Chapter 757

757.07(4)(c) (c) A representative from the judicial officer’s employer may submit a written request on the judicial officer’s behalf, provided that the judicial officer has given written consent to the representative and provided that the representative agrees to furnish a copy of that consent when the written request is made. The representative shall submit the written request as provided under par. (b).

757.07(4)(d) (d) A judicial officer’s written request shall be made on a form prescribed by the director of state courts and shall specify what personal information shall be maintained as private. If a judicial officer wishes to identify a secondary residence as a home address, the designation shall be made in the written request. A judicial officer’s written request shall disclose the identity of the officer’s immediate family and indicate that the personal information of these family members shall also be excluded to the extent that it could reasonably be expected to reveal personal information of the judicial officer. Any person receiving a written request form submitted by or on behalf of a judicial officer under this paragraph shall treat the submission as confidential.

757.07(4)(e) (e)

757.07(4)(e)1. 1. A judicial officer’s written request is valid for 10 years or until the judicial officer’s death, whichever occurs first.

757.07(4)(e)2. 2. Notwithstanding a judicial officer’s written request, a government agency, person, data broker, business, or association may release personal information otherwise subject to the written request under any of the following circumstances:

757.07(4)(e)2.a. a. As required in response to a court order.

757.07(4)(e)2.b. b. If a judicial officer or immediate family member of the judicial officer consents to the release of his or her own personal information as provided under subd. 3.

757.07(4)(e)2.c. c. If the judicial officer provides the government agency, person, data broker, business, or association with consent to release the personal information as provided under subd. 3.

757.07(4)(e)3. 3. A judicial officer or immediate family member of the judicial officer may consent to release personal information otherwise protected by a judicial officer’s written request if the consent is made in writing on a form prescribed by the director of state courts. An immediate family member of the judicial officer may only consent to the release of his or her own personal information.

757.07(4)(e)4. 4. A judicial officer under sub. (1) (e) 1. to 3., or 6. may designate the director of state courts as the judicial officer’s agent for purposes of service of process, and if the director of state courts receives service of process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to be served on a judicial officer who has designated the director of state courts as his or her agent for purposes of service of process under this subdivision, the director of state courts shall forward the process, notice, or demand to the judicial officer’s home address.

757.07(4m) (4m) 

757.07(4m)(a) (a) In this subsection, “land records website” means a public website that allows users to search and retrieve a real estate property database or geographic records.

757.07(4m)(b) (b) Any provider of a public-facing land records website shall establish a process for judicial officers and immediate family members of judicial officers to opt out from the display and search functions of their names on the provider’s public-facing land records website.

757.07(5) (5) 

757.07(5)(a) (a) A judicial officer whose personal information is made public as a result of a violation of this section may bring an action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief in any court of competent jurisdiction. Notwithstanding s. 814.04, if the court grants injunctive or declaratory relief, the governmental agency, business, association, data broker, or other person responsible for the violation shall be required to pay the judicial officer’s costs and reasonable attorney fees.

757.07(5)(b) (b) Provided that an employee of a government agency has complied with the conditions set forth in sub. (2), it is not a violation of this section if an employee of a government agency publishes personal information, in good faith, on the website of the government agency in the ordinary course of carrying out public functions.

757.07(5)(c) (c) It is unlawful for any person to knowingly publicly post or display on the Internet the personal information of a judicial officer or of the judicial officer’s immediate family if the person intends the public posting or display of the personal information to create or increase a threat to the health and safety of the judicial officer or the judicial officer’s immediate family and, under the circumstances, bodily injury or death of the judicial officer or a member of the judicial officer’s immediate family is a natural and probable consequence of the posting or display. A person who violates this paragraph is guilty of a Class G felony.

757.07(6) (6) This section shall be construed broadly to favor the protection of the personal information of judicial officers and the immediate family of judicial officers.

Effective date note NOTE: This section is created eff. 4-1-25 by 2023 Wis. Act 235.

757.07 History History: 2023 a. 235.

757.08 757.08 Vacancy in judgeship not to affect suits. No process, proceeding or action, civil or criminal, before any court of record shall be discontinued by the occurrence of any vacancy in the office of any judge or of all the judges of such court, nor by the election of any new judge or judges of any such court, but the persons so elected shall have power to continue, hear and determine such process, proceedings or action as their predecessors might have done if no new election had been held.

