SB26: Bill Text

SB26, s. 35 Section 35. 11.50 (2) (h) of the statutes is amended to read:

SB26,15,11 11.50 (2) (h) An eligible candidate who files an application under par. (a) may file a written withdrawal of the application. A withdrawal of an application may be filed with the board no later than the 7th day after the day of the primary in which the person withdrawing the application is a candidate or the 7th day after the date that the primary would be held, if required. If an application is withdrawn in accordance with this paragraph, the person withdrawing the application is no longer bound by the statement filed under par. (a) after the date of the withdrawal.

SB26, s. 36 Section 36. 11.50 (2) (i) of the statutes is repealed.

SB26, s. 37 Section 37. 11.50 (9) of the statutes is amended to read:

SB26,15,23 11.50 (9) Limitation on grants. The total grant available to an eligible candidate may not exceed that amount which, when added to all other contributions accepted from sources other than individuals, political party committees and legislative campaign committees, is equal to 45% of the expenditure level limitation specified for the applicable office for candidates other than candidates challenging incumbent officeholders, as determined under s. 11.31 (1) and adjusted as provided under s. 11.31 (9). The board shall scrutinize accounts and reports and records kept under this chapter to assure that applicable limitations under ss. 11.26 (9) and 11.31 are not exceeded and any violation is reported. No candidate or campaign treasurer may accept grants exceeding the amount authorized by this subsection.

SB26, s. 38 Section 38. 11.50 (11) (e) of the statutes is amended to read:

SB26,16,4 11.50 (11) (e) No candidate may expend, authorize the expenditure of or incur any obligation to expend any grant if he or she violates the pledge required under sub. (2) (a) as a precondition to receipt of a grant, except as authorized in sub. (2) (h) or (i).

SB26, s. 39 Section 39. 11.60 (3) of the statutes is amended to read:

SB26,16,10 11.60 (3) Notwithstanding sub. (1), any person, including any committee or group, who makes any contribution or expenditure in violation of this chapter may be required to forfeit treble the amount of the contribution or portion thereof which is illegally unlawfully contributed or treble the amount of the expenditure or portion thereof which is unlawfully disbursed.

SB26, s. 40 Section 40. Nonstatutory provisions legislative findings. The legislature, drawing on its collective experience with campaigns for public office and on the independent evidence presented to it by qualified analysts, finds and declares that:

SB26,16,16 (1)  Wisconsin has historically experienced a high level of civic participation in responsible government, which however is now in decline as the direct result of campaign financing arrangements that have the clear tendency to distance voters from the electoral process, and that cannot be successfully corrected under applicable rulings of the U.S. supreme court.

SB26,16,21 (2)  Current campaign financing arrangements, with their perceived preferential access to lawmakers for special interests that are capable of contributing sizeable sums to lawmakers' campaigns, have provoked public disaffection with elective government, as manifested by declines in voting percentages and in Wisconsin election campaign fund participation. 

SB26,17,3 (3)  The Wisconsin election campaign fund system has lost popular support because it does not diminish the perceived preferential access of the special interests and is therefore judged to be ineffective.

SB26,17,6 (4)  Before 1976, Wisconsin in company with 33 other states had these matters under regulatory control through a system of mandatory spending limits applicable to all candidates for state elective office.

SB26,17,8 (5)  In 1976, the U.S. supreme court, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, invalidated all such spending limits while approving campaign contribution limits.

SB26,17,11 (6)  Since that time campaign expenditures have risen steeply, doubling in Wisconsin legislative races since 1980. The addition has been made up principally by contributions from special interests.

SB26,17,14 (7)  Contribution limits are inadequate by themselves to check this trend. So long as spending is effectively unrestrained, contributions will find ways to protect favored candidates from being outspent.

SB26,17,17 (8)  Among such ways have been personal spending by wealthy candidates, independent expenditures that favor or oppose an identified candidate, and the use of political parties as conduits for the support of selected candidates.

SB26,17,23 (9)  Experience shows in particular that so-called "independent" support — whether by individuals, committees, or other entities — can be coordinated with a candidate's campaign, by means of informal "understandings", without losing its professedly independent character. Likewise, contributions to a political party for ostensible "party-building" purposes can be and are routed, by design, to the support of identified candidates.

SB26,18,3 (10)  Public financing cannot cure the problem so long as spending limits are so readily evadable. After 15 years of experience with the present law, and a 42% decline in Wisconsin election campaign fund designations, it has become evident that Wisconsin voters await some successful repair of the campaign finance system before they will give it their financial support.

SB26,18,9 (11)  The legislature agrees with the 1992 finding of the California commission on campaign financing, made after 8 years of study, that an effective remedy to this problem requires the reconsideration of Buckley v. Valeo. The legislature believes with that commission that it is "strongly desirable to present the [Supreme] Court with carefully researched data and arguments so that it can consider upholding reasonable spending limitations." This act is a step in that direction.

SB26,18,14 (12)  The supreme court based its Buckley decision on a concern that spending limits could restrict political speech, "by reducing the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." The experience of those engaged in the electoral process is otherwise. It is unlimited expenditure that can drown or distort political discourse, in a flood of distractive repetition.

SB26,18,18 (13)  The least distorted and most instructive channels of campaign communication are often free or inexpensive: debates, call-in programs, local interviews, and other voter connections that are not dependent on the power of money.

SB26,18,22 (14)  The expanded use of such low-cost channels, stimulated by the adoption of sensible spending limits, would benefit political discourse by drawing candidates out of the packaged world of media advertisements and into the real world of voter engagement and accountability.

SB26,19,2 (15)  Turning down the noise level of campaign communication, through reasonable spending limits, increases the opportunity for newer and quieter voices to be heard. It tends to increase the number, depth and diversity of ideas presented to the public.

SB26,19,7 (16)  Finally, a reasonable limit on campaign spending relieves candidates and officeholders alike from the constant necessity of engaging in defensive fund raising, arising as this does from the continual risk of massively financed opposition challenges to everything they may say or do. The conduct both of campaigns and of office will be thereby improved.

SB26, s. 41 Section 41. Nonstatutory provisions; nonseverability.

SB26,19,11 (1)  This act shall be considered a unit and its provisions inseparable. Notwithstanding section 990.001 (11) of the statutes, if any provision of the statutes, as affected by this act, is declared unconstitutional, the entire act is void.

SB26, s. 42 Section 42. Initial applicability.

SB26,19,14 (1)  The treatment of section 11.31 (9) of the statutes first applies to adjustment of expenditure limitations for the biennium beginning on January 1, 1997.

SB26, s. 43 Section 43. Effective date.

SB26,19,16 (1)  This act takes effect on January 1, 1997.

SB26,19,17 (End)