973.18 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1984: Sub. (2) is similar to prior s. 809.30 (1) (b). Subs. (3) and (4) codify State v. Argiz,
101 Wis. 2d 546,
305 N.W.2d 124 (1981). Sub. (5) codifies trial counsel's continuing duty to provide representation until appellate counsel is retained or appointed. Whitmore v. State,
56 Wis. 2d 706, 203 NW 2d 56 (1973). [Re order effective July 1, 1985]
973.19
973.19
Motion to modify sentence. 973.19(1)(a)(a) A person sentenced to imprisonment or the intensive sanctions program or ordered to pay a fine who has not requested the preparation of transcripts under
s. 809.30 (2) may, within 90 days after the sentence or order is entered, move the court to modify the sentence or the amount of the fine.
973.19(2)
(2) Within 90 days after a motion under
sub. (1) (a) is filed, the court shall enter an order either determining the motion or extending the time for doing so by not more than 90 days for cause.
973.19(3)
(3) If an order determining a motion under
sub. (1) (a) is not entered timely under
sub. (2), the motion shall be considered denied and the clerk of the court shall immediately enter an order denying the motion.
973.19(4)
(4) An appeal from an order determining a motion under
sub. (1) (a) is governed by the procedure for civil appeals.
973.19(5)
(5) By filing a motion under
sub. (1) (a) the defendant waives his or her right to file an appeal or postconviction motion under
s. 809.30 (2).
973.19 History
History: Sup. Ct. Order, 123 Wis. 2d xiv (1985);
1991 a. 39.
973.19 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1984: This section is intended as an expeditious alternative to the procedure prescribed in s. 809.30 (2) when the only claim for postconviction relief relates to the severity of the sentence. It is not intended to alter the substantive grounds for such relief and it restores the time limits governing such motions prior to the 1978 revision of the appellate rules.
973.19 Annotation
This section will probably be most frequently used in guilty plea cases, although it is not limited to such cases. However, if the defendant intends to withdraw a guilty plea or file other postconviction motions, s. 809.30 (2) or 974.06 provides the appropriate procedure. Motions under this section should usually be filed by trial counsel without the need for transcripts or for appointment of an appellate public defender. A defendant must elect between the remedies provided by this section and s. 809.30 (2). Filing a motion under this section waives relief under s. 809.30 (2). However, a defendant who has filed a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief under s. 809.30 (2) (b) may invoke this remedy at any time before transcripts are ordered under s. 809.30 (2). If transcripts are required for prosecution of a motion under sub. (1) (a), they should be sought under
SCR 71.03 (2).
973.19 Annotation
Sub. (4) does not expand the scope of appellate review. [Re Order effective July 1, 1985.]
973.19 Annotation
The trial court's increase of the defendant's sentence based solely on "reflection" did not constitute a valid basis for modification of a sentence. There was no "new factor" justifying a more severe sentence, a prerequisite for sentence reevaluation. Scott v. State,
64 Wis. 2d 54,
218 N.W.2d 350 (1974).
973.19 Annotation
A reduction in the maximum statutory penalty for an offense is not a "new factor" justifying a postconviction motion to modify the sentence. State v. Hegwood,
113 Wis. 2d 544,
335 N.W.2d 399 (1983).
973.19 Annotation
There are two alternative means to seek modification of a sentence; proceeding under sub. (1) (a) or (b). Under either, a motion must be first made in the trial court. State v. Norwood,
161 Wis. 2d 676,
468 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1991).
