Habeas corpus is a proper remedy with which to challenge the personal jurisdiction of a trial court over a criminal defendant and to challenge a ruling on motion to suppress evidence where constitutional issues are involved. State ex rel. Warrender v. Kenosha County Ct. 67 W (2d) 333, 227 NW (2d) 450.
Scope of inquiry in extradition habeas corpus cases discussed. State v. Ritter 74 W (2d) 227, 246 NW (2d) 552.
Relief under habeas corpus is not limited to release of person confined. State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 75 W (2d) 276, 249 NW (2d) 573.
SELF-INCRIMINATION AND CONFESSION
Granting a witness immunity and ordering him to answer questions does not violate his constitutional rights. State v. Blake, 46 W (2d) 386, 175 NW (2d) 210.
A hearing to determine the voluntariness of a confession is not necessary where a defendant knowingly fails to object to the evidence for purposes of trial strategy. Police officers need not stop all questioning after defendant requests an attorney, since a defendant can change his mind and volunteer a statement. Sharlow v. State, 47 W (2d) 259, 177 NW (2d) 88.
Admission of evidence of spending of money after a burglary is not unconstitutional as requiring a defendant to testify against himself in order to rebut it. State v. Heidelbach, 49 W (2d) 350, 182 NW (2d) 497.
Where defendant volunteered an incriminatory statement outside the presence of retained counsel the statement is admissible. State v. Chabonian, 50 W (2d) 574, 185 NW (2d) 289.
There is no requirement that a hearing as to the voluntariness of a confession be separated into 2 stages, i.e., as to the circumstances leading up to it and then as to its content. Content of Miranda warning discussed. Bohachef v. State, 50 W (2d) 694, 185 NW (2d) 339.
Argument by the district attorney that certain evidence was uncontroverted does not amount to a comment on defendant's failure to testify. Bies v. State, 53 W (2d) 322, 193 NW (2d) 46.
Questions of investigational versus custodial interrogation in relation to a confession discussed. Mikulovsky v. State, 54 W (2d) 699, 196 NW (2d) 748.
Where defendant, believing he was seriously wounded, began to tell what happened and was then given the Miranda warnings, his further continuation amounted to a waiver of his rights. He need not expressly state that he was waiving them, where the record shows he was conscious and alert and said he understood his rights. State v. Parker, 55 W (2d) 131, 197 NW (2d) 742.
The privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to the production of corporate records by their custodian, even though they may tend to incriminate him personally. State v. Balistrieri, 55 W (2d) 513, 201 NW (2d) 18.
A defendant who waived counsel and who agreed to sign a confession admitting 18 burglaries in return for an agreement that he would be prosecuted for only one, cannot claim that the confession was improperly induced. The state has the burden of showing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. Pontow v. State, 58 W (2d) 135, 205 NW (2d) 775.
Administration of a blood or breathalyzer test does not violate defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Driver, 59 W (2d) 35, 207 NW (2d) 850.
Factors to be considered in determining whether a confession is voluntary discussed. State v. Wallace, 59 W (2d) 66, 207 NW (2d) 855.
A voluntary confession is not rendered inadmissible although the arrest was made outside the statutory jurisdictional limits of the arresting officer. State v. Ewald, 63 W (2d) 165, 216 NW (2d) 213.
While Miranda does require that, upon exercise of the defendant's 5th amendment privilege, the interrogation must cease, Miranda does not explicitly state that the defendant may not, after again being advised of his rights, be interrogated in the future. State v. Estrada, 63 W (2d) 476, 217 NW (2d) 359.
Requirements of claim of immunity discussed. State v. Hall, 65 W (2d) 18, 221 NW (2d) 806.
The validity of a juvenile confession is determined by an analysis of the totality of circumstances surrounding the confession, and the presence of parent, guardian or attorney is not an absolute requirement for the juvenile to validly waive right to remain silent but only one of the factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of the confession. Theriault v. State, 66 W (2d) 33, 223 NW (2d) 850.
