SB179-engrossed,6,77 (b) "Medical emergency" has the meaning given in s. 253.10 (2) (d).
SB179-engrossed,6,98 (c) "Probable postfertilization age of the unborn child" means the number of
9weeks that have elapsed from the probable time of fertilization of a woman's ovum.
SB179-engrossed,6,14 10(2) Probable postfertilization age. Except in the case of a medical emergency,
11no physician may perform or induce an abortion, or attempt to perform or induce an
12abortion, unless the physician performing or inducing it has first made a
13determination of the probable postfertilization age of the unborn child or relied upon
14such a determination made by another physician.
SB179-engrossed,6,20 15(3) Protection of unborn child capable of feeling pain from abortions. (a)
16No person shall perform or induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion upon
17a woman when the unborn child is considered capable of experiencing pain unless
18the woman is undergoing a medical emergency. For purposes of this subsection, an
19unborn child is considered to be capable of experiencing pain if the probable
20postfertilization age of the unborn child is 20 or more weeks.
SB179-engrossed,7,221 (b) When the unborn child is considered capable of experiencing pain and the
22pregnant woman is undergoing a medical emergency, the physician shall terminate
23the pregnancy in the manner that, in reasonable medical judgment, provides the best
24opportunity for the unborn child to survive, unless the termination of the pregnancy
25in that manner poses a greater risk either of the death of the pregnant woman or of

1the substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function of the
2woman than other available methods.
SB179-engrossed,7,5 3(4) Penalty. Any person who violates sub. (3) (a) is guilty of a Class I felony.
4No penalty may be assessed against a woman upon whom an abortion is performed
5or induced or attempted to be performed or induced.
SB179-engrossed,7,9 6(5) Civil remedies; injunctions. (a) Any of the following individuals may bring
7a claim for damages, including damages for personal injury and emotional and
8psychological distress, against a person who performs, or attempts to perform, an
9abortion in violation of this section:
SB179-engrossed,7,1110 1. A woman on whom an abortion is performed or induced or attempted to be
11performed or induced.
SB179-engrossed,7,1412 2. The father of the aborted unborn child or the unborn child that is attempted
13to be aborted, unless the pregnancy is the result of sexual assault under s. 940.225
14(1), (2), or (3) or incest under s. 948.06 (1) or (1m).
SB179-engrossed,7,1715 (b) A person who has been awarded damages under par. (a) shall, in addition
16to any damages awarded under par. (a), be entitled to punitive damages for a
17violation that satisfies a standard under s. 895.043 (3).
SB179-engrossed,7,2018 (c) 1. Notwithstanding s. 814.04 (1), a person who recovers damages under par.
19(a) or (b) may also recover reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with the
SB179-engrossed,7,2421 2. If a defendant prevails in an action under par. (a) and the court finds the
22action was frivolous or brought in bad faith, notwithstanding s. 814.04 (1), the
23defendant may recover reasonable attorney fees incurred in connection with
24defending the action.
SB179-engrossed,7,2525 (d) A contract is not a defense to an action under this subsection.
1(e) Nothing in this subsection limits the common law rights of a person that are
2not in conflict with sub. (2) or (3).
SB179-engrossed,8,53 (f) A prosecuting attorney with appropriate jurisdiction may bring an action for
4injunctive relief against a person who has intentionally or recklessly violated this
SB179-engrossed,8,18 6(6) Confidentiality in court proceedings. (a) In every proceeding brought
7under this section, the court, upon motion or sua sponte, shall rule whether the
8identity of any woman upon whom an abortion was performed or induced or
9attempted to be performed or induced shall be kept confidential unless the woman
10waives confidentiality. If the court determines that a woman's identity should be
11kept confidential, the court shall issue orders to the parties, witnesses, and counsel
12and shall direct the sealing of the record and exclusion of individuals from
13courtrooms or hearing rooms to the extent necessary to safeguard the woman's
14identity from public disclosure. If the court issues an order to keep a woman's
15identity confidential, the court shall provide written findings explaining why the
16woman's identity should be kept confidential, why the order is essential to that end,
17how the order is narrowly tailored to its purpose, and why no reasonable less
18restrictive alternative exists.
SB179-engrossed,8,2219 (b) Any person, except for a public official, who brings an action under this
20section shall do so under a pseudonym unless the person obtains the written consent
21of the woman upon whom an abortion was performed or induced, or attempted to be
22performed or induced, in violation of this section.
SB179-engrossed,8,2423 (c) This section may not be construed to allow the identity of a plaintiff or a
24witness to be concealed from the defendant.
1(7) Construction. Nothing in this section may be construed as creating or
2recognizing a right to abortion or as making lawful an abortion that is otherwise
SB179-engrossed,8 4Section 8. Nonstatutory provisions.
SB179-engrossed,9,65 (1) Legislative findings. The legislature finds that the best current evidence
SB179-engrossed,9,97 (a) Pain receptors (unborn child's entire body nociceptors) are present no later
8than 16 weeks after fertilization and nerves link these receptors to the brain's
9thalamus and subcortical plate by no later than 20 weeks.
SB179-engrossed,9,1110 (b) By 8 weeks after fertilization, the unborn child reacts to stimuli that would
11be recognized as painful if applied to an adult human, for example, by recoiling.
SB179-engrossed,9,1312 (c) In the unborn child, application of painful stimuli is associated with
13significant increases in stress hormones known as the stress response.
SB179-engrossed,9,1614 (d) Subjection to painful stimuli is associated with long-term harmful
15neuro-developmental effects, such as altered pain sensitivity and, possibly,
16emotional, behavioral, and learning disabilities later in life.
SB179-engrossed,9,1917 (e) For the purposes of surgery on unborn children, fetal anesthesia is routinely
18administered and is associated with a decrease in stress hormones compared to their
19level when painful stimuli is applied without the anesthesia.
SB179-engrossed,9,2420 (f) The position, asserted by some medical experts, that the unborn child is
21incapable of experiencing pain until a point later in pregnancy than 20 weeks after
22fertilization predominately rests on the assumption that the ability to experience
23pain depends on the cerebral cortex and requires nerve connections between the
24thalamus and the cortex. However, recent medical research and analysis, especially

