102.17(1)(f)4.
4. Who is a member of the legislature, if any committee of the same or the house of which the witness is a member, is in session, provided the witness waives his or her privilege.
102.17(1)(g)
(g) Whenever the testimony presented at any hearing indicates a dispute, or is such as to create doubt as to the extent or cause of disability or death, the department may direct that the injured employee be examined or autopsy be performed, or an opinion of a physician, chiropractor, dentist, psychologist or podiatrist be obtained without examination or autopsy, by an impartial, competent physician, chiropractor, dentist, psychologist or podiatrist designated by the department who is not under contract with or regularly employed by a compensation insurance carrier or self-insured employer. The expense of such examination shall be paid by the employer or, if the employee claims compensation under
s. 102.81, from the uninsured employers fund. The report of such examination shall be transmitted in writing to the department and a copy thereof shall be furnished by the department to each party, who shall have an opportunity to rebut such report on further hearing.
102.17(1)(h)
(h) The contents of certified reports of investigation, made by industrial safety specialists who are employed by the department and available for cross-examination, served upon the parties 15 days prior to hearing, shall constitute prima facie evidence as to matter contained therein.
102.17(2)
(2) If the department shall have reason to believe that the payment of compensation has not been made, it may on its own motion give notice to the parties, in the manner provided for the service of an application, of a time and place when a hearing will be held for the purpose of determining the facts. Such notice shall contain a statement of the matter to be considered. Thereafter all other provisions governing proceedings on application shall attach insofar as the same may be applicable. When the department schedules a hearing on its own motion, the department does not become a party in interest and is not required to appear at the hearing.
102.17(2m)
(2m) Any party, including the department, may require any person to produce books, papers and records at the hearing by personal service of a subpoena upon the person along with a tender of witness fees as provided in
ss. 814.67 and
885.06. Except as provided in
sub. (2s), the subpoena shall be on a form provided by the department and shall give the name and address of the party requesting the subpoena.
102.17(2s)
(2s) A party's attorney of record may issue a subpoena to compel the attendance of a witness or the production of evidence. A subpoena issued by an attorney must be in substantially the same form as provided in
s. 805.07 (4) and must be served in the manner provided in
s. 805.07 (5). The attorney shall, at the time of issuance, send a copy of the subpoena to the appeal tribunal or other representative of the department responsible for conducting the proceeding.
102.17(3)
(3) Any person who shall wilfully and unlawfully fail or neglect to appear or to testify or to produce books, papers and records as required, shall be fined not less than $25 nor more than $100, or imprisoned in the county jail not longer than 30 days. Each day such person shall so refuse or neglect shall constitute a separate offense.
102.17(4)
(4) The right of an employee, the employee's legal representative or dependent to proceed under this section shall not extend beyond 12 years from the date of the injury or death or from the date that compensation, other than treatment or burial expenses, was last paid, or would have been last payable if no advancement were made, whichever date is latest. In the case of occupational disease there shall be no statute of limitations, except that benefits or treatment expense becoming due after 12 years from the date of injury or death or last payment of compensation shall be paid from the work injury supplemental benefit fund under
s. 102.65 and in the manner provided in
s. 102.66. Payment of wages by the employer during disability or absence from work to obtain treatment shall be deemed payment of compensation for the purpose of this section if the employer knew of the employee's condition and its alleged relation to the employment.
102.17(5)
(5) This section does not limit the time within which the state may bring an action to recover the amounts specified in
ss. 102.49 (5) and
102.59.
102.17(6)
(6) If an employee or dependent shall, at the time of injury, or at the time the employee's or dependent's right accrues, be under 18 years of age, the limitations of time within which the employee or dependent may file application or proceed under this chapter, if they would otherwise sooner expire, shall be extended to one year after the employee or dependent attains the age of 18 years. If, within any part of the last year of any such period of limitation, an employee, the employee's personal representative, or surviving dependent be insane or on active duty in the armed forces of the United States such period of limitation shall be extended to 2 years after the date that the limitation would otherwise expire. The provision hereof with respect to persons on active duty in the armed forces of the United States shall apply only where no applicable federal statute is in effect.
