization age of the unborn child is 20 or more weeks.
SB179-engrossed,7,221 (b) When the unborn child is considered capable of experiencing pain and the
22pregnant woman is undergoing a medical emergency, the physician shall terminate
23the pregnancy in the manner that, in reasonable medical judgment, provides the best
24opportunity for the unborn child to survive, unless the termination of the pregnancy
25in that manner poses a greater risk either of the death of the pregnant woman or of

1the substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function of the
2woman than other available methods.
SB179-engrossed,7,5 3(4) Penalty. Any person who violates sub. (3) (a) is guilty of a Class I felony.
4No penalty may be assessed against a woman upon whom an abortion is performed
5or induced or attempted to be performed or induced.
SB179-engrossed,7,9 6(5) Civil remedies; injunctions. (a) Any of the following individuals may bring
7a claim for damages, including damages for personal injury and emotional and
8psychological distress, against a person who performs, or attempts to perform, an
9abortion in violation of this section:
SB179-engrossed,7,1110 1. A woman on whom an abortion is performed or induced or attempted to be
11performed or induced.
SB179-engrossed,7,1412 2. The father of the aborted unborn child or the unborn child that is attempted
13to be aborted, unless the pregnancy is the result of sexual assault under s. 940.225
14(1), (2), or (3) or incest under s. 948.06 (1) or (1m).
SB179-engrossed,7,1715 (b) A person who has been awarded damages under par. (a) shall, in addition
16to any damages awarded under par. (a), be entitled to punitive damages for a
17violation that satisfies a standard under s. 895.043 (3).
SB179-engrossed,7,2018 (c) 1. Notwithstanding s. 814.04 (1), a person who recovers damages under par.
19(a) or (b) may also recover reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the
SB179-engrossed,7,2421 2. If a defendant prevails in an action under par. (a) and the court finds the
22action was frivolous or brought in bad faith, notwithstanding s. 814.04 (1), the
23defendant may recover reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with
24defending the action.
SB179-engrossed,7,2525 (d) A contract is not a defense to an action under this subsection.
1(e) Nothing in this subsection limits the common law rights of a person that are
2not in conflict with sub. (2) or (3).
SB179-engrossed,8,53 (f) A prosecuting attorney with appropriate jurisdiction may bring an action for
4injunctive relief against a person who has intentionally or recklessly violated this
SB179-engrossed,8,18 6(6) Confidentiality in court proceedings. (a) In every proceeding brought
7under this section, the court, upon motion or sua sponte, shall rule whether the
8identity of any woman upon whom an abortion was performed or induced or
9attempted to be performed or induced shall be kept confidential unless the woman
10waives confidentiality. If the court determines that a woman's identity should be
11kept confidential, the court shall issue orders to the parties, witnesses, and counsel
12and shall direct the sealing of the record and exclusion of individuals from
13courtrooms or hearing rooms to the extent necessary to safeguard the woman's
14identity from public disclosure. If the court issues an order to keep a woman's
15identity confidential, the court shall provide written findings explaining why the
16woman's identity should be kept confidential, why the order is essential to that end,
17how the order is narrowly tailored to its purpose, and why no reasonable less
18restrictive alternative exists.
SB179-engrossed,8,2219 (b) Any person, except for a public official, who brings an action under this
20section shall do so under a pseudonym unless the person obtains the written consent
21of the woman upon whom an abortion was performed or induced, or attempted to be
22performed or induced, in violation of this section.
SB179-engrossed,8,2423 (c) This section may not be construed to allow the identity of a plaintiff or a
24witness to be concealed from the defendant.
1(7) Construction. Nothing in this section may be construed as creating or
2recognizing a right to abortion or as making lawful an abortion that is otherwise
SB179-engrossed,8 4Section 8. Nonstatutory provisions.
SB179-engrossed,9,65 (1) Legislative findings. The legislature finds that the best current evidence
SB179-engrossed,9,97 (a) Pain receptors (unborn child's entire body nociceptors) are present no later
8than 16 weeks after fertilization and nerves link these receptors to the brain's
9thalamus and subcortical plate by no later than 20 weeks.
SB179-engrossed,9,1110 (b) By 8 weeks after fertilization, the unborn child reacts to stimuli that would
11be recognized as painful if applied to an adult human, for example, by recoiling.
SB179-engrossed,9,1312 (c) In the unborn child, application of painful stimuli is associated with
13significant increases in stress hormones known as the stress response.
SB179-engrossed,9,1614 (d) Subjection to painful stimuli is associated with long-term harmful
15neuro-developmental effects, such as altered pain sensitivity and, possibly,
16emotional, behavioral, and learning disabilities later in life.
SB179-engrossed,9,1917 (e) For the purposes of surgery on unborn children, fetal anesthesia is routinely
18administered and is associated with a decrease in stress hormones compared to their
19level when painful stimuli is applied without the anesthesia.
SB179-engrossed,9,2420 (f) The position, asserted by some medical experts, that the unborn child is
21incapable of experiencing pain until a point later in pregnancy than 20 weeks after
22fertilization predominately rests on the assumption that the ability to experience
23pain depends on the cerebral cortex and requires nerve connections between the
24thalamus and the cortex. However, recent medical research and analysis, especially

