940.01
940.01
First-degree intentional homicide. 940.01(1)(a)(a) Except as provided in
sub. (2), whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony.
940.01(1)(b)
(b) Except as provided in
sub. (2), whoever causes the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another is guilty of a Class A felony.
940.01(2)
(2) Mitigating circumstances. The following are affirmative defenses to prosecution under this section which mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree intentional homicide under
s. 940.05:
940.01(2)(a)
(a)
Adequate provocation. Death was caused under the influence of adequate provocation as defined in
s. 939.44.
940.01(2)(b)
(b)
Unnecessary defensive force. Death was caused because the actor believed he or she or another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force used was necessary to defend the endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable.
940.01(2)(c)
(c)
Prevention of felony. Death was caused because the actor believed that the force used was necessary in the exercise of the privilege to prevent or terminate the commission of a felony, if that belief was unreasonable.
940.01(3)
(3) Burden of proof. When the existence of an affirmative defense under
sub. (2) has been placed in issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts constituting the defense did not exist in order to sustain a finding of guilt under
sub. (1).
940.01 History
History: 1987 a. 399;
1997 a. 295.
940.01 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: First-degree intentional homicide is analogous to the prior offense of first-degree murder. Sub. (2) formerly contained a narrower definition of "intent to kill" than the general definition of criminal intent. That narrower definition has been eliminated in the interest of uniformity. Section 939.23 now defines the intent referred to.
940.01 Annotation
The affirmative defenses specified in sub. (2) were formerly treated in s. 940.05. This caused confusion because they seemed to be elements of manslaughter rather than defenses to first-degree murder. Sub. (2) specifies only those affirmative defenses which mitigate an intentional homicide from first to 2nd degree. Other affirmative defenses are a defense to 2nd-degree intentional homicide also, such as self-defense, i.e., when both beliefs specified in sub. (2) (b) are reasonable. Section 939.48.
940.01 Annotation
The prosecution is required to prove only that the defendant's acts were a substantial factor in the victim's death; not the sole cause. State v. Block,
170 Wis. 2d 676,
489 N.W.2d 715 (Ct. App. 1992).
940.01 Annotation
The trial court must apply an objective reasonable view of the evidence test to determine whether under sub. (3) a mitigating affirmative defense "has been placed in issue" before submitting the issue to the jury. In Interest of Shawn B. N.
173 Wis. 2d 343,
497 N.W.2d 141 (Ct. App. 1992).
940.01 Annotation
Imperfect self-defense contains an initial threshold element requiring a reasonable belief that the defendant was terminating an unlawful interference with his or her person. State v. Camacho,
176 Wis. 2d 860,
501 N.W.2d 380 (1993).
940.01 Annotation
Sub. (1) (a) cannot be applied against a mother for actions taken against a fetus while pregnant as the applicable definition of human being under s. 939.22 (16) is limited to one who is born alive. Sub. (1) (b) does not apply because s. 939.75 (2) (b) excludes from its application actions by a pregnant woman. State v. Deborah J.Z.
228 Wis. 2d 468,
596 N.W.2d 490 (Ct. App. 1999),
96-2797.
940.01 Annotation
Barring psychiatric or psychological opinion testimony on the defendant's capacity to form an intent to kill is constitutional. Haas v. Abrahamson,
910 F. 2d 384 (1990) citing Steele v. State,
97 Wis. 2d 72,
294 N.W.2d 2 (1980).
940.01 Annotation
A privilege for excusable homicide by accident or misfortune is incorporated in s. 939.45 (6). Accident is a defense that negatives intent. If a person kills another by accident, the killing could not have been intentional. Accident must be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt when a defendant raises it as a defense. When the state proves intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt, it necessarily disproves accident. State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101,
255 Wis. 2d 265,
647 N.W.2d 244,
00-0064.
940.01 Annotation
A defendant may demonstrate that he or she was acting lawfully, a necessary element of an accident defense, by showing that he or she was acting in lawful self-defense. Although intentionally pointing a firearm at another constitutes a violation of s. 941.20, under s. 939.48 (1) a person is privileged to point a gun at another person in self-defense if the person reasonably believes that the threat of force is necessary to prevent or terminate what he or she reasonably believes to be an unlawful interference. State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101,
255 Wis. 2d 265,
647 N.W.2d 244,
00-0064.