A written confession is admissible in evidence although it is not signed by the defendant, so long as the defendant has read the statement and adopted it as his own. Kutchera v. State, 69 W (2d) 534, 230 NW (2d) 750.
State may compel probationer's testimony in revocation proceeding if probationer is first advised that such testimony will be inadmissible in criminal proceedings arising out of alleged probation violation, except for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal. State v. Evans, 77 W (2d) 225, 252 NW (2d) 664.
Volunteered confession while in custody and prior to Miranda warning held admissible despite earlier inadmissible statement in response to custodial interrogation. LaTender v. State, 77 W (2d) 383, 253 NW (2d) 221.
No restrictions of the 4th and 5th amendments preclude enforcement of an order for handwriting exemplars directed by presiding judge in John Doe proceeding. State v. Doe, 78 W (2d) 161, 254 NW (2d) 210.
Due process does not require that a John Doe witness be advised of the nature of the proceeding or that the witness is a "target" of the investigation. Ryan v. State, 79 W (2d) 83, 255 NW (2d) 910.
Defendant's confession was admissible although obtained through custodial interrogation following defendant's request for a lawyer. Leach v. State, 83 W (2d) 199, 265 NW (2d) 495 (1978).
Where "conversational" visit was not custodial interrogation, defendant's voluntary statement was admissible despite lack of Miranda warnings. State v. Hockings, 86 W (2d) 709, 273 NW (2d) 339 (1979).
Confession after 28-hour post-arrest detention was admissible. Wagner v. State, 89 W (2d) 70, 277 NW (2d) 849 (1979).
Immunity for compelled testimony contrary to Fifth Amendment privilege extends to juvenile court proceeding. State v. J.H.S. 90 W (2d) 613, 280 NW (2d) 356 (Ct. App. 1979).
Defendant's voluntary statements were admissible for impeachment even though they were obtained in violation of Miranda. State v. Mendoza, 96 W (2d) 106, 291 NW (2d) 478 (1980).
Where accused cut off initial interrogation but was interrogated by another officer 9 minutes later following fresh Miranda warning, confession was admissible. State v. Shaffer, 96 W (2d) 531, 292 NW (2d) 370 (Ct. App. 1980).
By testifying as to his actions on day murder was committed, defendant waived self-incrimination privilege on cross-examination as to previous actions, related to the murder, which were subject of pending prosecution. Neely v. State, 97 W (2d) 38, 292 NW (2d) 859 (1980).
Miranda warnings were unnecessary where officer entered defendant's home, in belief that defendant might have killed wife 4 days earlier, and asked "Where is your wife?". State v. Kraimer, 99 W (2d) 306, 298 NW (2d) 568 (1980).
Prosecutor's comment on failure of alibi witness to come forward with alibi story immediately did not infringe on defendant's right of silence. State v. Hoffman, 106 W (2d) 185, 316 NW (2d) 143 (Ct. App. 1982).
Defendant's silence both before and after Miranda warning may not be referred to at trial by prosecution. State v. Fencl, 109 W (2d) 224, 325 NW (2d) 703 (1982).
Videotapes of sobriety tests were properly admitted to show physical manifestation of defendant driver's intoxication. State v. Haefer, 110 W (2d) 381, 328 NW (2d) 894 (Ct. App. 1982).
John Doe subpoena requiring production of income tax returns violated self-incrimination right. B. M. v. State, 113 W (2d) 183, 335 NW (2d) 420 (Ct. App. 1983).
Statement given police, without Miranda warnings, while accused was in emergency room, that accused was driver in fatal crash, was admissible. State v. Clappes, 117 W (2d) 277, 344 NW (2d) 141 (1984).
After guilty plea, privilege against self-incrimination continues at least until sentencing. State v. McConnohie, 121 W (2d) 57, 358 NW (2d) 256 (1984).
Where defendant does not testify but presents own argument to jury, prosecutor may caution jury that defendant's statements are not evidence. State v. Johnson, 121 W (2d) 237, 358 NW (2d) 824 (Ct. App. 1984).