102.17(7)(a)(a) Except as provided in
par. (b), in a claim under
s. 102.44 (2) and
(3), testimony or certified reports of expert witnesses on loss of earning capacity may be received in evidence and considered with all other evidence to decide on an employee's actual loss of earning capacity.
102.17(7)(b)
(b) Except as provided in
par. (c), the department shall exclude from evidence testimony or certified reports from expert witnesses under
par. (a) offered by the party that raises the issue of loss of earning capacity if that party failed to notify the department and the other parties of interest, at least 60 days before the date of the hearing, of the party's intent to provide the testimony or reports and of the names of the expert witnesses involved. Except as provided in
par. (c), the department shall exclude from evidence testimony or certified reports from expert witnesses under
par. (a) offered by a party of interest in response to the party that raises the issue of loss of earning capacity if the responding party failed to notify the department and the other parties of interest, at least 45 days before the date of the hearing, of the party's intent to provide the testimony or reports and of the names of the expert witnesses involved.
102.17(7)(c)
(c) Notwithstanding the notice deadlines provided in
par. (b), the department may receive in evidence testimony or certified reports from expert witnesses under
par. (a) when the applicable notice deadline under
par. (b) is not met if good cause is shown for the delay in providing the notice required under
par. (b) and if no party is prejudiced by the delay.
102.17(8)
(8) Unless otherwise agreed to by all parties, an injured employee shall file with the department and serve on all parties at least 15 days before the date of the hearing an itemized statement of all medical expenses and incidental compensation under
s. 102.42 claimed by the injured employee. The itemized statement shall include, if applicable, information relating to any travel expenses incurred by the injured employee in obtaining treatment including the injured employee's destination, number of trips, round trip mileage and meal and lodging expenses. The department may not admit into evidence any information relating to medical expenses and incidental compensation under
s. 102.42 claimed by an injured employee if the injured employee failed to file with the department and serve on all parties at least 15 days before the date of the hearing an itemized statement of the medical expenses and incidental compensation under
s. 102.42 claimed by the injured employee, unless the department is satisfied that there is good cause for the failure to file and serve the itemized statement.
102.17 History
History: 1971 c. 148;
1971 c. 213 s.
5;
1973 c. 150,
282; Sup. Ct. Order,
67 Wis. 2d 585, 774 (1975);
1975 c. 147 ss.
20,
54;
1975 c. 199,
200;
1977 c. 29,
195,
273;
1979 c. 278;
1981 c. 92,
314;
1981 c. 317 s.
2202;
1981 c. 380;
1981 c. 391 s.
211;
1985 a. 83;
1989 a. 64,
139,
359;
1991 a. 85;
1993 a. 81,
492;
1995 a. 27,
117;
1997 a. 38,
191,
237;
1999 a. 9.
102.17 Annotation
A plaintiff-employer was not deprived of any substantial due process rights by the department's refusal to invoke its rule requiring inspection of the opposing parties' medical reports when the plaintiff had ample notice of the nature of the employee's claim. Theodore Fleisner, Inc. v. DILHR,
65 Wis. 2d 317,
222 N.W.2d 600.
102.17 Annotation
Under the facts of the case, a refusal to grant an employer's request for adjournment was a denial of due process. Bituminous Cas. Co. v. DILHR,
97 Wis. 2d 730,
295 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App. 1980).
