The circuit courts are constitutional courts with plenary jurisdiction. They do not depend solely upon statute for their powers. However in certain cases with vast social ramifications not addressed by statute, prudence requires the courts to refuse to exercise their jurisdiction. As such, circuit courts are prohibited from exercising jurisdiction regarding sterilization of incompetents. Eberhardy v. Circuit Court, 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981). Because courts have exclusive criminal jurisdiction, criminal charges against the defendant were not collaterally estopped even though a parole revocation hearing examiner concluded that the defendant’s acts did not merit parole revocation. State v. Spanbauer, 108 Wis. 2d 548, 322 N.W.2d 511 (Ct. App. 1982). While circuit courts possess plenary jurisdiction not dependent upon legislative authorization, under some circumstances they may lack competency to act. Schoenwald v. M.C., 146 Wis. 2d 377, 432 N.W.2d 588 (Ct. App. 1988). Challenges to a circuit court’s competency are waived if not raised in the circuit court, subject to the reviewing court’s inherent authority to overlook a waiver in appropriate cases or engage in discretionary review of a waived competency challenge pursuant to s. 751.06 or 752.35. Lack of competency is not jurisdictional and does not result in a void judgment. Accordingly, it is not true that a motion for relief from judgment on grounds of lack of circuit court competency may be made at any time. Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 681 N.W.2d 190, 03-0534. See also City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738, 15-0869. A circuit court may lack competency to render a valid order or judgment when the parties seeking judicial review fail to meet certain statutory requirements. Not every failure to comply with statutory requirements will deprive the court of competency, however. Only when the failure to abide by a statutory mandate is central to the statutory scheme of which it is a part will the circuit court’s competency to proceed be implicated. Xcel Energy Services, Inc. v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, 349 Wis. 2d 234, 833 N.W.2d 665, 11-0203. Although cases sometimes use the words forfeiture and waiver interchangeably, the two words embody very different legal concepts. Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Challenges to court competency are forfeited if not timely raised in the circuit court. Properly construed, although Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, says “waiver,” it means “forfeiture.” City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738, 15-0869. A circuit court lacks competency but retains subject matter jurisdiction when the court enters a civil forfeiture judgment under a municipal ordinance for a first-offense operating while intoxicated (OWI) that factually should have been criminally charged as a second-offense OWI under s. 346.65 (2) due to an undiscovered prior countable conviction. Unlike defects in subject matter jurisdiction, challenges to circuit court competency may be forfeited. In this case, the defendant forfeited the right to challenge a 1992 first-offense OWI judgment by failing to timely raise the challenge. City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 2016 WI 65, 370 Wis. 2d 595, 882 N.W.2d 738, 15-0869. This section provides that the circuit court shall have such appellate jurisdiction in the circuit “as the legislature may prescribe by law.” The legislature has not granted the circuit courts appellate jurisdiction over rulings by referees. Therefore, a provision in a circuit court order of reference that the circuit court’s review of the referee’s rulings shall be based on the referee’s erroneous exercise of discretion contravened the constitution, statutes, and rules regarding circuit court and appellate court authority and practice. State ex rel. Universal Processing Services of Wisconsin, LLC v. Circuit Court, 2017 WI 26, 374 Wis. 2d 26, 892 N.W.2d 267, 16-0923. This section confers broad jurisdiction on circuit courts to hear all matters civil and criminal within this state “except as otherwise provided by law.” The Wisconsin Arbitration Act, ch. 788, comprises one constitutionally-permissible exception to a circuit court’s original jurisdiction. A circuit court possesses only limited, statutorily enumerated powers with respect to a private arbitration. A circuit court has no authority to halt a contractually agreed upon arbitration. State ex rel. CityDeck Landing LLC v. Circuit Court, 2019 WI 15, 385 Wis. 2d 516, 922 N.W.2d 832, 18-0291. The circuit court’s subject matter jurisdiction attaches when a complaint is filed. Once jurisdiction has attached, it continues until final disposition. In this case, the fact that the circuit court orally