973.19 Annotation
Rehabilitation may not be considered as a "new factor" for purposes of modifying an already imposed sentence. State v. Kluck,
210 Wis. 2d 1,
563 N.W.2d 468 (1997).
973.19 Annotation
A "new factor" justifying sentence modification is a fact that is highly relevant but not known by the judge at the time of sentencing because it did not exist or was unknowingly overlooked. The new factor must operate to frustrate the sentencing court's original intent. State v. Johnson,
210 Wis. 2d 197,
565 N.W.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1997).
973.19 Annotation
A defendant's sentence may be modified if there is some "new factor." Post-sentencing conduct does not constitute a new factor. State v. Scaccio, 2000 WI App 265,
240 Wis. 2d 95,
622 N.W.2d 449.
973.19 Annotation
A defendant subject to a post-probation revocation sentence cannot use s. 809. 30 and sub. (1) (b) to raise issues that go the original judgment, but the defendant may take a direct appeal from a subsequent judgment in order to fully litigate issues initially raised by the resentencing. State v. Scaccio, 2000 WI App 265,
240 Wis. 2d 95,
622 N.W.2d 449.
973.19 Annotation
Under the facts of the case, information presented to the court that had a direct bearing on the length of the sentence that proved to be incorrect was a "new factor" warranting sentence modification. State v. Norton, 2001 WI App 245,
248 Wis. 2d 162,
635 N.W.2d 656.
973.19 Annotation
A circuit court has the inherent power to modify a previously imposed sentence after the sentence has commenced, but it may not reduce a sentence merely upon reflection or second thoughts. A court may do so on the basis of new factors or when it concludes its original sentence was unduly harsh or unconscionable. A court's altered view of facts known to the court at sentencing, or a reweighing of their significance, does not constitute a new factor for sentencing purposes but is mere reflection or second thoughts. State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106,
255 Wis. 2d 632,
648 N.W.2d 507.
973.19 Annotation
A circuit court should proceed in a fashion similar to that outlined in s. 974.06 (3) when it receives a motion requesting sentence modification. State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106,
255 Wis. 2d 632,
648 N.W.2d 507.
973.19 Annotation
A defendant can seek sentence modification in two ways: 1) moving for modification as a matter of right under this section, to assert an erroneous exercise of discretion based on excessiveness, undue harshness, or unconscionability, or 2) moving for discretionary review, invoking the inherent power of the circuit court, which applies only if a new factor justifying sentence modification exists, in which case, the timeliness requirements of this section are inapplicable. State v. Noll, 2002 WI App 273,
258 Wis. 2d 573,
653 N.W.2d 895.
973.19 Annotation
A mental health professional who conducted a psychological assessment of a defendant convicted of sexual assault, which was incorporated into the presentence investigation report and admitted into evidence at the sentencing hearing, had a conflict of interest due to the fact that she had treated the victim in the case. The conflict of interest is a new factor justifying the modification of the sentence. State v. Stafford, 2003 WI App 138,
265 Wis. 2d 886,
667 N.W.2d 370,
02-0544.
973.19 Annotation
The adoption of Truth-in-Sentencing, s. 973.01, did not affect existing "new factor" jurisprudence. State v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
681 N.W.2d 524,
02-1809.
973.19 Annotation
A change in the classification of a crime under the 2003 revisions to the sentencing laws was not a new factor for sentence modification purposes. State v. Longmire, 2004 WI App 90, ___ Wis. 2d ___,
681 N.W.2d 354,
03-0300.
973.195
973.195
Sentence adjustment. 973.195(1g)(1g)
Definition. In this section, "applicable percentage" means 85% for a Class C to E felony and 75% for a Class F to I felony.
973.195(1r)(a)(a) An inmate who is serving a sentence imposed under
s. 973.01 for a crime other than a Class B felony may petition the sentencing court to adjust the sentence if the inmate has served at least the applicable percentage of the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence. If an inmate is subject to more than one sentence imposed under this section, the sentences shall be treated individually for purposes of sentence adjustment under this subsection.
973.195(1r)(b)1.
1. The inmate's conduct, efforts at and progress in rehabilitation, or participation and progress in education, treatment, or other correctional programs since he or she was sentenced.
973.195(1r)(b)3.
3. A change in law or procedure related to sentencing or revocation of extended supervision effective after the inmate was sentenced that would have resulted in a shorter term of confinement in prison or, if the inmate was returned to prison upon revocation of extended supervision, a shorter period of confinement in prison upon revocation, if the change had been applicable when the inmate was sentenced.
973.195(1r)(b)4.
4. The inmate is subject to a sentence of confinement in another state or the inmate is in the United States illegally and may be deported.
