4 To the extent that the Authority’s contentions about the practicality of voluntarily engaging in collective bargaining bear on the question of whether the Authority is permitted to collectively bargain, these and other sources demonstrate that employers have indeed successfully implemented voluntary collective bargaining agreements. See supra ¶ 31; see also City of Phoenix v. Phx. Emp. Rels. Bd. ex rel. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. Ass’n, Loc. 2384, 699 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (discussing the establishment of an ordinance modeled after the National Labor Relations Act); Ann C. Hodges, Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18 Cornell
J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 735, 752 (2009) (discussing memoranda of agreement with employers); Martin H. Malin, Life After Act 10?: Is There a Future for Collective Representation of Wisconsin Public Employees?, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 623, 641–55 (2012) (discussing various agreements and models).
Conclusion
33. In summary, although this opinion does not reach a conclusion on the issue, it appears that the Peace Act includes the Authority in its coverage based on the statute’s plain text. Assuming that the Authority is not covered by the Peace Act, I conclude that it is within the Authority’s statutory power to voluntarily engage in collective bargaining.5
(See PDF for image)Sincerely,
JLK:ADR:jrs
(See PDF for image)
5 Your request does not seek an opinion on, and this opinion does not address, what relevance, if any, federal law may have to the issues discussed here. As this office’s guidance has long stated, Attorney General opinion requests generally are not appropriate on questions of federal law. See 77 Op. Att’y Gen. Preface (1988).
Loading...
Loading...