The potential availability of an innocent explanation does not prohibit an investigative stop. If any reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be objectively discerned, notwithstanding the existence of innocent inferences that could be drawn, officers have the right to temporarily detain an individual for the purpose of inquiry. State v. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, ___ Wis. 2d___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 07-1578.
Although Terry provides only for an officer to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing in an attempt to discover weapons that might be used to assault the officer, under the circumstances of this case, the search was properly broadened to encompass the opening of the defendant's purse, which was essentially an extension of her person where the purse was accessible by her. State v. Limon, 2008 WI App 77, ___ Wis. 2d___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 07-1578.
Because of the limited intrusion resulting from a dog sniff for narcotics and the personal interests that Art. I, s. 11 were meant to protect, a dog sniff around the outside perimeter of a vehicle located in a public place is not a search under the Wisconsin Constitution. The 78 seconds during which the dog sniff occurred was a not an unreasonable incremental intrusion upon the defendant's liberty. State v. Arias, 2008 WI 84, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 06-0974.
The "search incident to arrest" exception to the 4th amendment warrant requirement holds that a lawful arrest creates a situation justifying a contemporaneous, warrantless search of the arrestee's person and the area within his or her immediate control. It is reasonable to search an area near the arrestee, but not an area so broad as to be unrelated to the protective purposes of the search. Although a bedroom might be considered within the defendant's immediate presence or control the search of a bedroom was not a search incident to arrest after the defendant had been removed from the home as the defendant could not have gained possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. State v. Sanders, 2008 WI 85, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 06-2060.
Reasonable suspicion was not obviated by the fact that 15 minutes passed between the time of a stop and a protective search when the defendant was kept under continuous surveillance. The passage of time can be a factor in the totality of circumstances, but it is not likely to be a determinative factor in establishing or eliminating reasonable suspicion for a frisk. State v. Sumner, 2008 WI 94, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 06-0102.
The standing of a guest to challenge a search is measured by the guest's relationship to the property and the host. When a person claims guest status, the analysis examines the evidence in light of: 1) whether the guest's use of the premises was for a purely commercial purpose; 2) the duration of the guest's stay; and 3) the nature of the guest's relationship to the host. The defendant did not have standing when there was little evidence of the duration or closeness of the defendant's friendship with the property owner, the defendant did not have a long-term relationship to the place andnot an overnight guest, and at the time of the search, used it for a largely commercial purpose. State v. Fox, 2008 WI App 136, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 07-0685.
The defendant did not have standing to assert a 4th amendment violation based on an officer unlocking the door of the public restroom the defendant occupied. The defendant's expectation of privacy was not reasonable when, while his initial use of the restroom was for its intended purpose, he continued to have the private use of the locked restroom for at least 25 minutes without responding to knocking and while dozing off. State v. Neitzel, 2008 WI App 143, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___, 07-2346.
A warrantless, non-exigent, felony arrest in public was constitutional despite the opportunity to obtain a warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411.
When a driver was stopped because of expired license plates, a police order to get out of the car was reasonable and a subsequent "pat down" based on an observed bulge under the driver's jacket resulted in the legal seizure of an unlicensed revolver. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
A burning building clearly presents an exigency rendering a warrantless entry reasonable, and fire officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the fire after it is extinguished. Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978)
The warrantless installation of a pen register, that recorded telephone numbers called but not the contents of the calls, did not violate the 4th amendment. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
A warrantless search of a suitcase in the trunk of a taxi was unconstitutional. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
Police may not make a warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
That police had lawful possession of pornographic film boxes did not give them authority to search their contents. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
The search of a jacket lying in the passenger compartment of a car was incident to a lawful custodial arrest that justified the infringement of any privacy interest the arrestee may have had. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
An officer who accompanied an arrestee to the arrestee's residence to obtain identification properly seized contraband in plain view. Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
Officers who have legitimately stopped an automobile and who have probable cause to believe contraband is concealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thorough as could be authorized by warrant. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
When an officer, after stopping a defendant's car at a routine driver's license checkpoint, saw a tied-off party balloon in plain sight, the officer had probable cause to believe the balloon contained an illicit substance. Hence, a warrantless seizure of the balloon was legal. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
A warrantless search by arson investigators of the defendant's fire-damaged home that was not a continuation of an earlier search was unconstitutional. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984).