757.08 History History: 1977 c. 187 s. 96; Stats. 1977 s. 757.08.

757.10 757.10 Failure to adjourn. No omission to adjourn any such court may vitiate any proceedings in the court.

757.10 History History: 1977 c. 187 s. 96; 1977 c. 449; Stats. 1977 s. 757.10.

757.12 757.12 Adjournment to another location. Whenever it is deemed unsafe or inexpedient, by reason of war, pestilence, public calamity, or other compelling factors limiting or preventing access to the courthouse, the justices or judges of the court may order court to be held at an alternative location in this state, including in another county, on a temporary basis. Every such order shall be made in writing. Notice of such orders shall be provided by e-mail to the chief justice, the chief judge of the judicial district, the director of state courts, the State Bar of Wisconsin, and the local bar association. Any such orders shall be placed on the Wisconsin state courts website, the county website, and the door of the courthouse, if practicable. All court proceedings moved to another location shall have the same force and effect as if held at the original location. Bench warrants shall not be issued for failure to appear without a finding that the party received notice of the date, time, and location of the proceeding.

757.12 History History: 1977 c. 187 s. 96; 1977 c. 449; Stats. 1977 s. 757.12; Sup. Ct. Order No. 21-03, 2022 WI 23, 401 Wis. 2d xv; s. 35.17 correction.

757.13 757.13 Continuances; legislative privilege. When a witness, party or an attorney for any party to any action or proceeding in any court or any commission, is a member of the Wisconsin legislature, in session, that fact is sufficient cause for the adjournment or continuance of the action or proceeding, and the adjournment or continuance shall be granted without the imposition of terms.

757.13 History History: 1977 c. 187 s. 96; Stats. 1977 s. 757.13; 1979 c. 34.

757.13 Annotation This section would violate the doctrine of separation of powers if construed to mandate the grant of a continuance or adjournment. Courts should consider, in the sound exercise of their discretion, that a witness, party, or party’s attorney is a member of the legislature in session when that person seeks a continuance or adjournment for that reason and should accommodate the schedule of the legislature consistent with the demands of fairness and efficiency in the particular case. State v. Chvala, 2003 WI App 257, 268 Wis. 2d 451, 673 N.W.2d 401, 03-0746.

757.14 757.14 Sittings, public. The sittings of every court shall be public and every citizen may freely attend the same, including proceedings held by telephone or videoconferencing technology, except if otherwise expressly provided by law. If the content of the proceeding is deemed graphic or obscene, the judge or justice may exclude from the courtroom all minors not present as parties or witnesses. The court may utilize electronic means to allow the public the ability to hear and see, in real time, all proceedings in a manner as similar as practicable to being present in the courtroom.

757.14 History History: 1977 c. 187 s. 96; Stats. 1977 s. 757.14; Sup. Ct. Order No. 21-03, 2022 WI 23, 401 Wis. 2d xv.

757.14 Annotation Any citizen has the right to attend immunity hearings arising out of a John Doe proceeding. State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit Court, 65 Wis. 2d 66, 221 N.W.2d 894 (1974).

757.14 Annotation It was an abuse of discretion to exclude the public from the voir dire of potential jurors. State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Circuit Court, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 340 N.W.2d 460 (1983).

757.14 Annotation Commitment hearings under s. 51.20 (12) are open unless the court grants the subject individual’s motion for closure. State ex rel. Wisconsin State Journal v. Dane County Circuit Court, 131 Wis. 2d 515, 389 N.W.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1986).

757.14 Annotation The 6th amendment right to a public trial extends to voir dire. A judge’s decision to close or limit public access to a courtroom in a criminal case requires the court to go through an analysis on the record in which the court considers overriding interests and reasonable alternatives. The court must make specific findings on the record to support the exclusion of the public and must narrowly tailor the closure. State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207, 11-2424.

757.14 Annotation Public access to criminal trials in particular is protected by the 1st amendment. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).

757.15 757.15 Holding court, effect of holidays. A court may be open to transact business on the first day of the week and on a legal holiday in like manner and with like effect as upon any other day.