1since 2007, provides strong evidence for the conclusion that a functioning cortex is
2not necessary to experience pain.
SB179-engrossed,10,43 (g) Substantial evidence indicates that children born missing the bulk of the
4cerebral cortex, those with hydraencephaly, nevertheless experience pain.
SB179-engrossed,10,65 (h) In adults, stimulation or ablation of the cerebral cortex does not alter pain
6perception while stimulation or ablation of the thalamus does.
SB179-engrossed,10,107 (i) Substantial evidence indicates that structures used for pain processing in
8early development differ from those of adults, using different neural elements
9available at specific times during development, such as the subcortical plate, to fulfill
10the role of pain processing.
SB179-engrossed,10,2211 (j) Consequently, there is substantial medical evidence that an unborn child is
12capable of experiencing pain by 20 weeks after fertilization. The legislature has the
13constitutional authority to make this judgment. As the U.S. supreme court has noted
14in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164-64 (2007): "The Court has given state and
15federal legislatures wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is
16medical and scientific uncertainty...See Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417, 427
17(1974) (`When Congress undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and
18scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad.') The law need
19not give abortion doctors unfettered choice in the course of their medical practice, nor
20should it elevate their status above other physicians in the medical community.
21...Medical uncertainty does not foreclose the exercise of legislative power in the
22abortion context any more than it does in other contexts."
SB179-engrossed,11,723 (k) It is the purpose of the state to assert a compelling state interest in
24protecting the lives of unborn children from the stage at which substantial medical
25evidence indicates that they are capable of feeling pain. In enacting this legislation,

1Wisconsin is not asking the Supreme Court to overturn or replace its holding, first
2articulated in Roe v. Wade and reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
3Pennsylvania v. Casey, that the state interest in unborn human life, which is
4"legitimate" throughout pregnancy, becomes "compelling" at viability. Rather, it
5asserts a separate and independent compelling state interest in unborn human life
6that exists once the unborn child is capable of feeling pain. It is asserted not in
7replacement of, but in addition, to, the state interest in the viable unborn child.
SB179-engrossed,11,148 (l) The U.S. supreme court has established that the "constitutional liberty of
9the woman to have some freedom to terminate her not so
10unlimited...that from the outset the State cannot show its concern for the life of the
11unborn, and at a later point in fetal development the State's interest in life has
12sufficient force so that the right of the woman to terminate the pregnancy can be
13restricted." Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
14833, 869 (1992).
SB179-engrossed,12,515 (m) The Supreme Court decision upholding the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
16Act, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) vindicated the dissenting opinion in
17the earlier decision that had struck down Nebraska's Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
18Act. That opinion stated, "[In Casey] We held it was inappropriate for the Judicial
19Branch to provide an exhaustive list of state interests implicated by
20abortion....Casey is premised on the States having an important constitutional role
21in defining their interests in the abortion debate. It is only with this principle in
22mind that [a state's] interests can be given proper weight. ... States also have an
23interest in forbidding medical procedures which, in the State's reasonable
24determination, might cause the medical profession or society as a whole to become
25insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life in the human fetus.... A State may

1take measures to ensure the medical profession and its members are viewed as
2healers, sustained by a compassionate and rigorous ethic and cognizant of the
3dignity and value of human life, even life which cannot survive without the
4assistance of others." Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 958-59 (2000) (Kennedy,
5J., dissenting.).
SB179-engrossed,9 6Section 9. Effective date.
SB179-engrossed,12,87 (1) This act takes effect on the first day of the 7th month beginning after