I,19Religious tests prohibited. Section 19. No religious tests shall ever be required as a qualification for any office of public trust under the state, and no person shall be rendered incompetent to give evidence in any court of law or equity in consequence of his opinions on the subject of religion. I,20Military subordinate to civil power. Section 20. The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power. I,21Rights of suitors. Section 21. [As amended April 1977] I,21(1)(1) Writs of error shall never be prohibited, and shall be issued by such courts as the legislature designates by law. I,21(2)(2) In any court of this state, any suitor may prosecute or defend his suit either in his own proper person or by an attorney of the suitor’s choice. [1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977] As a matter of Wisconsin constitutional law, the right to an appeal is absolute. In order that the right be meaningful, a defendant must be furnished a full transcript—or a functionally equivalent substitute that, in a criminal case, beyond a reasonable doubt, portrays in a way that is meaningful to the particular appeal exactly what happened in the course of trial. The usual remedy when the transcript deficiency is such that there cannot be a meaningful appeal is reversal with directions that there be a new trial. However, error in transcript preparation or production, like error in trial procedure, is subject to the harmless-error rule. State v. Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 401 N.W.2d 748 (1987). Every person has an absolute right to appear pro se. Hlavinka v. Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc., 174 Wis. 2d 381, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993). A nonlawyer may not sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation. Requiring a lawyer to represent a corporation in filing the notice does not violate the guarantee that any suitor may prosecute or defend a suit personally. A corporation is not a natural person and does not fall with in the term “any suitor.” Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 209 Wis. 2d 187, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997), 95-1946. Sub. (2) gives the right in a civil trial to chose whether to defend oneself personally or to have an attorney, but does not address whether the party may, or may not, be ordered to be physically present at trial when represented. City of Sun Prairie v. Davis, 217 Wis. 2d 268, 575 N.W.2d 268 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-1651. If a telephone warrant application has not been recorded and there is no evidence of intentional or reckless misconduct on the part of law enforcement officers, a reconstructed application may serve as an equivalent of the record of the original application and can protect the defendant’s right to a meaningful appeal. State v. Raflik, 2001 WI 129, 248 Wis. 2d 593, 636 N.W.2d 129, 00-1086. Because a transcript is crucial to the right to an appeal, courts provide additional protection for appellants when they do not have a complete transcript. Under Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92 (1987), and DeLeon, 127 Wis. 2d 74 (Ct. App. 1985), when a trial transcript is incomplete, a defendant may be entitled to a new trial, but only after the defendant makes a facially valid claim of arguably prejudicial error. The Perry/DeLeon procedure applies even when the entire trial transcript is unavailable. The court does not presume prejudice when the trial transcript is unavailable. State v. Pope, 2019 WI 106, 389 Wis. 2d 390, 936 N.W.2d 606, 17-1720. I,22Maintenance of free government. Section 22. The blessings of a free government can only be maintained by a firm adherence to justice, moderation, temperance, frugality and virtue, and by frequent recurrence to fundamental principles. I,23Transportation of school children. Section 23. [As created April 1967] Nothing in this constitution shall prohibit the legislature from providing for the safety and welfare of children by providing for the transportation of children to and from any parochial or private school or institution of learning. [1965 J.R. 46, 1967 J.R. 13, vote April 1967] Elementary Secondary Education Act funds may be used in dual enrollment programs to transport children from parochial schools to and from public schools. 65 Atty. Gen. 126.