102.17 Annotation
Sub. (1) (d) does not create a presumption that evidence presented by treating physicians is correct. The statute enforces the idea that LIRC determines the weight to be given medical witnesses. Conradt v. Mt. Carmel School,
197 Wis. 2d 60,
539 N.W.2d 713 (Ct. App. 1995).
102.17 Annotation
LIRC's authority under sub. (1) (a) to control its calender and manage its internal affairs necessarily implies the power to deny an applicant's motion to withdraw an application for hearing. An appellant's failure to appear at a hearing after a motion to withdraw the application was denied was grounds for entry of a default judgment under s. 102.18 (1) (a). Baldwin v. LIRC,
228 Wis. 2d 601,
599 N.W.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1999).
102.17 Annotation
In the absence of testimony in conflict with a claimant's medical experts, LIRC may reject the expert evidence if there is countervailing testimony raising legitimate doubt about the employee's injury. Kowalchuk v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 85,
234 Wis. 2d 203,
610 N.W.2d 122.
102.17 Annotation
Prehearing discovery under Wisconsin's worker's compensation act. Towers. 68 MLR 597 (1985).
102.175
102.175
Apportionment of liability. 102.175(1)
(1) If it is established at the hearing that 2 or more accidental injuries, for each of which a party to the proceedings is liable under this chapter, have each contributed to a physical or mental condition for which benefits would be otherwise due, liability for such benefits shall be apportioned according to the proof of the relative contribution to disability resulting from the injury.
102.175(2)
(2) If after a hearing or a prehearing conference the department determines that an injured employee is entitled to compensation but that there remains in dispute only the issue of which of 2 or more parties is liable for that compensation, the department may order one or more parties to pay compensation in an amount, time and manner as determined by the department. If the department later determines that another party is liable for compensation, the department shall order that other party to reimburse any party that was ordered to pay compensation under this subsection.
102.175 History
History: 1979 c. 278;
1993 a. 81.
102.18
102.18
Findings, orders and awards. 102.18(1)(a)(a) All parties shall be afforded opportunity for full, fair, public hearing after reasonable notice, but disposition of application may be made by compromise, stipulation, agreement, or default without hearing.
102.18(1)(b)
(b) Within 90 days after the final hearing and close of the record, the department shall make and file its findings upon the ultimate facts involved in the controversy, and its order, which shall state its determination as to the rights of the parties. Pending the final determination of any controversy before it, the department may in its discretion after any hearing make interlocutory findings, orders and awards which may be enforced in the same manner as final awards. The department may include in its final award, as a penalty for noncompliance with any such interlocutory order or award, if it finds that noncompliance was not in good faith, not exceeding 25% of each amount which shall not have been paid as directed thereby. Where there is a finding that the employee is in fact suffering from an occupational disease caused by the employment of the employer against whom the application is filed, a final award dismissing such application upon the ground that the applicant has suffered no disability from said disease shall not bar any claim he or she may thereafter have for disability sustained after the date of the award.
102.18(1)(bg)1.1. If the department finds under
par. (b) that an insurer or self-insured employer is liable under this chapter for any health services provided to an injured employee by a health service provider, but that the reasonableness of the fee charged by the health service provider is in dispute, the department may include in its order under
par. (b) a determination as to the reasonableness of the fee or the department may notify, or direct the insurer or self-insured employer to notify, the health service provider under
s. 102.16 (2) (b) that the reasonableness of the fee is in dispute.
102.18(1)(bg)2.
2. If the department finds under
par. (b) that an employer or insurance carrier is liable under this chapter for any treatment provided to an injured employee by a health service provider, but that the necessity of the treatment is in dispute, the department may include in its order under
par. (b) a determination as to the necessity of the treatment or the department may notify, or direct the employer or insurance carrier to notify, the health service provider under
s. 102.16 (2m) (b) that the necessity of the treatment is in dispute.
102.18(1)(bp)
(bp) The department may include a penalty in an award to an employee if it determines that the employer's or insurance carrier's suspension of, termination of or failure to make payments or failure to report injury resulted from malice or bad faith. This penalty is the exclusive remedy against an employer or insurance carrier for malice or bad faith. The department may award an amount which it considers just, not to exceed the lesser of 200% of total compensation due or $15,000. The department may assess the penalty against the employer, the insurance carrier or both. Neither the employer nor the insurance carrier is liable to reimburse the other for the penalty amount. The department may, by rule, define actions which demonstrate malice or bad faith.
