895.045 Annotation
The contributory negligence of the plaintiff-spectator in viewing an auto race was not greater than defendants' negligence as a matter of law when the plaintiff did not realize that watching from a curve would be more dangerous than sitting in the grandstand, was not aware that tires would fly into the spectator area, there was no warning of potential dangers, and she was watching the race closely immediately prior to the accident. Kaiser v. Cook,
67 Wis. 2d 460,
227 N.W.2d 50 (1975).
895.045 Annotation
The trial court's denial of a motion by 2 employee-defendants to direct the jury to consider the employer's negligence in its special verdict, even though the employer's liability extended only to workers compensation, was an error. Connar v. West Shore Equipment,
68 Wis. 2d 42,
227 N.W.2d 660 (1975).
895.045 Annotation
The trial court's instruction to the jury not to compute all of the damages the plaintiff suffered, but only that portion caused by the defendant's negligence, was erroneous. This section requires the jury to find 100% of the plaintiff's damages, which are then reduced by the amount of contributory negligence. Nimmer v. Purtell,
69 Wis. 2d 21,
230 N.W.2d 258 (1975).
895.045 Annotation
Conduct constituting implied or tacit assumption of risk is not a bar to an action for negligence. Polsky v. Levine,
73 Wis. 2d 547,
263 N.W.2d 204 (1976).
895.045 Annotation
A minor injured during employment cannot be charged with contributory negligence when the employment is in violation of child labor laws. Tisdale v. Hasslinger,
79 Wis. 2d 194,
255 N.W.2d 314 (1977).
895.045 Annotation
When the court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict regarding 2 of several defendants found causally negligent, and the percentage of negligence reallocated affected damages but not liability, the plaintiffs should have been given the option of a proportional reduction of the judgment or a new trial. Chart v. General Motors Corp.
80 Wis. 2d 91,
258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).
895.045 Annotation
If a court can find as matter of law that a party is causally negligent, contrary to the jury's answer, and the jury attributes some degree of comparative negligence to that party, the court should change the causal negligence answer and permit the jury's comparison to stand. Ollinger v. Grall,
80 Wis. 2d 213,
258 N.W.2d 693 (1977).
895.045 Annotation
When blowing snow obstructed a driver's vision, but the driver did not reduce speed, and a parked truck on the highway "loomed up" out of the snow, the driver was causally negligent as matter of law. Nelson v. Travelers Ins. Co.
80 Wis. 2d 272,
259 N.W.2d 48 (1977).
895.045 Annotation
The "emergency doctrine" relieves a person for liability for his actions when that person is faced with a sudden emergency he or she did not create. The "rescue rule" applies even though the action of the rescuer is deliberate and taken after some planning and consideration. Rescuers will not be absolved of all negligence if their actions are unreasonable under the circumstances. Cords v. Anderson,
80 Wis. 2d 525,
259 N.W.2d 672 (1977).
895.045 Annotation
The negligence of a tortfeasor dismissed from a lawsuit on summary judgment as being less or equally negligent as the plaintiff can be considered by the jury in apportioning the total causal negligence of the remaining parties. Gross v. Midwest Speedways, Inc.
81 Wis. 2d 129,
260 N.W.2d 36 (1977).
895.045 Annotation
Negligence per se arising out of a breach of a safety statute may be compared with common law negligence. Locicero v. Interpace Corp.
83 Wis. 2d 876,
266 N.W.2d 423 (1978).
895.045 Annotation
Contributory negligence, if proved, is a defense in a strict liability case. Austin v. Ford Motor Co.,
86 Wis. 2d 628,
273 N.W.2d 233 (1979).
895.045 Annotation
In a safe place case, comparative negligence instructions need not direct the jury to consider the defendant's higher duty of care. Brons v. Bischoff,
89 Wis. 2d 80,
277 N.W.2d 854 (1979).
895.045 Annotation
A motorist injured while fleeing the police was, as matter of law, more negligent than the pursuing officer. Brunette v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co.
107 Wis. 2d 361,
320 N.W.2d 43 (Ct. App. 1982).
895.045 Annotation
Failure to give the jury an emergency instruction was reversible error, despite the plaintiff's violation of several safety statutes. When an emergency instruction is appropriate is discussed. Westfall v. Kottke,
110 Wis. 2d 86,
328 N.W.2d 481 (1983).
895.045 Annotation
"Seat belt negligence" and "passive negligence" are distinguished. Jury instructions regarding seat belts are recommended. A method for apportioning damages in seat belt negligence cases is adopted. Foley v. City of West Allis,
113 Wis. 2d 475,
335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
895.045 Annotation
A bus driver who told an 11-year-old that he could not ride the school bus the next day, but did not inform either the school or the child's parents, was properly found 93% liable for injuries sustained by the boy while riding his bicycle to school the next day. Toeller v. Mutual Service Casualty Insurance Co.
