62.50(24) (24) Signal service department. All apparatus and all mechanical appliances requiring the use of telegraph or telephone wire or other wire for signaling purposes, with the consequent use of the public highways, together with such wire and all appurtenances to such apparatus and the constructional work therefor, may be placed under the management and control of a separate department. Such department shall be established and the compensation of the superintendent and all employees of such department shall be fixed by ordinance of the common council. The superintendent of the department shall be appointed by the board, and all other employees of the department shall be appointed in the same manner, and shall be subject to removal upon the same conditions as the members of the fire and police departments, and wherever applicable this section shall apply to such department the same as to the fire and police departments.

62.50(25) (25) Chief examiner. The board may appoint a chief examiner. The board shall prescribe the chief examiner’s duties and compensation, which shall be paid by the city on the certificate of the board. Such examiner is subject to removal at any time by a majority of the board, and the board may change such duties and compensation at any time as it deems proper. The board may fix and alter compensation for any other examiners appointed by the board, and such compensation shall be paid by the city on certificate of the board.

62.50(26) (26) Reservation of existing terms. Nothing contained in this section may be construed to affect the term of office of any person who is a member of any police or fire commission in any city of the 1st class nor to affect the term of office of any member appointed to fill out the unexpired term of any person who is a member of such commission at the time this section first applies to such city.

62.50(27) (27) Mayor to appoint additional members. A mayor of a city of the 1st class, whether acting under a general or special charter, shall appoint a sufficient number of members for the police and fire commission of such city so that the commission shall conform with this section, and such additional members and their successors shall be appointed for a term of 5 years.

62.50(28) (28) Engaging in political activity. Subject to the requirements of ch. 164, the common council of any 1st class city may enact an ordinance which regulates the political activities of its law enforcement officers, as defined in s. 165.85 (2) (c), including, but not limited to, providing for leaves of absence for members who are candidates for or who are elected to public office.

62.50(29) (29) Officers’ rights. In case of a conflict with ch. 164, the provisions of ch. 164 supersede the provisions of this section.

62.50 History History: 1977 c. 19, 20, 53, 151; 1977 c. 272 ss. 24 to 30, 92 to 95; 1979 c. 307, 351; 1979 c. 361 s. 113; 1981 c. 213, 380; 1981 c. 391 s. 211; 1983 a. 58, 179, 192, 219; 1989 a. 31; 1997 a. 237, 250; 1999 a. 9; 2001 a. 16; 2007 a. 114; 2009 a. 28; 2013 a. 20, 166; 2023 a. 12.

62.50 Annotation Circuit court review of a decision of the Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners by a writ of certiorari was proper. Edmonds v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 66 Wis. 2d 337, 224 N.W.2d 575 (1975).

62.50 Annotation The finding of the City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police Commissioners was insufficient in failing to specify what particular wrongful acts the officers performed or why those acts constituted conduct unbecoming an officer under the circumstances, and in failing to make separate findings as to each officer, because in making its determination the board is required to state specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in the manner required of state agencies under this section. Heffernan, 247 Wis. 77 (1945), is overruled. Edmonds v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 66 Wis. 2d 337, 224 N.W.2d 575 (1975).

62.50 Annotation An arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s power by directing that the grievant be transferred when the contract reserved transfer authority to the city and chief of police. City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee Police Ass’n, 97 Wis. 2d 15, 292 N.W.2d 841 (1980).

62.50 Annotation Discharges based solely on coerced confessions were improper. Oddsen v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 108 Wis. 2d 143, 321 N.W.2d 161 (1982).

62.50 Annotation A circuit court may sua sponte address constitutional issues not presented by the parties but must allow the parties to develop a factual record pursuant to sub. (21). Slawinski v. Milwaukee City Fire & Police Commission, 212 Wis. 2d 777, 569 N.W.2d 740 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-1347.

62.50 Annotation When multiple disciplinary charges and suspensions arise from a single transaction, the length of the suspension for purposes of sub. (13) must be measured by aggregating the suspensions. Parker v. Jones, 226 Wis. 2d 310, 595 N.W.2d 92 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-3218.

62.50 Annotation It is unconstitutional to condition continued public employment upon a waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. An employee may be required to answer questions in a disciplinary hearing when granted immunity from criminal prosecution. There is no immunity for uncoerced false statements made during a disciplinary investigation. There also is no requirement for Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)-like warnings, which in their absence would require the suppression of all statements made in the disciplinary proceedings. Herek v. Police & Fire Commission, 226 Wis. 2d 504, 595 N.W.2d 113 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-1927.

