Search of entire building on morning after localized fire was within scope of fire scene exception to search warrant requirement. State v. Monosso, 103 W (2d) 368, 308 NW (2d) 891 (Ct. App. 1981).
Warrantless entry into home was validated by emergency doctrine where official's reasonable actions were motivated solely by perceived need to render immediate aid or assistance, not by need or desire to obtain evidence. State v. Boggess, 115 W (2d) 443, 340 NW (2d) 516 (1983).
Warrantless noninventory search of automobile incident to arrest was permissible under Belton rule. State v. Fry, 131 W (2d) 153, 388 NW (2d) 565 (1986).
Police having probable cause to believe vehicle contains criminal evidence may search vehicle without warrant or exigent circumstances. State v. Tompkins, 144 W (2d) 116, 423 NW (2d) 823 (1988).
Under exigent circumstances of fire control, fire fighter may contact police to inform them of presence of illegal possessions in plain view; subsequent warrantless search and seizure is proper. State v. Gonzalez, 147 W (2d) 165, 432 NW (2d) 651 (Ct. App. 1988).
Reasonable police inventory search is exception to warrant requirement; issue is whether inventory was pretext for investigative search. State v. Axelson, 149 W (2d) 339, 441 NW (2d) 259 (Ct. App. 1989).
When effecting lawful custodial arrest of individual in his home, law enforcement may conduct search of closed areas within immediate area of arrestee even though search imposes infringement on privacy interest. State v. Murdock, 155 W (2d) 217, 455 NW (2d) 618 (1990).
Under circumstances presented, officer properly conducted inventory search resulting in discovery of contraband of purse left in police car because search was conducted pursuant to proper department policy. State v. Weide, 155 W (2d) 537, 455 NW (2d) 899 (1990).
Police corroboration of innocent details of anonymous tip may give rise to reasonable suspicion to make a stop under totality of circumstances; suspect's actions need not be inherently suspicious in and of themselves. State v. Richardson, 156 W (2d) 128, 456 NW (2d) 830 (1990).
Validity of "Good Samaritan" stop or entry requires that officer had motive only to assist and not to search for evidence, had reasonable belief that defendant needed help, and once entry is made absent probable cause, that objective evidence exists giving rise to investigation of criminal behavior. State v. Dunn, 158 W (2d) 138, 462 NW (2d) 538 (Ct. App. 1990).
Reasonableness of search does not come into question unless person had reasonable privacy expectation; is no reasonable expectation of privacy in TDD communications made from dispatch area of sheriff's department. State v. Rewolinski, 159 W (2d) 1, 464 NW (2d) 401 (1990).
Parolee's liberty is conditional; judicially issued warrant is not required for seizure of alleged parole violator in his home. State v. Pittman, 159 W (2d) 764, 465 NW (2d) 245 (Ct. App. 1990).
See note to this section, PROBABLE CAUSE AND WARRANTS, citing State v. Jeter, 160 W (2d) 333, 466 NW (2d) 211 (Ct. App. 1991).
Warrantless search of apartment for evidence of occupancy where police reasonably believed tenant had vacated and occupants were not legitimately on premises was not unreasonable; defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment or in property kept there. State v. Whitrock, 161 W (2d) 960, 468 NW (2d) 696 (1991).
Blood may be drawn in search incident to arrest if police have reasonable suspicion that blood contains evidence of crime. State v. Seibel, 163 W (2d) 164, 471 NW (2d) 226 (1991).
Where it is asserted that search was incident to arrest, objective test which assesses totality of circumstances shall be applied to determine whether arrest occurred; previous subjective test is abrogated. Where arrest has not occurred there can be no full warrantless search. State v. Swanson, 164 W (2d) 437, 475 NW (2d) 148 (1991).
When a convicted defendant is awaiting sentencing for a drug related offense where probation is a sentencing option, a judge may order, without warrant, probable cause or individualized suspicion, that the defendant submit to urinalysis to determine if drugs are present. State v. Guzman, 166 W (2d) 577, 480 NW (2d) 446 (1992).
Drawing of blood sample without consent is reasonable when (1) drawn incident to arrest, (2) there is a clear indication the desired evidence will be found and (3) exigent circumstances exist; rapid dissipation of blood alcohol is an exigent circumstance. Force allowable in obtaining sample discussed. State v. Krause, 168 W (2d) 578, 484 NW (2d) 347 (Ct. App. 1992).
Exception allowing warrantless search of automobiles is not extended to camper trailer unhitched from a towing vehicle. State v. Durbin, 170 W (2d) 475, 489 NW (2d) 655 (Ct. App. 1992).
Warrantless search of commercial premises without owner's consent where licensing ordinance provided that the licensed premises "shall be open to inspection at any time" was illegal. State v. Schwegler, 170 W (2d) 487, 490 NW (2d) 292 (Ct. App. 1992).
