Senator Bablitch asked unanimous consent that pursuant to Senate Rule 76 time limits of five minutes per question per member be placed on the Senate.
Senator Berger raised the point of order that pursuant to Senate Rule 76 only the committee on Senate Organization can place time limits on the Senate.
The chair [Pres. Risser] ruled the point of order not well taken.
88Debt management: referral of proposal to joint survey committee on
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Assembly Journal of May 24, 1983 .......... Page: 220
Point of order:
Representative D. Travis rose to the point of order that assembly substitute amendment 1 to Assembly Bill 450 [relating to applicability of the Wisconsin environmental protection act and a schedule for the establishment of any new Milwaukee correctional institution, judicial review of related decisions and injunctive and other relief and right of first acquisition of abandoned railroad property] was not germane under Assembly Rule 54 (1) and (3) (f) [substantial expansion of scope] because it increases bonding authority and sets a specific site for the location of a prison.
Representative D. Travis also rose to the point of order that the bill was not properly before the assembly under section 13.49 (6) of the Wisconsin Statutes.
The speaker [Loftus] ruled that the bill was properly before the assembly because section 13.49 (6) of the Wisconsin Statutes did not require the referral of substitute amendments to the Joint Survey Committee on Debt Management.
The speaker also ruled that the substitute was germane under Assembly Rule 54 (4) (d) [adding appropriations necessary to fill original intent].
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Senate Journal of February 17, 1983 .......... Page: 95
[Point of order:]
Senator Opitz raised the point of order that the referral of Assembly Bill 104 [relating to state cash flow, authorization to incur financial obligations and issue operating notes, reallocation of state moneys, delayed state payments to local governments, state claim proration and payment schedules and making appropriations] to the Joint Survey Committee on Debt Management was required by Sec. 13.49.
The chair [Pres. Risser] ruled the point of order not well taken.
Senator Opitz appealed the ruling of the chair. The question was: Shall the decision of the chair stand as the judgment of the senate? [Display of roll call vote omitted; ayes-17, noes-14.] So the decision of the chair shall stand as the judgment of the senate.
89 NOTE: Attorney General Bronson La Follette had already issued a legal opinion, at the request of Secretary of Administration Doris Hanson, that short-term borrowing does not constitute state debt. That opinion was reprinted beginning on the same page of the senate journal:
State of Wisconsin Department of Justice February 2, 1983Secretary Doris J. HansonDepartment of AdministrationDear Ms. Hanson:
You have asked whether it is constitutionally and statutorily permissible for the state to engage in short-term (eighteen months or less) borrowing from private financial institutions or other private sources for the purpose of meeting current cash flow shortages beginning in March of this year which will result in a budget deficit in excess of $250,000,000 for the biennium ending June 30, 1983.
Subject to the qualifications discussed below, I conclude that it is constitutionally permissible for the state to borrow from private sources to meet the anticipated deficit. But I find no provision in the statutes which would presently permit the state to engage in such borrowing. I therefore conclude that the Legislature must provide statutory authorization before borrowing may be undertaken.
To be constitutionally permissible, the proposed borrowing must not be general obligation borrowing, i.e., it must not create public debt. The
contracting of public debt is regulated by article VIII, section 4, of the Wisconsin Constitution, which provides that the "state shall never contract any public debt except in the cases and manner herein provided." In State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel, 267 Wis. 331, 346, 65 N.W.2d 529 (1954), the supreme court noted the "exceptions referred to are to be found in secs. 5, 6 and 7, art. VIII of the (Wisconsin) constitution...." Section 5 reads:
The legislature shall provide for an annual tax sufficient to defray the estimated expenses of the state for each year; and whenever the expenses of any year shall exceed the income, the legislature shall provide for levying a tax for the ensuing year, sufficient, with other sources of income, to pay the deficiency as well as the estimated expenses of such ensuing year.
Section 5 imposes an affirmation obligation on the Legislature to cure a deficit within the year following its occurrence, but section 5 does not allow the creation of public debt for this purpose.
Our supreme court in State ex rel. Owen v. Donald, 160 Wis. 21, 59, 151, N.W. 331 (1915), defined public debt in the following manner:
There is nothing particularly technical about the meaning of the word "debt" as used in the pay money, or its equivalent, from funds to be provided, as distinguished from money presently available or in process of collection and so treatable as in hand. Earles v. Wells, 94 Wis. 285, 68 N.W. 964; Doon Tp. v. Cummins 142 U.S. 366, 376, 12 Sup. Ct. 320.