940.01 Annotation
A defendant seeking a jury instruction on perfect self-defense to a charge of first-degree intentional homicide must satisfy an objective threshold showing that he or she reasonably believed that he or she was preventing or terminating an unlawful interference with his or her person and reasonably believed that the force used was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm. A defendant seeking a jury instruction on unnecessary defensive force under sub. (2) (b) to a charge of first-degree intentional homicide is not required to satisfy the objective threshold. State v. Head, 2002 WI 99,
255 Wis. 2d 194,
648 N.W.2d 413,
99-3071.
940.01 Annotation
A defendant who claims self-defense to a charge of first-degree intentional homicide may use evidence of a victim's violent character and past acts of violence to show a satisfactory factual basis that he or she actually believed he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and actually believed that the force used was necessary to defend himself or herself, even if both beliefs were unreasonable. State v. Head, 2002 WI 99,
255 Wis. 2d 194,
648 N.W.2d 413,
99-3071.
940.01 Annotation
The common law "year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42,
261 Wis. 2d 249,
661 N.W.2d 381,
01-3063.
940.01 Annotation
Importance of clarity in law of homicide: The Wisconsin revision. Dickey, Schultz & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323 (1989).
940.01 Annotation
State v. Camacho: The Judicial Creation of an Objective Element to Wisconsin's Law of Imperfect Self-defense Homicide. Leiser. 1995 WLR 742.
940.02
940.02
First-degree reckless homicide. 940.02(1)
(1) Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is guilty of a Class B felony.
940.02(1m)
(1m) Whoever recklessly causes the death of an unborn child under circumstances that show utter disregard for the life of that unborn child, the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or another is guilty of a Class B felony.
940.02(2)
(2) Whoever causes the death of another human being under any of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class C felony:
940.02(2)(a)
(a) By manufacture, distribution or delivery, in violation of
s. 961.41, of a controlled substance included in schedule I or II under
ch. 961, of a controlled substance analog of a controlled substance included in schedule I or II under
ch. 961 or of ketamine or flunitrazepam, if another human being uses the controlled substance or controlled substance analog and dies as a result of that use. This paragraph applies:
940.02(2)(a)1.
1. Whether the human being dies as a result of using the controlled substance or controlled substance analog by itself or with any compound, mixture, diluent or other substance mixed or combined with the controlled substance or controlled substance analog.
940.02(2)(a)2.
2. Whether or not the controlled substance or controlled substance analog is mixed or combined with any compound, mixture, diluent or other substance after the violation of
s. 961.41 occurs.
940.02(2)(a)3.
3. To any distribution or delivery described in this paragraph, regardless of whether the distribution or delivery is made directly to the human being who dies. If possession of the controlled substance included in schedule I or II under
ch. 961, of the controlled substance analog of the controlled substance included in schedule I or II under
ch. 961 or of the ketamine or flunitrazepam is transferred more than once prior to the death as described in this paragraph, each person who distributes or delivers the controlled substance or controlled substance analog in violation of
s. 961.41 is guilty under this paragraph.
940.02(2)(b)
(b) By administering or assisting in administering a controlled substance included in schedule I or II under
ch. 961, a controlled substance analog of a controlled substance included in schedule I or II of
ch. 961 or ketamine or flunitrazepam, without lawful authority to do so, to another human being and that human being dies as a result of the use of the substance. This paragraph applies whether the human being dies as a result of using the controlled substance or controlled substance analog by itself or with any compound, mixture, diluent or other substance mixed or combined with the controlled substance or controlled substance analog.
940.02 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: [As to sub. (1)] First-degree reckless homicide is analogous to the prior offense of 2nd-degree murder. The concept of "conduct evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life" has been a difficult one for modern juries to comprehend. To avoid the mistaken connotation that a clinical mental disorder is involved, the offense has been recodified as aggravated reckless homicide. The revision clarifies that a subjective mental state, i.e., criminal recklessness, is required for liability. See s. 939.24. The aggravating element, i.e., circumstances which show utter disregard for human life, is intended to codify judicial interpretations of "conduct evincing a depraved mind, regardless of life". State v. Dolan,
44 Wis. 2d 68 (1969); State v. Weso,
60 Wis. 2d 404 (1973).
940.02 Annotation
Under prior law, adequate provocation mitigated 2nd-degree murder to manslaughter. State v. Hoyt,
21 Wis. 2d 284 (1964). Under this revision, the analogs of those crimes, i.e., first-degree reckless and 2nd-degree intentional homicide, carry the same penalty; thus mitigation is impossible. Evidence of provocation will usually be admissible in prosecutions for crimes requiring criminal recklessness, however, as relevant to the reasonableness of the risk (and, in prosecutions under this section, whether the circumstances show utter disregard for human life). Since provocation is integrated into the calculus of recklessness, it is not an affirmative defense thereto and the burdens of production and persuasion stated in s. 940.01 (3) are inapplicable. [Bill 191-S]
940.02 Annotation
Possession of a controlled substance is not a lesser included offense of sub. (2) (a). State v. Clemons,
164 Wis. 2d 506,
476 N.W.2d 283 (Ct. App. 1991).
940.02 Annotation
Generally expert evidence of personality dysfunction is irrelevant to the issue of intent, although it might be admissible in very limited circumstances. State v. Morgan,
195 Wis. 2d 388,
536 N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1995),
93-2611.