62.50 Annotation The 60-day period in sub. (17) refers to working days. Balcerzak v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 2000 WI App 50, 233 Wis. 2d 644, 608 N.W.2d 382, 98-2889.

62.50 Annotation Sub. (9) only designates who must fill vacancies and new appointments in the department, not when the vacancies must be filled. It does not create a positive duty to fill vacancies as they occur. If the chief determines that vacancies can be filled by promotion with safety to the department, the chief must fill these positions by promotion, but the chief is not required to fill those positions at any certain time. Pasko v. City of Milwaukee, 2002 WI 33, 252 Wis. 2d 1, 643 N.W.2d 72, 99-2355.

62.50 Annotation The board of fire and police commissioners has express and implied authority to promulgate a rule implementing sub. (19) pertaining to complaints by aggrieved persons against a member. Sub. (19) implicitly conveys some powers to the board because it leaves open some of the methods by which the board should operate. State ex rel. Castaneda v. Welch, 2007 WI 103, 303 Wis. 2d 570, 735 N.W.2d 131, 04-3306.

62.50 Annotation Police officers who are discharged have a right to a trial before the board that comports with due process. The legitimacy of a discharge is not “disposed of by the board” under sub. (18) until the board provides such a trial. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. City of Milwaukee, 2008 WI App 119, 313 Wis. 2d 253, 757 N.W.2d 76, 07-2433.

62.50 Annotation Subs. (11) to (19) require a just cause due process hearing only when a police officer or firefighter has been disciplined. There is nothing in the statute’s language or context that suggests that this section applies to an officer placed on unpaid Family Medical Leave Act leave. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 2011 WI App 112, 335 Wis. 2d 495, 801 N.W.2d 466, 10-2254.

62.50 Annotation Correcting a mistake of law is neither specifically authorized nor specifically prohibited, but compliance with the specific standards imposed on the board by statute is certainly expected by the legislature. The board is a quasi-judicial body and was functioning as such when it held hearings into the alleged infractions of the rules and regulations of the Milwaukee Police Department in this case. The authority to reconsider a decision based on an error was implicit in the grant of authority to the board as a quasi-judicial body. Schoen v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 2015 WI App 95, 366 Wis. 2d 279, 873 N.W.2d 232, 14-2821.

62.50 Annotation The phrase “reasons for the discharge or suspension” in sub. (13) means the reason some serious form of discipline is imposed. Sub. (13) does not require an explanation of all the reasons a specific level of discipline is chosen. Andrade v. City of Milwaukee Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 2024 WI 17, 411 Wis. 2d 340, 5 N.W.3d 261, 20-0333.

62.50 Annotation A property interest in employment with the police department is recognized in sub. (11), but there is no property interest in a particular job assignment. Without a protected interest, there can be no violation of procedural due process rights in the making of a job assignment. Gustafson v. Jones, 117 F.3d 1015 (1997).

62.50 Annotation Discharge or suspension of a Milwaukee police officer has two distinct phases: 1) discharge or suspension by the chief, which must be for cause, as embodied in sub. (11); and 2) trial and appeal of discharge or suspension, as provided in subs. (14) to (17). The second phase occurs if requested by the discharged or suspended officer under sub. (13). An officer discharged for cause is guaranteed an opportunity to reclaim the officer’s property interest in employment on appeal after a trial. Sub. (18) provides that “salary or wages for the period of time ... preceding an investigation or trial” are owed only to suspended officers, not those discharged. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 863 F.3d 636 (2017).

62.50 Annotation A city rule that provided that the chief of police could discharge an appointee during a probationary period if the appointee proved unfit for the position could be harmonized with this section by interpreting the phrase “member of the police force” to exclude those individuals who had not satisfied the requirements of the rule. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 787 F. Supp. 2d 888 (2011).

62.50 Annotation This section directs that officers discharged by the chief but who await trial before the board of police and fire commissioners are not to receive pay during that period. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v. Flynn, 213 F. Supp. 3d 1113 (2016).

62.51 62.51 Mayoral appointments in 1st class cities.

62.51(1) (1) In this section:

62.51(1)(a) (a) “Public office” means the following positions or their equivalent: city engineer; city purchasing agent; commissioner of building inspection, of city development, of health or of public works; director of administration, of budget and management, of community development agency, of employee relations, of office of telecommunications, or of safety; emergency management coordinator; employee benefits administrator; executive director of the commission on community relations; municipal port director; commissioner of assessments; director of liaison; city personnel director; executive director of the retirement board; executive director of the city board of election commissioners; city librarian; city labor negotiator; executive secretary of the board of fire and police commissioners; and supervisor of the central electronics board.

62.51(1)(b) (b) “Public official” means a person appointed to a public office under this section.