Frisk of person not named in search warrant during execution of warrant was reasonable where occupants of the residence were very likely to be involved in drug trafficking; drugs felt in a pocket during the frisk were lawfully seized where the officer had probable cause to believe there was a connection between what was felt and criminal activity. State v. Guy, 172 W (2d) 86, 492 NW (2d) 311 (1992).
Dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream constitutes a sufficient exigency to justify a warrantless blood draw when made at an officer's direction following an arrest for OWI. State v. Bohling, 173 W (2d) 529, 494 NW (2d) 399 (1993).
Warrantless protective sweep of residence incident to arrest requires police to have a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the residence harbors an individual posing a danger to the officers. State v. Kruse, 175 W (2d) 89, 499 NW (2d) 185 (Ct. App. 1993).
Six factor analysis for use in making determination of reasonableness of investigatory stop discussed. State v. King, 175 W (2d) 146, NW (2d) (Ct. App. 1993).
Rule that a judicial determination of probable cause to support a warrantless arrest must be made within 48 hours applies to Wisconsin; failure to comply did not require suppression of evidence not obtained because of the delay where probable cause for arrest was present. State v. Koch, 175 W (2d) 684, 499 NW (2d) 153 (1993).
Where a school adopts a written policy retaining ownership and possessory control of lockers, students have no reasonable privacy expectation in those lockers. Interest of Isiah B. 176 W (2d) 639, 500 NW (2d) 637 (1993).
Officer's step into threshold of defendant's home constituted an entry subject to constitutional protection. State v. Johnson, 177 W (2d) 224, 501 NW (2d) 876 (Ct. App. 1993).
A defendant under lawful arrest has a diminished privacy interest in personal property inventoried by jail authorities and a warrantless search of the property where there is probable cause to believe it contains evidence is valid. State v. Jones, 181 W (2d) 194, 510 NW (2d) 784 (Ct. App. 1993). See also State v. Betterly, 183 W (2d) 165, 515 NW (2d) 911 (Ct. App. 1994).
Warrantless entry of uniformed officers to make arrests after undercover agents gained permissive entrance to premises was justified under the consent exception and no exigent circumstances were required. State v. Johnston, 184 W (2d) 794, 518 NW (2d) 759 (1994).
Non-parolee living with parolee has a legitimate expectation of privacy in shared living quarters, but a warrantless search authorized as a condition of parole can reasonably extend to all areas in which the parolee and non-parolee enjoy common authority. Evidence found in such a search may be used against the non-parolee. State v. West, 185 W (2d) 68, 517 NW (2d) 482 (1994).
Failure to conduct a probable cause hearing within 48 hours of arrest is not a jurisdictional defect and not grounds for dismissal with prejudice or voiding of a subsequent conviction unless the delay prejudiced the defendant;'s right to present a defense. State v. Golden, 185 W (2d) 763, 519 NW (2d) 659 (Ct. App. 1994).
Evidence obtained in consensual search of defendant's car where the consent was given during an illegal search was admissible as the evidence was not "come at" by information learned in the interrogation. State v. Goetsch, 186 W (2d) 1, 519 NW (2d) 634 (Ct. App. 1994).
A determination that an area was within a defendant's immediate control at the time of arrest does not give police authority to generally search the premises; only a limited search is justified. State v. Angiolo, 186 W (2d) 488, NW (2d) 923 (Ct. App. 1994).
The plain view exception applies if the following criteria are met: the officer must have prior justification for being present, the evidence must be in plain view and its discovery inadvertent and the seized item and facts known by the officer at the time of seizure must provide probable cause to believe there is a connection between a crime and the evidence. State v. Angiolo, 186 W (2d) 488, NW (2d) 923 (Ct. App. 1994).
Permission to search a vehicle for weapons did allow the officer to open a film cannister discovered in the search as it could not have contained a weapon and its contents were not in plain view. State v. Johnson, 187 W (2d) 237 , ___ NW (2d) ___ (Ct. App. 1994).
Warrantless, non-exigent, felony arrest in public was constitutional despite opportunity to obtain warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 US 411.
Where driver was stopped because of expired license plates, police order to get out of car was reasonable and subsequent "pat down" based on observed bulge under driver's jacket resulted in legal seizure of unlicensed revolver. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 US 106 (1977).
Warrantless installation of pen register, which recorded telephone numbers called but not contents of calls, did not violate Fourth Amendment. Smith v. Maryland, 442 US 735 (1979).
Warrantless search of suitcase in trunk of taxi was unconstitutional. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 US 753 (1979).
Police may not make warrantless and nonconsensual entry into suspect's home in order to make routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 US 573 (1980).
Fact that police had lawful possession of pornographic film boxes did not give them authority to search their contents. Walter v. United States, 447 US 649 (1980).