In Earles v. Wells and others, 94 Wis. 285, 298, 68 N.W. 964 (1896), the supreme court stated:
So long as the current expenses of the municipality are kep within the limits of the moneys and assets actually in the treasury, and the current revenues collected or in process of immediate collection, the municipality may be fairly regarded as doing business on a cash basis, and not on credit - even though there may be for a short time some unpaid liabilities.
To meet its constitutional responsibility under article VIII, section 5, the Legislature must levy "a tax for the ensuing year, sufficient .... to pay the deficiency." The Legislature must therefore enact, collect and appropriate a tax sufficient to cure the deficit by June 30, 1984. Since the tax receipts must be collected within a year so as to meet the constitutional requirement that the deficit be cured, those tax receipts may properly be characterized as "funds in the process of collection" and there will be no public debt.
There likely are additional ways to condition the liability. For example, if repayment of the loan is subject to a subsequent appropriation of funds by the Legislature, or if repayment of the loan is restricted to a particular source of funds, the loan would be conditional rather than absolute, and so would not constitute public debt within the meaning of the constitution.
Subject to the requirements discussed above, I therefore conclude that the Legislature may enact legislation which would enable the state to borrow funds from private sources to meet its obligation to balance the budget under article VIII, section 5. This opinion is intended only for early general guidance. Any proposed legislation must be drafted with due respect
for the constitutional concerns discussed above. Our office will of course stand ready to assist you in developing the necessary legislation.
Sincerely yours, BRONSON C. La FOLLETTE Attorney General
By request of Senator Chilsen, with unanimous consent, the letter from the Secretary of the Department of Administration to the Attorney General was spread upon the journal.
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Assembly Journal of March 20, 1980 .......... Page: 2950
[Background:] Letter of February 20, 1980, from Speaker Jackamonis to Marcel Dandeneau, Assembly Chief Clerk] "Dear Marcel: "I have, as of this date, appointed Representative Dan Fischer to replace Representative Gervase Hephner as Chairperson and as member of the Joint Survey Committee on Debt Management."
Assembly Journal of March 20, 1980 .......... Page: 2960
Representative Johnson asked unanimous consent that Senate Bill 566 [relating to providing authorization for the assumption of certain mortgages in the veterans housing loan program, the purchase of assumed mortgages and the increase of interest rates on the loans, providing restrictions on obtaining additional housing loans and making an appropriation] be taken from the calendar of Monday, March 24 and taken up at this time. Granted.
Point of order:
Representative Hephner rose to the point of order that the report of the Joint Survey Committee on Debt Management Senate Bill 566] was not proper.
The speaker [Jackamonis] ruled the point of order not well taken.
Assembly Journal of March 19, 1980 .......... Page: 2925
Point of order:
91 Representative Shabaz rose to the point of order that Senate Bill 566 [relating to providing authorization for the assumption of certain mortgages in the veterans housing
loan program, the purchase of assumed mortgages and the increase of interest rates on the loans, providing restrictions on obtaining
additional housing loans and making an appropriation] was not properly before the assembly under section 13.49 of the Wisconsin Statutes.
The speaker [Jackamonis] ruled the point of order well taken.
Representative Shabaz asked unanimous consent that Senate Bill 566 be referred to the Joint Survey Committee on Debt Management. Granted.
Delayed calendar: sequence of completion
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Assembly Journal of March 26, 1986 .......... Page: 1026
Point of order:
Representative T. Thompson rose to the point of order that the assembly was not on the calendar of Wednesday, March 26 because a printed calendar had not been printed pursuant to Assembly Rule 29 (3). The speaker took the point of order under advisement.
[Note:] Two special rules affect the last week of the final general business floorperiod of each biennial session. A.Rule 24 (3) and (4) permits the committee on rules to place any business still still held by it during the final week on any calendar for that week unless such business still needs referral to a joint survey committee. The result is that the printed calendar (if one has been distributed) may not show all the business scheduled by the rules committee for a particular day during the final week.
The other special rule concerns the motion for reconsideration. A.Rule 73 (3)(b) says that after the 7th (reconsideration of passage or concurrence) order of business on the final scheduled day of the last general business floorperiod any motion for reconsideration may be taken up at any time by majority vote.
On the adjournment of that final day, new proposals may be introduced and printed only if needed for: 1) the veto review session under Jt.Rule 82; or germane to 2) any special session called by the governor or 3) any extraordinary session called by the legislature.
Assembly Journal of March 26, 1986 .......... Page: 1037
The speaker [Loftus] ruled that a printed calendar containing all of the proposals was not required for today's session because the committee on Rules had the authority to place bills on the calendar pursuant to Assembly Rule 24 (4). The speaker ruled not well taken the point of order raised by Representative T. Thompson.
