¶ 9. Combining the content of Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a), (b) into subparts, these prohibitions apply to:
the disclosure of records and information that relates to an investigation of the enumerated offenses, unless disclosure is the release of the record and it is authorized by Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s) or specifically authorized by any other law;
prior to presentation of the information or record in a court of law;
by an “investigator or prosecutor, or employee of an investigator or prosecutor, or member or employee of the board;”
to any person other than
o an employee or agent of the prosecutor or investigator or a member, employee, or agent of the board;
o a person to whom a communication would be made in the normal course of an investigation or prosecution;
o local, state, or federal law enforcement or prosecutorial authority;
o attorneys of a person under investigation; or
o attorneys of an investigator, prosecutor, employee, or member of the board.
¶ 10. Fundamental to answering the questions you present is to first determine whether Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) applies at all to district attorneys offices and law enforcement agencies. By its terms, the statute’s prohibitions on disclosure cover only disclosures made by an “investigator, prosecutor, employee of an investigator or prosecutor, or member or employee of the board.”
¶ 11. Defining the last category is simple. As used in Wis. Stat. chs. 5 to 12, “board” is defined to mean the GAB. See Wis. Stat. § 5.02(1s). The GAB is composed of “members,” appointed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 15.60, who are assisted by nonpartisan “employees.” Cf. Wis. Stat. § 5.05(4). Wisconsin Stat. § 12.13(5) therefore regulates disclosures by GAB members and GAB employees. ¶ 12. While, absent context or limitations, the definitions of “investigator” and “prosecutor” might normally be thought to include law enforcement and district attorneys, respectively, the rules of statutory construction command me to consider the full text and structure of Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) and closely related statutes. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 46. The statutory context shows that those terms are being used in a more restricted sense in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5). Thus, I conclude that the phrase “of the board” is intended to modify “investigator[s],” “prosecutor[s],” and “employee of an investigator or prosecutor” such that Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a)’s prohibitions apply only to GAB-employees, GAB-members, investigators, and prosecutors retained by GAB pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m), and employees of those investigators and prosecutors. ¶ 13. The global context of Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) can be understood by examining the Act in which it was created. The prohibitions on disclosure of investigative information were enacted as a part of a comprehensive reform to the administration of the state’s elections, ethics, and lobbying laws. 2007 Wisconsin Act 1 (“Act 1”). Act 1 created the GAB and vested it with the administration of these laws. Wis. Stat. § 5.05(1). Under Act 1, GAB “shall investigate violations of laws administered by the board and may prosecute alleged civil violations of those laws” and allows GAB to make referrals to others for criminal enforcement. Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m). Act 1 details this process. See generally Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m). If GAB receives a complaint alleging a violation of the laws it administers, then it may commence an investigation and retain a “special investigator.” Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)4. GAB can also retain special counsel to exercise its authority to prosecute civil violations. Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)6. The enforcement provisions in Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m) also provided a series of provisions that would enable the GAB to refer cases to a district attorney or the attorney general if certain conditions are met. See Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)11., 14.-17. ¶ 14. While establishing a mechanism for referring criminal matters, this comprehensive reform did not affect the ability of law enforcement and district attorneys to pursue investigations and prosecutions regarding the elections, lobbying, and ethics laws independent of the GAB. See Wis. Stat. § 978.05(1) and (2); Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)11., 15., 16., 18.; see also OAG1008 (October 29, 2008) (discussing respective prosecutorial powers of GAB and district attorneys). ¶ 15. In sum, Act 1 created for the first time GAB-investigators and GAB-prosecutors by authorizing GAB to hire investigators to investigate alleged violations of the elections, ethics, and lobbying laws, and to hire counsel to civilly prosecute these violations. The Act left undisturbed the collective investigative and prosecutorial authority of state and local law enforcement and prosecutors.
