8. Removal of county seats.
9. Election or appointment of statutory officers.
11. Passes, franks and privileges.
12. Recall of elective officers.
ARTICLE XIV.
SCHEDULE.
Section
1. Effect of change from territory to state.
2. Territorial laws continued.
13. Common law continued in force.
16. Implementing revised structure of judicial branch.
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Note: An index to the Wisconsin Constitution follows. The general index contains references to the Wisconsin Constitution under the head "Constitution, Wisconsin."
PREAMBLE
We, the people of Wisconsin, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to secure its blessings, form a more perfect government, insure domestic tranquility and promote the general welfare, do establish this constitution.
The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution. Ranney. Wis. Law. Sept. 1992.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
I,1 Equality; inherent rights. Section 1. [As amended Nov. 1982 and April 1986] All people are born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. [1979 J.R. 36, 1981 J.R. 29, vote Nov. 1982; 1983 J.R. 40, 1985 J.R. 21, vote April 1986]
EQUAL PROTECTION
The fact that there is no mandatory release date for persons convicted of 1st degree murder as there is for other crimes does not amount to denial of equal protection. Bies v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 322, 193 N.W.2d 46.
Legislative classifications violate equal protection only if they are irrational or arbitrary. Any reasonable basis for the classification for the classification validates the statute. There is a five point test to determine reasonableness. Omernik v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 6, 218 Wis. 2d 734 (1974).
There is a meaningful distinction between governmental employes and nongovernmental employes. The statutory strike ban imposed on public employes is based upon a valid classification and the legislation creating it is not unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. Hortonville Ed. Asso. v. Jt. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 225 N.W.2d 658.
The statutory distinction between parolees out of state under 57.13, 1987 stats. [now 304.13] and absconding parolees, denying extradition to the former but not the latter, is a constitutionally valid classification. State ex rel. Niederer v. Cady, 72 Wis. 2d 311, 240 N.W.2d 626.
In order for a female prostitute to avoid prosecution upon equal protection grounds, it must be shown that the failure to prosecute male patrons was selective, persistent, discriminatory and without justifiable prosecutorial discretion. State v. Johnson, 74 Wis. 2d 169, 246 N.W.2d 503.
Equal protection does not require symmetry in probation and parole systems. State v. Aderhold, 91 Wis. 2d 306, 284 N.W.2d 108 (Ct. App. 1979).
Discriminatory prosecution discussed. Sears v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 128, 287 N.W.2d 785 (1980).
A gender based rule must serve important governmental objectives and the means employed must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. The common law doctrine of necessaries does not deny equal protection. Marshfield Clinic v. Discher, 105 Wis. 2d 506, 314 N.W.2d 326 (1982).
It does not violate equal protection to classify employes according to retirement date for purpose of pension benefits. Bence v. Milwaukee, 107 Wis. 2d 469, 320 N.W.2d 199 (1982).
A grandfather clause granting a perpetual exception from police power regulation for certain persons for purely economic reasons denies equal protection. Wis. Wine & Spirit Institute v. Ley, 141 Wis. 2d 958, 416 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1987).
A prostitution raid focusing only on female participants amounts to selective prosecution in violation of equal protection; in depth discussion of constitutional analysis. State v. McCollum, 159 Wis. 2d 184, 464 N.W.2d 44 (Ct. App. 1990).
A prisoner who is a defendant in a civil tort action is entitled to a meaningful opportunity to be heard; where no liberty interest is at stake there is no constitutional right to appointed counsel, and there is a rebuttable presumption against such appointment. Piper v. Popp, 167 Wis. 2d 633, 482 N.W.2d 353 (1992).
The defense of discriminatory prosecution requires showing the prosecution is selective and intended to deny a constitutional right or motivated by the prosecutor's personal vindictiveness. Upon such a showing, the state has the burden of showing a reasonable basis for the classification. State v. Barman, 183 Wis. 2d 180, 515 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1994).
A nonlawyer may not sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation. To do so constitutes practicing law without a license in violation of s. 757.30 and voids the appeal. Requiring a lawyer to represent a corporation in filing the notice does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 209 Wis. 2d 187, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997).
