An ex post facto law is one which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or which deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available at the time the act was committed. State v. Thiel, 188 W (2d) 695, 524 NW (2d) 641 (1994).
Constitutionality of rent control discussed. 62 Atty. Gen. 276.
I,13 Private property for public use. Section 13. The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor.
A dismissal of an appeal for lack of prosecution in a condemnation action does not violate condemnee's right to just compensation. Taylor v. State Highway Comm. 45 W (2d) 490, 173 NW (2d) 707.
Total rental loss occasioned by the condemnation is compensable, and the limitation to one year's loss in 32.19 (4), 1969 Stats., is invalid. Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 W (2d) 271, 177 NW (2d) 380.
A prohibition against filling in wetlands pursuant to an ordinance adopted under 59.971 and 144.26 does not amount to a taking of property unconstitutionally. Police powers vs. eminent domain discussed. Just v. Marinette County, 56 W (2d) 7, 201 NW (2d) 761.
A special assessment against a railroad for a sanitary sewer laid along the railroad's right-of-way, admittedly of no immediate use or benefit to the railroad, does not constitute a violation of this section. Soo Line RR. Co v. Neenah, 64 W (2d) 665, 221 NW (2d) 907.
In order for the petitioner to succeed in the initial stages of the inverse condemnation proceeding, it must allege facts that, prima facie at least, show there has been either an occupation of its property under 32.10, or a taking, which must be compensated under the terms of the Wisconsin Constitution. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. 66 W (2d) 720, 226 NW (2d) 185.
The owners of private wells ordered by the department of natural resources to seal them because of bacteriological danger are not entitled to compensation, because such orders were a proper exercise of the state's police power to prevent a public harm, for which compensation is not required. Village of Sussex v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 68 W (2d) 187, 228 NW (2d) 173.
5342There must be a "taking" of property to justify compensation. DeBruin v. Green County, 72 W (2d) 464, 241 NW (2d) 167.
Condemnation power discussed. See also notes to 32.06 and 32.07 citing this case. Falkner v. Northern States Power Co. 75 W (2d) 116, 248 NW (2d) 885.
Ordering utility to place its power lines underground in order to expand airport constituted a taking because the public benefited from the enlarged airport. Public Service Corp. v. Marathon County, 75 W (2d) 442, 249 NW (2d) 543.
For inverse condemnation purposes, taking can occur absent physical invasion only where there is legally imposed restriction upon property's use. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. 92 W (2d) 74, 284 NW (2d) 887 (1979).
Doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot bar action for just compensation based on taking of private property for public use even though legislature has failed to establish specific provisions for recovery of just compensation. Zinn v. State, 112 W (2d) 417, 334 NW (2d) 67 (1983).
Zoning classification unconstitutionally deprived owners of property without due process of law. State ex rel. Nagawicka Is. Corp. v. Delafield, 117 W (2d) 23, 343 NW (2d) 816 (Ct. App. 1983).
Ordering riparian owner to excavate and maintain ditch to regulate lake level was unconstitutional taking of property. Otte v. DNR, 142 W (2d) 222, 418 NW (2d) 16 (Ct. App. 1987).
In absence of physical occupancy or possession property is "taken" for public use only by action which imposes legally enforceable restriction on use and deprives owner of significant portion of use. Reel Enterprises v. City of LaCrosse, 146 W (2d) 662, 431 NW (2d) 743 (Ct. App. 1988).
Discussion of operation of this section. W.H. Pugh Coal Co., 157 W (2d) 620, 460 NW (2d) 787 (Ct. App. 1990).
A taking by government restriction occurs only if the restriction deprives the owner of all or practically all use. Busse v. Dane County Regional Planning Comm. 181 W (2d) 527, 510 NW (2d) 136 (Ct. App. 1993).
A taking claim is not ripe for judicial review until the government agency charged with implementing applicable regulations has made a final decision applying the regulations to the property at issue. Taking claims based on equal protection or due process grounds must meet the ripeness requirement. Streff v. Town of Delafield, 190 W (2d) 348, 526 NW (2d) 822 (Ct. App. 1994).
Damage to property is not compensated as a taking. For flooding to be a taking it must constitute a permanent physical occupation of property. Menick v. City of Menasha, 200 W (2d) 737, 547 NW (2d) 778 (Ct. App. 1996).
A constructive taking occurs when government regulation renders a property useless for all practical purposes. Taking jurisprudence does not allow dividing the property into segments and determining whether rights in a particular segment have been abrogated. Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 W (2d) 365, 548 NW (2d) 528 (1996).
