Wisconsin Legislature: Lotteries; Words and Phrases;

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 278 (1986)

I conclude, based upon the statutory language involved and the clear and specific statement of the legislative policy and purpose underlying chapter 163, that the statute prohibits all such payments regardless of their source.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 278 (1986)

Section 163.02(1) states in part that "[a]ll phases of the conduct of bingo and raffles... should be closely controlled by appropriate laws and rules which should be strictly and uniformly enforced throughout this state."

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 278 (1986)

Subsection (2) of that statute states in part that "[t]he conduct of bingo, raffles and all attendant activities... should be so regulated as to discourage

commercialization

of bingo and raffles

in all forms

...."

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 278 (1986)

I believe it to be patently clear that to allow payment of fees or salaries to any person or organization in return for services rendered in conducting or promoting a raffle would result in commercialization in clear violation of the expressed legislative purpose and policy. The statute demands this conclusion.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 278 (1986)

Section 163.94 requires in pertinent part that "[a]ll profits from raffles shall be used by the organization conducting the raffles to further the organization's purpose for existence and

no salaries, fees or profit shall be paid

to any other organization or individual in connection with the operation of a raffle."

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 278 (1986)

It is a maxim of statutory construction "that a law should be so construed that no word or clause shall be rendered surplusage."

Mulvaney v. Tri State Truck & Auto Body, Inc.

, 70 Wis. 2d 760, 764, 235 N.W.2d 460 (1975).

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 279 (1986)

It is also fundamental in construing statutes that "we attempt to find the common sense meaning and purpose of the words employed...."

State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta

, 71 Wis. 2d 662, 677, 239 N.W.2d 313 (1976), cited with approval in 66 Op. Att'y Gen. 215, 216 (1977).

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 279 (1986)

Our supreme court has stated this principle in the following manner: "'[t]he plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to be preferred to any curious, narrow, or hidden sense....'"

A.O. Smith Corp. v. Department of Revenue

, 43 Wis. 2d 420, 429, 168 N.W.2d 887 (1969), quoting from

State Bank of Drummond v. Nuesse

, 13 Wis. 2d 74, 78, 108 N.W.2d 283 (1961).

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 279 (1986)

I, therefore, conclude that the common sense, plain, obvious and rational meaning of the statute involved prohibits any such payments. Also, the words utilized by the Legislature in section 163.94 have recognized meanings in the law.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 279 (1986)

The word profit is defined as meaning "[m]ost commonly, the gross proceeds of a business transaction less the costs of the transaction;

i.e.

, net proceeds. Excess of revenues over expenses for a transaction; sometimes used synonymously with net income for the period. Gain realized from business or investment over and above expenditures."

Black's Law Dictionary

1090 (5th ed. 1979).

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 279 (1986)

Were this the only word used and referred to in the statute under consideration, and the words "fees" and "salaries" were not present, the argument could be advanced that the payments about which you inquire are prohibited only if made from the net proceeds or "profits" from raffle activity.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 279 (1986)

They are present in the statute, however, and to construe them as being equivalent to the meaning of "profit" so as to prohibit such payments

only

if made out of profits would result in rendering the words fees and salaries surplusage. Those words do, in fact, have meanings separate and distinct from the word profit.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 279 (1986)

Black's Law Dictionary defines fees in part as a reward, wage or compensation given to a person for performance of services or something done and defines salaries in part as reward or recompense for services performed. Clearly, they are not analogous or equivalent to the word profit.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 279 (1986)

Therefore, I conclude all such payments to be prohibited regardless of source.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 280 (1986)

IV.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 280 (1986)

ORGANIZATION-IMPOSED LIMITATION ON DISTRIBUTION OF RAFFLE TICKETS

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 280 (1986)

You next ask whether a licensed organization may: (a) require ticket purchasers to become a member of the licensed organization or pay a separate fee in order to buy raffle tickets, or (b) require ticket purchasers to buy more than one ticket as a condition to participating in the raffle.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 280 (1986)

Answering subquestion (a), I find nothing in the statutues or relevant court decisions regarding lotteries which prohibits an organization from restricting raffle ticket sales to members. However, an organization which charges prospective raffle ticket purchasers a separate fee in order to purchase tickets is in fact violating section 163.93(2) if the stated ticket cost plus the fee combine to exceed $5.00 per ticket. I believe this conclusion to be further required by the expressed legislative policy of discouraging all types of commercialization.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 280 (1986)

In response to subquestion (b), the requirement that a prospective purchaser must buy multiple tickets flies straight in the face of the already mentioned and explicitly stated policy of the Legislature. In addition, there is implicit in your question another issue.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 280 (1986)

I am advised that some organizations have utilized a method of selling tickets wherein prospective purchasers are required to buy a sheet or block of tickets. Each "ticket" in the block or sheet is stated to cost $5.00, and there are usually twenty "tickets" to a sheet or in a block, thereby costing the buyer $100.00. However, for each sheet or block purchased the buyer receives only

one

entry for the eventual drawing for prizes.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 280 (1986)

If this method is utilized, such scheme clearly violates section 163.93(2) in that it is in actuality the sheet or block of tickets which comprises "a ticket" whose cost is therefore clearly in excess of $5.00.

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 280 (1986)

DEFINITION OF "SERVICE ORGANIZATION"

75 Op. Att'y Gen. 273, 280-281 (1986)

You next ask me to define "service organization" as that phrase is used in section 163.90. You indicate in your request that the department has apparently adopted as a criterion for eligibility under that section that an applicant organization must have as one of its principle purposes the benefit of the public. I agree with that conclusion.