dismissed the defendant’s case without prejudice, but rescinded that order minutes later, did not result in the court losing subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court’s oral ruling was not a final disposition, and the following jury trial and verdict was not a legal nullity. State v. Davis, 2023 WI App 25, 407 Wis. 2d 783, 991 N.W.2d 491, 21-1526. VII,9Judicial elections, vacancies. Section 9. [As amended April 1953 and April 1977] When a vacancy occurs in the office of justice of the supreme court or judge of any court of record, the vacancy shall be filled by appointment by the governor, which shall continue until a successor is elected and qualified. There shall be no election for a justice or judge at the partisan general election for state or county officers, nor within 30 days either before or after such election. [1951 J.R. 41, 1953 J.R. 12, vote April 1953; 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977] VII,10Judges: eligibility to office. Section 10. [As amended Nov. 1912 and April 1977] VII,10(1)(1) No justice of the supreme court or judge of any court of record shall hold any other office of public trust, except a judicial office, during the term for which elected. No person shall be eligible to the office of judge who shall not, at the time of election or appointment, be a qualified elector within the jurisdiction for which chosen. VII,10(2)(2) Justices of the supreme court and judges of the courts of record shall receive such compensation as the legislature may authorize by law, but may not receive fees of office. [1909 J.R. 34, 1911 J.R. 24, 1911 c. 665, vote Nov. 1912; 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977] Sub. (1) prohibits a circuit judge from holding a nonjudicial office of public trust during the full period of time for which the judge is elected to serve in a judicial position, even if the judge chooses to resign before that term would otherwise expire. The period of time constituting the “term for which elected” is set when a judge or justice is elected and is thereafter unalterable by means of resignation. Wagner v. Milwaukee County Election Commission, 2003 WI 103, 263 Wis. 2d 709, 666 N.W.2d 816, 02-0375. An “office of public trust” does not refer only to an elective office. “Judicial office,” as used in this article, should be construed as referring to an office that is located within the judicial branch of government created by that article. Membership on the Government Accountability Board is an office of public trust but is not a judicial office within the meaning of this section, and therefore an individual who has resigned from the office of judge may not serve as a member of the board for the duration of the term to which the individual was elected to serve as a judge. OAG 4-08.
Terms of courts; change of judges. Section 11. [Repealed April 1977; see 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977.]
VII,11Disciplinary proceedings. Section 11. [As created April 1977] Each justice or judge shall be subject to reprimand, censure, suspension, removal for cause or for disability, by the supreme court pursuant to procedures established by the legislature by law. No justice or judge removed for cause shall be eligible for reappointment or temporary service. This section is alternative to, and cumulative with, the methods of removal provided in sections 1 and 13 of this article and section 12 of article XIII. [1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977] VII,12Clerks of circuit and supreme courts. Section 12. [As amended Nov. 1882 and April 2005] VII,12(1)(1) There shall be a clerk of circuit court chosen in each county organized for judicial purposes by the qualified electors thereof, who, except as provided in sub. (2), shall hold office for two years, subject to removal as provided by law. VII,12(2)(2) Beginning with the first general election at which the governor is elected which occurs after the ratification of this subsection, a clerk of circuit court shall be chosen by the electors of each county, for the term of 4 years, subject to removal as provided by law. VII,12(3)(3) In case of a vacancy, the judge of the circuit court may appoint a clerk until the vacancy is filled by an election. VII,12(4)(4) The clerk of circuit court shall give such security as the legislature requires by law. VII,12(5)(5) The supreme court shall appoint its own clerk, and may appoint a clerk of circuit court to be the clerk of the supreme court. [1881 J.R. 16A, 1882 J.R. 3, 1882 c. 290, vote Nov. 1882; 2003 J.R. 12, 2005 J.R. 2, vote April 2005] VII,13Justices and judges: removal by address. Section 13. [As amended April 1974 and April 1977] Any justice or judge may be removed from office by address of both houses of the legislature, if two-thirds of all the members elected to each house concur