The contrast between percentage of black population of city, 17.2%, and percentage of black composition of "fixed wage" skilled craft positions available in city, 3.1%, evidenced a substantial disparity between proportion of minorities in general population and proportion in a specific job classification and was such as to establish a prima facie case of unlawful racial discrimination, absent a showing by city that statistical discrepancy resulted from causes other than racial discrimination. Crockett v. Grun, 388 F. Supp. 912.
Civil rights actions against municipalities discussed. Starstead v. City of Superior, 533 F. Supp. 1365 (1982).
Zoning—Equal protection. 1976 WLR 234.
Equal protection—Sex discrimination. 1976 WLR 330.
DUE PROCESS
Although a person may invoke the Fifth amendment in a civil case in order to protect himself from the use of such evidence against him in a subsequent criminal action, if he does so an inference against his interest may be drawn as a matter of law based upon an implied admission that a truthful answer would tend to prove that the witness had committed the criminal act or might constitute a criminal act, and is not based upon the condition that the witness is seeking relief or ought not to receive relief because he has invoked the privilege. Molloy v. Molloy, 46 Wis. 2d 682, 176 N.W.2d 292.
A school board's refusal to renew of a teacher' coaching duties in addition his to full-time teaching duties, without notice and hearing, did not violate his right to due process where no charge was made that reflected on him and invoked a protected liberty interest and where no legal right in the job gave rise to a protected property interest. Richards v. Board of Education, 58 Wis. 2d 444, 206 N.W.2d 597.
A property interest in employment conferred by state law is protected by the due process provisions of both the state and federal constitutions. State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council, 72 Wis. 2d 672, 242 N.W.2d 689.
The due process standard in juvenile proceeding is fundamental fairness. Basic requirements are discussed. In Interest of D.H. 76 Wis. 2d 286, 251 N.W.2d 196.
A permanent status public employe forfeits due process property interests in a job by accepting an inter-departmental promotion. DH&SS v. State Personnel Board, 84 Wis. 2d 675, 267 N.W.2d 644 (1978).
Where an attorney is permitted to withdraw on the day of trial without notice, due process requires granting a continuance. Sherman v. Heiser, 85 Wis. 2d 246, 270 N.W.2d 397 (1978).
Liberty interests in public employment are discussed. Nufer v. Village Bd. of Village of Palmyra, 92 Wis. 2d 289, 284 N.W.2d 649 (1979).
Where a city ordinance specified narrow grounds upon which civil service applicants may be screened out, an applicant had no right to know grounds for screen-out. Taplick v. City of Madison Personnel Board, 97 Wis. 2d 162, 293 N.W.2d 173 (1980).
Due process rights of a student at expulsion hearing are discussed. Racine Unified School Dist. v. Thompson, 107 Wis. 2d 657, 321 N.W.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1982).
Due process was not violated where a defendant was illegally arrested in an asylum state and involuntarily brought to trial. State v. Monje, 109 Wis. 2d 138, 325 N.W.2d 695 (1982).
Due process rights of a tenured professor who was alleged to have resigned were not protected by a hearing to determine eligibility for unemployment compensation. Patterson v. University Board of Regents, 119 Wis. 2d 570, 350 N.W.2d 612 (1984).
Attributes of property interests protected by due process are discussed. Waste Management of Wisconsin v. DNR, 128 Wis. 2d 59, 381 N.W.2d 318 (1986).
Due process rights of a probationer at a hearing to modify probation enumerated. State v. Hayes, 173 Wis. 2d 439, 496 N.W.2d 645 (Ct. App. 1992).
The tort of intentional denial of due precess is discussed. Old Tuckaway Assoc. v. City of Greenfield, 180 Wis. 2d 254, 509 N.W.2d 323 (Ct. App. 1993).
An inmate has a protected liberty interest in earned good-time credits and in not being placed in segregation. Post deprivation remedies provided by the state are adequate. Irby v. Macht, 184 Wis. 2d 831, 522 N.W.2d 9 (1994).