B. Wisconsin Stat. § 12.13(5) must be interpreted to avoid superfluity. ¶ 16. The first reason I believe Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) does not apply to district attorneys and law enforcement is that applying it to district attorneys and law enforcement would deprive separate clauses of meaning and render portions of the statute superfluous. See Hutson, 263 Wis. 2d 612, ¶ 49 (‘“[A] construction which would make part of the statute superfluous should be avoided wherever possible.’”). ¶ 17. Wisconsin Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) applies only if the group of persons to whom the prohibitions apply are not communicating with specified groups of other individuals. Wisconsin Stat. § 12.13(5)(b) provides exceptions to Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a)’s application. One of those exceptions is for “communications made by an investigator, prosecutor, employee of an investigator or prosecutor, or member or employee of the [GAB]” with “a local, state, or federal law enforcement or prosecutorial authority.” Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(b)2. District attorneys are plainly “state prosecutorial authorities.” A sheriff is plainly “local law enforcement.” So if the statutory term “prosecutor” were intended to include district attorneys and “investigator” to include a sheriff, then the exception in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(b)2. would refer, among other things, to communications between a district attorney and him or herself. By providing for communications with “local, state, or federal law enforcement or prosecutorial authority” in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(b)2., the legislature considered those entities as being distinct from the entities or persons to whom Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) applies. By identifying state law enforcement and state prosecutorial authorities in this exception, therefore, the legislature has signaled that the provisions of Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) do not apply to those agencies. Had the legislature wished to signal otherwise, it could have easily provided that the exception to the disclosure rule provided in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(b)2. applied to communications with other prosecutorial authorities or law enforcement agencies or used more specific terms in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a). ¶ 18. No such superfluity is created, however, if one reads “investigator” and “prosecutor” to mean only those individuals retained by GAB pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)—in other words, if the phrase “of the board” in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) is understood to modify “investigator[s]” and “prosecutor[s].” Each category of the exceptions contained in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(b) to the application of Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) involve communications with those outside of GAB, GAB’s retained prosecutors and investigators, and the employees of the GAB-retained investigators and employees. “Inside” communications would never need to be subject to an exemption because they are not covered by Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a). See Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) (prohibitions do not cover communications with “an employee or agent of the prosecutor or investigator or a member, employee, or agent of the board”). If “prosecutor” included a district attorney, however, then Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a)’s prohibition would not apply to his or her conversation with an assistant in the office—because conversations with a prosecutor’s employees are not covered—and would also be subject to an exception from coverage because they would be communications with a “local prosecutorial authority.” There would be no need for the legislature to create an “exception” for a communication that is not covered in the first instance. An interpretation of the terms “prosecutor” and “investigator” that includes only GAB investigators and prosecutors avoids this superfluity and incoherence.
¶ 19. The exceptions in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(b), too, contain superfluity only if Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) is read to include district attorneys and law enforcement as “prosecutor[s]” and “investigator[s]” respectively. Wisconsin Stat. § 12.13(5)(b)3. exempts from Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a)’s prohibitions communications “made to [an] . . . attorney of a person who is investigated or prosecuted by the board.” It also exempts communications made “in the normal course of an investigation or prosecution.” Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(b)1. Because statutes are to be construed to give effect, where possible, to every clause, the legislature must have considered “[a] communication[ ] made in the normal course of an investigation” to not include all communications with “the attorney of a person being investigated or prosecuted.” It is difficult to fathom any communication with the attorney of the person being investigated about the matter being investigated that would not be in furtherance of an investigation unless the legislature considered all such communications to be of a different nature. Thus, if “prosecutor” and “investigator” as used in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) referred to a district attorney and a law enforcement officer respectively, then it would appear that district attorneys and law enforcement would be barred from communicating with the attorneys of individuals under investigation. Surely this is not what the legislature intended by using the term “prosecutor” and “investigator” in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a). a. The statutory cross-reference to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s) signals the legislature was concerned with the GAB’s disclosure of records and information.
