62.50(28)(28) Engaging in political activity. Subject to the requirements of ch. 164, the common council of any 1st class city may enact an ordinance which regulates the political activities of its law enforcement officers, as defined in s. 165.85 (2) (c), including, but not limited to, providing for leaves of absence for members who are candidates for or who are elected to public office.

62.50 AnnotationCircuit court review of a decision of the Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners by a writ of certiorari was proper. Edmonds v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 66 Wis. 2d 337, 224 N.W.2d 575 (1975).

62.50 AnnotationThe finding of the City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners was insufficient in failing to specify what particular wrongful acts the officers performed or why those acts constituted conduct unbecoming an officer under the circumstances, and in failing to make separate findings as to each officer, because in making its determination the board is required to state specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in the manner required of state agencies under this section. Heffernan, 247 Wis. 77 (1945), is overruled. Edmonds v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 66 Wis. 2d 337, 224 N.W.2d 575 (1975).

62.50 AnnotationAn arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s power by directing that the grievant be transferred when the contract reserved transfer authority to the city and chief of police. City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police Ass’n, 97 Wis. 2d 15, 292 N.W.2d 841 (1980).

62.50 AnnotationA circuit court may sua sponte address constitutional issues not presented by the parties but must allow the parties to develop a factual record pursuant to sub. (21). Slawinski v. Milwaukee City Fire & Police Commission, 212 Wis. 2d 777, 569 N.W.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1347.

62.50 AnnotationWhen multiple disciplinary charges and suspensions arise from a single transaction, the length of the suspension for purposes of sub. (13) must be measured by aggregating the suspensions. Parker v. Jones, 226 Wis. 2d 310, 595 N.W.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-3218.

62.50 AnnotationIt is unconstitutional to condition continued public employment upon a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. An employee may be required to answer questions in a disciplinary hearing when granted immunity from criminal prosecution. There is no immunity for uncoerced false statements made during a disciplinary investigation. There also is no requirement for Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)-like warnings, which in their absence would require the suppression of all statements made in the disciplinary proceedings. Herek v. Police & Fire Commission, 226 Wis. 2d 504, 595 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1927.

62.50 AnnotationThe 60-day period in sub. (17) refers to working days. Balcerzak v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 2000 WI App 50, 233 Wis. 2d 644, 608 N.W.2d 382, 98-2889.

62.50 AnnotationSub. (9) only designates who must fill vacancies and new appointments in the department, not when the vacancies must be filled. It does not create a positive duty to fill vacancies as they occur. If the chief determines that vacancies can be filled by promotion with safety to the department, the chief must fill these positions by promotion, but the chief is not required to fill those positions at any certain time. Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, 252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72, 99-2355.

62.50 AnnotationThe board of fire and police commissioners has express and implied authority to promulgate a rule implementing sub. (19) pertaining to complaints by aggrieved persons against a member. Sub. (19) implicitly conveys some powers to the board because it leaves open some of the methods by which the board should operate. State ex rel. Castaneda v. Welch, 2007 WI 103, 303 Wis. 2d 570, 735 N.W.2d 131, 04-3306.

62.50 AnnotationPolice officers who are discharged have a right to a trial before the board that comports with due process. The legitimacy of a discharge is not “disposed of by the board” under sub. (18) until the board provides such a trial. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI App 119, 313 Wis. 2d 253, 757 N.W.2d 76, 07-2433.

62.50 AnnotationSubs. (11) to (19) require a just cause due process hearing only when a police officer or firefighter has been disciplined. There is nothing in the statute’s language or context that suggests that this section applies to an officer placed on unpaid Family Medical Leave Act leave. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 2011 WI App 112, 335 Wis. 2d 495, 801 N.W.2d 466, 10-2254.

62.50 AnnotationCorrecting a mistake of law is neither specifically authorized nor specifically prohibited, but compliance with the specific standards imposed on the board by statute is certainly expected by the legislature. The board is a quasi-judicial body and was functioning as such when it held hearings into the alleged infractions of the rules and regulations of the Milwaukee Police Department in this case. The authority to reconsider a decision based on an error was implicit in the grant of authority to the board as a quasi-judicial body. Schoen v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 2015 WI App 95, 366 Wis. 2d 279, 873 N.W.2d 232, 14-2821.

62.50 AnnotationThe phrase “reasons for the discharge or suspension” in sub. (13) means the reason some serious form of discipline is imposed. Sub. (13) does not require an explanation of all the reasons a specific level of discipline is chosen. Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 2024 WI 17, 411 Wis. 2d 340, 5 N.W.3d 261, 20-0333.

62.50 AnnotationA property interest in employment with the police department is recognized in sub. (11), but there is no property interest in a particular job assignment. Without a protected interest, there can be no violation of procedural due process rights in the making of a job assignment. Gustafson v. Jones, 117 F.3d 1015 (1997).

62.50 AnnotationDischarge or suspension of a Milwaukee police officer has two distinct phases: 1) discharge or suspension by the chief, which must be for cause, as embodied in sub. (11); and 2) trial and appeal of discharge or suspension, as provided in subs. (14) to (17). The second phase occurs if requested by the discharged or suspended officer under sub. (13). An officer discharged for cause is guaranteed an opportunity to reclaim the officer’s property interest in employment on appeal after a trial. Sub. (18) provides that “salary or wages for the period of time ... preceding an investigation or trial” are owed only to suspended officers, not those discharged. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d 636 (2017).

62.50 AnnotationA city rule that provided that the chief of police could discharge an appointee during a probationary period if the appointee proved unfit for the position could be harmonized with this section by interpreting the phrase “member of the police force” to exclude those individuals who had not satisfied the requirements of the rule. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 787 F. Supp. 2d 888 (2011).

62.50 AnnotationThis section directs that officers discharged by the chief but who await trial before the board of police and fire commissioners are not to receive pay during that period. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 213 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (2016).

62.51(1)(a)(a) “Public office” means the following positions or their equivalent: city engineer; city purchasing agent; commissioner of building inspection, of city development, of health or of public works; director of administration, of budget and management, of community development agency, of employee relations, of office of telecommunications, or of safety; emergency management coordinator; employee benefits administrator; executive director of the commission on community relations; municipal port director; commissioner of assessments; director of liaison; city personnel director; executive director of the retirement board; executive director of the city board of election commissioners; city librarian; city labor negotiator; executive secretary of the board of fire and police commissioners; and supervisor of the central electronics board.

62.51(1)(b)(b) “Public official” means a person appointed to a public office under this section.

62.51(2)(2) In any 1st class city, the mayor shall appoint, subject to confirmation of the common council, a person to serve in the unclassified service in each public office. A public official serves at the pleasure of the mayor until the end of the mayoral term of office during which the public official is appointed unless reappointed and reconfirmed or until a successor is appointed and confirmed, whichever is later. The mayor shall make appointments under this subsection within 90 days after taking office or within 90 days after a vacancy in the public office occurs, whichever is later. The common council shall vote on confirmation of any appointment under this subsection within 45 days after that appointment.

62.51(3)(3) If a 1st class city authorizes the position of deputy for a public office, the public official in that office shall appoint a person to serve in the unclassified service as deputy. That deputy shall serve at the pleasure of the public official, but not longer than the public official’s term of office unless reappointed.