A property interest conferred by a statute subsequently amended to make an appointed governmental position at-will is terminated upon the conclusion of the appointing official's term of office. Unertl v. Dane County, 190 Wis. 2d 145, 526 N.W.2d 775 (Ct. App. 1994).
A procedural due process claim arises when there is a deprivation of a right without sufficient process. Generally a predeprivation hearing is required, but when a deprivation results form a random act of a state employe the question becomes the adequacy of postdeprivation remedies. Jones v. Dane County, 195 Wis. 2d 892, 537 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1995).
Substantive due process requires the state not to deprive its citizens of life, liberty and property without due process. Absent a special relationship, it does not impose an affirmative obligation upon the state to ensure the protection of those rights from a private actor, even when governmental aid may be necessary to secure a person's life, liberty or property. Jones v. Dane County, 195 Wis. 2d 892, 537 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1995).
Where a prisoner could not show that a period of segregated confinement which exceeded the time allowed by rule was not atypical of his prison life generally, there was no unconstitutional due process deprivation. The only time factor which courts will be concerned with in determining a procedural due process deprivation is the time the inmate is ultimately required to spend confined under the authority of the state. Chaney v. Renteria, 203 Wis. 2d 310, 554 N.W.2d 503 (Ct. App. 1996).
Foster children have a constitutional right under the due process clause to safe and secure placement in a foster home. Whether a public official violated that right will be determined based on a professional judgment standard. Kara B. v. Dane County, 205 Wis. 2d 140, 555 N.W.2d 630 (1996).
An inmate has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in not having his mandatory release date extended. Due process is violated in a prison discipline case when guilt is found if there is not "some evidence" that supports the finding of guilt. Santiago v. Ware, 205 Wis. 2d 295, 556 N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App. 1996).
A nonlawyer may not sign and file a notice of appeal on behalf of a corporation. To do so constitutes practicing law without a license in violation of s. 757.30 and voids the appeal. Requiring a lawyer to represent a corporation in filing the notice does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process. Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 209 Wis. 2d 187, 561 N.W.2d 718 (1997).
Whether to proceed with civil litigation or to hold it in abeyance while a party is incarcerated depends on the nature of the case, the practical concerns raised by the prisoner's appearance and the alternative methods available to provide the prisoner with access to the hearing. Marriage of Schmidt v. Schmidt, 212 Wis. 2d 405, 569 N.W.2d 74 (Ct. App. 1997).
The state and federal constitutions provide identical procedural due process and equal protection safeguards. County of Kenosha v. C. & S. Management, Inc. 223 Wis. 2d 373, 588 N.W.2d 236 (1999).
In a procedural due process claim, it is not the deprivation of property or liberty that is unconstitutional; it is the deprivation of property without due process of law. Arneson v. Jezwinski, 225 Wis. 2d 371, 592 N.W.2d 606 (1999).
Substantive due process guarantees protect citizens against arbitrary action of government. To violate substantive due process guarantees a decision must involve more than simple errors in law or an improper exercise of discretion; it must shock the conscience. Eternalist Foundation, Inc. v. City of Platteville, 225 Wis. 2d 759, 593 N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1999).
A criminal proceeding may be conclusive against a 3rd party only if the 3rd party and criminal defendant have sufficient identity of interest so that in the prior proceeding the 3rd party had a full opportunity to fairly adjudicate the issues leading to the conviction. If not the 3rd party's due process rights would be violated by application of issue preclusion. Paige K.B. v. Steven G.B. 226 Wis. 2d 210, 594 N.W.2d 370 (1999).
A deprivation of the due process right of a fair warning can occur, not only from vague statutory language, but also from unforeseeable and retroactive interpretation of that statutory language. Elections Board v. Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, 227 Wis. 2d 650, 597 N.W.2d 721 (1999).
The retroactive application of a substantive statute must meet the test of due process determined by by balancing the public interest served by retroactive application against the private interests that are overturned. Neiman v. American National Property & Casualty Co. 2000 WI 83, 236 Wis. 2d 411, 613 N.W.2d 160.