115 Wis. 2d 631,
340 N.W.2d 923 (Ct. App. 1983).
895.045 Annotation
Recovery under s.895.04 (7) is barred by this section if a decedent's negligence was greater than any individual tortfeasor's. Delvaux v. Vanden Langenberg,
130 Wis. 2d 464,
387 N.W.2d 751 (1986).
895.045 Annotation
A negligent tortfeasor has the right to indemnity from an intentional joint tortfeasor. A Pierringer release of the intentional tortfeasor absolved the negligent tortfeasor. Fleming v. Threshermen's Mutual Insurance Co.
131 Wis. 2d 123,
388 N.W.2d 908 (1986).
895.045 Annotation
Punitive damages may not be recovered when actual damages are unavailable due to this section. Tucker v. Marcus,
142 Wis. 2d 425,
418 N.W.2d 818 (1988).
895.045 Annotation
This section is inapplicable to the equitable resolution of a subrogation dispute. Ives v. Coopertools,
197 Wis. 2d 938,
541 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1995).
895.045 Annotation
Only a tortfeasor found to be 51% or more causally negligent may be jointly and severally liable for a plaintiff's total damages. That a plaintiff has no negligence does not alter that rule. Thomas v. Bickler,
2002 WI App 268,
258 Wis. 2d 304,
654 N.W.2d 248,
01-2006.
895.045 Annotation
When the plaintiff's negligence was greater than any injurer's, neither the plaintiff nor the plaintiff's spouse could recover. Spearing v. National Iron Co.
770 F.2d 87 (1985).
895.045 Annotation
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment prohibits a state from imposing a grossly excessive punishment on a tortfeasor. The degree of reprehensibility of the conduct, the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damage award, and the difference between the remedy and other civil penalties imposed in comparable cases are factors to be considered. The most important factor is the degree of reprehensibility. Strenke v. Hogner,
2005 WI App 194,
287 Wis. 2d 135,
704 N.W.2d 309,
03-2527.
895.045 Annotation
When a trial court finds that a small claims plaintiff's actual damages exceed the statutory award limit of $5,000, the court should apply any reduction for comparative negligence to the damages found before applying the statutory limit. Bryhan v. Pink,
2006 WI App 110,
294 Wis. 2d 347,
718 N.W.2d 112,
05-1030.
895.045 Annotation
Sub. (2) is a codification of the common-law rule on concerted-action liability discussed and not a new cause of action. Concerted-action liability attaches when 2 or more persons commit a tortious act in concert. Even if an agreement exists, if that agreement does not directly relate to the tortious conduct that caused the injury, the agreement is insufficient to satisfy the agreement required for concerted action. A plan among 3 people to purchase alcohol for an underage drinker who later caused injury driving while intoxicated did not constitute a concerted action when the common plan to purchase alcohol was not also a common scheme or plan to engage in the act of driving that caused the injury. Richards v. Badger Mutual Insurance,
2006 WI App 255,
297 Wis. 2d 699,
727 N.W.2d 69,
05-2796.
895.045 Annotation
Sub. (2) applies only after a judge or jury has determined, under applicable substantive law, that more than one tortfeasor is liable in some measure to the plaintiff. Sub. (2) plays no role in determining whether a given defendant may be held liable to the plaintiff. Danks v. Stock Building Supply, Inc.
2007 WI App 8,
298 Wis. 2d 348,
727 N.W.2d 846,
05-2679.
895.045 Annotation
Sub. (2) is the codification of the common law concerted action theory of liability. There are 3 factual predicates necessary to proving concerted action: 1) there must be an explicit or tacit agreement among the parties to act in accordance with a mutually agreed upon scheme or plan; parallel action, without more, is insufficient to show a common scheme or plan; 2) there must be mutual acts committed in furtherance of that common scheme or plan that are tortious acts; and 3) the tortious acts that are undertaken to accomplish the common scheme or plan must be the acts that result in damages. Richards v. Badger Mutual Insurance,
2008 WI 52,
309 Wis. 2d 541,
749 N.W.2d 581,
05-2796.
895.045 Annotation
Proportioning comparative negligence — problems of theory and special verdict formulation. Aiken, 53 MLR 293.
895.045 Annotation
From defect to cause to comparative fault — Rethinking some product liability concepts. Twerski, 60 MLR 297.
895.045 Annotation
The problem of the insolvent contributor. Myse, 60 MLR 891.
895.045 Annotation
Punitive damage recovery in products liability cases. Ghiardi and Kircher, 65 MLR 1 (1981).
895.045 Annotation
The concepts of "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" in products liability law. Swartz, 66 MLR 280 (1983).
895.045 Annotation
Seat belt negligence: The ambivalent Wisconsin rules. McChrystal. 68 MLR 539 (1985).