When a damaged shipping package was examined by company employees who discovered white powder, a subsequent warrantless field test by police was constitutional. U.S. v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
The "open fields" doctrine is discussed. Oliver v. U.S. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
The warrantless, nighttime entry of the defendant's home for arrest for a civil, nonjailable traffic offense was not justified under the "hot pursuit" doctrine or the preservation of evidence doctrine. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
School officials need not obtain a warrant before searching a student. The legality of the search depends on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search. New Jersey v. T. L. O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
When officers were entitled to seize packages in a vehicle and could have searched them immediately without a warrant, a warrantless search of the packages 3 days later was reasonable. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
The vehicle exception for warrantless searches applies to motor homes. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies when an officer reasonably relies upon a statute allowing a warrantless administrative search that was subsequently ruled unconstitutional. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
A protective sweep of a residence in conjunction with an arrest is permissible if police reasonably believe that the area harbors an individual posing a danger to officers or others. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 108 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1990).
Inadvertence is not a necessary condition to a "plain view" seizure. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990).
For a seizure of a person to occur there must either be an application of force, however slight, or when force is absent, submission to an officer's "show of authority." California v. Hodari D. 499 U.S. 279, 113 L. Ed. 690 (1991).
A determination of probable cause made within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest generally meets the promptness requirement. If a hearing is held more than 48 hours following the arrest the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate an emergency or extraordinary circumstances. County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991).
There shall be one rule governing all automobile searches. The police may search the car and all containers within it without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained in either. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 114 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1991).
If during a lawful weapons pat down an officer feels an object whose contours or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of privacy beyond that already authorized. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 (1993).
An officer making a traffic stop may order passengers to get out of the vehicle pending the completion of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1997).
Persons observed through a window in a home where they were not overnight guests but were present for a short period to engage in a primarily commercial illegal drug transaction, had no expectation of privacy in the home and the observation of those persons was not a constitutionally prohibited search. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 142 L. Ed. 2d 373 (1998).
The issuance of a traffic citation without an arrest did not authorize a full search of the vehicle. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 142 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1998).
When there is probable cause to search a vehicle for contraband officers may examine containers in the vehicle without a showing of individualized probable cause for each container. The container may be searched whether or not it's owner is present as a passenger, or otherwise, because it may contain contraband that the officers reasonably believe is in the car. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408 (1999).
Police need not obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile from a public place when there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle is forfeitable contraband. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 143 L. Ed. 2d 748 (1999).
The exception to the requirement of a warrant for automobiles does not require a separate finding of exigency, in addition to a finding of probable cause. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).
When there is probable cause to search a motor vehicle, the search is not unreasonable if the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, although a warrant was not obtained. No separate finding of exigent circumstances is required. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 144 L. Ed. 2d 442 (1999).
There is no murder scene exception to the warrant requirement. Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 145 L. Ed. 2d 16 (1999).
Nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion. Headlong flight is the consummate act of evasion. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570 (2000).
An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more, is insufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of a person. The tip must bear indicia of reliability. Reasonable suspicion requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of criminal activity, not just in its tendency to to identify a person. Florida v. J.L. 529 U.S. 266, 146 L. Ed. 2d 254 (2000).
Stopping vehicles at highway checkpoints without any individualized suspicion to interdict illegal drugs was an unreasonable seizure under the 4th amendment because the primary purpose was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, unlike checkpoints to check for drunk driving or illegal immigrants. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000).
The police acted reasonably when, with probable cause to believe that the defendant had hidden drugs in his home, they prevented the man from entering the home for about 2 hours until a search warrant could be obtained. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 148 LEd2d 838 (2001).
A state hospital could not test maternity patients for cocaine and then turn the results over to law enforcement authorities without patient consent. The interest of using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine does not justify a departure from the rule that a nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a warrant. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 525 U.S. 67, 149 LEd 2d 205 (2001).
If an officer has probable cause to believe a person has committed even a very minor criminal offense that does not breach the peace, the officer may, without violating the 4th amendment, arrest the offender without the need to balance the circumstances involved in the particular situation. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001)
Obtaining, by sense-enhancing technology like infrared imaging, information regarding the interior of a home that could otherwise not be obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area is a search presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Kyllo v. U.S. 533 U.S. 27, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001).
A warrantless search of a probationer's residence founded on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and authorized as a condition of probation was reasonable. Such a search is not restricted to monitoring whether the probationer is complying with probation restrictions. U.S. v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 151 L. Ed. 2d 497 (2001).