757.15 History History: 1975 c. 159; 1977 c. 54; 1977 c. 187 s. 96; 1977 c. 449; Stats. 1977 s. 757.15; 1989 a. 261.

757.18 757.18 Process, etc., to be in English. All writs, process, proceedings and records in any court within this state shall be in the English language, except that the proper and known names of process and technical words may be expressed in the language heretofore and now commonly used, and shall be made out on paper or parchment in a fair, legible character, in words at length and not abbreviated; but such abbreviations as are now commonly used in the English language may be used and numbers may be expressed by Arabic figures or Roman numerals in the usual manner.

757.18 History History: 1977 c. 187 s. 96; Stats. 1977 s. 757.18.

757.19 757.19 Disqualification of judge.

757.19(1) (1) In this section, “judge” includes the supreme court justices, court of appeals judges, circuit court judges and municipal judges.

757.19(2) (2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from any civil or criminal action or proceeding when one of the following situations occurs:

757.19(2)(a) (a) When a judge is related to any party or counsel thereto or their spouses within the 3rd degree of kinship.

757.19(2)(b) (b) When a judge is a party or a material witness, except that a judge need not disqualify himself or herself if the judge determines that any pleading purporting to make him or her a party is false, sham or frivolous.

757.19(2)(c) (c) When a judge previously acted as counsel to any party in the same action or proceeding.

757.19(2)(d) (d) When a judge prepared as counsel any legal instrument or paper whose validity or construction is at issue.

757.19(2)(e) (e) When a judge of an appellate court previously handled the action or proceeding while judge of an inferior court.

757.19(2)(f) (f) When a judge has a significant financial or personal interest in the outcome of the matter. Such interest does not occur solely by the judge being a member of a political or taxing body that is a party.

757.19(2)(g) (g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, he or she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in an impartial manner.

757.19(3) (3) Any disqualification that may occur under sub. (2) may be waived by agreement of all parties and the judge after full and complete disclosure on the record of the factors creating such disqualification.

757.19(4) (4) Any disqualification under sub. (2) in a civil or criminal action or proceeding must occur, unless waived under sub. (3), when the factors creating such disqualification first become known to the judge.

757.19(5) (5) When a judge is disqualified, the judge shall file in writing the reasons and the assignment of another judge shall be requested under s. 751.03.

757.19(6) (6) In addition to other remedies, an alleged violation under this section or abuse of the disqualification procedure shall be referred to the judicial commission.

757.19 History History: 1977 c. 135; 1977 c. 187 s. 96; 1977 c. 447, 449; Stats. 1977 s. 757.19; 1979 c. 175 s. 53; 1979 c. 221; 1985 a. 332.

757.19 Note Judicial Council Note, 1977: Section 256.19 [757.19] has been repealed and recreated to more comprehensively set out the procedure in Wisconsin for a judge to disqualify himself or herself. The new provisions apply to courts of record and municipal courts and define those situations in which a judge should in the interest of justice disqualify himself or herself from hearing a matter. Subsection (2) (g) is a catch-all provision to be used in those situations where a particular set of circumstances dictates that a judge disqualify himself or herself.

757.19 Note The new judge disqualification section contains provisions for assuring that a disqualification is timely made and also provides for waiver of a statutory disqualification upon agreement of all interested parties and the judge. Alleged violations of this section will be brought to the attention of the judicial commission for appropriate review. [Bill 74-S]

757.19 Annotation A judge who represented the defendant as counsel in another phase of a criminal matter had no power to act as judge in hearing a related postconviction motion and should have, sua sponte, disqualified himself. Rainey v. State, 65 Wis. 2d 374, 222 N.W.2d 620 (1974).

757.19 Annotation Although the judge was apparently biased against defense counsel, the judge’s refusal to recuse himself was harmless error under the facts of the case. State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 325 N.W.2d 687 (1982).

757.19 Annotation Under sub. (2) (g), the self-disqualification decision is subjective, and review is limited to determining whether the judge concluded disqualification was necessary. State v. American TV & Appliance, 151 Wis. 2d 175, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989).

757.19 Annotation That a judge’s spouse was employed in the office of the district attorney, but had no connection to a particular case, did not require the judge’s disqualification. State v. Harrell, 199 Wis. 2d 654, 546 N.W.2d 115 (1996), 94-1655.