940.02 Annotation
Utter disregard for human life is an objective standard of what a reasonable person in the defendant's position is presumed to have known and is proved through an examination of the acts that caused death and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct. State v. Edmunds,
229 Wis. 2d 67,
598 N.W.2d 290 (Ct. App. 1999),
98-2171.
940.02 Annotation
The common law "year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42,
261 Wis. 2d 249,
661 N.W.2d 381,
01-3063.
940.02 Annotation
Sections 940.02 (2) (a) and 948.40 (4) (a) address 2 different categories of proscribed conduct that differ markedly in their essential nature. That the defendant's particular conduct happens to fall within a relatively limited area covered by both statutes does not show that the legislature intended only one punishment. State v. Patterson, 2009 WI App 161,
321 Wis. 2d 752,
776 N.W.2d 602,
08-1968.
940.02 Annotation
Importance of clarity in law of homicide: The Wisconsin revision. Dickey, Schultz & Fullin. 1989 WLR 1323 (1989).
940.03
940.03
Felony murder. Whoever causes the death of another human being while committing or attempting to commit a crime specified in
s. 940.19,
940.195,
940.20,
940.201,
940.203,
940.225 (1) or
(2) (a),
940.30,
940.31,
943.02,
943.10 (2),
943.23 (1g), or
943.32 (2) may be imprisoned for not more than 15 years in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for that crime or attempt.
940.03 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: The prior felony murder statute (s. 940.02 (2)) did not allow enhanced punishment for homicides caused in the commission of a Class B felony. State v. Gordon,
111 Wis. 2d 133,
330 N.W.2d 564 (1983). The revised statute eliminates the "natural and probable consequence" limitation and limits the offense to homicides caused in the commission of or attempt to commit armed robbery, armed burglary, arson, first-degree sexual assault or 2nd-degree sexual assault by use or threat of force or violence. The revised penalty clause allows imposition of up to 20 years' imprisonment more than that prescribed for the underlying felony. Prosecution and punishment for both offenses remain barred by double jeopardy. State v. Carlson,
5 Wis. 2d 595,
93 N.W.2d 355 (1958). [Bill 191-S]
940.03 Annotation
To prove that the defendant caused the death, the state need only prove that the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor. The phrase "while committing or attempting to commit" encompasses the immediate flight from the felony. A defendant may be convicted if another person, including an intended felony victim, fires the fatal shot. State v. Oimen,
184 Wis. 2d 423,
516 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1994), State v. Rivera,
184 Wis. 2d 485,
516 N.W.2d 391 (1994) and State v. Chambers,
183 Wis. 2d 316,
515 N.W.2d 531 (Ct. App. 1994).
940.03 Annotation
Attempted felony murder does not exist. Attempt requires intent and the crime of felony murder is complete without specific intent. State v. Briggs,
218 Wis. 2d 61,
579 N.W.2d 783 (Ct. App. 1998),
97-1558.
940.03 Annotation
Oimen affirms that felony murder liability exists if a defendant is a party to one of the listed felonies and a death results. State v. Krawczyk, 2003 WI App 6,
259 Wis. 2d 843,
657 N.W.2d 77,
02-0156.
940.03 Annotation
The common law "year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42,
261 Wis. 2d 249,
661 N.W.2d 381,
01-3063.
940.03 Annotation
For purposes of calculating initial confinement, felony murder is a stand-alone unclassified crime, not a penalty enhancer. State v. Mason, 2004 WI App 176,
276 Wis. 2d 434,
687 N.W.2d 526,
03-2693.
940.04(1)(1) Any person, other than the mother, who intentionally destroys the life of an unborn child is guilty of a Class H felony.
940.04(2)
(2) Any person, other than the mother, who does either of the following is guilty of a Class E felony:
940.04(2)(a)
(a) Intentionally destroys the life of an unborn quick child; or
940.04(2)(b)
(b) Causes the death of the mother by an act done with intent to destroy the life of an unborn child. It is unnecessary to prove that the fetus was alive when the act so causing the mother's death was committed.