973.195(1r)(b)5.
5. Sentence adjustment is otherwise in the interests of justice.
973.195(1r)(c)
(c) Upon receipt of a petition filed under
par. (a), the sentencing court may deny the petition or hold the petition for further consideration. If the court holds the petition for further consideration, the court shall notify the district attorney of the inmate's petition. If the district attorney objects to adjustment of the inmate's sentence within 45 days of receiving notification under this paragraph, the court shall deny the inmate's petition.
973.195(1r)(d)
(d) If the sentence for which the inmate seek's adjustment is for an offense under
s. 940.225 (2) or
(3),
948.02 (2), or
948.08 and the district attorney does not object to the petition within 10 days of receiving notice under
par. (c), the district attorney shall notify the the victim, as defined under
s. 950.02 (4), of the inmate's petition. The notice to the victim shall include information on the sentence adjustment petition process under this subsection, including information on how to object to the inmate's petition. If the victim objects to adjustment of the inmate's sentence within 45 days of the date on which the district attorney received notice under
par. (c), the court shall deny the inmate's petition.
973.195(1r)(e)
(e) Notwithstanding the confidentiality of victim address information obtained under
s. 302.113 (9g) (g) 3., a district attorney who is required to send notice to a victim under
par. (d) may obtain from the clerk of the circuit court victim address information that the victim provided to the clerk under
s. 302.113 (9g) (g) 3.
973.195(1r)(f)
(f) If the sentencing court receives no objection to sentence adjustment from the district attorney under
par. (c) or the victim under
par. (d) and the court determines that sentence adjustment is in the public interest, the court may adjust the inmate's sentence as provided under
par. (g). The court shall include in the record written reasons for any sentence adjustment granted under this subsection.
973.195(1r)(g)
(g) Except as provided under
par. (h), the only sentence adjustments that a court may make under this subsection are as follows:
973.195(1r)(g)1.
1. If the inmate is serving the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence, a reduction in the term of confinement in prison by the amount of time remaining in the term of confinement in prison portion of the sentence, less up to 30 days, and a corresponding increase in the term of extended supervision.
973.195(1r)(g)2.
2. If the inmate is confined in prison upon revocation of extended supervision, a reduction in the amount of time remaining in the period of confinement in prison imposed upon revocation, less up to 30 days, and a corresponding increase in the term of extended supervision.
973.195(1r)(h)1.1. If the court adjusts a sentence under
par. (g) on the basis of a change in law or procedure as provided under
par. (b) 3. and the total sentence length of the adjusted sentence is greater than the maximum sentence length that the offender could have received if the change in law or procedure had been applicable when the inmate was originally sentenced, the court may reduce the length of the term of extended supervision so that the total sentence length does not exceed the maximum sentence length that the offender could have received if the change in law or procedure had been applicable when the inmate was originally sentenced.
973.195(1r)(h)2.
2. If the court adjusts a sentence under
par. (g) on the basis of a change in law or procedure as provided under
par. (b) 3. and the adjusted term of extended supervision is greater than the maximum term of extended supervision that the offender could have received if the change in law or procedure had been applicable when the inmate was originally sentenced, the court may reduce the length of the term of extended supervision so that the term of extended supervision does not exceed the maximum term of extended supervision that the offender could have received if the change in law or procedure had been applicable when the inmate was originally sentenced.
973.195(1r)(i)
(i) An inmate may submit only one petition under this subsection for each sentence imposed under
s. 973.01.
973.195 History
History: 2001 a. 109.
973.20(1g)(a)
(a) "Crime considered at sentencing" means any crime for which the defendant was convicted and any read-in crime.
973.20(1g)(b)
(b) "Read-in crime" means any crime that is uncharged or that is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that the defendant agrees to be considered by the court at the time of sentencing and that the court considers at the time of sentencing the defendant for the crime for which the defendant was convicted.