102.18(1)(bw)
(bw) If an insurer, a self-insured employer or, if applicable, the uninsured employers fund pays compensation to an employee in excess of its liability and another insurer is liable for all or part of the excess payment, the department may order the insurer or self-insured employer that is liable to reimburse the insurer or self-insured employer that made the excess payment or, if applicable, the uninsured employers fund.
102.18(1)(c)
(c) If 2 or more examiners have conducted a formal hearing on a claim and are unable to agree on the order or award to be issued, the decision shall be the decision of the majority. If the examiners are equally divided on the decision, the department may appoint an additional examiner who shall review the record and consult with the other examiners concerning their personal impressions of the credibility of the evidence. Findings of fact and an order or award may then be issued by a majority of the examiners.
102.18(1)(d)
(d) Any award which falls within a range of 5% of the highest or lowest estimate of permanent partial disability made by a practitioner which is in evidence is presumed to be a reasonable award, provided it is not higher than the highest or lower than the lowest estimate in evidence.
102.18(2)
(2) The department shall have and maintain on its staff such examiners as are necessary to hear and decide disputed claims and to assist in the effective administration of this chapter. These examiners shall be attorneys and may be designated as administrative law judges. These examiners may make findings and orders, and approve, review, set aside, modify or confirm stipulations of settlement or compromises of claims for compensation.
102.18(3)
(3) A party in interest may petition the commission for review of an examiner's decision awarding or denying compensation if the department or commission receives the petition within 21 days after the department mailed a copy of the examiner's findings and order to the party's last-known address. The commission shall dismiss a petition which is not timely filed unless the petitioner shows probable good cause that the reason for failure to timely file was beyond the petitioner's control. If no petition is filed within 21 days from the date that a copy of the findings or order of the examiner is mailed to the last-known address of the parties in interest, the findings or order shall be considered final unless set aside, reversed or modified by the examiner within that time. If the findings or order are set aside by the examiner the status shall be the same as prior to the findings or order set aside. If the findings or order are reversed or modified by the examiner the time for filing a petition commences with the date that notice of reversal or modification is mailed to the last-known address of the parties in interest. The commission shall either affirm, reverse, set aside or modify the findings or order in whole or in part, or direct the taking of additional evidence. This action shall be based on a review of the evidence submitted.
102.18(4)(b)
(b) Within 28 days after a decision of the commission is mailed to the last-known address of each party in interest, the commission may, on its own motion, set aside the decision for further consideration.
102.18(4)(c)
(c) On its own motion, for reasons it deems sufficient, the commission may set aside any final order or award of the commission or examiner within one year after the date of the order or award, upon grounds of mistake or newly discovered evidence, and, after further consideration, do any of the following:
102.18(4)(c)1.
1. Affirm, reverse or modify, in whole or in part, the order or award.
102.18(4)(c)3.
3. Remand the case to the department for further proceedings.
102.18(4)(d)
(d) While a petition for review by the commission is pending or after entry of an order or award by the commission but before commencement of an action for judicial review or expiration of the period in which to commence an action for judicial review, the commission shall remand any compromise presented to it to the department for consideration and approval or rejection pursuant to
s. 102.16 (1). Presentation of a compromise does not affect the period in which to commence an action for judicial review.
102.18(5)
(5) If it shall appear to the department that a mistake may have been made as to cause of injury in the findings, order or award upon an alleged injury based on accident, when in fact the employee was suffering from an occupational disease, the department may upon its own motion, with or without hearing, within 3 years from the date of such findings, order or award, set aside such findings, order or award, or the department may take such action upon application made within such 3 years. Thereafter, and after opportunity for hearing, the department may, if in fact the employee is suffering from disease arising out of the employment, make new findings and award, or it may reinstate the previous findings, order or award.
