History: 1977 c. 126
; 1989 a. 31
Sentence, terms, escapes. 973.15(1)
Except as provided in s. 973.032
, all sentences to the Wisconsin state prisons shall be for one year or more. Except as otherwise provided in this section, all sentences commence at noon on the day of sentence, but time which elapses after sentence while the convicted offender is at large on bail shall not be computed as any part of the term of imprisonment.
Except as provided in par. (b)
, the court may impose as many sentences as there are convictions and may provide that any such sentence be concurrent with or consecutive to any other sentence imposed at the same time or previously.
The court may not impose a sentence to the intensive sanctions program consecutive to any other sentence. The court may not impose a sentence to the intensive sanctions program concurrent with a sentence imposing imprisonment, except that the court may impose a sentence to the program concurrent with an imposed and stayed imprisonment sentence or with a prison sentence for which the offender has been released on parole. The court may impose concurrent intensive sanctions program sentences. The court may impose an intensive sanctions program sentence concurrent to probation. The court may impose any sentence for an escape from a sentence to the intensive sanctions program concurrent with the sentence to the intensive sanctions program.
Courts may impose sentences to be served in whole or in part concurrently with a sentence being served or to be served in a federal institution or an institution of another state.
When a court orders a sentence to the Wisconsin state prisons to be served in whole or in part concurrently with a sentence being served or to be served in a federal institution or an institution of another state:
The court shall order the department to immediately inform the appropriate authorities in the jurisdiction where the prior sentence is to be served that the convicted offender is presently available to commence or resume serving that sentence; and
The trial and commitment records required under s. 973.08
shall be delivered immediately to the warden or superintendent of the Wisconsin institution designated as the reception center to receive the convicted offender when he or she becomes available to Wisconsin authorities.
A convicted offender who is made available to another jurisdiction under ch. 976
or in any other lawful manner shall be credited with service of his or her Wisconsin sentence or commitment under the terms of s. 973.155
for the duration of custody in the other jurisdiction.
(6) Sections 302.11
are applicable to an inmate serving a sentence to the Wisconsin state prisons but confined in a federal institution or an institution in another state.
If a convicted offender escapes, the time during which he or she is unlawfully at large after escape shall not be computed as service of the sentence.
The sentencing court may stay execution of a sentence of imprisonment or to the intensive sanctions program only:
If a court sentences a person under s. 973.03 (5) (b)
, this subsection applies only to the first period of imprisonment.
Judicial Council Note, 1981: Sub. (2) has been simplified to allow a court, in imposing a criminal sentence, to order that it be concurrent with or consecutive to any other sentence imposed at the same time or previously. The prior statute, although lengthier and more complicated, failed to achieve its apparent purpose of allowing consecutive sentencing in situations involving probation and parole revocations, escapes, etc. See Drinkwater v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 60
(1975); Guyton v. State, 69 Wis. 2d 663
(1975); Bruneau v. State, 77 Wis. 2d 166
(1977); Smith v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 650
(1978); and Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306
This revision allows sentences to be made consecutive to any previously or simultaneously imposed sentence, without regard to whether the offender is "then serving" such sentence, is subject to parole revocation proceedings, or has received a new sentence between the time of an escape and a return to a state facility. The revised statute also governs the sentencing of probationers by virtue of the cross-references in ss. 973.09 (1) (a) and 973.10 (2) (a). [Bill 341-A]
Judicial Council Note, 1981: Sub. (8) has been added to specify the circumstances under which execution of a sentence of imprisonment may be stayed. Par. (a) references the rule of Reinex v. State, 51 Wis. 152 (1881) and Weston v. State, 28 Wis. 2d 136
(1965), whereby execution can be stayed for "legal cause", such as during the pendency of an appeal. Par. (b) cross-references the probation statute. Par. (c) is new. It allows the court to delay the commencement of a sentence for up to 60 days. The Wisconsin supreme court recently held that courts have no authority to stay execution of a sentence of imprisonment in the absence of such a statutory provision or legal cause. State v. Braun, 100 Wis. 2d 77
(1981). [Bill 736-A]
Under subs. 973.15 (2) and (3), 1979 stats., state court may impose sentence consecutive to out-of-state sentence. State v. Toy, 125 W (2d) 216, 371 NW (2d) 386 (Ct. App. 1985).
Sentencing court has authority to stay sentence and order it be served consecutive to s. 345.47 and 973.07 commitment for failure to pay fine and penalty assessment. State v. Strohbeen, 147 W (2d) 566, 433 NW (2d) 288 (Ct. App. 1988).
Defendant is entitled to credit against sentence for period during which he was denied admission to county jail due to overcrowding, however, defendant is not entitled to credit for time as of date he was to have reported to jail to serve sentence. State v. Riske, 152 W (2d) 260, 448 NW (2d) 260 (Ct. App. 1989).
Primary factors to be considered in exercising discretion in sentencing are gravity of offense, rehabilitative needs of defendant and protection of public. State v. Paske, 163 W (2d) 52, 471 NW (2d) 55 (1991).