895.045 Annotation
Second collision law — Wisconsin. Ghiardi. 69 MLR 1 (1985).
895.045 Annotation
Comparative Negligence in Wisconsin. Horowitz, WBB Jan. 1981.
895.045 Annotation
Plaintiff's failure to wear a safety belt. Towers, WBB July, 1985.
895.045 Annotation
Strict products liability in Wisconsin. 1977 WLR 227.
895.045 Annotation
Wisconsin's Modified, Modified Comparative Negligence Law. Kircher. Wis. Law. Feb. 1996.
895.045 Annotation
Enforceable Exculpatory Agreements. Pendleton. Wis. Law. Nov. 1997.
895.045 Annotation
Wisconsin's Comparative Negligence Statute: Applying It to Products Liability Cases Brought under a Strict Liability Theory. Pless. Wis. Law. Aug. 1998.
895.046
895.046
Remedies against manufacturers, distributors, sellers, and promoters of products. 895.046(1)(a)
(a) "Claimant" means a person seeking damages or other relief for injury or harm to a person or property caused by or arising from a product, or a person on whose behalf a claim for such damages or other relief is asserted.
895.046(1)(b)
(b) "Relevant production period" means the time period during which the specific product that allegedly caused a claimant's injury or harm was manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted.
895.046(2)
(2) Applicability. This section applies to all actions in law or equity in which a claimant alleges that the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product is liable for an injury or harm to a person or property, including actions based on allegations that the design, manufacture, distribution, sale, or promotion of, or instructions or warnings about, a product caused or contributed to a personal injury or harm to a person or property, a private nuisance, or a public nuisance, and to all related or independent claims, including unjust enrichment, restitution, or indemnification.
895.046(3)
(3) Remedy with specific product identification. Except as provided in
sub. (4), the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product may be held liable in an action under
sub. (2) only if the claimant proves, in addition to any other elements required to prove his or her claim, that the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted the specific product alleged to have caused the claimant's injury or harm.
895.046(4)
(4) Remedy without specific product identification. Subject to
sub. (5), if a claimant cannot meet the burden of proof under
sub. (3), the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product may be held liable for an action under
sub. (2) only if all of the following apply:
895.046(4)(a)1.
1. That no other lawful process exists for the claimant to seek any redress from any other person for the injury or harm.
895.046(4)(a)2.
2. That the claimant has suffered an injury or harm that can be caused only by a manufactured product chemically and physically identical to the specific product that allegedly caused the claimant's injury or harm.
895.046(4)(a)3.
3. That the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted a complete integrated product, in the form used by the claimant or to which the claimant was exposed, and that meets all of the following criteria:
895.046(4)(a)3.a.
a. Is chemically and physically identical to the specific product that allegedly caused the claimant's injury or harm.
895.046(4)(a)3.b.
b. Was manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted in the geographic market where the injury or harm is alleged to have occurred during the time period in which the specific product that allegedly caused the claimant's injury or harm was manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted.
895.046(4)(a)3.c.
c. Was distributed or sold without labeling or any distinctive characteristic that identified the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter.
895.046(4)(b)
(b) The action names, as defendants, those manufacturers of a product who collectively manufactured at least 80 percent of all products sold in this state during the relevant production period by all manufacturers of the product in existence during the relevant production period that are chemically identical to the specific product that allegedly caused the claimant's injury or harm.
895.046(5)
(5) Limitation on liability. No manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product is liable under
sub. (4) if more than 25 years have passed between the date that the manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product last manufactured, distributed, sold, or promoted the specific product chemically identical to the specific product that allegedly caused the claimant's injury and the date that the claimant's cause of action accrued.
895.046(6)
(6) Apportionment of liability. If more than one manufacturer, distributor, seller, or promoter of a product is found liable for the claimant's injury or harm under
subs. (4) and
(5), the court shall apportion liability among those manufacturers, distributors, sellers, and promoters, but that liability shall be several and not joint.
895.046 History
History: 2011 a. 2.
895.047(1)(1)
Liability of manufacturer. In an action for damages caused by a manufactured product based on a claim of strict liability, a manufacturer is liable to a claimant if the claimant establishes all of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:
895.047(1)(a)
(a) That the product is defective because it contains a manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings. A product contains a manufacturing defect if the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the manufacture of the product. A product is defective in design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design by the manufacturer and the omission of the alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe. A product is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings only if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the manufacturer and the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe.
895.047(1)(b)
(b) That the defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to persons or property.
895.047(1)(c)
(c) That the defective condition existed at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer.
895.047(1)(d)
(d) That the product reached the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
895.047(1)(e)
(e) That the defective condition was a cause of the claimant's damages.