973.20(1r)
(1r) When imposing sentence or ordering probation for any crime, other than a crime involving conduct that constitutes domestic abuse under
s. 813.12 (1) (am) or
968.075 (1) (a), for which the defendant was convicted, the court, in addition to any other penalty authorized by law, shall order the defendant to make full or partial restitution under this section to any victim of a crime considered at sentencing or, if the victim is deceased, to his or her estate, unless the court finds substantial reason not to do so and states the reason on the record. When imposing sentence or ordering probation for a crime involving conduct that constitutes domestic abuse under
s. 813.12 (1) (am) or
968.075 (1) (a) for which the defendant was convicted or that was considered at sentencing, the court, in addition to any other penalty authorized by law, shall order the defendant to make full or partial restitution under this section to any victim of a crime or, if the victim is deceased, to his or her estate, unless the court finds that imposing full or partial restitution will create an undue hardship on the defendant or victim and describes the undue hardship on the record. Restitution ordered under this section is a condition of probation, extended supervision, or parole served by the defendant for a crime for which the defendant was convicted. After the termination of probation, extended supervision, or parole, or if the defendant is not placed on probation, extended supervision, or parole, restitution ordered under this section is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action by the victim named in the order to receive restitution or enforced under
ch. 785.
973.20(2)
(2) If a crime considered at sentencing resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of property, the restitution order may require that the defendant:
973.20(2)(a)
(a) Return the property to the owner or owner's designee; or
973.20(2)(b)
(b) If return of the property under
par. (a) is impossible, impractical or inadequate, pay the owner or owner's designee the reasonable repair or replacement cost or the greater of:
973.20(2)(b)1.
1. The value of the property on the date of its damage, loss or destruction; or
973.20(2)(b)2.
2. The value of the property on the date of sentencing, less the value of any part of the property returned, as of the date of its return. The value of retail merchandise shall be its retail value.
973.20(3)
(3) If a crime considered at sentencing resulted in bodily injury, the restitution order may require that the defendant do one or more of the following:
973.20(3)(a)
(a) Pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric and psychological care and treatment.
973.20(3)(b)
(b) Pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation.
973.20(3)(c)
(c) Reimburse the injured person for income lost as a result of a crime considered at sentencing.
973.20(3)(d)
(d) If the injured person's sole employment at the time of the injury was performing the duties of a homemaker, pay an amount sufficient to ensure that the duties are continued until the person is able to resume performance of the duties.
973.20(4)
(4) If a crime considered at sentencing resulted in death, the restitution order may also require that the defendant pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary funeral and related services under
s. 895.04 (5).
973.20(4m)
(4m) If the defendant violated
s. 940.225,
948.02,
948.025,
948.05,
948.06,
948.07 or
948.08 and
sub. (3) (a) does not apply, the restitution order may require that the defendant pay an amount, not to exceed $10,000, equal to the cost of necessary professional services relating to psychiatric and psychological care and treatment. The $10,000 limit under this subsection does not apply to the amount of any restitution ordered under
sub. (3) or
(5) for the cost of necessary professional services relating to psychiatric and psychological care and treatment.
973.20(5)
(5) In any case, the restitution order may require that the defendant do one or more of the following:
973.20(5)(a)
(a) Pay all special damages, but not general damages, substantiated by evidence in the record, which could be recovered in a civil action against the defendant for his or her conduct in the commission of a crime considered at sentencing.
973.20(5)(b)
(b) Pay an amount equal to the income lost, and reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred, by the person against whom a crime considered at sentencing was committed resulting from the filing of charges or cooperating in the investigation and prosecution of the crime.
973.20(5)(c)
(c) Reimburse any person or agency for amounts paid as rewards for information leading to the apprehension or successful prosecution of the defendant for a crime for which the defendant was convicted or to the apprehension or prosecution of the defendant for a read-in crime.
973.20(5)(d)
(d) If justice so requires, reimburse any insurer, surety or other person who has compensated a victim for a loss otherwise compensable under this section.
973.20(6)
(6) Any order under
sub. (5) (c) or
(d) shall require that all restitution to victims under the order be paid before restitution to other persons.