I,24Use of school buildings. Section 24. [As created April 1972] Nothing in this constitution shall prohibit the legislature from authorizing, by law, the use of public school buildings by civic, religious or charitable organizations during nonschool hours upon payment by the organization to the school district of reasonable compensation for such use. [1969 J.R. 38, 1971 J.R. 27, vote April 1972] I,25Right to keep and bear arms. Section 25. [As created Nov. 1998] The people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose. [1995 J.R. 27, 1997 J.R. 21, vote Nov. 1998] The state constitutional right to bear arms is fundamental, but it is not absolute. This section does not affect the reasonable regulation of guns. The standard of review for challenges to statutes allegedly in violation of this section is whether the statute is a reasonable exercise of police power. State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W.2d 328, 01-0350. The concealed weapons statute is a restriction on the manner in which firearms are possessed and used. It is constitutional under Art. I, s. 25. Only if the public benefit in the exercise of the police power is substantially outweighed by an individual’s need to conceal a weapon in the exercise of the right to bear arms will an otherwise valid restriction on that right be unconstitutional. The right to keep and bear arms for security, as a general matter, must permit a person to possess, carry, and sometimes conceal arms to maintain the security of a private residence or privately operated business, and to safely move and store weapons within those premises. State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785, 01-0056. A challenge on constitutional grounds of a prosecution for carrying a concealed weapon requires affirmative answers to the following before the defendant may raise the constitutional defense: 1) under the circumstances, did the defendant’s interest in concealing the weapon to facilitate exercise of his or her right to keep and bear arms substantially outweigh the state’s interest in enforcing the concealed weapons statute? and 2) did the defendant conceal his or her weapon because concealment was the only reasonable means under the circumstances to exercise his or her right to bear arms? State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785, 01-0056. Under both Hamdan and Cole there are 2 places in which a citizen’s desire to exercise the right to keep and bear arms for purposes of security is at its apex: in the citizen’s home or in his or her privately-owned business. It logically and necessarily follows that the individual’s interest in the right to bear arms for purposes of security will not, as a general matter, be particularly strong outside those two locations. An individual generally has no heightened interest in his or her right to bear arms for security while in a vehicle. State v. Fisher, 2006 WI 44, 290 Wis. 2d 121, 714 N.W.2d 495, 04-2989. The ban on felons possessing firearms is constitutional and that ban extends to all felons, including nonviolent ones. The governmental objective of public safety is an important one, and the legislature’s decision to deprive a nonviolent felon, such as the plaintiff, of the right to possess a firearm is substantially related to this goal. State v. Pocian, 2012 WI App 58, 341 Wis. 2d 380, 814 N.W.2d 894, 11-1035. Silencers are not “arms” for the purposes of the 2nd amendment. The prohibition on possession of a silencer under s. 941.298 does not impose a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the 2nd amendment’s guarantee and therefore is not unconstitutional. State v. Barrett, 2020 WI App 13, 391 Wis. 2d 283, 941 N.W.2d 866, 18-2324. The most natural reading of “keep arms” in the 2nd amendment is to have weapons. The natural meaning of “bear arms” is to “wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person or in the clothing or in a pocket, for the purpose . . . of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of conflict with another person.” Putting all textual elements together, the 2nd amendment guarantees the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. However, like most rights, the right secured by the 2nd amendment is not unlimited. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637, 128 S. Ct. 2783, (2008). The 2nd amendment right to bear arms, is fully applicable to the states. The due process clause of the 14th amendment incorporates the 2nd amendment right recognized in Heller. However, incorporation does not imperil every law regulating firearms. McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010). The Next Big Gun Case: The Resurrection of the Second Amendment at the New Roberts Court. Ciocchetti. 102 MLR 309 (2018).
Out of the Home and in Plain Sight: Our Evolving Second Amendment and Open Carry in Wisconsin. Duroni. 102 MLR 1305 (2019).
I,26Right to fish, hunt, trap, and take game. Section 26. [As created April 2003] The people have the right to fish, hunt, trap, and take game subject only to reasonable restrictions as prescribed by law. [2001 J.R. 16, 2003 J.R. 8, vote April 2003] BOUNDARIES
II,1State boundary. Section 1. It is hereby ordained and declared that the state of Wisconsin doth consent and accept of the boundaries prescribed in the act of congress entitled “An act to enable the people of Wisconsin territory to form a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such state into the Union,” approved August sixth, one thousand eight hundred and forty-six, to wit: Beginning at the northeast corner of the state of Illinois — that is to say, at a point in the center of Lake Michigan where the line of forty-two degrees and thirty minutes of north latitude crosses the same; thence running with the boundary line of the state of Michigan, through Lake Michigan, Green Bay, to the mouth of the Menominee river; thence up the channel of the said river to the Brule river; thence up said last-mentioned river to Lake Brule; thence along the southern shore of Lake Brule in a direct line to the center of the channel between Middle and South Islands, in the Lake of the Desert; thence in a direct line to the head waters of the Montreal river, as marked upon the survey made by Captain Cramm; thence down the main channel of the Montreal river to the middle of Lake Superior; thence through the center of Lake Superior to the mouth of the St. Louis river; thence up the main channel of said river to the first rapids in the same, above the Indian village, according to Nicollet’s map; thence due south to the main branch of the river St. Croix; thence down the main channel of said river to the Mississippi; thence down the center of the main channel of that river to the northwest corner of the state of Illinois; thence due east with the northern boundary of the state of Illinois to the place of beginning, as established by “An act to enable the people of the Illinois territory to form a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such state into the Union on an equal footing with the original states,” approved April 18th, 1818. The Mississippi River is an inland water of Wisconsin and the boat toilet law may be enforced on the entire width of the Mississippi bordering Minnesota and up to the center of the main channel bordering Iowa. 61 Atty. Gen. 167.