¶ 20. The second reason I believe Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) does not apply to district attorneys and law enforcement agencies is the statute’s reliance upon a cross-reference to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s). When one statute specifically refers to another statute, the two statutes should be construed together. Appointment of Interpreter in State v. Le, 184 Wis. 2d 860, 865, 517 N.W.2d 144 (1994). Wisconsin Stat. § 12.13(5) is closely related to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s). Wisconsin Stat. § 12.13(5) regulates actions by people; Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s) regulates access to records. Tellingly, Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s) relates exclusively to GAB-records. This gives further support to the interpretation that the terms “prosecutor” and “investigator” relate to GABprosecutors and GAB-investigators. It shows that the legislature was addressing GABdisclosures in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5), not disclosures by others. ¶ 21. Wisconsin Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) contains an exception to the general prohibition on disclosure of records for records that are “subject to access under s. 5.05(5s).” Wisconsin Stat. § 5.05(5s) provides in part that: (e) The following records of the board are open to public inspection and copying under s. 19.35(1): 1. Any record of the action of the board authorizing the filing of a civil complaint under sub. (2m)(c)6.
2. Any record of the action of the board referring a matter to a district attorney or other prosecutor for investigation or prosecution.
3. Any record containing a finding that a complaint does not raise a reasonable suspicion that a violation of the law has occurred.
4. Any record containing a finding, following an investigation, that no probable cause exists to believe that a violation of the law has occurred.
¶ 22. By its plain meaning, Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s)(e) applies only to records of the GAB and no other person or governmental authority. Subparts 1.-4. relate to GAB actions or GAB determinations, not determinations by others. See Wis. Stat. § 5.05(2m)(c)4., 6., 11. Indeed, Wis. Stat. § 5.05 is entitled “Government accountability board; powers and duties.” In sum, nothing about Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s) indicates that its provisions were intended to apply to any records authority other than the GAB. ¶ 23. Therefore, if a district attorney or law enforcement authority possesses records related to investigations and prosecutions of the enumerated offenses, the cross-reference in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s) provides no guidance whatsoever as to when, and under what circumstances, those records can be accessed. It is hard to understand why Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) would rely upon a cross-reference to another section of the statutes in order to define the scope of a crucial exception to Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) if the cross-referenced statute only applied to some of the authorities subject to Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5). More plausibly, Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) regulates GAB, its staff, its retained prosecutors and investigators, and the employees of those retained prosecutors and investigators. b. The legislature’s purpose of allowing the disclosure of certain information to the public is defeated if one reads “prosecutor” and “investigator” to include district attorneys and law enforcement respectively.
¶ 24. This structural aspect of the statutes becomes particularly significant when one considers your fourth question: what statements district attorneys or law enforcement officials could make, and what records they could disclose, upon determining that no prosecution of an enumerated offense is warranted.
¶ 25. The intent of Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) and its cross-reference to Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s) is clear: certain records demonstrating the government’s final decisions to investigate or prosecute should be accessible to the public. Without such access, of course, it would be impossible for the public and other government officials including the legislature to evaluate whether the enforcement of laws is operating as it should. An interpretation that would include a district attorney or law enforcement official within Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a)’s definition of “prosecutor” and “investigator” would run counter to the clear legislative intent allowing the disclosure of certain records relating to investigations and prosecutions by virtue of creating Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s).