Section 32.10 does not govern inverse condemnation proceedings seeking just compensation for a temporary taking of land for public use. Such takings claims are based directly on Article I, section 13, of the constitution. Anderson v. Village of Little Chute, 201 W (2d) 467, 549 NW (2d) 561 (Ct. App. 1996).
New York law that landlord must permit cable television company to install cable facilities upon property was compensable taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 US 419 (1982).
State land use regulation preventing beachfront development which rendered owner's land valueless constituted a taking; when a regulation foreclosing all productive economic use of land goes beyond what "relevant background principals", such as nuisance law, would dictate, compensation must be paid. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003, 120 LEd 2d 798 (1992).
Seizure of private property in a forfeiture action under a warrant issued at an ex parte hearing to establish probable cause that a crime subjecting the property to forfeiture was committed, while possibly satisfying the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, was a taking of property without due process. United States v. Good Real Estate, 510 US 43, 126 LEd 2d 490 (1993).
A municipality requiring the dedication of private property for some future public use as a condition of obtaining a building permit must meet a "rough proportionality" test showing it made some individualized determination that the dedication is related in nature and extent to the proposed development. Dolen v. City of Tigard, 512 US ___, 129 LEd 2d 546 (1994).
The backing of water so as to overflow the lands of an individual, or any other superinduced addition of water, earth, sand, or other material, if done under statutes authorizing it for the public benefit, is a taking within the meaning of Art. I, sec. 13. Pumpelly v. Green Bay and Miss. Canal Co. 13 Wall. (U.S.) 166.
Compensation for lost rents. 1971 WLR 657.
I,14 Feudal tenures; leases; alienation. Section 14. All lands within the state are declared to be allodial, and feudal tenures are prohibited. Leases and grants of agricultural land for a longer term than fifteen years in which rent or service of any kind shall be reserved, and all fines and like restraints upon alienation reserved in any grant of land, hereafter made, are declared to be void.
I,15 Equal property rights for aliens and citizens. Section 15. No distinction shall ever be made by law between resident aliens and citizens, in reference to the possession, enjoyment or descent of property.
I,16 Imprisonment for debt. Section 16. No person shall be imprisoned for debt arising out of or founded on a contract, expressed or implied.
Section 943.20 (1) (e) does not unconstitutionally imprison one for debt. State v. Roth, 115 W (2d) 163, 339 NW (2d) 807 (Ct. App. 1983).
I,17 Exemption of property of debtors. Section 17. The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter contracted.
I,18 Freedom of worship; liberty of conscience; state religion; public funds. Section 18. [As amended Nov. 1982] The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries. [1979 J.R. 36, 1981 J.R. 29, vote Nov. 1982]
The contract requiring the state to pay an amount to Marquette University for the education of dental students (ch. 44, Laws 1971) violates the constitution. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 55 W (2d) 316, 198 NW (2d) 650.
It is outside the province of a civil court to review the merits of a determination of a duly authorized ecclesiastical tribunal which has adhered to prescribed canonical procedure and which results in terminating a clergyman's relationship with his church. Olston v. Hallock, 55 W (2d) 687, 201 NW (2d) 35.
Section 115.85 (2) (d) does not violate this section since the primary effect is not the advancement of a religious organization but to provide special educational services to the handicapped children of Wisconsin, a clearly secular purpose. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 64 W (2d) 314, 219 NW (2d) 577.
This section is not violated by the released time provisions of 118.155, where the statute accommodates rather than restricts the right of students to religious instruction, does not compel any student to participate in religious training, and does not involve the use or expenditure of public funds especially where the electorate approved an amendment to art. X, sec. 3, specifically authorizing enactment of a released time statute. State ex rel. Holt v. Thompson, 66 W (2d) 659, 225 NW (2d) 678.
For purposes of 121.51 (4), 1981 stats. [now 121.51 (1)] and in the absence of fraud or collusion, where a religious school demonstrates by its corporate charter and bylaws that it is independent of, and unaffiliated with, a religious denomination, further inquiry by the state would violate Art. I, sec. 18. Holy Trinity Community School v. Kahl, 82 W (2d) 139, 262 NW (2d) 210.
Refusal on religious grounds to send children to school was held to be a personal, philosophical choice by parents, rather than a protected religious expression. State v. Kasuboski, 87 W (2d) 407, 275 NW (2d) 101 (Ct. App. 1978).