II,2Enabling act accepted. Section 2. [As amended April 1951] The propositions contained in the act of congress are hereby accepted, ratified and confirmed, and shall remain irrevocable without the consent of the United States; and it is hereby ordained that this state shall never interfere with the primary disposal of the soil within the same by the United States, nor with any regulations congress may find necessary for securing the title in such soil to bona fide purchasers thereof; and in no case shall nonresident proprietors be taxed higher than residents. Provided, that nothing in this constitution, or in the act of congress aforesaid, shall in any manner prejudice or affect the right of the state of Wisconsin to 500,000 acres of land granted to said state, and to be hereafter selected and located by and under the act of congress entitled “An act to appropriate the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, and grant pre-emption rights,” approved September fourth, one thousand eight hundred and forty-one. [1949 J.R. 11, 1951 J.R. 7, vote April 1951] SUFFRAGE
III,1Electors. Section 1. [Amended Nov. 1882, Nov. 1908, and Nov. 1934; repealed April 1986; as created April 1986 and amended Nov. 2024] III,1(1)(a)(a) “Local office” means any elective office other than a state or national office. III,1(1)(b)(b) “National office” means the offices of president and vice president of the United States, U.S. senator, and representative in congress. III,1(1)(c)(c) “Referendum” means an election at which an advisory, validating, or ratifying question is submitted to the electorate. III,1(1)(d)(d) “State office” means the offices of governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, attorney general, state superintendent of public instruction, justice of the supreme court, court of appeals judge, circuit court judge, state senator, state representative to the assembly, and district attorney. III,1(2)(2) Only a United States citizen age 18 or older who is a resident of an election district in this state is a qualified elector of that district who may vote in an election for national, state, or local office or at a statewide or local referendum. [1881 J.R. 26 A, 1882 J.R. 5, 1882 c. 272, vote Nov. 1882; 1905 J.R. 15, 1907 J.R. 25, 1907 c. 661, vote Nov. 1908; 1931 J.R. 91, 1933 J.R. 76, vote Nov. 1934; 1983 J.R. 30, 1985 J.R. 14, vote April 1986; 2021 J.R. 13, 2023 J.R. 8, vote Nov. 2024] It is clearly within the legislature’s province to require any person offering to vote to furnish such proof as it deems requisite that he or she is a qualified elector. Requiring a potential voter to identify himself or herself as a qualified elector through acceptable photo identification does not impose an elector qualification in addition to those set out in this section. League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Network, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302, 12-0584. The legislature can amend the current election statutes, without referendum, so as to make the statutes conform with the 26th amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 61 Atty. Gen. 89. A proposal to amend a statute to allow nonresident property owners to vote on metropolitan sewerage district bonds, in addition to electors, probably would require the proposal to be submitted to a vote of the electorate under sec. 1. 63 Atty. Gen. 391.
Constitutional law: residency requirements. 53 MLR 439.
