Police may not make a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
The fact that police had lawful possession of pornographic film boxes did not give them authority to search their contents. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
The search of a jacket lying in the passenger compartment of a car was incident to a lawful custodial arrest that justified th infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
An officer who accompanied an arrestee to the arrestee's residence to obtain identification properly seized contraband in plain view. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
Officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thorough as could be authorized by warrant. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
Where a damaged shipping package was examined by company employes who discovered white powder, a subsequent warrantless field test by police was constitutional. U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
The "open fields" doctrine discussed. Oliver v. U.S. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
The warrantless, nighttime entry of the defendant's home for arrest for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense was not justified under the "hot pursuit" doctrine or the preservation of evidence doctrine. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student. The legality of the search depends on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search. New Jersey v. T. L. O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
Where officers were entitled to seize packages in a vehicle and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, a warrantless search of the packages 3 days later was reasonable. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
The vehicle exception for warrantless search applies to motor homes. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies where an officer reasonably relies upon a statute allowing a warrantless administrative search that was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
A protective sweep of a residence in conjunction with an arrest is permissible if law enforcement reasonably believes that the area harbors an individual posing a danger to officers or others. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990).
"Inadvertence" is not a necessary condition to a "plain view" seizure. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990).
A determination of probable cause made within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest generally meets the promptness requirement. If a hearing is held more than 48 hours following the arrest the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate an emergency or extraordinary circumstances. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991).
An officer's opening of a closed bag found on the floor of a suspect's car during a search of the car made with suspect's consent was not unreasonable. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991).
There shall be one rule governing all automobile searches. The police may search the car and all containers within it without a warrant where they have probable cause to believe contain contraband or evidence is contained. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991).
If during a lawful weapons pat down an officer feels an object whose contours or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993).
An officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the vehicle pending the completion of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997).
Persons observed through a window in a home where they were not overnight guests but were present for a short period to engage in a primarily commercial illegal drug transaction, had no expectation of privacy in the home and the observation of those persons was not a constitutionally prohibited search. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998).
The issuance of a traffic citation without an arrest did not authorize a full search of the vehicle. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998).
When there is probable cause to search a vehicle for contraband officers may examine containers in the vehicle without a showing of individualized probable cause for each container. The container may be searched whether or not it's owner is present as a passenger, or otherwise, because it may contain contraband that the officers reasonably believe is in the car. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999).
Police need not obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle is forfeitable contraband. Florida v. White, 526 US 559, 143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999).
The exception to the requirement of a warrant for automobiles does not require a separate finding of exigency, in addition to a finding of probable cause. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 144 L.Ed. 2d 442 (1999).
When there is probable cause to search a motor vehicle, the search is not unreasonable if the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, although a warrant was not obtained. No separate finding of exigent circumstances is required. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).
There is no murder scene exception to the warrant requirement. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 145 L.Ed. 2d 16 (1999).
Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 US 119, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).
An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more, is insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of a person. The tip must bear indicia of reliability. Reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of criminal activity, not just in its tendency to to identify a person. Florida v. J.L. 529 US ___, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000).
State v. Seibel: Wisconsin Police Now Need Only a Reasonable Suspicion to Search a Suspect's Blood Incident to an Arrest. Armstrong. 1993 WLR 563.
I,12 Attainder; ex post facto; contracts. Section 12. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
Section 45.37 (9), Stats. 1963, constituted a contract as to the property an applicant for admission to the Grand Army Home had to surrender, and to apply a later amendment would be unconstitutional. Estate of Nottingham, 46 Wis. 2d 580, 175 N.W.2d 640.
Although the obligation of contract is not an absolute right but one that may yield to the compelling interest of the public, the public purpose served by a law mandating rent reductions due to property tax relief is not so vital so as to permit such an impairment of contract. State ex rel. Bldg. Owners v. Adamany, 64 Wis. 2d 280, 219 N.W.2d 274.
Retroactive application of 57.06, 1987 stats. [now 304.06] as amended in 1973, increasing the period to be served by petitioners, state prison inmates, from 2 to 5 years before they are eligible for parole consideration, imposes an additional penalty and violates the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. State ex rel. Mueller v. Powers, 64 Wis. 2d 643, 221 N.W.2d 692.