Primary effect of health facilities authority under ch. 231 does not advance religion, nor does chapter foster excessive entanglement between church and state. State ex rel. Wis. Health Fac. Auth. v. Lindner, 91 W (2d) 145, 280 NW (2d) 773 (1979).
Meals served by religious order, in carrying out their religious work, were not, under circumstances, subject to Wisconsin sales tax for that portion of charges made to guests for lodging, food, and use of order's facilities. Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 W (2d) 552, 313 NW (2d) 47 (1981).
Equal Rights Division does not violate free exercise clause by investigating discrimination complaint brought by employee of religious school. Sacred Heart School Board, 157 W (2d) 638, 460 NW (2d) 430 (Ct. App 1990).
Test to determine whether governmental aid offends establishment clause discussed. Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Thompson, 164 W (2d) 736, 476 NW (2d) 318 (Ct. App. 1991).
Free exercise clause does not excuse a person from compliance with a valid law; a visitation order intended to prevent a noncustodial parent from imposing his religion on his children was a reasonable protection of the custodial parent's statutory right to choose the children's religion. Lange v. Lange, 175 W (2d) 373, NW (2d) (Ct. App. 1993).
In setting a sentence, a court may consider a defendant's religious beliefs and practices only if a reliable nexus exists between the defendant's criminal conduct and those beliefs and practices. State v. Fuerst, 181 W (2d) 903, 512 NW (2d) 243 (Ct. App. 1994).
A nativity scene surrounded by Christmas trees and accompanied by a sign proclaiming a "salute to liberty" did not violate the first amendment's establishment and free exercise of religion clause or Art. I, s.18. King v. Village of Waunakee, 185 W (2d) 25, 517 NW (2d) 671 (1994).
Probation conditions may impinge on religious rights as long as the conditions are not overly broad and are reasonably related to rehabilitation. Von Arx v. Schwarz, 185 W (2d) 645, 517 NW (2d) 540 (Ct. App. 1994).
The courts are prevented from determining what makes one competent to serve as a priest, and therefore the courts cannot decide a claim of negligent hiring or retention by a church. Pritzlaff v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 194 W (2d) 303, 533 NW (2d) 780 (1995).
Laws burdening the free expression of religion must further a compelling state interest and be the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. Requiring Amish buggies to carry slow moving vehicle signs furthered a compelling state interest, but was not shown to be the least restrictive means of accomplishing that interest. State v. Miller, 196 W (2d) 238, 538 NW (2d) 573 (Ct. App. 1995).
The state is prevented from enforcing discrimination laws against religious associations when the employment at issue serves a ministerial or ecclesiastical function. While it must be given considerable weight, a religious associations's designation of a position as ministerial or ecclesiastical does not control its status. Jocz v. LIRC, 196 W (2d) 273, 538 NW (2d) 588 (Ct. App. 1995).
Freedom of conscience as guaranteed by the Wisconsin constitution is not constrained by the boundaries of protection set by the United States Supreme Court for the federal provision. The state constitution provides an independent basis for deciding such cases. As applied to Amish, requiring slow moving vehicle signs on buggies unconstitutionally infringed on religious liberties. State v. Miller, 202 NW (2d) 56, 549 NW (2d) 235 (1996).
Constitutionality of state tuition grants to parents of resident pupils enrolled in private elementary or high schools discussed. 58 Atty. Gen. 163.
1971 Assembly Bill 1577 would violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Const. and sec. 18. Guidelines to possibly avoid constitutional objection to CESA service contracts with private schools discussed. 62 Atty. Gen. 75.
Leasing of university buildings to a religious congregation during nonschool days and hours on a temporary basis while the congregation's existing facility is being renovated and leasing convention space to a church conference would not violate separation of church and state provisions of the First Amendment to U.S. Const. and sec. 18. 63 Atty. Gen. 374.
The department of public instruction may, if so authorized under 16.54, implement the school lunch program and special food service plan for children in secular and sectarian private schools and child-care institutions without violating the U.S. or Wisconsin Constitutions. 63 Atty. Gen. 473.
Funds received under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act may not be used to pay salaries of public school teachers teaching in church affiliated private schools. See 64 Atty. Gen. 139. 64 Atty. Gen. 136.
Establishment clause and this section prohibit public schools leasing classrooms from parochial schools to provide educational programs for parochial students. 67 Atty. Gen. 283.
Group of churches is entitled to permit under s. 16.845 to use capitol grounds for civic or social activity even if content of program is partly religious in nature. 68 Atty. Gen. 217.