III,2Implementation. Section 2. [Repealed April 1986; as created April 1986] Laws may be enacted: III,2(2)(2) Providing for registration of electors. III,2(3)(3) Providing for absentee voting. III,2(4)(4) Excluding from the right of suffrage persons: III,2(4)(a)(a) Convicted of a felony, unless restored to civil rights. III,2(4)(b)(b) Adjudged by a court to be incompetent or partially incompetent, unless the judgment specifies that the person is capable of understanding the objective of the elective process or the judgment is set aside. III,2(5)(5) Subject to ratification by the people at a general election, extending the right of suffrage to additional classes. [1983 J.R. 30, 1985 J.R. 14, vote April 1986] The requirement to present acceptable photo identification comes within the legislature’s authority to enact laws providing for the registration of electors under this section because acceptable photo identification is the mode by which election officials verify that a potential voter is the elector listed on the registration list. League of Women Voters of Wisconsin Education Network, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 97, 357 Wis. 2d 360, 851 N.W.2d 302, 12-0584. Even rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications. However evenhanded restrictions that protect the integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself are not invidious. An Indiana statute requiring citizens voting in person on election day, or casting a ballot in person at the office of the circuit court clerk prior to election day, to present photo identification issued by the government did not violate constitutional standards. Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 128 S. Ct. 1610, 170 L. Ed. 2d 574 (2008). III,3Secret ballot. Section 3. [Repealed April 1986; as created April 1986] All votes shall be by secret ballot. [1983 J.R. 30, 1985 J.R. 14, vote April 1986] III,4Residence saved. Section 4. [Repealed April 1986; see 1983 J.R. 30, 1985 J.R. 14, vote April 1986.] III,5Military stationing does not confer residence. Section 5. [Repealed April 1986; see 1983 J.R. 30, 1985 J.R. 14, vote April 1986.] III,6Exclusion from suffrage. Section 6. [Repealed April 1986; see 1983 J.R. 30, 1985 J.R. 14, vote April 1986.] III,7Private donations and grants; designated election officials. Section 7. [As created April 2024] III,7(1)(1) No state agency or officer or employee in state government and no political subdivision of the state or officer or employee of a political subdivision may apply for, accept, expend, or use any moneys or equipment in connection with the conduct of any primary, election, or referendum if the moneys or equipment are donated or granted by an individual or nongovernmental entity. III,7(2)(2) No individual other than an election official designated by law may perform any task in the conduct of any primary, election, or referendum. [2021 J.R. 17, 2023 J.R. 10, vote April 2024] An “election official designated by law” is synonymous with “election official,” as defined in s. 5.02 (4e), and includes village clerks, municipal clerks, county clerks, municipal and county boards of canvassers, and school district clerks. OAG 1-24.
A “task in the conduct of any primary, election, or referendum” refers to work in directing or leading the administration of an election. Sub. (2) does not apply to more ordinary circumstances in which an election official works with or is assisted by non-election officials in ensuring the proper administration of an election, such as work with vendors on the layout and printing of ballots, information technology personnel on software and hardware security, law enforcement personnel on ballot transport, or employees or volunteers assisting with mailings or other clerical work. It also does not apply to activities that are distinct from the “administration” of an election, such as the kinds of efforts by non-election officials to encourage voting that commonly take place in connection with elections. OAG 1-24.
LEGISLATIVE
IV,1Legislative power. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in a senate and assembly. An act validating existing sewerage districts previously held to be unconstitutionally organized is within the power of the legislature. Madison Metropolitan Sewerage Dist. v. Stein, 47 Wis. 2d 349, 177 N.W.2d 131. The power given vocational district boards to levy taxes does not violate this section. The manner of appointing board members is constitutional. West Milwaukee v. Area Bd. Vocational, T. & A. Ed., 51 Wis. 2d 356, 187 N.W.2d 387. One legislature cannot dictate action by a future legislature or a future legislative committee. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780. The legislature may constitutionally prescribe a criminal penalty for violation of an administrative rule. State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 247 N.W.2d 714. Provisions of s. 144.07 (1m) [now s. 281.34 (1m)], that void a DNR sewerage connection order if electors in the affected town area reject annexation to the city ordered to extend sewerage service, represents a valid legislative balancing and accommodation of 2 statewide concerns: urban development and pollution control. City of Beloit v. Kallas, 76 Wis. 2d 61, 250 N.W.2d 342. Mediation - arbitration under s. 111.70 (4) (cm) is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority. Milwaukee County v. District Council 48, 109 Wis. 2d 14, 325 N.W.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1982). The court will invalidate legislation only for constitutional violations. State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983). Reference in a statute to a general federal law, as amended, necessarily references the current federal law where the act named in the statute is repealed and the law rewritten in another act. Because reference is stated as part of a contingency, it does not constitute unlawful delegation of legislative authority to U.S. Congress. Dane County Hospital & Home v. LIRC, 125 Wis. 2d 308, 371 N.W.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1985). The supreme court declined to review the validity of the procedure used to give notice of a joint legislative committee on conference alleged to violate the state open meetings law. The court will not determine whether internal operating rules or procedural statutes have been complied with by the legislature in the course of its enactments and will not intermeddle in what it views, in the absence of constitutional directives to the contrary, to be purely legislative concerns. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 2011 WI 43, 334 Wis. 2d 70, 798 N.W.2d 436, 11-0613. When administrative agencies promulgate rules, they are exercising legislative power that the legislature has chosen to delegate to them by statute. Stated otherwise, agencies have no inherent constitutional authority to make rules, and their rule-making powers can be repealed by the legislature. It follows that the legislature may place limitations and conditions on an agency’s exercise of rulemaking authority, including establishing the procedures by which agencies may promulgate rules. Koschkee v. Taylor, 2019 WI 76, 387 Wis. 2d 552, 929 N.W.2d 600, 17-2278. The legislature may enact the laws the executive is duty-bound to execute, but it may not control his knowledge or intentions about those laws. Nor may it mute or modulate the communication of his knowledge or intentions to the public. Because there was no set of facts pursuant to which 2017 Wis. Act 369’s restrictions on guidance documents would not impermissibly interfere with the executive’s exercise of his core constitutional power, they were in that respect facially unconstitutional. Service Employees International Union (SEIU), Local 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946 N.W.2d 35, 19-0614. Proposed amendments to bills creating variable obscenity laws that would exempt motion picture films shown at theaters that comply with the film ratings of the motion picture association of America constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. 58 Atty. Gen. 36.