The legislative preclusion against the State Medical Society's divesting itself of control of ch. 148, disability plans does not constitute any impairment of the Society's charter because: 1) The grant of ch. 148 powers is permissive and voluntarily exercised by the Society; 2) the ch. 148 grant is in the nature of a franchise rather than a contract and cannot be viewed as unalterable or it would constitute a delegation of inalienable legislative power; and 3) the constitutional interdiction against statutes impairing contracts does not prevent the state from exercising its police powers for the common good. State Medical Society v. Comm. of Insurance, 70 Wis. 2d 144, 233 N.W.2d 470.
Where a probation statute was amended after a crime was committed but before the accused pled guilty and was placed on probation, application of the amended statute to probation revocation proceedings offended ex post facto clause. State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 517, 294 N.W.2d 36 (Ct. App. 1979).
A challenge to legislation must prove 1) the legislation impairs an existing contractual relationship, 2) the impairment is substantial and 3) if substantial, the impairment is not justified by the purpose of the legislation. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 108 Wis. 2d 637, 323 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1982).
The ex post facto prohibition applies to judicial pronouncements as well as legislative acts. The question to be addressed is whether the new law criminalizes conduct that was innocent when committed. State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 509 N.W.2d 712 (1993).
Legislation creating penalty enhancers resulting from convictions prior to the effective date does not run afoul of the ex post facto clause. State v. Schuman, 186 Wis. 2d 213, 520 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1994).
An ex post facto law is one that punishes as a crime an act previously committed, that 1) was innocent when done, 2) makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission or 3) deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available at the time the act was committed. State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994).
Constitutionality of rent control discussed. 62 Atty. Gen. 276.
I,13 Private property for public use. Section 13. The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor.
The dismissal of an appeal for lack of prosecution in a condemnation action does not violate the condemnee's right to just compensation. Taylor v. State Highway Comm. 45 Wis. 2d 490, 173 N.W.2d 707.
The total rental loss occasioned by the condemnation is compensable, and a limitation to one year's loss is invalid. Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380.
A prohibition against filling in wetlands pursuant to an ordinance adopted under ss. 59.971 and 144.26 [now 59.692 and 281.31] does not amount to a taking of property. Police powers vs. eminent domain discussed. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761.
A special assessment against a railroad for a sanitary sewer laid along the railroad's right-of-way, admittedly of no immediate use or benefit to the railroad, does not constitute a violation of this section. Soo Line RR. Co v. Neenah, 64 Wis. 2d 665, 221 N.W.2d 907.
In order for the petitioner to succeed in the initial stages of an inverse condemnation proceeding, it must allege facts that, prima facie at least, show there has been either an occupation of its property under 32.10, or a taking, which must be compensated under the terms of the Wisconsin Constitution. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. 66 Wis. 2d 720, 226 N.W.2d 185.
The owners of private wells ordered by the department of natural resources to seal them because of bacteriological danger are not entitled to compensation, because such orders were a proper exercise of the state's police power to prevent a public harm, for which compensation is not required. Village of Sussex v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 68 Wis. 2d 187, 228 N.W.2d 173.
There must be a "taking" of property to justify compensation. DeBruin v. Green County, 72 Wis. 2d 464, 241 N.W.2d 167.
Condemnation powers are discussed. Falkner v. Northern States Power Co. 75 Wis. 2d 116, 248 N.W.2d 885.
Ordering a utility to place its power lines under ground in order to expand an airport constituted a taking because the public benefited from the enlarged airport. Public Service Corp. v. Marathon County, 75 Wis. 2d 442, 249 N.W.2d 543.
For inverse condemnation purposes, a taking can occur absent a physical invasion only where there is a legally imposed restriction upon the property's use. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. 92 Wis. 2d 74, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot bar an action for just compensation based on the taking of private property for public use even though legislature has failed to establish specific provisions for recovery of just compensation. Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
Zoning classifications may unconstitutionally deprive property owners of due process of law. State ex rel. Nagawicka Is. Corp. v. Delafield, 117 Wis. 2d 23, 343 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1983).
Ordering a riparian owner to excavate and maintain a ditch to regulate a lake level was an unconstitutional taking of property. Otte v. DNR, 142 Wis. 2d 222, 418 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1987).
The operation of this section is discussed. W.H. Pugh Coal Co. 157 Wis. 2d 620, 460 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1990).
A taking by government restriction occurs only if the restriction deprives the owner of all or practically all use. Busse v. Dane County Regional Planning Comm. 181 Wis. 2d 527, 510 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1993).