Police officers may approach bus riders at random to ask questions and to request consent to search luggage without advising the passengers of their right to not cooperate. U.S. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242 (2002).
A school district policy of requiring all participants in competitive extracurricular activities to submit to drug testing was a reasonable means of furthering the district's interest in preventing drug use among students and was not an unreasonable search. Board of Education of Independent School District. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. White, 536 U.S. 822, 153 L. Ed. 2d 735 (2002).
A highway checkpoint where police stopped motorists to ask them for information about a recent hit-and-run was reasonable. The arrest of a drunk driver arrested when his vehicle swerved nearly hitting an officer at the checkpoint was constitutional. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 157 L. Ed 2d 843, 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
When a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of an occupant of an automobile, the 4th amendment allows the officer to search the passenger compartment of that vehicle as a contemporaneous incident of arrest whether the officer makes contact with the occupant while the occupant is inside the vehicle, or when the officer first makes contact with the arrestee after the latter has exited the vehicle. Thornton v. U.S. 541 U.S. 615, 158 L. Ed 2d 905, 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004).
The principles of Terry permit a state to require a suspect to disclose his or her name in the course of a Terry stop and allow imposing criminal penalties for failing to do so. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 159 L. Ed 2d 292, 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
The 4th amendment does not requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop. The use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog that does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from public view during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2004).
Police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. An action is reasonable under the 4th amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, "as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 164 L. Ed. 2d 650, 126 S. Ct. 1943 (2006).
The 4th Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 165 L. Ed. 2d 250, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006).
Warrantless arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable under the U.S. constitution, and while states are free to regulate such arrests however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the 4th Amendment's protections. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U. S. ___, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
State v. Seibel: Wisconsin Police Now Need Only a Reasonable Suspicion to Search a Suspect's Blood Incident to an Arrest. Armstrong. 1993 WLR 563.
But What of Wisconsin's Exclusionary Rule? The Wisconsin Supreme Court Accepts Apparent Authority to Consent as Grounds for Warrantless Searches. Schmidt. 83 MLR 299.
But What of Wisconsin's Exclusionary Rule? The Wisconsin Supreme Court Accepts Apparent Authority to Consent as Grounds for Warrantless Searches. Schmidt. 83 MLR 299 (1999).
I,12 Attainder; ex post facto; contracts. Section 12. No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, nor any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, and no conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.
Section 45.37 (9), Stats. 1963, constituted a contract as to the property an applicant for admission to the Grand Army Home had to surrender, and to apply a later amendment would be unconstitutional. Estate of Nottingham, 46 Wis. 2d 580, 175 N.W.2d 640.
Although the obligation of a contract is not an absolute right but one that may yield to the compelling interest of the public, the public purpose served by a law mandating rent reductions due to property tax relief is not so vital so as to permit such an impairment of contract. State ex rel. Bldg. Owners v. Adamany, 64 Wis. 2d 280, 219 N.W.2d 274.
Retroactive application of s. 57.06, 1987 stats. [now s. 304.06], as amended in 1973, increasing the period to be served by state prison inmates imposed an additional penalty and violated the prohibition against ex post facto legislation. State ex rel. Mueller v. Powers, 64 Wis. 2d 643, 221 N.W.2d 692.
The legislative preclusion against the State Medical Society's divesting itself of control of ch. 148, disability plans did not constitute any impairment of the society's charter because: 1) the grant of ch. 148 powers is permissive and voluntarily exercised by the society; 2) the ch. 148 grant is in the nature of a franchise rather than a contract and cannot be viewed as unalterable or it would constitute a delegation of inalienable legislative power; and 3) the constitutional interdiction against statutes impairing contracts does not prevent the state from exercising its police powers for the common good. State Medical Society v. Comm. of Insurance, 70 Wis. 2d 144, 233 N.W.2d 470.
When a probation statute was amended after a crime was committed but before the accused pled guilty and was placed on probation, application of the amended statute to probation revocation proceedings offended the ex post facto clause. State v. White, 97 Wis. 2d 517, 294 N.W.2d 36 (Ct. App. 1979).
A challenge to legislation must prove: 1) the legislation impairs an existing contractual relationship; 2) the impairment is substantial; and 3) if substantial, the impairment is not justified by the purpose of the legislation. Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. La Follette, 108 Wis. 2d 637, 323 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1982).