Search of jacket lying in passenger compartment of car was incident to lawful custodial arrest which justified infringement of any privacy interest arrestee may have. New York v. Belton, 453 US 454 (1981).
Officer who accompanied arrested person to residence to obtain identification properly seized contraband in plain view. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 US 1 (1982).
Officers who have legitimately stopped automobile and who have probable cause to believe contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct warrantless search of vehicle as thorough as could be authorized by warrant. United States v. Ross, 456 US 798 (1982).
Where damaged shipping package was examined by company employes who discovered white powder, subsequent warrantless field test by police was constitutional. U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 US 109 (1984).
"Open fields" doctrine discussed. Oliver v. U.S. 466 US 170 (1984).
Warrantless, nighttime entry of defendant's home for arrest for civil, nonjailable traffic offense was not justified under "hot pursuit" doctrine or preservation of evidence doctrine. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 US 740 (1984).
School officials need not obtain warrant before searching student; legality of search depends simply on reasonableness, under all circumstances, of search. New Jersey v. T. L. O. 469 US 325 (1985).
Where officers were entitled to seize packages in vehicle and could have searched them immediately without warrant, warrantless search of packages 3 days later was reasonable. United States v. Johns, 469 US 478 (1985).
Vehicle exception for warrantless search applies to motor homes. California v. Carney, 471 US 386 (1985).
Good faith exception to exclusionary rule applies where officer reasonably relies upon statute allowing warrantless administrative search which was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 480 US 340 (1987).
Protective sweep of residence in conjunction with arrest is permissible if law enforcement reasonably believes that area harbors individual posing danger to officers or others. Maryland v. Buie, 494 US 325, 108 LEd 2d 276 (1990).
"Inadvertence" is not necessary condition to "plain view" seizure. Horton v. California, 496 US 128, 110 LEd 2d 112 (1990).
Determination of probable cause made within 48 hours of warrantless arrest generally meets promptness requirement; if hearing is held more than 48 hours following arrest the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate emergency or extraordinary circumstances. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 US 44, 114 LEd 2d 49 (1991).
Officer's opening of closed bag found on floor of suspect's car during search of car made with suspect's consent was not unreasonable. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 US 248, 114 LEd 2d 297 (1991).
There shall be one rule governing all automobile searches; the police may search the car and all containers within it without a warrant where they have probable cause to believe contain contraband or evidence is contained. California v. Acevedo, 500 US 565, 114 LEd 2d 619 (1991).
If during a lawful weapons pat down an officer feels an object whose contours or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 US ___, 124 LEd 2d 334 (1993).
State v. Seibel: Wisconsin Police Now Need Only a Reasonable Suspicion to Search a Suspect's Blood Incident to an Arrest. Armstrong. 1993 WLR 563.
I,12 Attainder; ex post facto; contracts. Section 12. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
45.37 (9), Stats. 1963, constituted a contract as to the property an applicant for admission to the Grand Army Home had to surrender, and to apply a later amendment would be unconstitutional. Estate of Nottingham, 46 W (2d) 580, 175 NW (2d) 640.
Although the obligation of contract is not an absolute right but one that may yield to the compelling interest of the public, the public purpose served by a law mandating rent reductions due to property tax relief is not so vital so as to permit such impairment of contract. State ex rel. Bldg. Owners v. Adamany, 64 W (2d) 280, 219 NW (2d) 274.
Retroactive application of 57.06, 1987 stats. [now 304.06] as amended in 1973, increasing the period to be served by petitioners, state prison inmates, from 2 to 5 years before they are eligible for parole consideration, imposes an additional penalty and violates the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. State ex rel. Mueller v. Powers, 64 W (2d) 643, 221 NW (2d) 692.
Challenge by the creditor to the constitutionality of the entire Wisconsin Consumer Act, by reason of alleged balance or imbalance of remedies available respectively to creditor and debtor, cannot be considered on the factual situation presented. Smith v. Burns, 65 W (2d) 638, 223 NW (2d) 562.
The legislative preclusion against the State Medical Society's divesting itself of control of ch. 148, disability plans does not constitute any impairment of the Society's charter because: (1) The grant of ch. 148 powers is permissive and voluntarily exercised by the Society; (2) the ch. 148 grant is in the nature of a franchise rather than a contract and cannot be viewed as unalterable or it would constitute a delegation of inalienable legislative power; and (3) the constitutional interdiction against statutes impairing contracts does not prevent the state from exercising its police powers for the common good. State Medical Society v. Comm. of Insurance, 70 W (2d) 144, 233 NW (2d) 470.
Where probation statute was amended after crime was committed but before accused pled guilty and was placed on probation, application of amended statute to probation revocation proceedings offended ex post facto clause. State v. White, 97 W (2d) 517, 294 NW (2d) 36 (Ct. App. 1979).