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions do not prohibit state from disbursing state matching funds under National School Lunch Act to private as well as public schools. 69 Atty. Gen. 109.
Department of health and social services can constitutionally license and regulate community based residential facilities operated by religious organizations not exempt under 50.01 (1), 1985 stats. [now 50.01 (1g)] or 50.03 (9). 71. Atty. Gen. 112.
University of Wisconsin athletes may not engage in voluntary prayer led by coach prior to athletic event, although silent meditation or prayer organized by athletes may be undertaken within certain guidelines. 75 Atty. Gen. 81.
Scope of this section discussed. 75 Atty. Gen. 251 (1986).
Establishment Clause prohibits states from loaning instructional material to sectarian schools or providing auxiliary services to remedial and exceptional students in such schools. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 US 349.
In adjudicating church property dispute, state may adopt "neutral principles of law" analysis regarding deeds, applicable statutes, local church's charter and general church's constitution. Jones v. Walf, 443 US 595 (1979).
Statute does not contravene establishment clause if it has secular legislative purpose, its primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and it does not excessively entangle government with religion. Committee for Public Education v. Regan, 444 US 646 (1980).
Representation of Ten Commandments as basis for legal code of western civilization violated establishment clause. Stone v. Graham, 449 US 39 (1980).
Denial of unemployment compensation to Jehovah's Witness who quit job due to religious beliefs was violation of free exercise right. Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div. 450 US 707 (1981).
State fair rule which limited religious group to assigned booth in conducting its religious activities did not violate free exercise clause. Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consc. 452 US 640 (1981).
Public university which provided forum to many student groups but excluded religious student groups violated principle that state regulation of speech should be content-neutral. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981).
Nativity scene displayed by city did not violate Establishment Clause. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 US 668 (1984).
Due to setting and nature of display, menorah placed next to Christmas tree placed outside of city-county building did not violate establishment clause while prominent placement of creche inside courthouse did. Allegheny County v. Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 US 573, 106 LEd 2d 472 (1989).
Prohibition of peyote used in religious ceremony does not violate free exercise of religion. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 US 872, 108 LEd 2d 876 (1990).
Federal equal access act prohibits high schools from barring student religious club meetings on school premises when other "noncurriculum-related" clubs are allowed access. Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 US 292, 110 LEd 2d 191 (1990).
Public school district's inclusion of prayers at public graduation ceremony, offered by member of the clergy at the district's request and direction, violated establishment clause of 1st Amendment. Lee v. Weisman, 505 US 77, 120 LEd 2d 467 (1992).
Denial of the use of a school building to a church seeking to exhibit a film when a nonsectarian group would have been allowed the use of the building to show a secular film on the same topic violated the right to free speech. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches, 508 US 384, 124 LEd 2d 352 (1993).
A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment is subject to the most rigorous scrutiny. Regulation of animal sacrifice that effectively prohibits the practices of one sect is void. Church of Lukumi v. Hialeah, 508 US 520, 124 LEd 2d 472 (1993).
Provision of interpreter by school district to student attending parochial school was permissible when provided as a part of a neutral program benefitting all qualified children without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian nature of the school. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills, 509 US 1, 125 LEd 2d 1 (1993).
Special legislation creating a public school district for a village consisting solely of members of a single religious community violated the 1st amendment establishment clause. Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 US ___, 129 LEd 2d (1994).
A state university which funded printing of a broad range of student publications but denied funding for printing the publication of a student religious group violated free speech guarantees and was not excused by the need to comply with the establishment of religion clause of the constitution. Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 US ___, 132 LEd 2d (1995).
Legislative mandate requiring reasonable accommodation of religious conduct does not violate establishment clause. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Wkrs. D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F (2d) 445 (1981).
Nyquist and public aid to private education. Piekarski, 58 MLR 247.
The role of civil courts in church disputes. 1977 WLR 904.
First amendment-based attacks on Wisconsin "attendance area" statutes. 1980 WLR 409.
Brave new world revisited: Fifteen years of chemical sacraments. 1980 WLR 879.
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District: Creating Greater Protection Religious Speech Through the Illusion of Public Forum Analysis. Ehrmann. 1994 WLR 965.
King v. Village of Waunakee: Redefining Establishment Clause Jurisprudence in Wisconsin. Lanford. 1996 WLR 185.
How Vast is King's Realm? Constitutional Challenge to the Church-State Clause. Gordon. Wis. Law. Aug. 1995.