Where relative of accused contacted police and asked if anything could be done to help accused, subsequent confession elicited from accused by relative was inadmissible. Court lists factors to consider in determining when civilian becomes agent of police. State v. Lee, 122 W (2d) 266, 362 NW (2d) 149 (1985).
Where police knew that suspect had asked wife to contact attorney and didn't inform suspect when that attorney arrived at police station, confession obtained after attorney's arrival was inadmissible. State v. Middleton, 135 W (2d) 297, 399 NW (2d) 917 (Ct. App. 1986).
Police had no duty to inform suspect during custodial interrogation that lawyer retained by suspect's family was present. State v. Hanson, 136 W (2d) 195, 401 NW (2d) 771 (1987).
Incriminating statement by intoxicated defendant undergoing medical treatment for painful injuries was voluntary since there was no affirmative police misconduct compelling defendant to answer police questioning. State v. Clappes, 136 W (2d) 222, 401 NW (2d) 759 (1987).
"Rescue doctrine" exception to Miranda rule discussed. State v. Kunkel, 137 W (2d) 172, 404 NW (2d) 69 (Ct. App. 1987).
Probationer's answers to probation agent's questions are "compelled" and may not be used for any purpose in criminal trial. State v. Thompson, 142 W (2d) 821, 419 NW (2d) 564 (Ct. App. 1987).
Prosecution may comment on accused's pre-Miranda silence when accused elects to testify on own behalf. State v. Sorenson, 143 W (2d) 226, 421 NW (2d) 77 (1988).
"Functional equivalent" of direct custodial interrogation discussed. State v. Cunningham, 144 W (2d) 272, 423 NW (2d) 862 (1988).
Admission of involuntary or coerced confession is subject to harmless error test. State v. Childs, 146 W (2d) 116, 430 NW (2d) 353 (Ct. App. 1988).
Use of Goodchild testimony to impeach defendant's trial testimony does not violate privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Schultz, 152 W (2d) 408, 448 NW (2d) 424 (1989).
See note to 970.03, citing State v. Moats, 156 W (2d) 74, 457 NW (2d) 299 (1990).
Where psychiatrist did not comply with Miranda, constitution does not require exclusion of results of interview with defendant from competency phase of trial. State v. Lindh, 161 W (2d) 324, 468 NW (2d) 168 (1991).
Miranda does not require warning suspect that he has the right to stop answering questions. State v. Mitchell, 167 W (2d) 672, 482 NW (2d) 364 (1992).
Statement made after Miranda warnings but before contact with requested counsel is admissible for impeachment. Oregon v. Hass, 420 US 714.
Witness who refuses to testify on self-incrimination grounds after judge grants immunity may summarily be found in criminal contempt. United States v. Wilson, 421 US 309.
Use of defendant's income tax returns to prove gambling charge did not deny self-incrimination protection. Garner v. United States, 424 US 648.
Accused's silence during police interrogation lacked probative value for impeachment of alibi at trial. United States v. Hale, 422 US 171. See: Doyle v. Ohio, 426 US 610.
Voluntary interview at police station was not "custodial interrogation". Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 US 492.
Instruction given to jury over defense objection not to draw adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify did not violate self-incrimination right. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 US 333 (1978).
While statements made by defendant in circumstances violating Miranda protections are admissible for impeachment if their trustworthiness satisfies legal standards, any criminal trial use against defendant of involuntary statements is denial of due process. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385 (1978).
Testimony before grand jury under grant of immunity could not constitutionally be used for impeachment purposes in later criminal trial. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 US 450 (1979).
Explicit statement of waiver is not necessary to support finding that defendant waived Miranda rights. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 US 369 (1979).
Voluntary confession obtained during custodial interrogation following illegal arrest was inadmissible. Dunaway v. New York, 442 US 200 (1979).
Witness compelled by grant of immunity to testify despite claim of self-incrimination privilege was property prosecuted for perjured testimony. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 US 115 (1980).
Officer's comment that child might find loaded gun was not functional equivalent of questioning in violation of Miranda rights. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 US 291 (1980).