The one man-one vote principle is inapplicable to legislative committees since that principle applies only to the exercise of legislative powers and such powers cannot constitutionally be delegated to these committees. There has been no such unconstitutional delegation as to the joint committee on finance, the board on government operations, the joint legislative council or the committee to visit state properties. Legislative oversight of administrative rules discussed. 63 Atty. Gen. 173.
The elections clause under article I, section 4, of the U.S. Constitution does not insulate state legislatures from review by state courts for compliance with state law. Nothing in the elections clause instructs that a state legislature may prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner of holding federal elections in defiance of provisions of the state’s constitution. A state legislature may not create congressional districts independently of requirements imposed by the state constitution with respect to the enactment of laws. Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. ___, 143 S. Ct. 2065, 216 L. Ed. 2d 729 (2023). IV,2Legislature, how constituted. Section 2. The number of the members of the assembly shall never be less than fifty-four nor more than one hundred. The senate shall consist of a number not more than one-third nor less than one-fourth of the number of the members of the assembly. IV,3Apportionment. Section 3. [As amended Nov. 1910, Nov. 1962, and Nov. 1982] At its first session after each enumeration made by the authority of the United States, the legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the senate and assembly, according to the number of inhabitants. [1907 J.R. 30, 1909 J.R. 55, 1909 c. 478, vote Nov. 1910; 1959 J.R. 30, 1961 J.R. 32, vote Nov. 1962; 1979 J.R. 36, 1981 J.R. 29, vote Nov. 1982] The phrase “according to the number of inhabitants” in this section was intended to secure the preexisting right to proportionate representation and apportionment as nearly equal as practicable among the several counties for the election of members of the legislature. This section gives the legislature the duty to enact a redistricting plan after each federal census to prevent one person’s vote in an underpopulated district from having more weight than another’s in an overly populated district. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450. Unlike the Wisconsin Constitution’s Declaration of Rights, article IV, sections 3, 4, and 5, of the Wisconsin Constitution express a series of discrete requirements governing redistricting. These are the only Wisconsin constitutional limits the supreme court has ever recognized on the legislature’s discretion to redistrict. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450. The Wisconsin Constitution requires the legislature—a political body—to establish the legislative districts in this state. Just as the laws enacted by the legislature reflect policy choices, so will the maps drawn by that political body. Nothing in the constitution empowers the supreme court to second-guess those policy choices, and nothing in the constitution vests the court with the power of the legislature to enact new maps. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450. In this state’s constitutional order, redistricting remains the legislature’s duty. Any remedy the court may impose would be in effect only until such time as the legislature and governor have enacted a valid legislative apportionment plan. Johnson v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2021 WI 87, 399 Wis. 2d 623, 967 N.W.2d 469, 21-1450. State and federal law require a state’s population to be distributed equally amongst legislative districts with only minor deviations. When it comes to population equality, courts adopting remedial maps are held to a higher standard than state legislatures as courts have a judicial duty to achieve the goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation. Clarke v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2023 WI 79, 410 Wis. 2d 1, 998 N.W.2d 370, 23-1399.