940.04(3)
(3) Any pregnant woman who intentionally destroys the life of her unborn child or who consents to such destruction by another may be fined not more than $200 or imprisoned not more than 6 months or both.
940.04(4)
(4) Any pregnant woman who intentionally destroys the life of her unborn quick child or who consents to such destruction by another is guilty of a Class I felony.
940.04(5)
(5) This section does not apply to a therapeutic abortion which:
940.04(5)(b)
(b) Is necessary, or is advised by 2 other physicians as necessary, to save the life of the mother; and
940.04(5)(c)
(c) Unless an emergency prevents, is performed in a licensed maternity hospital.
940.04(6)
(6) In this section "unborn child" means a human being from the time of conception until it is born alive.
940.04 History
History: 2001 a. 109.
940.04 Annotation
Aborting a child against a father's wishes does not constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. Przybyla v. Przybyla,
87 Wis. 2d 441,
275 N.W.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1978).
940.04 Annotation
Sub. (2) (a) proscribes feticide. It does not apply to consensual abortions. It was not impliedly repealed by the adoption of s. 940.15 in response to
Roe v. Wade. State v. Black,
188 Wis. 2d 639,
526 N.W.2d 132 (1994).
940.04 Annotation
The common law "year-and-a-day rule" that no homicide is committed unless the victim dies within a year and a day after the injury is inflicted is abrogated, with prospective application only. State v. Picotte, 2003 WI 42,
261 Wis. 2d 249,
661 N.W.2d 381,
01-3063.
940.04 Annotation
This section is cited as similar to a Texas statute that was held to violate the due process clause of the 14th amendment, which protects against state action the right to privacy, including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy. Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
940.04 Annotation
The state may prohibit first trimester abortions by nonphysicians. Connecticut v. Menillo,
423 U.S. 9 (1975).
940.04 AnnotationThe viability of an unborn child is discussed. Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379 (1979).
940.04 Annotation
Poverty is not a constitutionally suspect classification. Encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances is rationally related to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life. Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
940.04 Annotation
Abortion issues are discussed. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
462 U.S. 416 (1983); Planned Parenthood Assn. v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476 (1983); Simopoulas v. Virginia,
462 U.S. 506 (1983).
940.04 Annotation
The essential holding of Roe v. Wade allowing abortion is upheld, but various state restrictions on abortion are permissible. Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833,
120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992).
940.04 Annotation
Wisconsin's abortion statute, 940.04, Stats. 1969, is unconstitutional as applied to the abortion of an embryo that has not quickened. Babbitz v. McCann,
310 F. Supp. 293 (1970).
940.04 Annotation
When U.S. supreme court decisions clearly made Wisconsin's antiabortion statute unenforceable, the issue in a physician's action for injunctive relief against enforcement became mooted, and it no longer presented a case or controversy over which the court could have jurisdiction. Larkin v. McCann,
368 F. Supp. 1352 (1974).
940.04 Annotation
State regulation of abortion. 1970 WLR 933.
940.05
940.05
Second-degree intentional homicide. 940.05(1)(1) Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class B felony if:
940.05(1)(a)
(a) In prosecutions under
s. 940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in
s. 940.01 (2) did not exist as required by
s. 940.01 (3); or
940.05(1)(b)
(b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in
s. 940.01 (2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so concedes.
940.05(2)
(2) In prosecutions under
sub. (1), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another.
940.05(2g)
(2g) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another is guilty of a Class B felony if:
940.05(2g)(a)
(a) In prosecutions under
s. 940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in
s. 940.01 (2) did not exist as required by
s. 940.01 (3); or
940.05(2g)(b)
(b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in
s. 940.01 (2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so concedes.
940.05(2h)
(2h) In prosecutions under
sub. (2g), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another.
940.05(3)
(3) The mitigating circumstances specified in
s. 940.01 (2) are not defenses to prosecution for this offense.
940.05 History
History: 1987 a. 399;
1997 a. 295.
940.05 Note
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Second-degree intentional homicide is analogous to the prior offense of manslaughter. The penalty is increased and the elements clarified in order to encourage charging under this section in appropriate cases.
940.05 Annotation
Adequate provocation, unnecessary defensive force, prevention of felony, coercion and necessity, which are affirmative defenses to first-degree intentional homicide but not this offense, mitigate that offense to this. When this offense is charged, the state's inability to disprove their existence is conceded. Their existence need not, however, be pleaded or proved by the state in order to sustain a finding of guilty.