therein, but no removal shall be made by virtue of this section unless the justice or judge complained of is served with a copy of the charges, as the ground of address, and has had an opportunity of being heard. On the question of removal, the ayes and noes shall be entered on the journals. [1971 J.R. 30, 1973 J.R. 25, vote April 1974; 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977] VII,14Municipal court. Section 14. [As amended April 1977] The legislature by law may authorize each city, village and town to establish a municipal court. All municipal courts shall have uniform jurisdiction limited to actions and proceedings arising under ordinances of the municipality in which established. Judges of municipal courts may receive such compensation as provided by the municipality in which established, but may not receive fees of office. [1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977] A municipal court has authority to determine the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance. City of Milwaukee v. Wroten, 160 Wis. 2d 207, 466 N.W.2d 861 (1991). The municipal court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction over an operating while intoxicated (OWI) case that was incorrectly charged as a first-offense ordinance violation instead of a second-offense criminal violation. At the time the proceeding in municipal court commenced, it was based on an alleged ordinance violation, and therefore jurisdiction “arose under” the ordinance of the municipality for the purposes of this section. City of Cedarburg v. Hansen, 2020 WI 11, 390 Wis. 2d 109, 938 N.W.2d 463, 18-1129. The defendant forfeited any objection that could exist to the competency of the municipal court when the defendant failed to raise it for 11 years. City of Cedarburg v. Hansen, 2020 WI 11, 390 Wis. 2d 109, 938 N.W.2d 463, 18-1129. VII,15Justices of the peace. Section 15. [Amended April 1945; repealed April 1966; see 1943 J.R. 27, 1945 J.R. 2, vote April 1945; 1963 J.R. 48, 1965 J.R. 50, vote April 1966.] VII,16Tribunals of conciliation. Section 16. [Repealed April 1977; see 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977.] VII,17Style of writs; indictments. Section 17. [Repealed April 1977; see 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977.] VII,18Suit tax. Section 18. [Repealed April 1977; see 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977.] VII,19Testimony in equity suits; master in chancery. Section 19. [Repealed April 1977; see 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977.] VII,20Rights of suitors. Section 20. [Repealed April 1977; see 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977.] See Art. I, sec. 21. VII,21Publication of laws and decisions. Section 21. [Repealed April 1977; see 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977.] See Art. IV, sec. 17. VII,22Commissioners to revise code of practice. Section 22. [Repealed April 1977; see 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977.] VII,23Court commissioners. Section 23. [Repealed April 1977; see 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977.] VII,24Justices and judges: eligibility for office; retirement. Section 24. [As created April 1955 and amended April 1968 and April 1977] VII,24(1)(1) To be eligible for the office of supreme court justice or judge of any court of record, a person must be an attorney licensed to practice law in this state and have been so licensed for 5 years immediately prior to election or appointment. VII,24(2)(2) Unless assigned temporary service under subsection (3), no person may serve as a supreme court justice or judge of a court of record beyond the July 31 following the date on which such person attains that age, of not less than 70 years, which the legislature shall prescribe by law. VII,24(3)(3) A person who has served as a supreme court justice or judge of a court of record may, as provided by law, serve as a judge of any court of record except the supreme court on a temporary basis if assigned by the chief justice of the supreme court. [1953 J.R. 46, 1955 J.R. 14, vote April 1955; 1965 J.R. 101, 1967 J.R. 22 and 56, vote April 1968; 1975 J.R. 13, 1977 J.R. 7, vote April 1977] FINANCE