A taking claim is not ripe for judicial review until the government agency charged with implementing applicable regulations has made a final decision applying the regulations to the property at issue. Taking claims based on equal protection or due process grounds must meet the ripeness requirement. Streff v. Town of Delafield, 190 Wis. 2d 348, 526 N.W.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1994).
Damage to property is not compensated as a taking. For flooding to be a taking it must constitute a permanent physical occupation of property. Menick v. City of Menasha, 200 Wis. 2d 737, 547 N.W.2d 778 (Ct. App. 1996).
A constructive taking occurs when government regulation renders a property useless for all practical purposes. Taking jurisprudence does not allow dividing the property into segments and determining whether rights in a particular segment have been abrogated. Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 201 Wis. 2d 365, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996).
Section 32.10 does not govern inverse condemnation proceedings seeking just compensation for a temporary taking of land for public use. Such takings claims are based directly on Article I, section 13, of the constitution. Anderson v. Village of Little Chute, 201 Wis. 2d 467, 549 N.W.2d 561 (Ct. App. 1996).
The mandate of just compensation cannot be limited by statute or barred by sovereign immunity. Just compensation is not measured by the economic benefit to the state resulting from the taking, but by the property owner's loss. Just compensation is for property presently taken and necessarily means the property's present value presently paid, not its present value to be paid at some future time without interest. Retired Teachers Association v. Employe Trust Funds Board, 207 Wis. 2d 1, 558 N.W.2d 83 (1997).
When a state's constitution and statutes are silent as to the distribution of excess proceeds received when a tax lien is foreclosed on and the property is subsequently sold by the municipality, the municipality may constitutionally retain the proceeds as long as there has been notice sufficient to meet due process requirements. Due process does not require that notices state that should the tax lien be foreclosed and the property sold the municipality may retain all the proceeds. Ritter v. Ross, 207 Wis. 2d 477, 558 N.W.2d 909 (Ct. App. 1996).
The reversal of an agency decision by a court does not convert an action that might have otherwise been actionable as a taking into one that is not. Once there has been sufficient deprivation of use of property, there has been a taking even though the property owner regains full use of the land through rescission of the restriction. Eberle v. Dane County Board of Adjustment, 227 Wis. 2d 609, 595 N.W.2d 730 (1999).
When a regulatory taking claim is made, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) a government restriction or regulation is excessive and therefore constitutes a taking; and (2) any proffered compensation is unjust. Eberle v. Dane County Board of Adjustment, 227 Wis. 2d 609, 595 N.W.2d 730 (1999).
A condemnation of property for a highway that was never built because an alternative route was found constituted a temporary taking entitling the owner to compensation, but not to attorney fees as there is no authority to award fees for an action brought directly under this section. Stelpflug v. Town of Waukesha, 2000 WI 81, 236 Wis.2d 275, 612 N.W.2d 700.
A New York law that a landlord must permit a cable television company to install cable facilities upon property was a compensable taking. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
State land use regulation preventing beachfront development that rendered an owner's land valueless constituted a taking. When a regulation foreclosing all productive economic use of land goes beyond what "relevant background principals", such as nuisance law, would dictate, compensation must be paid. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992).
Seizure of private property in a forfeiture action under a warrant issued at an ex parte hearing to establish probable cause that a crime subjecting the property to forfeiture was committed, while possibly satisfying the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, was a taking of property without due process. United States v. Good Real Estate, 510 U.S. 43, 126 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1993).
A municipality requiring the dedication of private property for some future public use as a condition of obtaining a building permit must meet a "rough proportionality" test showing it made some individualized determination that the dedication is related in nature and extent to the proposed development. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994).
The backing of water so as to overflow the lands of an individual, or any other superinduced addition of water, earth, sand, or other material, if done under statutes authorizing it for the public benefit, is a taking within the meaning of Art. I, sec. 13. Pumpelly v. Green Bay and Miss. Canal Co. 13 Wall. (U.S.) 166.
Compensation for lost rents. 1971 WLR 657.
I,14 Feudal tenures; leases; alienation. Section 14. All lands within the state are declared to be allodial, and feudal tenures are prohibited. Leases and grants of agricultural land for a longer term than fifteen years in which rent or service of any kind shall be reserved, and all fines and like restraints upon alienation reserved in any grant of land, hereafter made, are declared to be void.
I,15 Equal property rights for aliens and citizens. Section 15. No distinction shall ever be made by law between resident aliens and citizens, in reference to the possession, enjoyment or descent of property.