102.18(6)
(6) In case of disease arising out of the employment, the department may from time to time review its findings, order or award, and make new findings, order or award, based on the facts regarding disability or otherwise as they may then appear. This subsection shall not affect the application of the limitation in
s. 102.17 (4).
102.18 Annotation
Committee Note, 1971: The intent is to authorize the commission within its absolute discretion to reopen final orders on the basis of mistake or newly discovered evidence within a period of one year from the date of such order where this is found to be just. It is intended that the commission have authority to grant or deny compensation, including the right to increase or to decrease benefits previously awarded. [Bill 371-A]
102.18 Annotation
Interlocutory orders issued by the department in workmen's compensation cases are not res judicata. Worsch v. DILHR,
46 Wis. 2d 504,
175 N.W.2d 201.
102.18 Annotation
When the department reverses an examiner's findings and makes independent findings, the latter should be accompanied by a memorandum opinion indicating not only prior consultation with the examiner and review of the record, but a statement or statements of the reasons for reaching a different result or conclusion, particularly when the credibility of witnesses is involved. Transamerica Ins. Co. v. DILHR,
54 Wis. 2d 272,
195 N.W.2d 656.
102.18 Annotation
The department could properly find no permanent disability in the case of a successful fusion of vertebrae and still retain jurisdiction to determine future disability when doctors testified that there might be future effects. Vernon County v. DILHR,
60 Wis. 2d 736,
211 N.W.2d 441.
102.18 Annotation
In a case involving conflicting testimony in which the department reverses an examiner's findings, fundamental fairness requires a separate statement by the department explaining why it reached its decision, as well as specifically setting forth in the record its consultation with the examiner with respect to impressions or conclusions in regard to the credibility of witnesses. Simonton v. ILHR Dept.
62 Wis. 2d 112,
214 N.W.2d 302.
102.18 Annotation
Sub. (5) is inapplicable if at the original hearing the examiner considered the possibility of both accidental injury and injury caused by occupational disease, and denied the applicant benefits. Murphy v. DILHR,
63 Wis. 2d 248,
217 N.W.2d 370.
102.18 Annotation
An award will be affirmed if it is supported by any credible evidence. When there are inconsistencies or conflicts in medical testimony, it is for the department and not the courts to reconcile inconsistencies. Theodore Fleisner, Inc. v. DILHR,
65 Wis. 2d 317,
222 N.W.2d 600.
102.18 Annotation
The authority granted under sub. (3) to modify the findings of a hearing examiner does not extend to the making of findings and an order on an alternative basis of liability neither tried by the parties nor ruled on by the examiner. When another basis of liability is applicable, the examiner's findings must be set aside and an order directing the taking of additional testimony entered, directing the examiner to make new findings as to the substituted basis. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. v. DILHR,
67 Wis. 2d 185,
226 N.W.2d 492.
102.18 Annotation
The dismissal of an application that was neither based upon a stipulation or compromise nor entered after a hearing was void; the original application was valid though made many years earlier. Kohler Co. v. DILHR,
81 Wis. 2d 11,
259 N.W.2d 695.
102.18 Annotation
The department is not required to make specific findings as to a defense to a worker's claim, but it is better practice to either make findings or state why none were made. Universal Foundry Co. v. DILHR,
82 Wis. 2d 479,
263 N.W.2d 172.
102.18 Annotation
Commission guidelines, formulated as internal standards of credibility in worker's compensation cases, are irrelevant to a court's review of the commission's findings. E. F. Brewer Co. v. DILHR,
82 Wis. 2d 634,
264 N.W.2d 222.
102.18 Annotation
A general finding by the department implies all facts necessary to support it. A finding not explicitly made may be inferred from other properly made findings and from findings that were not made, if there is evidence that would support those findings. Valadzic v. Briggs & Stratton Corp.