The ex post facto prohibition applies to judicial pronouncements as well as legislative acts. The question to be addressed is whether the new law criminalizes conduct that was innocent when committed. State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 509 N.W.2d 712 (1993).
Legislation creating penalty enhancers resulting from convictions prior to the effective date does not run afoul of the ex post facto clause. State v. Schuman, 186 Wis. 2d 213, 520 N.W.2d 107 (Ct. App. 1994).
An ex post facto law is one that punishes as a crime an act previously committed, that: 1) was innocent when done; 2) makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission; or 3) deprives one charged with a crime of any defense available at the time the act was committed. State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 524 N.W.2d 641 (1994).
Retroactive application of a new statute of limitations, enacted at a time when the old limitations period has not yet run, does not violate the ex post facto clause. State v. Haines, 2003 WI 39, 261 Wis. 2d 139, 661 N.W.2d 72, 01-1311.
Constitutionality of rent control discussed. 62 Atty. Gen. 276.
I,13 Private property for public use. Section 13. The property of no person shall be taken for public use without just compensation therefor.
The dismissal of an appeal for lack of prosecution in a condemnation action did not violate the condemnee's right to just compensation. Taylor v. State Highway Comm. 45 Wis. 2d 490, 173 N.W.2d 707.
The total rental loss occasioned by a condemnation is compensable, and a limitation to one year's loss was invalid. Luber v. Milwaukee County, 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380.
A prohibition against filling in wetlands pursuant to an ordinance adopted under ss. 59.971 and 144.26 [now ss. 59.692 and 281.31] does not amount to a taking of property. Police powers and eminent domain are compared. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761.
A special assessment against a railroad for a sanitary sewer laid along the railroad's right-of-way, admittedly of no immediate use or benefit to the railroad, did not constitute a violation of this section. Soo Line RR. Co v. Neenah, 64 Wis. 2d 665, 221 N.W.2d 907.
In order for the petitioner to succeed in the initial stages of an inverse condemnation proceeding, it must allege facts that, prima facie at least, show there has been either an occupation of its property under s. 32.10, or a taking, which must be compensated under the constitution. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. 66 Wis. 2d 720, 226 N.W.2d 185.
The owners of private wells ordered by the department of natural resources to seal them because of bacteriological danger are not entitled to compensation because such orders are a proper exercise of the state's police power to prevent a public harm, for which compensation is not required. Village of Sussex v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 68 Wis. 2d 187, 228 N.W.2d 173.
There must be a "taking" of property to justify compensation. DeBruin v. Green County, 72 Wis. 2d 464, 241 N.W.2d 167.
Condemnation powers are discussed. Falkner v. Northern States Power Co. 75 Wis. 2d 116, 248 N.W.2d 885.
Ordering a utility to place its power lines under ground in order to expand an airport constituted a taking because the public benefited from the enlarged airport. Public Service Corp. v. Marathon County, 75 Wis. 2d 442, 249 N.W.2d 543.
For inverse condemnation purposes, a taking can occur absent a physical invasion only when there is a legally imposed restriction upon the property's use. Howell Plaza, Inc. v. State Highway Comm. 92 Wis. 2d 74, 284 N.W.2d 887 (1979).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot bar an action for just compensation based on the taking of private property for public use even though the legislature has failed to establish specific provisions for recovery of just compensation. Zinn v. State, 112 Wis. 2d 417, 334 N.W.2d 67 (1983).
Zoning classifications may unconstitutionally deprive property owners of due process of law. State ex rel. Nagawicka Is. Corp. v. Delafield, 117 Wis. 2d 23, 343 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1983).
Ordering a riparian owner to excavate and maintain a ditch to regulate a lake level was an unconstitutional taking of property. Otte v. DNR, 142 Wis. 2d 222, 418 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1987).
The operation of this section is discussed. W.H. Pugh Coal Co. 157 Wis. 2d 620, 460 N.W.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1990).
A taking by government restriction occurs only if the restriction deprives the owner of all or practically all use of property. Busse v. Dane County Regional Planning Comm. 181 Wis. 2d 527, 510 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 1993).
A taking claim is not ripe for judicial review until the government agency charged with implementing applicable regulations has made a final decision applying the regulations to the property at issue. Taking claims based on equal protection or due process grounds must meet the ripeness requirement. Streff v. Town of Delafield, 190 Wis. 2d 348, 526 N.W.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1994).