Prisoners' due process rights are discussed. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539.
Public high school students facing temporary suspension have property and liberty interests protected by due process. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565.
Garnishment of corporate bank accounts must comply with due process protections of Fuentes and Sniadach. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. 419 U.S. 601.
Wisconsin medical examining board does not deny due process by both investigating and adjudicating charge of professional misconduct. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35.
States may deny benefits to those who fail to prove they did not quit a job in order to obtain benefits. Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577.
Due process does not disqualify an agency as a decision-maker merely because of familiarity with the facts of a case. Hortonville Dist. v. Hortonville Ed. Asso. 426 U.S. 482.
Dismissal from medical school for academic deficiencies without a hearing did not violate the due process clause. Board of Curators, Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
Utility customers' due process rights were violated where the utility shut off service for nonpayment without advising the customers of available administrative procedures. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
A father's acquiescence in his daughter's desire to live with her mother in California did not confer jurisdiction over father in California courts. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
The due process clause was not violated when the IRS monitored a conversation with the defendant in violation of IRS rules. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
A state may not exercise quasi in rem jurisdiction over a defendant having no forum contacts by attacking the contractual obligation of defendant's insurer licensed in the state. Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
Involuntary transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital implicated protected liberty interests. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
The termination of appointed assistant public defenders, who were neither policymakers nor confidential employes, solely on grounds of political affiliation was a denial of first and fourteenth amendment rights. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
Segregation confinement of a prisoner without prior hearing may violate due process if postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5 (1980).
Where an accident involving only Wisconsin residents occurred in Wisconsin, the fact that the decedent had been employed in Minnesota conferred jurisdiction on Minnesota courts and Minnesota insurance law was applicable. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
The national democratic party has a protected right of political association and may not be compelled to seat delegates chosen in an open primary in violation of the party's rules. Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
A statute which required a putative father in a paternity suit to pay for blood tests denied due process to indigent putative fathers. Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
Due process does not require appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every parental status termination proceeding. Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
A life prisoner had no due process right to a statement of reasons why the board did not commute his life sentence. Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
An ordinance regulating sale of drug paraphernalia was constitutional. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
Revocation of probation for failure to pay a fine, without a determination that the probationer had not made a bona fide effort to pay or that alternate forms of punishment did not exist, denied due process and equal protection. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
Notice by publication did not satisfy due process requirements in a tax sale. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791 (1983).
A state's policy of preserving county boundaries in a reapportionment plan justified a population deviation averaging 13%. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835 (1983).
Discussion of a minority set-aside program held to violate due process. Richmond v. Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469, 102 L. Ed. 2d 854 (1989).
Discussion of abortion restrictions held to comply with constitutional protections. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv. 492 U.S. 490, 106 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1989).
Assuming that a competent person has a constitutional right to refuse treatment, a state may require clear and convincing evidence that incompetent patient desired withdrawal of treatment. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Health Dept. 497 U.S. 261, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1990).
Substantive due process is not violated by a police officer who causes death through deliberate or reckless indifference to life in a high speed chase aimed at apprehending a suspect. Only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest satisfies the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to the conscience necessary for a due process violation. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1043 (1998).
It is not a violation of the due process clause to tow an illegally parked car without first giving the owner notice and opportunity to be heard regarding the lawfulness of the towing. Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644 (1982).
A village board's denial of an application for a liquor license did not deprive the applicant of either liberty or property. Scott v. Village of Kewaskum, 786 F.2d 338 (1986).
A teacher's alleged de facto tenure is not a protected property interest. Liberty interests are discussed. Stevens v. Jt. School Dist. No. 1, Tony, Etc. 429 F. Supp. 477.
A sheriff violated a tenant's protectible property interest by executing a stale writ of restitution. Wolf-Lillie v. Kenosha Cty. Sheriff, 504 F. Supp. 1 (1980).