Right of self-incrimination was not violated when defendant who testifies in own defense is impeached by use of defendant's prearrest silence. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 US 231 (1980).
Upon defendant's request, judge must instruct jury not to infer guilt from defendant's failure to testify. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 US 288 (1981).
Accused who requests counsel may not be interrogated without counsel unless accused initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477 (1981).
Where for impeachment purposes prosecution cross-examined defendant as to postarrest silence before defendant received Miranda warnings, due process was not violated. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 US 603 (1982).
Where prosecutor improperly commented to jury that defendants did not challenge certain accusations against them, court erred in reversing conviction on appeal without determining whether error was harmless. U.S. v. Hasting, 461 US 499 (1983).
Probationer under obligation to appear before probation officer and answer questions truthfully was not entitled to Miranda warnings; confession was, therefore, admissible. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 US 420 (1984).
Court adopts "inevitable discovery" exception to exclusionary rule. Nix v. Williams, 467 US 431 (1984).
Court adopts "public safety" exception to Miranda rule. Where accused, known to have had gun, did not have gun at time of arrest in supermarket, officer properly asked where the gun was before giving Miranda warnings. New York v. Quarles, 467 US 649 (1984).
Person subjected to custodial interrogation is entitled to Miranda warnings regardless of nature or severity of offense. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 US 420 (1984).
Suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning may later waive rights and confess after Miranda warnings are given. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 US 298 (1985).
Police's failure to inform defendant that third party had retained counsel didn't invalidate defendant's waiver of Miranda rights. Moran v. Burbine, 475 US 412 (1986).
Where no evidence is present suggesting that police officers sent suspect's wife in to see him with the hope of obtaining incriminating information, no "interrogation" was undertaken even though detective was present and tape recorded conversation. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 US 520 (1987).
Corporate records custodian may not resist subpoena for records on self-incrimination grounds, regardless of size of corporate entity. Braswell v. United States, 487 US 99 (1988).
Self-incrimination privilege does not support refusal to comply with juvenile court's order to produce child. Baltimore Soc. Serv. v. Bouknight, 493 US 474, 107 LEd 2d 992 (1990).
Undercover officer is not required to give Miranda warnings to suspect before surreptitious custodial interrogation. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 US 292, 110 LEd 2d 243 (1990).
When counsel is requested, interrogation must cease and may not be reinstated without counsel present even though the accused previously did have an opportunity to consult an attorney. Minnich v. Mississippi, 498 US , 112 LEd 2d 489 (1990).
Admission of coerced confession may be found to be "harmless error". Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 US , 113 LEd 2d 302 (1991).
Sixth amendment right to counsel is offense specific; an accused's invocation of this right during a judicial proceeding did not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel under Miranda arising from the 5th amendment guarantees against self incrimination in regard to police questioning concerning a separate offense. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 US , 115 LEd 2d 158 (1991).
Collateral estoppel barred state from introducing evidence of van theft as overt act in conspiracy charge where accuseds had earlier been acquitted in van theft trial. Accused's silence prior to receiving Miranda warnings was properly used to impeach accused; prosecution's reference to post-Miranda silence was harmless error. Feela v. Israel, 727 F (2d) 151 (1984).
Assertion of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in federal civil litigation: Rights and remedies. Daskal, 64 MLR 243 (1980).
Privilege against self-incrimination-truthful statements may be used in a perjury prosecution. 64 MLR 744 (1981).
The privilege against self-incrimination in civil commitment proceedings. 1980 WLR 697.
I,9 Remedy for wrongs. Section 9. Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly and without delay, conformably to the laws.
The trial court's holding that plaintiff's claim was barred because the period of limitations ran from the time the last architectural services were performed is not sustained, for to so read the statute, although susceptible of that literal meaning, would reveal a constitutionally impermissible legislative intent to negate a right statutorily recognized in 893.14. Rosenthal v. Kurtz, 62 W (2d) 1, 213 NW (2d) 741, 216 NW (2d) 252.