895.047(2)
(2) Liability of seller or distributor. 895.047(2)(a)(a) A seller or distributor of a product is not liable based on a claim of strict liability to a claimant unless the manufacturer would be liable under
sub. (1) and any of the following applies:
895.047(2)(a)1.
1. The claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the seller or distributor has contractually assumed one of the manufacturer's duties to manufacture, design, or provide warnings or instructions with respect to the product.
895.047(2)(a)2.
2. The claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that neither the manufacturer nor its insurer is subject to service of process within this state.
895.047(2)(a)3.
3. A court determines that the claimant would be unable to enforce a judgment against the manufacturer or its insurer.
895.047(2)(b)
(b) The court shall dismiss a product seller or distributor as a defendant based on
par. (a) 2. if the manufacturer or its insurer submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court in which the suit is pending.
895.047(3)(a)(a) If the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence that at the time of the injury the claimant was under the influence of any controlled substance or controlled substance analog to the extent prohibited under
s. 346.63 (1) (a), or had an alcohol concentration, as defined in
s. 340.01 (1v), of 0.08 or more, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that the claimant's intoxication or drug use was the cause of his or her injury.
895.047(3)(b)
(b) Evidence that the product, at the time of sale, complied in material respects with relevant standards, conditions, or specifications adopted or approved by a federal or state law or agency shall create a rebuttable presumption that the product is not defective.
895.047(3)(c)
(c) The damages for which a manufacturer, seller, or distributor would otherwise be liable shall be reduced by the percentage of causal responsibility for the claimant's harm attributable to the claimant's misuse, alteration, or modification of the product.
895.047(3)(d)
(d) The court shall dismiss the claimant's action under this section if the damage was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product that would be recognized by an ordinary person with ordinary knowledge common to the community that uses or consumes the product.
895.047(3)(e)
(e) A seller or distributor of a product is not liable to a claimant for damages if the seller or distributor receives the product in a sealed container and has no reasonable opportunity to test or inspect the product. This paragraph does not apply if the seller or distributor may be liable under
sub. (2) (a) 2. or
3.
895.047(4)
(4) Subsequent remedial measures. In an action for damages caused by a manufactured product based on a claim of strict liability, evidence of remedial measures taken subsequent to the sale of the product is not admissible for the purpose of showing a manufacturing defect in the product, a defect in the design of the product, or a need for a warning or instruction. This subsection does not prohibit the admission of such evidence to show a reasonable alternative design that existed at the time when the product was sold.
895.047(5)
(5) Time limit. In any action under this section, a defendant is not liable to a claimant for damages if the product alleged to have caused the damage was manufactured 15 years or more before the claim accrues, unless the manufacturer makes a specific representation that the product will last for a period beyond 15 years. This subsection does not apply to an action based on a claim for damages caused by a latent disease.
895.047(6)
(6) Inapplicability. This section does not apply to actions based on a claim of negligence or breach of warranty.
895.047 History
History: 2011 a. 2.
895.047 Annotation
A New Era: Products Liability in Wisconsin. Edwards & Ozlap. Wis. Law. July 2011.
895.048
895.048
Recovery by auto or motorboat owner limited. The owner of a motor vehicle or motorboat which, while being operated by the spouse or minor child of such owner, is damaged as the result of an accident involving another vehicle or boat, may not recover from the owner or operator of such other vehicle or boat for such damages, if the negligence of such spouse or minor child exceeds that of the operator of such other vehicle or boat. In the event that it is judicially determined that a spouse or minor operator of the motor vehicle or motorboat is found to be guilty of less than 50% of the causal negligence involved in an accident, then in that event the owner of the motor vehicle or motorboat involved shall be entitled to recover in accordance with the contributory negligence principles as laid down in
s. 895.045. For the purposes of recovery of damages by the owner under
s. 895.048, and for this purpose only, the negligence of the spouse or minor operator shall be imputed to the owner.
895.049
895.049
Recovery by a person who fails to use protective headgear while operating certain motor vehicles. Notwithstanding
s. 895.045, failure by a person who operates or is a passenger on a utility terrain vehicle, as defined in
s. 23.33 (1) (ng), a motorcycle, as defined in
s. 340.01 (32), an all-terrain vehicle, as defined in
s. 340.01 (2g), or a snowmobile, as defined in
s. 340.01 (58a), on or off a highway, to use protective headgear shall not reduce recovery for injuries or damages by the person or the person's legal representative in any civil action. This section does not apply to any person required to wear protective headgear under
s. 23.33 (3g) or
347.485 (1).
895.049 History
History: 2003 a. 148;
2011 a. 208.
895.049 Annotation
When this section applies to prohibit a reduction of damages, it necessarily also precludes a person's failure to wear a helmet from being considered a form of negligence. Hardy v. Hoefferle,
2007 WI App 264,
306 Wis. 2d 513,
743 N.W.2d 843,
06-2861