One cannot have a constitutionally protected interest solely in a state law procedure; a separate property interest must also be present. Molgaard v. Town of Caledonia, 527 F. Supp. 1073 (1981).
Demon rum and the dirty dance: reconsidering government regulation of live sex entertainment after California v. La Rue. 1975 WLR 161.
Reasonable corporal punishment by school official over parental objection is constitutional. 1976 WLR 689.
Procedural due process in public schools: The "thicket" of Goss v. Lopez. 1976 WLR 934.
Impartial decisionmaker—authority of school board to dismiss striking teachers. 1977 WLR 521.
Property interest—government employment—state law defines limitation of entitlement. 1977 WLR 575.
MISCELLANEOUS
An adult bookstore has no right to protect the privacy rights of its customers in a public, commercial establishment. City News & Novelty v. City of Waukesha, 170 Wis. 2d 14, 487 N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. 1992).
A narrowly drawn anti-cruising ordinance did not violate the right to assemble or travel. Scheunemann v. City of West Bend, 179 Wis. 2d 469, 507 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1993).
The right to intrastate travel, including the right to move about one's neighborhood in an automobile, is fundamental, but infringements on the right are not subject to strict scrutiny. Cruising ordinances, reasonable in time, place and manner, do not violate this right. Brandmiller v. Arreola, 199 Wis. 2d 528, 544 N.W.2d 849 (1996).
Putative father's right to custody of his child. 1971 WLR 1262.
I,2 Slavery prohibited. Section 2. There shall be neither slavery, nor involuntary servitude in this state, otherwise than for the punishment of crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.
I,3 Free speech; libel. Section 3. Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions or indictments for libel, the truth may be given in evidence, and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as libelous be true, and was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the fact.
FREE SPEECH
A city can validly prohibit picketing of private homes where the subject of the picketing has no relationship to any activity carried on there. Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530.
A journalist has a constitutional right to the privilege not to disclose his sources of information received in confidential relationship, but when such confidence is in conflict with the public's overriding need to know, it must yield to the interest of justice. The state need not affirmatively demonstrate proof of compelling need or lack of an alternative method of obtaining the information sought, where the crimes involved and the prevention of repetition of such crimes constitute a compelling need. State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93.
Only that portion of an obscenity ordinance defining obscenity in Roth-Memoirs terms is unconstitutional, and the remainder is a viable, effective ordinance when supplemented by the supreme court's Chobot obscenity definition "community standards" definition. Madison v. Nickel, 66 Wis. 2d 71, 223 N.W.2d 865.
The majority representative's exclusive right to represent all employes in a bargaining unit precludes speech by others in the form of bargaining or negotiating for a labor agreement, the infringement on speech being justified by the necessity to avoid the dangers attendant upon relative chaos in labor-management relations. Madison Jt. Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. WERC, 69 Wis. 2d 200, 231 N.W.2d 206.
Prohibiting the solicitation of prostitutes, does not violate the right of free speech. Shillcutt v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 642, 247 N.W.2d 694.
Where a radio talk show announcer was fired for allowing talk show guests to slander minorities, the announcer's right of free speech was not infringed. Augustine v. Anti-Defamation Lg. B'nai B'rith, 75 Wis. 2d 207, 249 N.W.2d 547.
Where the record did not indicate that a tenant union would provide inadequate, unethical or complex legal advice to tenants, the tenant union's information service was protected by free speech guarantees. Hopper v. Madison, 79 Wis. 2d 120, 256 N.W.2d 139.
The public's right to be aware of all facts surrounding an issue does not interfere with the right of newspaper to reject advertising. Wis. Assoc. of Nursing Homes v. Journal Co. 92 Wis. 2d 709, 285 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 1979).
Procedures to determine whether journalist may properly invoke privilege to prevent disclosure of confidential sources set. Green Bay Newspaper v. Circuit Court, 113 Wis. 2d 411, 335 N.W.2d 367 (1983).
The right of free speech applies against state action, not private action. Jacobs v. Major, 139 Wis. 2d 492, 407 N.W.2d 832 (1987).