1since 2007, provides strong evidence for the conclusion that a functioning cortex is
2not necessary to experience pain.
SB179-engrossed,10,43 (g) Substantial evidence indicates that children born missing the bulk of the
4cerebral cortex, those with hydraencephaly, nevertheless experience pain.
SB179-engrossed,10,65 (h) In adults, stimulation or ablation of the cerebral cortex does not alter pain
6perception while stimulation or ablation of the thalamus does.
SB179-engrossed,10,107 (i) Substantial evidence indicates that structures used for pain processing in
8early development differ from those of adults, using different neural elements
9available at specific times during development, such as the subcortical plate, to fulfill
10the role of pain processing.
SB179-engrossed,10,2211 (j) Consequently, there is substantial medical evidence that an unborn child is
12capable of experiencing pain by 20 weeks after fertilization. The legislature has the
13constitutional authority to make this judgment. As the U.S. supreme court has noted
14in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164-64 (2007): "The Court has given state and
15federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is
16medical and scientific uncertainty...See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427
17(1974) (`When Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and
18scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad.') The law need
19not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical practice, nor
20should it elevate their status above other physicians in the medical community.
21...Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the
22abortion context any more than it does in other contexts."
SB179-engrossed,11,723 (k) It is the purpose of the state to assert a compelling state interest in
24protecting the lives of unborn children from the stage at which substantial medical
25evidence indicates that they are capable of feeling pain. In enacting this legislation,

1Wisconsin is not asking the Supreme Court to overturn or replace its holding, first
2articulated in Roe v. Wade and reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
3Pennsylvania v. Casey, that the state interest in unborn human life, which is
4"legitimate" throughout pregnancy, becomes "compelling" at viability. Rather, it
5asserts a separate and independent compelling state interest in unborn human life
6that exists once the unborn child is capable of feeling pain. It is asserted not in
7replacement of, but in addition, to, the state interest in the viable unborn child.
SB179-engrossed,11,148 (l) The U.S. supreme court has established that the "constitutional liberty of
9the woman to have some freedom to terminate her not so
10unlimited...that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the
11unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State's interest in life has
12sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be
13restricted." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
14833, 869 (1992).
SB179-engrossed,12,515 (m) The Supreme Court decision upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
16Act, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) vindicated the dissenting opinion in
17the earlier decision that had struck down Nebraska's Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
18Act. That opinion stated, "[In Casey] We held it was inappropriate for the Judicial
19Branch to provide an exhaustive list of state interests implicated by
20abortion....Casey is premised on the States having an important constitutional role
21in defining their interests in the abortion debate. It is only with this principle in
22mind that [a state's] interests can be given proper weight. ... States also have an
23interest in forbidding medical procedures which, in the State's reasonable
24determination, might cause the medical profession or society as a whole to become
25insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life in the human fetus.... A State may

1take measures to ensure the medical profession and its members are viewed as
2healers, sustained by a compassionate and rigorous ethic and cognizant of the
3dignity and value of human life, even life which cannot survive without the
4assistance of others." Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 958-59 (2000) (Kennedy,
5J., dissenting.).
SB179-engrossed,9 6Section 9. Effective date.
SB179-engrossed,12,87 (1) This act takes effect on the first day of the 7th month beginning after