757.19 Annotation The fact that the trial judge “witnesses” the actions of the jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and parties does not transform the judge into a “material witness” under sub. (2) (b). State v. Hampton, 217 Wis. 2d 614, 579 N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1998), 95-0152.

757.19 Annotation A motion to vacate a supreme court decision on the grounds that a participating justice was disqualified, filed 1300 days after the decision was issued and 600 days after the facts on which the motion was based became known, was untimely and frivolous. Jackson v. Benson, 2002 WI 14, 249 Wis. 2d 681, 639 N.W.2d 545, 97-0270.

757.19 Annotation Sub. (2) (g) does not require disqualification when a person other than the judge objectively believes that there is an appearance that the judge is unable to act in an impartial manner. In re Estate of Sharpley, 2002 WI App 201, 257 Wis. 2d. 152, 653 N.W.2d 124, 01-2167.

757.19 Annotation When analyzing a judicial bias claim, there is a rebuttable presumption that the judge was fair, impartial, and capable of ignoring any biasing influences. The test for bias comprises two inquiries, one subjective and one objective, either of which can violate a defendant’s due process right to an impartial judge. Actual bias on the part of the decision maker meets the objective test. The appearance of partiality can also offend due process. Every procedure that would offer a possible temptation to the average person as a judge not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the state and the accused, denies the latter due process of law. State v. Gudgeon, 2006 WI App 143, 295 Wis. 2d 189, 720 N.W.2d 114, 05-1528.

757.19 Annotation Absent a pervasive and perverse animus a judge may assess a case and potential arguments based on what he or she knows from the case in the course of the judge’s judicial responsibilities. Opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. State v. Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, 295 Wis. 2d 801, 722 N.W.2d 136, 05-1265.

757.19 Annotation Affirmed on other grounds. 2007 WI App 252, 306 Wis. 2d 129, 743 N.W.2d 460, 05-1265.

757.19 Annotation A court’s rejection of a plea does not in and of itself become a “personal interest in the outcome of the matter,” and sub. (2) (f) is not implicated. State v. Conger, 2010 WI 56, 325 Wis. 2d 664, 797 N.W.2d 341, 08-0755.

757.19 Annotation In this case, when the judge served as both the presiding judge in the drug court program in which the defendant participated and as the sentencing judge in the defendant’s criminal case, the defendant met his burden to demonstrate objective judicial bias based on the combined effect of 1) the judge’s comments indicating he had determined before the sentencing-after-revocation hearing that the defendant would be sentenced to prison if he did not succeed in drug court; and 2) the judge’s dual role as the presiding judge in the drug court proceedings and as the judge who sentenced the defendant after the revocation of his probation. State v. Marcotte, 2020 WI App 28, 392 Wis. 2d 183, 943 N.W.2d 911, 19-0695.

757.19 Annotation In lieu of exclusive reliance on a judge’s personal inquiry, or on appellate review of the judge’s determination respecting actual bias, the due process clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias. In defining these standards, the U.S. Supreme Court has asked whether, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, the interest poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009).

757.19 Annotation There is a serious risk of actual bias, based on objective and reasonable perceptions, when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. The inquiry centers on the contribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amount of money contributed to the campaign, the total amount spent in the election, and the apparent effect the contribution had on the outcome of the election. Whether campaign contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of a judge’s victory is not the proper inquiry. Due process requires an objective inquiry into whether the contributor’s influence on the election under all the circumstances would offer a possible temptation to the average judge to lead the judge not to hold the balance “nice, clear, and true.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009).

757.19 Annotation Under the due process clause, there is an impermissible risk of actual bias when a judge earlier had significant, personal involvement as a prosecutor in a critical decision regarding the defendant’s case. Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 195 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2016).

757.19 Annotation Step One to Recusal Reform: Find an Alternative to the Rule of Necessity. Croy. 2019 WLR 623.

757.22 757.22 Judge not to act as attorney, etc.; attorneys not to have office with judge.