Challenge to legislation must prove 1) legislation impairs existing contractual relationship; 2) impairment is substantial; and 3) if substantial, impairment is not justified by purpose of legislation. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 108 W (2d) 637, 323 NW (2d) 173 (Ct. App. 1982).
Retroactive application of 46.03 (22) doesn't violate this section. Overlook Farms v. Alternative Living, 143 W (2d) 485, 422 NW (2d) 131 (Ct. App. 1988).
Ex post facto prohibition applies to judicial pronouncements as well as legislative acts; the question to be addressed is whether the new law criminalizes conduct which was innocent when committed. State v. Kurzawa, 180 W (2d) 502, 509 NW (2d) 712 (1993).
Legislation creating penalty enhancers resulting from convictions prior to the effective date does not run afoul of the ex post facto clause. State v. Schuman, 186 W (2d) 213, 520 NW (2d) 107 (Ct. App. 1994).
Constitutionality of rent control discussed. 62 Atty. Gen. 276.
I,13 Private property for public use. Section 13. The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor.
A dismissal of an appeal for lack of prosecution in a condemnation action does not violate condemnee's right to just compensation. Taylor v. State Highway Comm. 45 W (2d) 490, 173 NW (2d) 707.
Total rental loss occasioned by the condemnation is compensable, and the limitation to one year's loss in 32.19 (4), 1969 Stats., is invalid. Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 W (2d) 271, 177 NW (2d) 380.
A prohibition against filling in wetlands pursuant to an ordinance adopted under 59.971 and 144.26 does not amount to a taking of property unconstitutionally. Police powers vs. eminent domain discussed. Just v. Marinette County, 56 W (2d) 7, 201 NW (2d) 761.
A special assessment against a railroad for a sanitary sewer laid along the railroad's right-of-way, admittedly of no immediate use or benefit to the railroad, does not constitute a violation of this section. Soo Line RR. Co v. Neenah, 64 W (2d) 665, 221 NW (2d) 907.
In order for the petitioner to succeed in the initial stages of the inverse condemnation proceeding, it must allege facts that, prima facie at least, show there has been either an occupation of its property under 32.10, or a taking, which must be compensated under the terms of the Wisconsin Constitution. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. 66 W (2d) 720, 226 NW (2d) 185.
The owners of private wells ordered by the department of natural resources to seal them because of bacteriological danger are not entitled to compensation, because such orders were a proper exercise of the state's police power to prevent a public harm, for which compensation is not required. Village of Sussex v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 68 W (2d) 187, 228 NW (2d) 173.
There must be a "taking" of property to justify compensation. DeBruin v. Green County, 72 W (2d) 464, 241 NW (2d) 167.
Condemnation power discussed. See also notes to 32.06 and 32.07 citing this case. Falkner v. Northern States Power Co. 75 W (2d) 116, 248 NW (2d) 885.
Ordering utility to place its power lines underground in order to expand airport constituted a taking because the public benefited from the enlarged airport. Public Service Corp. v. Marathon County, 75 W (2d) 442, 249 NW (2d) 543.
For inverse condemnation purposes, taking can occur absent physical invasion only where there is legally imposed restriction upon property's use. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. 92 W (2d) 74, 284 NW (2d) 887 (1979).
Doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot bar action for just compensation based on taking of private property for public use even though legislature has failed to establish specific provisions for recovery of just compensation. Zinn v. State, 112 W (2d) 417, 334 NW (2d) 67 (1983).
Zoning classification unconstitutionally deprived owners of property without due process of law. State ex rel. Nagawicka Is. Corp. v. Delafield, 117 W (2d) 23, 343 NW (2d) 816 (Ct. App. 1983).
Ordering riparian owner to excavate and maintain ditch to regulate lake level was unconstitutional taking of property. Otte v. DNR, 142 W (2d) 222, 418 NW (2d) 16 (Ct. App. 1987).
In absence of physical occupancy or possession property is "taken" for public use only by action which imposes legally enforceable restriction on use and deprives owner of significant portion of use. Reel Enterprises v. City of LaCrosse, 146 W (2d) 662, 431 NW (2d) 743 (Ct. App. 1988).
Discussion of operation of this section. W.H. Pugh Coal Co., 157 W (2d) 620, 460 NW (2d) 787 (Ct. App. 1990).
A taking by government restriction occurs only if the restriction deprives the owner of all or practically all use. Busse v. Dane County Regional Planning Comm. 181 W (2d) 527, 510 NW (2d) 136 (Ct. App. 1993).
New York law that landlord must permit cable television company to install cable facilities upon property was compensable taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 US 419 (1982).
State land use regulation preventing beachfront development which rendered owner's land valueless constituted a taking; when a regulation foreclosing all productive economic use of land goes beyond what "relevant background principals", such as nuisance law, would dictate, compensation must be paid. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US ___, 120 LEd 2d 798 (1992).