"Selective prosecution" when referring to the failure to prosecute all known lawbreakers has no standing in equal protection law. Only "selective prosecution" when referring to the decision to prosecute in retaliation for the exercise of a constitutional right gives rise to an actionable right under the constitution. County of Kenosha v. C. & S. Management, Inc. 223 Wis. 2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999).
The state and federal constitutions provide identical procedural due process and equal protection safeguards. County of Kenosha v. C. & S. Management, Inc. 223 Wis. 2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999).
Although counties may charge reasonable fees for the use of facilities in their county parks, they may not charge such fees only to out-of-state residents while allowing all Wisconsin residents to utilize such facilities free of charge simply because ORAP or ORAP-200 funds are involved. Such action would create an arbitrary and unreasonable distinction based on residence and unconstitutionally deny residents of other states equal protection of the laws. 60 Atty. Gen. 18.
Requirement that deputy sheriffs and police officers be citizens does not deny equal protection to resident aliens. 68 Atty. Gen. 61.
Classifications by gender must serve important government objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
Citizenship requirement for public teachers in New York did not violate equal protection. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
Massachusetts civil service preference for veterans did not deny equal protection to women. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Worker's compensation law that required men, but not women, to prove disability or dependence on deceased spouse's earnings violated equal protection. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
Racial classification did not violate equal protection clause. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
Statutory rape law applicable only to males had "fair and substantial relationship" to legitimate state ends. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
A state university open only to women violated equal protection. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
A layoff plan giving preference on basis of race to accomplish affirmative action goals wasn't sufficiently narrowly tailored and, therefore, violated equal protection. Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
There is no equal protection violation in a state classifying as nonresidents for tuition purposes persons who are residents for all other purposes. Lister v. Hoover, 655 F.2d 123 (1981).
The postconviction detention of a person in county jail is a violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment if it is occasioned by the prisoner's indigency. Taylor v. Gray, 375 F. Supp. 790.
The contrast between percentage of black population of city, 17.2%, and percentage of black composition of "fixed wage" skilled craft positions available in city, 3.1%, evidenced a substantial disparity between proportion of minorities in general population and proportion in a specific job classification and was such as to establish a prima facie case of unlawful racial discrimination, absent a showing by city that statistical discrepancy resulted from causes other than racial discrimination. Crockett v. Grun, 388 F. Supp. 912.
Civil rights actions against municipalities discussed. Starstead v. City of Superior, 533 F. Supp. 1365 (1982).
Zoning—Equal protection. 1976 WLR 234.
Equal protection—Sex discrimination. 1976 WLR 330.
DUE PROCESS
Although a person may invoke the Fifth amendment in a civil case in order to protect himself from the use of such evidence against him in a subsequent criminal action, if he does so an inference against his interest may be drawn as a matter of law based upon an implied admission that a truthful answer would tend to prove that the witness had committed the criminal act or might constitute a criminal act, and is not based upon the condition that the witness is seeking relief or ought not to receive relief because he has invoked the privilege. Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292.
A school board's refusal to renew of a teacher' coaching duties in addition his to full-time teaching duties, without notice and hearing, did not violate his right to due process where no charge was made that reflected on him and invoked a protected liberty interest and where no legal right in the job gave rise to a protected property interest. Richards v. Board of Education, 58 Wis. 2d 444, 206 N.W.2d 597.
A property interest in employment conferred by state law is protected by the due process provisions of both the state and federal constitutions. State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council, 72 Wis. 2d 672, 242 N.W.2d 689.
The due process standard in juvenile proceeding is fundamental fairness. Basic requirements are discussed. In Interest of D.H. 76 Wis. 2d 286, 251 N.W.2d 196.
A permanent status public employe forfeits due process property interests in a job by accepting an inter-departmental promotion. DH&SS v. State Personnel Board, 84 Wis. 2d 675, 267 N.W.2d 644 (1978).
Where an attorney is permitted to withdraw on the day of trial without notice, due process requires granting a continuance. Sherman v. Heiser, 85 Wis. 2d 246, 270 N.W.2d 397 (1978).