¶ 26. If we read Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) to apply to district attorneys, then a district attorney who has investigated a possible violation of the enumerated offenses, but who has concluded that no prosecution is warranted (whether because of a belief that no probable cause exists or any other reason), could not disclose any records containing the district attorney’s reasons for making that decision. He or she would be bound by the prohibition on disclosure set forth in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a), unlike the GAB (and its special counsel), who could release such documents to the public under the specific exceptions set forth in Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s)(3)3. and 4. Such an interpretation would run counter to the legislature’s purpose in creating the exception, and is thus an unreasonable interpretation. ¶ 27. When the legislature enacts a statute, ‘“it is presumed to do so with full knowledge of the existing law.’” State DOC v. Schwarz, 2005 WI 34, ¶ 24, 279 Wis. 2d 223, 693 N.W.2d 703 (quoting Peters v. Menard, Inc., 224 Wis. 2d 174, 187, 589 N.W.2d 395 (1999)). As discussed above, when the legislature created the GAB, the legislature knew that district attorneys already possessed prosecutorial authority over the elections, ethics, and lobbying laws, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 978.05. The legislature also knew that under State ex rel. Richards v. Foust, 165 Wis. 2d 429, 477 N.W.2d 608 (1991) and its progeny, district attorneys’ case files are protected from public access unless the prosecutor elects in his or her discretion to provide access. So it seems a highly unreasonable interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) to believe that the legislature intended to curtail district attorneys’ ability to explain their decisions not to charge, while at the very same time specifically giving the GAB the ability to release records explaining their decisions on the same kinds of matters. ¶ 28. The legislature wanted certain of the GAB’s records to be exempt from the public records law—hence Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s). The fact that the legislature specifically provided for the lawful release of records dealing with no-charge determinations shows how important it regarded public access to those determinations to be. To read the terms “prosecutor” and “investigator” in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) to include district attorneys and law enforcement would criminalize conduct that the legislature expressly authorizes with respect to the GAB and curtail the flow of information that the legislature has specifically permitted. While it is sometimes the case that records are treated differently for purposes of Wisconsin’s public records law depending on which authority has custody over them, see Portage Daily Register, 308 Wis. 2d 357, ¶ 18, there is no indication that the legislature intended to create such a disparity here as the statutory context supports reading the terms “prosecutor” and “investigator” in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) to relate to prosecutors and investigators of the board and as not applying to district attorneys or law enforcement. ¶ 29. The interplay of Wis. Stat. §§ 12.13(5)(a) and 5.05(5s) causes another, similarly unreasonable result if the terms “prosecutor” and “investigator” in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) are read to include district attorneys and law enforcement agencies. Under Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s)(d), the subject of a GAB-initiated investigation under the enumerated offenses may ask the GAB to make available for inspection and copying records of the investigation that pertain to that person, if those records are otherwise “available by law.” However, since Wis. Stat. § 5.05(5s) pertains only to the GAB and its records, a district attorney presented with the same kind of request by the subject of district attorney-initiated investigation would be prohibited from disclosing records to that person, on threat of criminal penalties, were Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) to be applied to district attorneys. ¶ 30. Such a stark disparity in treatment seems unreasonable, especially in light of the fact that the legislature is presumed to have known, when it enacted Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5), that district attorneys have discretion, under the public records law, to disclose or withhold their investigative records. See Foust, supra. The legislature would not have removed that discretion completely, replaced it with a criminal sanction, and at the same time authorized the GAB to release the very same types of records, without a clear, explicit statement in the statutory language. Act 1 contains no such clear statement. D. Prohibitions on public access to records are to be narrowly construed.
¶ 31. Moreover, as an exemption to Wisconsin’s public records law, Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5) should be narrowly construed so as to ensure public access to public records. Stepping back from the specific issues discussed above, the terms “prosecutor” and “investigator” in Wis. Stat. § 12.13(5)(a) should be read to exclude district attorneys and law enforcement because, to the extent there is any uncertainty about the scope of those terms, they should be read to ensure public access to the greatest extent possible.
¶ 32. Only when the legislature’s intent to curtail access is clear should an exemption be read into a statute. Chvala, 204 Wis. 2d at 88. As the supreme court has explained:
Exceptions should be recognized for what they are, instances in derogation of the general legislative intent, and should, therefore, be narrowly construed; and unless the exception is explicit and unequivocal, it will not be held to be an exception. It would be contrary to general well established principles of freedomofinformation statutes to hold that, by implication only, any type of record can be held from public inspection.