973.20(7)
(7) If the court orders that restitution be paid to more than one person, the court may direct the sequence in which payments are to be transferred under
sub. (11) (a). If more than one defendant is ordered to make payments to the same person, the court may apportion liability between the defendants or specify joint and several liability. If the court specifies that 2 or more defendants are jointly and severally liable, the department or the clerk to whom payments are made under
sub. (11) (a) shall distribute any overpayments so that each defendant, as closely as possible, pays the same proportion of the ordered restitution.
973.20(8)
(8) Restitution ordered under this section does not limit or impair the right of a victim to sue and recover damages from the defendant in a civil action. The facts that restitution was required or paid are not admissible as evidence in a civil action and have no legal effect on the merits of a civil action. Any restitution made by payment or community service shall be set off against any judgment in favor of the victim in a civil action arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the restitution. The court trying the civil action shall hold a separate hearing to determine the validity and amount of any setoff asserted by the defendant.
973.20(9)(a)(a) If a crime victim is paid an award under
ch. 949 for any loss arising out of a criminal act, the state is subrogated to the rights of the victim to any restitution required by the court. The rights of the state are subordinate to the claims of victims who have suffered a loss arising out of the offenses or any transaction which is part of the same continuous scheme of criminal activity.
973.20(9)(b)
(b) When restitution is ordered, the court shall inquire to see if an award has been made under
ch. 949 and if the department of justice is subrogated to the cause of action under
s. 949.15. If the restitution ordered is less than or equal to the award under
ch. 949, the restitution shall be paid only to the general fund. If the restitution ordered is greater than the award under
ch. 949, the general fund shall receive an amount equal to the award under
ch. 949 and the balance shall be paid to the victim.
973.20(10)
(10) The court may require that restitution be paid immediately, within a specified period or in specified installments. If the defendant is placed on probation or sentenced to imprisonment, the end of a specified period shall not be later than the end of any period of probation, extended supervision or parole. If the defendant is sentenced to the intensive sanctions program, the end of a specified period shall not be later than the end of the sentence under
s. 973.032 (3) (a).
973.20(11)(a)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph, the restitution order shall require the defendant to deliver the amount of money or property due as restitution to the department for transfer to the victim or other person to be compensated by a restitution order under this section. If the defendant is not placed on probation or sentenced to prison, the court may order that restitution be paid to the clerk of court for transfer to the appropriate person. The court shall impose on the defendant a restitution surcharge under
ch. 814 equal to 5% of the total amount of any restitution, costs, attorney fees, court fees, fines, and surcharges ordered under
s. 973.05 (1) and imposed under
ch. 814, which shall be paid to the department or the clerk of court for administrative expenses under this section.
973.20(11)(b)
(b) The department shall establish a separate account for each person in its custody or under its supervision ordered to make restitution for the collection and disbursement of funds. A portion of each payment constitutes the surcharge for administrative expenses under
par. (a).
973.20(12)(a)(a) If the court orders restitution in addition to the payment of fines, costs, fees, and surcharges under
ss. 973.05 and
973.06 and
ch. 814, it shall set the amount of fines, costs, fees, and surcharges in conjunction with the amount of restitution and issue a single order, signed by the judge, covering all of the payments. If the costs for legal representation by a private attorney appointed under
s. 977.08 are not established at the time of issuance of the order, the court may revise the order to include those costs at a later time.
973.20(12)(b)
(b) Except as provided in
par. (c), payments shall be applied first to satisfy the ordered restitution in full, then to pay any fines or surcharges under
s. 973.05, then to pay costs, fees, and surcharges under
ch. 814 other than attorney fees and finally to reimburse county or state costs of legal representation.
973.20(12)(c)
(c) If a defendant is subject to more than one order under this section and the financial obligations under any order total $50 or less, the department or the clerk of court, whichever is applicable under
sub. (11) (a), may pay these obligations first.
973.20(13)(a)(a) The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount thereof, shall consider all of the following:
973.20(13)(a)1.
1. The amount of loss suffered by any victim as a result of a crime considered at sentencing.
973.20(13)(a)3.
3. The present and future earning ability of the defendant.