An adult sentence cannot run consecutive to a juvenile disposition. State v. Woods, 173 W (2d) 129, 496 NW (2d) 144 (Ct. App. 1992).
Overcrowding doesn't constitute legal cause under (8) (a). 76 Atty. Gen. 165
A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed. As used in this subsection, "actual days spent in custody" includes, without limitation by enumeration, confinement related to an offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of the same course of conduct, which occurs:
While the offender is awaiting imposition of sentence after trial.
The categories in par. (a)
include custody of the convicted offender which is in whole or in part the result of a probation or parole hold under s. 304.06 (3)
or 973.10 (2)
placed upon the person for the same course of conduct as that resulting in the new conviction.
After the imposition of sentence, the court shall make and enter a specific finding of the number of days for which sentence credit is to be granted, which finding shall be included in the judgment of conviction. In the case of revocation of probation or parole, the department, if the hearing is waived, or the division of hearings and appeals in the department of administration, in the case of a hearing, shall make such a finding, which shall be included in the revocation order.
The credit provided in sub. (1)
shall be computed as if the convicted offender had served such time in the institution to which he or she has been sentenced.
The credit provided in sub. (1)
shall include earned good time for those inmates subject to s. 302.43
, 303.07 (3)
or 303.19 (3)
serving sentences of one year or less and confined in a county jail, house of correction or county reforestation camp.
If this section has not been applied at sentencing to any person who is in custody or to any person who is on probation or parole, the person may petition the department to be given credit under this section. Upon proper verification of the facts alleged in the petition, this section shall be applied retroactively to the person. If the department is unable to determine whether credit should be given, or otherwise refuses to award retroactive credit, the person may petition the sentencing court for relief. This subsection applies to any person, regardless of the date he or she was sentenced.
A defendant aggrieved by a determination by a court under this section may appeal in accordance with s. 809.30
This section grants credit for each day in custody regardless of basis for confinement as long as it is connected to offense for which sentence is imposed. State v. Gilbert, 115 W (2d) 371, 340 NW (2d) 511 (1983).
Where intended sentence was valid, but judge did not follow procedures under this section, appropriate remedy was to modify sentence to conform it to requirements of this section. State v. Walker, 117 W (2d) 579, 345 NW (2d) 413 (1984).
"Custody" must result from occurrence of legal event, process, or authority which occasions, or is related to, confinement on charge for which accused is ultimately sentenced. State v. Demars, 119 W (2d) 19, 349 NW (2d) 708 (Ct. App. 1984).
Where offender committed robbery and 24 hours later fled from officer, offender was not entitled to credit toward robbery sentence for time served under sentence for fleeing officer. State v. Gavigan, 122 W (2d) 389, 362 NW (2d) 162 (Ct. App. 1984).
Where probationer is arrested for second crime and consequently begins serving time for first crime, no credit towards second sentence is required for time served under first sentence. State v. Beets, 124 W (2d) 372, 369 NW (2d) 382 (1985).
No credit was due for time spent in drug treatment facility as condition of probation where defendant was not in actual "custody" at facility within meaning of this section and 946.42. State v. Cobb, 135 W (2d) 181, 400 NW (2d) 9 (Ct. App. 1986).
Credit under this section is given on a day-to-day basis, which isn't to be duplicatively credited to more than one consecutive sentence. State v. Boettcher, 144 W (2d) 86, 423 NW (2d) 533 (1988).
Defendant not entitled to credit against sentence for time spent under home detention. State v. Pettis, 149 W (2d) 207, 441 NW (2d) 247 (Ct. App. 1989).
Pre-sentence credit must be applied to each of the concurrent terms to which defendant is sentenced. State v. Ward, 153 W (2d) 743, 452 NW (2d) 158 (Ct. App. 1989).
Out of state presentence confinement while defendant was on parole from Wisconsin may not be credited against subsequent reconfinement in Wisconsin for parole violation. State v. Rohl, 160 W (2d) 325, 466 NW (2d) 208 (Ct. App. 1991).
Where waiver of juvenile jurisdiction is granted, secure juvenile detention time is eligible for credit consideration under this section as if it were jail time, retroactive to the date of the filing of the juvenile petition. State v. Baker, 179 W (2d) 655, 508 NW (2d) 40 (Ct. App. 1993).
A person subject to home detention under s. 302.425 is not "in custody" and therefore is not entitled to sentence credit for time served under s. 973.155. State v. Swadley, 190 W (2d) 139, 526 NW (2d) 778 (Ct. App. 1994).
Department may not grant jail credit where it is not provided for by statute. 71 Atty. Gen. 102
Sentence Credit: More Than Just Math. White. Wis. Law. Oct. 1991.
If an order or judgment releasing a prisoner on habeas corpus is reversed, the time during which the prisoner was at liberty thereunder shall not be counted as part of the prisoner's term.
History: 1993 a. 486
Judgment against a corporation or limited liability company. 973.17(1)(1)
If a corporation or limited liability company fails to appear within the time required by the summons, the default of such corporation or limited liability company may be recorded and the charge against it taken as true, and judgment shall be rendered accordingly.