757.22(1) (1) No judge, while holding office, may be in any manner engaged or act as attorney or counsel; and no judge or his or her clerk or any person employed by the judge in or about his or her office, court commissioner or other judicial officer shall be allowed to give advice to parties litigant in any matter or action pending before the judge or officer, or which the judge has reason to believe will be brought before him or her for decision, or draft or prepare any papers, including wills, or other proceedings relating to any such matter or action except when expressly authorized by law; and no court commissioner or other judicial officer may be allowed to demand or receive any fees or compensation for services as such commissioner or judicial officer, except those expressly authorized by law, upon penalty, for any violation hereof, of removal from office.

757.22(2) (2) No practicing attorney may hold office in the office of the clerk of any court in which he or she practices nor may he or she hold office in the same room with a judge.

757.22(3) (3) No practicing attorney may have his or her office in the same room with any district attorney, municipal judge or court commissioner, unless he or she is a partner of the district attorney, municipal judge or court commissioner, in which case he or she shall not practice as an attorney before the municipal judge or court commissioner nor act as attorney in any case in which it is the duty of the district attorney to appear or prosecute for the state; except that the law partner of any district attorney may, at the request of the district attorney, without fee or compensation therefor, assist the district attorney in the prosecution of any case on the part of the state.

757.22(4) (4) No law partner of any district attorney may act as a municipal judge or court commissioner in any case in which the state may be a party or defend in any court any person charged with any offense, or appear in any civil action against the state in which it is the duty of the district attorney to prosecute or appear for the state.

757.22(5) (5) Any attorney who violates sub. (2), (3) or (4), and any municipal judge or court commissioner who violates or knowingly permits any such violation, may be fined not to exceed $100 for each such offense.

757.22 History History: 1977 c. 187 s. 96; 1977 c. 305 ss. 52, 64; Stats. 1977 s. 757.22.

757.22 Annotation Under sub. (1), a judge may not draft or prepare legal papers even on a gratuitous basis. In re Van Susteren, 82 Wis. 2d 307, 262 N.W.2d 133 (1978).

757.22 Annotation A probate registrar is an official of the court. An attorney who serves as probate registrar is prohibited from practicing law in the court. 63 Atty. Gen. 55.

757.23 757.23 Court commissioner, when disqualified. A municipal, circuit, or supplemental court commissioner, or any judge acting as a court commissioner, shall not act or take part in the decision of, or make any order in any matter or proceeding in which he or she is a party, or in which his or her rights would be in any manner affected by his or her decision or order thereon, or in which he or she is interested, or in which his or her law partner, or any person connected with him or her as employer, employee or clerk, or in the law business in any manner, shall be interested or appear as a party, agent, attorney or counsel. Any municipal, circuit, or supplemental court commissioner or judge, acting as a court commissioner, violating this section shall forfeit $25 for each violation, and shall also be subject to removal from office.

757.23 History History: 1977 c. 187 s. 96; Stats. 1977 s. 757.23; 1997 a. 27; 2001 a. 61.

757.24 757.24 Liability of judicial officers. Circuit judges and circuit and supplemental court commissioners shall be held personally liable to any party injured for any willful violation of the law in granting injunctions and appointing receivers, or for refusing to hear motions to dissolve injunctions and to discharge receivers if the motions are made in accordance with law or such rules as are promulgated by the supreme court.

757.24 History History: 1977 c. 187 s. 96; 1977 c. 449; Stats. 1977 s. 757.24; 2001 a. 61.

757.25 757.25 Money in court, how deposited. The judge of any court of record on the application of a party to any action or proceeding therein who has paid $1,000 or more into court in the action or proceeding may order the money to be deposited in a safe depository until the further order of the court or judge thereof. After the money has been so deposited it shall be withdrawn only upon a check signed by the clerk of the court pursuant to whose order the deposit was made and upon an order made by the court or the judge thereof. The fee for the clerk’s services for depositing and disbursing the money is prescribed in s. 814.61 (12) (a).

757.25 History History: 1977 c. 187 s. 96; Stats. 1977 s. 757.25; 1981 c. 317.

757.25 Annotation This section has two prerequisites for a fee under s. 814.61 (12) (a): 1) a party to the action has paid at least $1000 into court; and 2) the same party has obtained from the judge an order directing the clerk of court to deposit the money in a safe depository. HSBC Realty Credit Corp. v. City of Glendale, 2007 WI 94, 303 Wis. 2d 1, 734 N.W.2d 874, 05-1042.