VIII,1Rule of taxation uniform; income, privilege and occupation taxes. Section 1. [As amended Nov. 1908, April 1927, April 1941, April 1961, and April 1974] The rule of taxation shall be uniform but the legislature may empower cities, villages or towns to collect and return taxes on real estate located therein by optional methods. Taxes shall be levied upon such property with such classifications as to forests and minerals including or separate or severed from the land, as the legislature shall prescribe. Taxation of agricultural land and undeveloped land, both as defined by law, need not be uniform with the taxation of each other nor with the taxation of other real property. Taxation of merchants’ stock-in-trade, manufacturers’ materials and finished products, and livestock need not be uniform with the taxation of real property and other personal property, but the taxation of all such merchants’ stock-in-trade, manufacturers’ materials and finished products and livestock shall be uniform, except that the legislature may provide that the value thereof shall be determined on an average basis. Taxes may also be imposed on incomes, privileges and occupations, which taxes may be graduated and progressive, and reasonable exemptions may be provided. [1905 J.R. 12, 1907 J.R. 29, 1907 c. 661, vote Nov. 1908; 1925 J.R. 62, 1927 J.R. 13, vote April 1927; 1939 J.R. 88, 1941 J.R. 18, vote April 1941; 1959 J.R. 78, 1961 J.R. 13, vote April 1961; 1971 J.R. 39, 1973 J.R. 29, vote April 1974] While a sale establishes value, the assessment still has to be equal to that on comparable property. Section 70.32 (2) (b) requires the assessor to fix a value before classifying the land. It does not prohibit the assessor from considering the zoning of the property when it is used for some other purpose. State ex rel. Hensel v. Town of Wilson, 55 Wis. 2d 101, 197 N.W.2d 794 (1972). The fact that land purchased for industrial development under s. 66.521 [now s. 66.1103] and leased to a private person is not subject to a tax lien if taxes are not paid does not violate the uniformity provision. State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. La Plante, 58 Wis. 2d 32, 205 N.W.2d 784 (1973). The Housing Authority Act, in granting tax exemptions to bonds, does not violate this section. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973). A law requiring a reduction in rent due to property tax relief does not violate the uniformity clause. It is not a tax law. State ex rel. Building Owners & Managers Ass’n of Milwaukee v. Adamany, 64 Wis. 2d 280, 219 N.W.2d 274 (1974). The denial of equal protection claimed by the taxpayer, by reason of the exclusion from the “occasional sale” exemption of sellers holding permits was properly held by the trial court to be without merit. Ramrod, Inc. v. DOR, 64 Wis. 2d 499, 219 N.W.2d 604 (1974). The income and property tax exemptions provided in the Solid Waste Recycling Authority Act bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate end of governmental action and therefore do not violate the Wisconsin Constitution, since the exemptions allow for reduction in user charges and in the cost of capital needs, thereby benefiting the state’s citizens by promoting use of the authority’s facilities. Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Authority v. Earl, 70 Wis. 2d 464, 235 N.W.2d 648 (1975). Negative-aid provisions of school district financing, as mandated by former ss. 121.07 and 121.08, 1973 stats., are violative of the rule of uniform taxation. Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976). Improvements tax relief provisions of former ss. 79.24 and 79.25, 1977 stats., are unconstitutional as violative of the uniformity clause. State ex rel. La Follette v. Torphy, 85 Wis. 2d 94, 270 N.W.2d 187 (1978). A tax exemption with a reasonable, though remote, relation to a legitimate government purpose was permissible. Madison General Hospital Ass’n v. City of Madison, 92 Wis. 2d 125, 284 N.W.2d 603 (1979). The Tax Increment Law, s. 66.46 [now s. 66.1105], does not violate the uniformity rule. Sigma Tau Gamma Fraternity House Corp. v. City of Menomonie, 93 Wis. 2d 392, 288 N.W.2d 85 (1980). A contract by which a landowner agreed to petition for annexation to a city, not to develop land, and to grant water rights to the city in exchange for reimbursement of all property taxes violated the uniformity rule. Cornwell v. City of Stevens Point, 159 Wis. 2d 136, 464 N.W.2d 33 (Ct. App. 1990). For purposes of the uniformity clause, there is only one class of property, property that is taxable, and the burden of taxation must be borne as nearly as practicable among all property, based on value. Noah’s Ark Family Park v. Board of Review, 210 Wis. 2d 301, 565 N.W.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1074. To prove a statute unconstitutional due to a violation of the uniformity clause, a taxpayer must initially prove that the taxpayer’s property has been overvalued while other property has been undervalued. Norquist v. Zeuske, 211 Wis. 2d 241, 564 N.W.2d 748 (1997), 96-1812. Sections 70.47 (13), 70.85, and 74.37 provide the exclusive method to challenge a municipality’s bases for assessment of individual parcels. All require appeal to the board of review prior to court action. There is no alternative procedure to challenge an assessment’s compliance with the uniformity clause. Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 572 N.W.2d 855 (1998), 96-0171. The uniformity clause is limited to property taxes, recurring ad valorem taxes on property, as opposed to transactional taxes such as those imposed on income or sales. Telemark Development, Inc. v. DOR, 218 Wis. 2d 809, 581 N.W.2d 585 (Ct. App. 1998), 97-3133. The supreme court has rejected challenges alleging violations of the rule of uniformity when the claim was based on comparing one taxpayer’s appraised value to the value assigned to an inadequate number of other properties in the assessment district. A lack of uniformity must be established by showing general undervaluation on a district-wide basis if the subject property has been assessed at full market value. Allright Properties, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 46, 317 Wis. 2d 228, 767 N.W.2d 567, 08-0510. Comparing the value attributed to only one component of the real property in a uniformity challenge is an analytical method without support in statutes or relevant case law. Taxes are levied on the value of the real property, not separately on the components of land, or improvements, or other rights or limitations of ownership. Allright Properties, Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 2009 WI App 46, 317 Wis. 2d 228, 767 N.W.2d 567, 08-0510. Reassessing one property at a significantly higher rate than comparable properties using a different methodology and then declining to reassess the comparable properties by that methodology violates the uniformity clause. U.S. Oil Co. v. City of Milwaukee, 2011 WI App 4, 331 Wis. 2d 407, 794 N.W.2d 904, 09-2260. Comparing a taxpayer’s appraised value to lower values assigned to a relatively small number of other properties has long been rejected as a claimed violation of the uniformity clause. Lack of uniformity must be established by showing a general undervaluation of properties within a district when the subject property has been assessed at full market value. Great Lakes Quick Lube, LP v. City of Milwaukee, 2011 WI App 7, 331 Wis. 2d 137, 794 N.W.2d 510, 09-2775. The court in Zinn, 112 Wis. 2d 417 (1983), endorsed the view that the constitutional directive that persons receive just compensation for takings of their private property is “self-executing,” and no express statutory provision for its enforcement against the state is necessary. Conversely, no language in the uniformity clause is analogous to that constitutional command. Just compensation is a constitutional directive contained in the takings clause; nowhere does the uniformity clause authorize general damages for an alleged violation of the uniformity principle. Klein v. DOR, 2020 WI App 56, 394 Wis. 2d 66, 949 N.W.2d 608, 18-1133. A partial exemption from property taxation, proposed for land conveyed to The National Audubon Society, Inc., probably is unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment and the rule of uniformity. 61 Atty. Gen. 173.
Competitive bidding for the issuance of a liquor license violates this section. 61 Atty. Gen. 180.
A bill providing for a tax on all known commercially feasible low-grade iron ore reserve deposits in Wisconsin would appear to violate the uniformity of taxation provisions of this section. 63 Atty. Gen. 3.
A law providing that improvements to real property would be assessed as of the date of completion of the improvements would be unconstitutional. 81 Atty. Gen. 94.
VIII,2Appropriations; limitation. Section 2. [As amended Nov. 1877] No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation by law. No appropriation shall be made for the payment of any claim against the state except claims of the United States and judgments, unless filed within six years after the claim accrued. [1876 J.R. 7, 1877 J.R. 4, 1877 c. 158, vote Nov. 1877] The creation of a continuing appropriation by one legislature does not restrict a subsequent legislature from reallocating the unexpended, unencumbered public funds subject to the original appropriation. Flynn v. DOA, 216 Wis. 2d 521, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998), 96-3266. Although there is no specific clause in the constitution establishing the public purpose doctrine, the doctrine is firmly accepted as a basic tenet of the constitution, mandating that public appropriations may not be used for other than public purposes. Courts are to give great weight and afford very wide discretion to legislative declarations of public purpose but are not bound by such legislative expressions. It is the duty of the court to determine whether a public purpose can be conceived that might reasonably justify the basis of the duty. Town of Beloit v. County of Rock, 2003 WI 8, 259 Wis. 2d 37, 657 N.W.2d 344, 00-1231. Funds may not be used to construct a project that has not been provided for in either the long-range building program or specifically described in the session laws. 61 Atty. Gen. 298.