Upon default of the defendant corporation or limited liability company or upon conviction, judgment for the amount of the fine shall be entered.
A judgment against a corporation or limited liability company shall be collected in the same manner as in civil actions.
History: 1993 a. 112
Notice of rights to appeal and representation. 973.18(1)(1)
In this section, "postconviction relief" and "sentencing" have the meanings ascribed in s. 809.30 (1)
The trial judge shall personally inform the defendant at the time of sentencing of the right to seek postconviction relief and, if indigent, the right to the assistance of the state public defender.
Before adjourning the sentencing proceeding, the judge shall direct the defendant and defendant's trial counsel to sign a form to be entered in the record, indicating that the lawyer has counseled the defendant regarding the decision to seek postconviction relief, and that the defendant understands that a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief must be filed in the trial court within 20 days after sentencing for that right to be preserved.
The judge shall direct the defendant's counsel to confer with the defendant before signing the form, during the proceeding or as soon thereafter as practicable, and may make appropriate orders to allow the defendant to confer with counsel before being transferred to the state prison. The defendant shall be given a copy of the form.
If the defendant desires to pursue postconviction relief, the defendant's trial counsel shall file the notice required by s. 809.30 (2) (b)
History: Sup. Ct. Order, 123 W (2d) xi (1985).
Judicial Council Note, 1984: Sub. (2) is similar to prior s. 809.30 (1) (b). Subs. (3) and (4) codify State v. Argiz, 101 Wis. 2d 546
, 305 N.W. 2d 124
(1981). Sub. (5) codifies trial counsel's continuing duty to provide representation until appellate counsel is retained or appointed. Whitmore v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 706
, 203 NW 2d 56 (1973). [Re order effective July 1, 1985]
Motion to modify sentence. 973.19(1)(a)(a)
A person sentenced to imprisonment or the intensive sanctions program or ordered to pay a fine who has not requested the preparation of transcripts under s. 809.30 (2)
may, within 90 days after the sentence or order is entered, move the court to modify the sentence or the amount of the fine.
Within 90 days after a motion under sub. (1) (a)
is filed, the court shall enter an order either determining the motion or extending the time for doing so by not more than 90 days for cause.
If an order determining a motion under sub. (1) (a)
is not entered timely under sub. (2)
, the motion shall be considered denied and the clerk of the court shall immediately enter an order denying the motion.
An appeal from an order determining a motion under sub. (1) (a)
is governed by the procedure for civil appeals.
By filing a motion under sub. (1) (a)
the defendant waives his or her right to file an appeal or postconviction motion under s. 809.30 (2)
Sup. Ct. Order, 123 W (2d) xiv (1985); 1991 a. 39
Judicial Council Note, 1984: This section is intended as an expeditious alternative to the procedure prescribed in s. 809.30 (2) when the only claim for postconviction relief relates to the severity of the sentence. It is not intended to alter the substantive grounds for such relief and it restores the time limits governing such motions prior to the 1978 revision of the appellate rules.
This section will probably be most frequently used in guilty plea cases, although it is not limited to such cases. However, if the defendant intends to withdraw a guilty plea or file other postconviction motions, s. 809.30 (2) or 974.06 provides the appropriate procedure. Motions under this section should usually be filed by trial counsel without the need for transcripts or for appointment of an appellate public defender. A defendant must elect between the remedies provided by this section and s. 809.30 (2). Filing a motion under this section waives relief under s. 809.30 (2). However, a defendant who has filed a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief under s. 809.30 (2) (b) may invoke this remedy at any time before transcripts are ordered under s. 809.30 (2). If transcripts are required for prosecution of a motion under sub. (1) (a), they should be sought under SCR 71.03
Sub. (4) does not expand the scope of appellate review. [Re Order effective July 1, 1985.]
Are two alternative means to seek modification of sentence, proceeding under (1) (a) or (b); under either, motion must be first made in trial court. State v. Norwood, 161 W (2d) 676, 468 NW (2d) 741 (Ct. App. 1991).
"Crime considered at sentencing" means any crime for which the defendant was convicted and any read-in crime.
"Read-in crime" means any crime that is uncharged or that is dismissed as part of a plea agreement, that the defendant agrees to be considered by the court at the time of sentencing and that the court considers at the time of sentencing the defendant for the crime for which the defendant was convicted.
When imposing sentence or ordering probation for any crime for which the defendant was convicted, the court, in addition to any other penalty authorized by law, shall order the defendant to make full or partial restitution under this section to any victim of a crime considered at sentencing or, if the victim is deceased, to his or her estate, unless the court finds substantial reason not to do so and states the reason on the record. Restitution ordered under this section is a condition of probation or parole served by the defendant for a crime for which the defendant was convicted. After the termination of probation or parole, or if the defendant is not placed on probation or parole, restitution ordered under this section is enforceable in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action by the victim named in the order to receive restitution or enforced under ch. 785