92 Wis. 2d 583,
286 N.W.2d 540 (1979).
102.18 Annotation
An employer was penalized for denying a claim which was not "fairly debatable" under sub. (1) (bp). Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. LIRC,
138 Wis. 2d 58,
405 N.W.2d 684 (Ct. App. 1987).
102.18 Annotation
Sub. (4) (c) grants the review commission exclusive authority to set aside findings due to newly discovered evidence; the trial court does not possess that authority. Hopp v. LIRC,
146 Wis. 2d 172,
430 N.W.2d 359 (Ct. App. 1988).
102.18 Annotation
To show bad faith under sub. (1) (bp) a claimant must show that the employer acted without a reasonable basis for the delay and with knowledge or a reckless disregard of the lack of reasonable basis for the delay. North American Mechanical v. LIRC,
157 Wis. 2d 801,
460 N.W.2d 835 (Ct. App. 1990).
102.18 Annotation
After the commission makes a final order and the review period has passed, the commission's decision is final for all purposes. Kwaterski v. LIRC,
158 Wis. 2d 112,
462 N.W.2d 534 (Ct. App. 1990).
102.18 Annotation
Sub. (3) does not authorize LIRC to take administrative notice of any fact; review is limited to the record before the hearing examiner. Amsoil, Inc. v. LIRC,
173 Wis. 2d 154,
496 N.W.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1992).
102.18 Annotation
The commission may not reject a medical opinion absent something in the record to support the rejection; countervailing expert testimony is not required in all cases. Leist v. LIRC,
183 Wis. 2d 450,
515 N.W.2d 268 (Ct. App. 1994).
102.18 Annotation
Issuance of a default order under sub. (1) (a) is discretionary. Rules of civil procedure do not apply to administrative proceedings. Nothing in the law suggests a default order must be issued in the absence of excusable neglect. Verhaagh v. LIRC,
204 Wis. 2d 154,
554 N.W.2d 678 (Ct. App. 1996).
102.18 Annotation
The commission may not rule on and consider issues on appeal that were not litigated and may not consider evidence not considered by the administrative law judge unless the parties are allowed to offer rebuttal evidence. Wright v. LIRC,
210 Wis. 2d 290,
565 N.W.2d 221 (Ct. App. 1997).
102.18 Annotation
LIRC's authority under s. 102.17 (1) (a) to control its calender and manage its internal affairs necessarily implies the power to deny an applicant's motion to withdraw an application for hearing. An appellant's failure to appear at a hearing after a motion to withdraw the application was denied was grounds for entry of a default judgment under sub. (1) (a). Baldwin v. LIRC,
228 Wis. 2d 601,
599 N.W.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1999).
102.19
102.19
Alien dependents; payments through consular officers. In case a deceased employee, for whose injury or death compensation is payable, leaves surviving alien dependents residing outside of the United States, the duly accredited consular officer of the country of which such dependents are citizens or such officer's designated representative residing within the state shall, except as otherwise determined by the department, be the sole representative of the deceased employee and dependents in all matters pertaining to their claims for compensation. The receipt by such officer or agent of compensation funds and the distribution thereof shall be made only upon order of the department, and payment to such officer or agent pursuant to any such order shall be a full discharge of the benefits or compensation. Such consular officer or such officer's representative shall furnish, if required by the department, a bond to be approved by it, conditioned upon the proper application of all moneys received by such person. Before such bond is discharged, such consular officer or representative shall file with the department a verified account of the items of his or her receipts and disbursements of such compensation. Such consular officer or representative shall make interim reports to the department as it may require.
102.19 History
History: 1977 c. 29.
102.195
102.195
Employees confined in institutions; payment of benefits. In case an employee is adjudged insane or incompetent, or convicted of a felony, and is confined in a public institution and has wholly dependent upon the employee for support a person, whose dependency is determined as if the employee were deceased, compensation payable during the period of the employee's confinement may be paid to the employee and the employee's dependents, in such manner, for such time and in such amount as the department by order provides.