The constitution does not preclude grants of state money to private parties for the purpose of affording disaster relief under the federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974. An appropriation by the legislature is required, however, to provide the state funding contemplated by the Act. Federal advances under the Act are limited by article VIII, section 6. 64 Atty. Gen. 39.
VIII,3Credit of state. Section 3. [As amended April 1975] Except as provided in s. 7 (2) (a), the credit of the state shall never be given, or loaned, in aid of any individual, association or corporation. [1973 J.R. 38, 1975 J.R. 3, vote April 1975] VIII,4Contracting state debts. Section 4. The state shall never contract any public debt except in the cases and manner herein provided. The Housing Authority Act does not create a state debt even though it calls for legislative appropriations in future years to service payment of notes and bonds. State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis. 2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973). An authority’s power to issue notes and bonds does not constitute the creation of a state debt or a pledge of the state’s credit in violation of this article, since the creating act specifically prohibits the authority from incurring state debt or pledging state credit, and the provision of the act recognizing a moral obligation on the part of the legislature to make up deficits does not create an obligation legally enforceable against the state. Wisconsin Solid Waste Recycling Authority v. Earl, 70 Wis. 2d 464, 235 N.W.2d 648 (1975). This section restricts the state from levying taxes to create a surplus having no public purpose. Although the constitutional provision does not apply directly to municipalities, the same limitation applies to school districts because the state cannot delegate more power than it has. Barth v. Board of Education, 108 Wis. 2d 511, 322 N.W.2d 694 (Ct. App. 1982). Because operating notes are to be paid from money in the process of collection, notes are not public debt. State ex rel. La Follette v. Stitt, 114 Wis. 2d 358, 338 N.W.2d 684 (1983). An agreement to pay rent under a long-term lease would amount to contracting a debt unless the lease is made subject to the availability of future funds. 60 Atty. Gen. 408.
Borrowing money from the federal government to replenish Wisconsin’s unemployment compensation fund does not contravene either this section or article VIII, section 3. 71 Atty. Gen. 95.
This section’s limits on “public debt” apply only when the state itself is under a legally enforceable obligation. The State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB) is not an arm of the state but is an independent going concern with independent proprietary powers and functions. SWIB’s investment-management actions with respect to the core retirement investment trust fund do not create debt payable by the state; rather, obligations run against the funds. OAG 2-22.
VIII,5Annual tax levy to equal expenses. Section 5. The legislature shall provide for an annual tax sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the state for each year; and whenever the expenses of any year shall exceed the income, the legislature shall provide for levying a tax for the ensuing year, sufficient, with other sources of income, to pay the deficiency as well as the estimated expenses of such ensuing year. Deficit reported in financial statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles would not violate this section. 74 Atty. Gen. 202.
VIII,6Public debt for extraordinary expense; taxation. Section 6. For the purpose of defraying extraordinary expenditures the state may contract public debts (but such debts shall never in the aggregate exceed one hundred thousand dollars). Every such debt shall be authorized by law, for some purpose or purposes to be distinctly specified therein; and the vote of a majority of all the members elected to each house, to be taken by yeas and nays, shall be necessary to the passage of such law; and every such law shall provide for levying an annual tax sufficient to pay the annual interest of such debt and the principal within five years from the passage of such law, and shall specially appropriate the proceeds of such taxes to the payment of such principal and interest; and such appropriation shall not be repealed, nor the taxes be postponed or diminished, until the principal and interest of such debt shall have been wholly paid. The constitution does not preclude grants of state money to private parties for the purpose of affording disaster relief under the federal Disaster Relief Act of 1974. An appropriation by the legislature is required, however, to provide the state funding contemplated by the Act. Federal advances under the Act are limited by this section. 64 Atty. Gen. 39.
VIII,7Public debt for public defense; bonding for public purposes. Section 7. [As amended April 1969, April 1975, and April 1992]