Liberty interests in public employment are discussed. Nufer v. Village Bd. of Village of Palmyra, 92 Wis. 2d 289, 284 N.W.2d 649 (1979).
Where a city ordinance specified narrow grounds upon which civil service applicants may be screened out, an applicant had no right to know grounds for screen-out. Taplick v. City of Madison Personnel Board, 97 Wis. 2d 162, 293 N.W.2d 173 (1980).
Due process rights of a student at expulsion hearing are discussed. Racine Unified School Dist. v. Thompson, 107 Wis. 2d 657, 321 N.W.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1982).
Due process was not violated where a defendant was illegally arrested in an asylum state and involuntarily brought to trial. State v. Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 325 N.W.2d 695 (1982).
Due process rights of a tenured professor who was alleged to have resigned were not protected by a hearing to determine eligibility for unemployment compensation. Patterson v. University Board of Regents, 119 Wis. 2d 570, 350 N.W.2d 612 (1984).
Attributes of property interests protected by due process are discussed. Waste Management of Wisconsin v. DNR, 128 Wis. 2d 59, 381 N.W.2d 318 (1986).
Due process rights of a probationer at a hearing to modify probation enumerated. State v. Hayes, 173 Wis. 2d 439, 496 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1992).
The tort of intentional denial of due precess is discussed. Old Tuckaway Assoc. v. City of Greenfield, 180 Wis. 2d 254, 509 N.W.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1993).
An inmate has a protected liberty interest in earned good-time credits and in not being placed in segregation. Post deprivation remedies provided by the state are adequate. Irby v. Macht, 184 Wis. 2d 831, 522 N.W.2d 9 (1994).
A property interest conferred by a statute subsequently amended to make an appointed governmental position at-will is terminated upon the conclusion of the appointing official's term of office. Unertl v. Dane County, 190 Wis. 2d 145, 526 N.W.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1994).
A procedural due process claim arises when there is a deprivation of a right without sufficient process. Generally a predeprivation hearing is required, but when a deprivation results form a random act of a state employe the question becomes the adequacy of postdeprivation remedies. Jones v. Dane County, 195 Wis. 2d 892, 537 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1995).
Substantive due process requires the state not to deprive its citizens of life, liberty and property without due process. Absent a special relationship, it does not impose an affirmative obligation upon the state to ensure the protection of those rights from a private actor, even when governmental aid may be necessary to secure a person's life, liberty or property. Jones v. Dane County, 195 Wis. 2d 892, 537 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1995).
Where a prisoner could not show that a period of segregated confinement which exceeded the time allowed by rule was not atypical of his prison life generally, there was no unconstitutional due process deprivation. The only time factor which courts will be concerned with in determining a procedural due process deprivation is the time the inmate is ultimately required to spend confined under the authority of the state. Chaney v. Renteria, 203 Wis. 2d 310, 554 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1996).
Foster children have a constitutional right under the due process clause to safe and secure placement in a foster home. Whether a public official violated that right will be determined based on a professional judgment standard. Kara B. v. Dane County, 205 Wis. 2d 140, 555 N.W.2d 630 (1996).
An inmate has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in not having his mandatory release date extended. Due process is violated in a prison discipline case when guilt is found if there is not "some evidence" that supports the finding of guilt. Santiago v. Ware, 205 Wis. 2d 295, 556 N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1996).
A nonlawyer may not sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation. To do so constitutes practicing law without a license in violation of s. 757.30 and voids the appeal. Requiring a lawyer to represent a corporation in filing the notice does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 209 Wis. 2d 187, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997).
Whether to proceed with civil litigation or to hold it in abeyance while a party is incarcerated depends on the nature of the case, the practical concerns raised by the prisoner's appearance and the alternative methods available to provide the prisoner with access to the hearing. Marriage of Schmidt v. Schmidt, 212 Wis. 2d 405, 569 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1997).
The state and federal constitutions provide identical procedural due process and equal protection safeguards. County of Kenosha v. C. & S. Management, Inc. 223 Wis. 2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999).
In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property without due process of law. Arneson v. Jezwinski, 225 Wis. 2d 371, 592 N.W.2d 606 (1999).