Assembly Journal of March 26, 1986 .......... Page: 1037
Point of order:
Representative T. Thompson rose to the point of order that the assembly should not be on the calendar of Wednesday, March 26 because unfinished business remained on previous calendars.
92 The speaker [Loftus] ruled the point of order not well taken because no proposals remained under the regular orders of business on previous calendars. Only proposals which were special orders of business were pending.
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Assembly Journal of September 23, 1975 .......... Page: 1964
Point of order:
Representative Shabaz rose to the point of order that Assembly Bill 352 was not before the Assembly pursuant to Assembly Rule 18.
[Note:] At issue was completion of "housekeeping" orders on current calendar - including "consideration of senate action on proposals approved by the assembly" - prior to completion of regular orders on unfinished calendars.
The speaker [Anderson] ruled the point of order not well taken.
Assembly Journal of September 16, 1975 .......... Page: 1835
Ruling of the chair [no point of order raised]:
The speaker [Anderson] ruled that pursuant to Assembly Rule 18 (2), the Assembly must complete the first eleven orders of business of the current day's calendar before returning to complete unfinished business under the 12th and succeeding orders of business on previous calendars.
Pursuant to the ruling the speaker stated that the Assembly would proceed to consideration of the proposals under the first eleven orders of business which are on calendars of Tuesday, June 24 to the present.
[Note:] The procedure was codified in the 1977 adoption of the assembly rules (A.Res.6) which created the following rule:
"Unless otherwise ordered, after completion of the 9th order of business on the current calendar day, and prior to consideration of the 10th and succeeding orders, unfinished calendars shall be taken up and completed in the order in which they are dated."
In the 1983 rules adoption (A.Res. 12), the procedure was modified so that unfinished calendars are completed by order of business and, within each order, by date.
Representative Shabaz appealed the ruling of the chair. The question was: Shall the decision of the chair stand as the judgement of the Assembly?
The roll was taken. [Display of roll call omitted.] Motion carried.
Assembly Journal of September 16, 1975 .......... Page: 1837
Point of order:
Representative Shabaz rose to the point of order that Assembly Bill 93 was not properly before the assembly pursuant to Assembly Rule 18 (2) because the Assembly is on the calendar of Thursday, June 19.
93 The speaker [Anderson] ruled the point of order not well taken.
Assembly Journal of September 16, 1975 .......... Page: 1839
Point of order:
Representative Thompson rose to the point of order that Assembly Joint Resolution 11 was not properly before the Assembly under Assembly Rule 18 (2) because the Assembly was on the calendar of Thursday, June 19.
The chair ruled the point of order not well taken.
Assembly Journal of September 16, 1975 .......... Page: 1843
Point of order:
Representative Shabaz rose to the point of order that Assembly Bill 154 was not properly before the Assembly pursuant to Assembly Rule 18 (2) because the Assembly is on the calendar of Thursday, June 19.
[Note:] At issue was completion of "housekeeping" orders on current calendar - including "consideration of senate action on proposals approved by the assembly" - prior to completion of regular orders on unfinished calendars.
The speaker [Anderson] ruled the point of order not well taken.
Delayed calendar: time limit on debate
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Assembly Journal of March 26, 1976 .......... Page: 3693
Point of order:
Representative Shabaz rose to the point of order that the assembly was not behind on its calendar, therefore, the time limits under Assembly Rule 61m [debate under delayed calendar] did not apply.
The speaker [Anderson] ruled the point of order not well taken.
Dilatory procedures
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Assembly Journal of May 24, 1989 .......... Page: 179
Point of order:
Representative Welch rose to the point of order that the motion to table Assembly Bill 286 [relating to contributions to retailers by brewers and wholesalers of fermented malt beverages] was not properly before the assembly because the motion had been voted upon earlier. The chair took the point of order under advisement.
The chair [Rep. Clarenbach, speaker pro tem] ruled not well taken the point of order raised by Representative Welch that the motion to table Assembly Bill 286 had been acted upon earlier and therefore was not properly before the assembly. The motion to table Assembly Bill 286 had not been before the assembly.
Point of order (p. 180):
Representative Welch rose to the point of order that the motion to table assembly substitute amendment 1 to Assembly Bill 286 was not properly before the assembly under Assembly Rule 88.
[Note:] Except for a point of order on a motion to table the entire bill, the most recent action on 1989 AB 286 had been the assembly's refusal to table the substitute amendment.
Although the assembly was not under a call of the house at that time (A.Rule 88 prohibits successive calls on same question), A.Rule 69 declares that a motion or procedure used for the purpose of delay is "dilatory and out of order".
The chair [Rep. Clarenbach, speaker pro tem] ruled the point of order well taken.
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