I,16 Imprisonment for debt. Section 16. No person shall be imprisoned for debt arising out of or founded on a contract, expressed or implied.
Section 943.20 (1) (e), which criminalizes the failure to return rented personal property, does not unconstitutionally imprison one for debt. State v. Roth, 115 Wis. 2d 163, 339 N.W.2d 807 (Ct. App. 1983).
This section only prohibits imprisonment for debt arising out of or founded upon a contract. A court imposed support order is not a debt on a contract and prosecution and incarceration for criminal nonsupport does not violate this section. State v. Monarch, 230 Wis. 2d 542, 602 N.W.2d 179 (Ct. App. 1999).
I,17 Exemption of property of debtors. Section 17. The privilege of the debtor to enjoy the necessary comforts of life shall be recognized by wholesome laws, exempting a reasonable amount of property from seizure or sale for the payment of any debt or liability hereafter contracted.
I,18 Freedom of worship; liberty of conscience; state religion; public funds. Section 18. [As amended Nov. 1982] The right of every person to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of conscience shall never be infringed; nor shall any person be compelled to attend, erect or support any place of worship, or to maintain any ministry, without consent; nor shall any control of, or interference with, the rights of conscience be permitted, or any preference be given by law to any religious establishments or modes of worship; nor shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of religious societies, or religious or theological seminaries. [1979 J.R. 36, 1981 J.R. 29, vote Nov. 1982]
A statute authorizing a contract requiring the state to pay an amount to a Catholic university for the education of dental students violated the establishment clause by permitting the use of funds paid by the state to be used in support of the operating costs of the university generally and violated the free exercise clause by requiring regulations as to management and hiring by the university that were not restricted to the dental school. Warren v. Nusbaum, 55 Wis. 2d 316, 198 N.W.2d 650.
It is outside the province of a civil court to review the merits of a determination of a duly authorized ecclesiastical tribunal that has adhered to prescribed canonical procedure and that results in terminating a clergyman's relationship with his church. Olston v. Hallock, 55 Wis. 2d 687, 201 N.W.2d 35.
This section is not violated by the released time provisions of 118.155, where the statute accommodates rather than restricts the right of students to religious instruction, does not compel any student to participate in religious training, and does not involve the use or expenditure of public funds especially where the electorate approved an amendment to art. X, sec. 3, specifically authorizing enactment of a released time statute. State ex rel. Holt v. Thompson, 66 Wis. 2d 659, 225 N.W.2d 678.
For purposes of 121.51 (4), 1981 stats. [now 121.51 (1)] and in the absence of fraud or collusion, where a religious school demonstrates by its corporate charter and bylaws that it is independent of, and unaffiliated with, a religious denomination, further inquiry by the state would violate Art. I, sec. 18. Holy Trinity Community School v. Kahl, 82 Wis. 2d 139, 262 N.W.2d 210.
Refusal on religious grounds to send children to school was held to be a personal, philosophical choice by parents, rather than a protected religious expression. State v. Kasuboski, 87 Wis. 2d 407, 275 N.W.2d 101 (Ct. App. 1978).
The primary effect of health facilities authority under ch. 231, which fiances improvements for private, nonprofit health facilities, does not advance religion, nor does the chapter foster excessive entanglement between church and state. State ex rel. Wis. Health Fac. Auth. v. Lindner, 91 Wis. 2d 145, 280 N.W.2d 773 (1979).
Meals served by a religious order, in carrying out their religious work, were not, under the circumstances, subject to Wisconsin sales tax for that portion of charges made to guests for lodging, food, and use of order's facilities. Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981).
Tee state Equal Rights Division did not violate the free exercise clause by investigating a discrimination complaint brought by an employee of a religious school. Sacred Heart School Board, 157 Wis. 2d 638, 460 N.W.2d 430 (Ct. App 1990).
The test to determine whether the governmental aid offends the establishment clause is discussed. Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Thompson, 164 Wis. 2d 736, 476 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1991).
The free exercise clause does not excuse a person from compliance with a valid law. A visitation order intended to prevent a noncustodial parent from imposing his religion on his children was a reasonable protection of the custodial parent's statutory right to choose the children's religion. Lange v. Lange, 175 Wis. 2d 373, N.W.2d (Ct. App. 1993).
In setting a sentence, a court may consider a defendant's religious beliefs and practices only if a reliable nexus exists between the defendant's criminal conduct and those beliefs and practices. State v. Fuerst, 181 Wis. 2d 903, 512 N.W.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1994).