102.195 History
History: 1993 a. 492.
102.20
102.20
Judgment on award. If either party presents a certified copy of the award to the circuit court for any county, the court shall, without notice, render judgment in accordance therewith. A judgment rendered under this section shall have the same effect as though rendered in an action tried and determined by the court, and shall, with like effect, be entered in the judgment and lien docket.
102.20 History
History: 1995 a. 224.
102.20 Annotation
"Award" under this section means an award that has become final under s. 102.18 (3). Warren v. Link Farms, Inc.
123 Wis. 2d 485,
368 N.W.2d 688 (Ct. App. 1985).
102.21
102.21
Payment of awards by municipalities. Whenever an award is made by the department under this chapter or s.
66.191, 1981 stats., against any municipality, the person in whose favor it is made shall file a certified copy thereof with the municipal clerk. Within 20 days thereafter, unless an appeal is taken, such clerk shall draw an order on the municipal treasurer for the payment of the award. If upon appeal such award is affirmed in whole or in part the order for payment shall be drawn within 10 days after a certified copy of such judgment is filed with the proper clerk. If more than one payment is provided for in the award or judgment, orders shall be drawn as the payments become due. No statute relating to the filing of claims against, and the auditing, allowing and payment of claims by municipalities shall apply to the payment of an award or judgment under this section.
102.21 History
History: 1983 a. 191 s.
6.
102.22
102.22
Penalty for delayed payments; interest. 102.22(1)
(1) If the employer or his or her insurer inexcusably delays in making the first payment that is due an injured employee for more than 30 days after the day on which the employee leaves work as a result of an injury and if the amount due is $500 or more, the payments as to which the delay is found shall be increased by 10%. If the employer or his or her insurer inexcusably delays in making the first payment that is due an injured employee for more than 14 days after the day on which the employee leaves work as a result of an injury, the payments as to which the delay is found may be increased by 10%. If the employer or his or her insurer inexcusably delays for any length of time in making any other payment that is due an injured employee, the payments as to which the delay is found may be increased by 10%. Where the delay is chargeable to the employer and not to the insurer
s. 102.62 shall apply and the relative liability of the parties shall be fixed and discharged as therein provided. The department may also order the employer or insurance carrier to reimburse the employee for any finance charges, collection charges or interest which the employee paid as a result of the inexcusable delay by the employer or insurance carrier.
102.22(2)
(2) If the sum ordered by the department to be paid is not paid when due, that sum shall bear interest at the rate of 10% per year. The state is liable for such interest on awards issued against it under this chapter. The department has jurisdiction to issue award for payment of such interest at any time within one year of the date of its order, or upon appeal after final court determination. Such interest becomes due from the date the examiner's order becomes final or from the date of a decision by the labor and industry review commission, whichever is later.
102.22(3)
(3) If upon petition for review the commission affirms an examiner's order, interest at the rate of 7% per year on the amount ordered by the examiner shall be due for the period beginning on the 21st day after the date of the examiner's order and ending on the date paid under the commission's decision. If upon petition for judicial review under
s. 102.23 the court affirms the commission's decision, interest at the rate of 7% per year on the amount ordered by the examiner shall be due up to the date of the commission's decision, and thereafter interest shall be computed under
sub. (2).
102.22 Annotation
The department can assess the penalty for inexcusable delay in making payments prior to the entry of an order. The question of inexcusable delay is one of law and the courts are not bound by the department's finding as to it. Milwaukee County v. DILHR,
48 Wis. 2d 392,
180 N.W.2d 513.
102.22 Annotation
The penalty under sub. (1) does not bar an action for bad faith for failure to pay a claim. Coleman v. American Universal Insurance Co.
86 Wis. 2d 615,
273 N.W.2d 220 (1979).
102.23
102.23
Judicial review.
